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Abstract 
Previous researchers have empirically investigated the existence or otherwise of credit 
rationing of small businesses in both developed and developing economies. Particularly lacking 
are the study on the evidence o f credit rationing on the individual entrepreneurs as founders 
and/or owner-managers o f these small businesses. To f i l l this gap, this study examines two sets 
of data from the entrepreneurs o f small businesses and the credit managers o f commercial banks 
in Ghana. 
This study aimed at investigating the extent to which the entrepreneurs of small 
businesses were able to access bank credit they required for working capital and long-term 
investment projects. The performance and success of the entrepreneur is largely dependent on the 
entrepreneur's level of human and social capital. Entrepreneurs with a higher level of education, 
prior work experience and social networking are considered to possess a higher competitive 
advantage over inexperience entrepreneurs in terms of information search, opportunity 
identification, exploitation and pursuance of resources including finance. This thesis contributes 
significantly to the development of this accession. 
The overall results lend support to the argument that the habitual entrepreneur is more 
likely to have access to external finance at the start of a new venture compared to the novice 
entrepreneur. Secondly, the habitual (experienced) entrepreneurs for reasons of higher levels of 
human and social capital are less likely to be credit rationed compared to the novice 
(inexperienced) entrepreneurs. Thirdly, experienced entrepreneurs located further away from 
their banks are less likely to be credit rationed compared to novice entrepreneur. This study has 
several implications for commercial bank managers (practitioners) and policy makers in Ghana 
in particular and in general for all developing countries. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and overview 
1.1 Introduction 
Previous research has empirically investigated the existence or otherwise of 
credit rationing o f small businesses in both developed and developing economies 
(Aryeetey et al., 1994; Baydas et al., 1994; Levenson and Wil l iad , 2000; Okurut et al., 
2005; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2005; Tagoe et al., 2005; De Meza and Webb, 2006; 
Craig et al., 2007; Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). Particularly lacking are studies on 
the evidence o f credit rationing on individual entrepreneurs as founders and/or owner-
managers o f these small businesses. To fill this gap, this study examines two sets o f 
data from entrepreneurs o f small businesses and credit managers o f commercial banks 
in Ghana. The study has several implications for commercial bank managers and 
policy makers in Ghana in particular and in general for all developing countries. 
The aim of the study was to investigate the extent to which entrepreneurs o f 
small businesses wi th 4-50 employees in Ghana over the three year period January 
2004 - December 2006, were able to access bank credit they required for working 
capital and long-term investment projects. With the launch o f the 'Golden Age of 
Business' by the Government o f Ghana in 2001, most policies o f the Government 
have been geared towards the development o f small businesses with employees o f 
between 4 and 50 (Sowa, 2003). It is therefore appropriate to l imit the study to small 
businesses with this employment level where much attention is being focused. 
There is not a universal standard for the definition o f small businesses; they 
are often content specific and they vary from country to country (OECD, 2002; 
Ayyagari et al., 2003). As a result o f the diverse set o f definitions on small businesses, 
it is important for studies to adopt a unique definition o f small businesses based on the 
specific purpose and for the specific usage o f the study rather than on a universal or 
national standard (Harper, 1984; Levitsky, 1989). The next section therefore provides 
the definition o f small business to be used in this study. 
1.2 Definition of small businesses 
The definition o f micro, small and medium-size enterprises (small businesses) 
varies within countries and within different markets (Auciello et al., 1975) and 
depending on the purpose for which the definition is being carried out (Liedholm and 
Mead, 1987) and also the level o f national development in the country (UNIDO, 
2006). Defining what a small business is has always been a di f f icul t issue amongst 
scholars and policy makers, often generating unresolved debates. The challenges 
include the terminology, the form and the scope to adopt and use. 
In Ghana, the most used criterion in defining small businesses in surveys is the 
quantitative characteristics (Statistical definitions) using mainly the number o f 
employees (Steel and Webster, 1992; Sowa et al., 1992; Okoh and Ping, 2000; 
Aryeetey, 2001; Quartey, 2001; Amonoo et al., 2003; Wolf , 2004; Mensah, 2005). 
This study therefore adopts the definition o f a small business as an enterprise 
employing not less than 4 employees and not more than 50 employees. Enterprises 
with less than 4 employees are excluded because they are more likely to be oriented 
towards income for survival or subsistence and are best seen in the informal sector 
(Steel and Webster, 1992). Similarly, enterprises with over 50 employees are 
excluded because they are regarded as large enterprises (Boon, 1989; NBSSI, 1997) 
and are not likely to encounter credit constraints with the banks (Parker, 2002). 
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A number of scholars and policy makers have described small businesses in 
varying ways as being the backbone of the economy (Green, 2003; 
Wattanapruttipaisan, 2003), as an engine for growth in both developed and developing 
countries (Boocock and Shariff, 2005), as the principal driving force for economic 
development (Szabro, 1996) and the lifeblood of most economies (Luetkenhorst, 
2004). Based on these descriptions the next section reviews the contributions of small 
businesses to national development. 
1.3 The contributions of small businesses to national development 
The contributions of small businesses to the growth and development of the 
economies of developing countries have been widely recognised (Kayanula and 
Quartey, 2000). Small businesses have over the years contributed substantially to 
economic growth, the creation of employment opportunities, the advancement of 
innovation, social cohesion, poverty reduction, the generation of export revenue 
(Mensah, 1996; Harvie and Lee, 2001; Lerner 2002) and local, national and regional 
development (Smallbone and Welter, 2001). Small businesses are considered a major 
contributor to national output in Ghana. They provide employment (Steel and 
Webster, 1991) and income to a large portion of the urban labour force (Aryeetey, 
2001). Cook and Nixson (2000) emphasised the importance of small businesses in 
socio-economic development and in particular their major role in poverty alleviation 
in Africa. 
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• Employment generation 
In both developed and developing economies, small businesses tend to use more 
labour-intensive production processes and thus generate more employment compared 
to large enterprises (Santos, 2003). In most developing countries it is estimated that 
small business are a potential source of employment and generate employment of 
between 50-60% of the total labour force (Kennedy and Hobohm, 1999; Chen, 2001; 
Luetkenhorst, 2004). In a survey conducted in some African nations including; 
Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and South Africa, 
Liedholm (2002) observed that small businesses employs between 17% and 27% of 
the working age group. Small businesses in most developing countries are said to 
generate employment mainly for novice and nascent entrepreneurs, as well as the 
unskilled labour force (Albaladejo, 2002; Biggs, 2003) and in terms of sector, small 
businesses generate more employment within the service and agriculture sectors 
compared to that of the manufacturing sector (Liedholm and Mead, 1999). 
In spite of the pivotal role played by the small businesses in employment 
generation, a number of questions have been asked about their effectiveness and 
efficiency in employment creation. Little (1988) argued that the size of employment 
and level of productivity is not commensurate. Besides, the employment generated by 
the small businesses are seasonal or temporary, and also the level of remuneration, job 
satisfaction, working conditions and productivity are low compared to those of the 
large enterprises (Rosenzweig, 1988). 
• Contribution to national output 
Small businesses are considered major contributors to national output in Ghana, 
providing employment and income to a large portion of the urban labour force 
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(Aryeetey, 2001). The contributions of small businesses to job creation have been 
well noted, accounting for about 85% of manufacturing employment in Ghana 
(Okoh and Ping, 2000). Small businesses also contribute over 70% of Ghana's 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Steel and Webster, 1991). Cook and Nixson (2000) 
emphasised the importance of small businesses in socio-economic development and 
in particular their major role in poverty alleviation in Africa. 
• Equitable distribution of income and opportunities 
Small businesses in a region or local community provide employment for the 
labour force in a region. The generation of employment provides the labour force and 
their dependents with an opportunity to enjoy goods and services and also earn an 
income (Albaladejo, 2002). The inter-related small business activities which are 
widely dispersed reaches the remote areas of the region; thus providing a 
redistribution of income and livelihood opportunities for the region and thereby 
reducing the income gap (Manuh and Brown, 1987; Luetkenhorst, 2004). 
• Promotion of entrepreneurial skills 
The promotion of entrepreneurial skills through the education and training of 
employees within the small business sector provide a platform for the development of 
new methods instead of using standard procedures (Born and Altink, 1996). These 
entrepreneurial skills also brings along entrepreneur's initiative, risk taking and 
opportunity recognition (Kourilsky, 1995). The creation of new jobs means the 
provision of new opportunities for entrepreneurs to employ new hands, offer more 
training and thereby lead to an increase in entrepreneurial skills (Albaladejo, 2002). 
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• Mobilisation of resources 
Most small businesses in developing countries adopt labour intensive methods 
of production and are therefore more flexible in their choice of production methods. 
Also, by using simple technology and local raw materials, small businesses are able to 
mobilise the required resources to support themselves within a cluster (Sandee and 
Rietveld, 2000). Entrepreneurs within a cluster are able to share or use machinery, 
tools and equipment belonging to other businesses (Sverrisson, 1994), share technical 
skills and knowledge (Meyer-Stamer, 2000) and produce components, goods and 
services to meet each others needs (Sverrisson, 1997). 
Small businesses are also able to produce goods and services primarily for the 
domestic market (Szabro, 1996). Besides, small businesses also serve as either a 
source of raw materials utilisation or as a raw materials producer and thus they play a 
pivotal link between small and large enterprises (Luetkenhorst, 2004). 
• Innovation and technology transfer 
Innovation involves the introduction of a new product, a qualitative change in 
existing product, the opening of a new market, the development of a new supply 
source and a change in productive and technological processes (OECD, 1997; Boer 
and During, 2001; Goswami and Mathew, 2005). An entrepreneur's ability to 
innovate depends on the available skills and knowledge required to effectively absorb, 
master and improve existing technologies and create new ones (Lall, 1992). 
Entrepreneurs of small businesses are well noted for their innovative ideas as they 
may be faster at recognising opportunities, are more flexible in adjusting to changes in 
production process (Rogers, 2004) and are more reliable in the creation, adaptation 
and fusion of new ideas (Mitra, 2000). 
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Technology can be defined as 'a systematic body of knowledge about how 
nature and artificial things function and interact' (Itami and Numagami, 1992 pp. 
119). Technological knowledge is tacit in nature and requires learning before it can be 
transferred, imitated or mastered (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1988; Reed and De Fillippi, 1990). Entrepreneurs requiring the transfer of 
technological knowledge are expected to build up their skills, put in much effort and 
invest considerable resources to acquire it (Nonaka, 1994). Entrepreneurs lacking the 
resources and skills needed for this transfer will have their businesses deficient in 
technological transfer (Hitt et al., 2000). Again, entrepreneurs of small businesses are 
more likely to adopt technological skills from their counterparts at a much easier and 
less expensive way (Rogers, 2004). 
In spite of the numerous contributions of small businesses to the growth and 
development of both developed and developing nations, small businesses in many 
countries face a myriad of challenges (Sowa et al., 1992; Levy, 1993; Aryeetey et al., 
1994; Kayanula and Quartey, 2000; Hall, 2002). The next section briefly presents the 
problem statement to be examined in this study. 
1.4 Statement of the problem 
The availability of credit is a major factor for the promotion of rapid economic 
growth in many nations (Ikhide, 2003; Omonona, et al., 2008) and this has important 
economic implications (Crook, 1996) for policy makers and practitioners (Berger and 
Udell, 1992; Pruteanu, 2004). The existence of financial constraints and credit 
rationing in the entrepreneurship and finance literature has long been recognised 
(Fazzari et al., 1988; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Johansson, 2000). Entrepreneurs 
have encountered many difficulties in accessing finance from lending institutions in 
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support of their working capital and fixed capital investments (Meyer 1989; 
Cruickshank, 2000). The activities of entrepreneurs are hindered by limited access to 
external finance (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). Entrepreneurs with opportunities to 
invest into profitable ventures do face a number of challenges in accessing bank credit 
because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Green, 2003). 
Generally small business entrepreneurs encounter many constraints to their 
growth and development. These include: input and labour constraints (Steel and 
Webster, 1992; Levy, 1993; Aryeetey et al., 1994; Parker et al., 1995); legal 
constraints (Pinheiro and Cabral, 1999; Kumar et al., 1999; Collier and Gunning, 
1999); regulatory constraints (Johnson et al., 1998; Hoshi et al., 2003; Ting, 2004; 
UPS, 2005); administrative constraints (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000; Ayyagari et al., 
2003); managerial constraints (Trulsson, 1999; Rauch and Frese, 2000; Davidsson and 
Honig; Santos, 2003; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005); technological constraints 
(Anderson, 1985; Neck and Nelson, 1987; Stewart, 1987); macroeconomic constraints 
(Smallbone and Welter, 2001; Mcmillan and Woodruff, 2002; Monge-Naranjo and 
Hall, 2003); globalisation, liberalisation, technological changes and competition 
(Sarder, 2001; Moy and Luk, 2003). 
In addition to the constraints mentioned above many studies have also cited 
financing as the main obstacle to the growth in small businesses (Sowa et al., 1992; 
Parker et al., 1995; Wolf, 2004; Tagoe et al., 2005). In their study on the barriers to 
growth in Ghana among small business entrepreneurs, Robson and Obeng (2008) 
observed that a high rate of inflation; a high interest rates and the high depreciation of 
the Ghanaian cedis are the main obstacles to growth. Wolf (2004) examined 100 small 
businesses in Ghana and noted that interest rates, access to credit, depreciation and 
inflation were the main obstacles to their growth. 
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Access to external finance can be limited by the presence of informational 
problems (Guiso, 1998). The asymmetric flow of information between the 
entrepreneur and the bank leads to market failure in the provision of finance to small 
business entrepreneurs (Levitsky and Prasad, 1987). This market failure creates an 
excess demand for bank credit over supply resulting in an imperfect market situation. 
The banks for reasons of optimal interest rate and profitability will ration credit to its 
borrowers rather than increase interest rates to resolve the increase in bank credit, 
hence leading to credit rationing among some business (Blinder and Stiglitz, 1983; 
Wette 1983; Gale and Hellwig, 1984, Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2005). As a result of 
these information asymmetry problems between banks and entrepreneurs, banks are 
reluctant to offer credit to these small businesses (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) as they 
regard them as high risk ventures (Nissanke, 2001; Tagoe et al., 2005). Credit 
rationing therefore occurs i f in equilibrium the demand for bank credit exceeds the 
supply at the ruling interest rate (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2005). 
Banks are unable to clear the credit market of excess demand by raising their 
interest rates beyond their optimal point because when they do, credit risk will 
increase because of the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Banks will 
therefore prefer to reduce the credit volume, ration credit or increase collateral 
requirements to clear the increased demand (Berger and Udell, 1990; Coco, 2000; 
Elsas and Krahnen, 2000; Manove et al., 2001; and Inderst and Muller, 2007). Again 
due to these imperfect information flows, banks very often restrict the provision of 
credit to specific projects as well as the business size, entrepreneurial experience, 
business track record, provision of collateral and geographical location of applicants 
(Schiffer and Weder, 2001; Lieholm, 2002; Atieno, 2001; van Eeden et al., 2003; 
Ogujiuba et al., 2004; and Okurut et al., 2004). Information is a vital tool in any 
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relationship. The presence of asymmetric information has two main effects on the 
bank-entrepreneur relationship, and they are adverse selection and the moral hazard 
effects (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
The literature has also demonstrated the importance of distance to the 
availability and pricing of bank loans (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Wolken and Rohde, 
2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; and Carling and 
Lundberg, 2005). There is also the centralization of business lending decisions which 
is now reducing the discretionary roles of branch managers (Bannock and Doran, 
1991; Binks et al., 1992). Asymmetric information with its effects of adverse selection 
and moral hazard affect small businesses access to bank credit. The problem of 
asymmetric information and the resulting adverse selection and moral hazard are 
further complicated by the increasing banking competition leading to greater 
concentration (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). 
To resolve the asymmetric information problems, banks may resort to the use 
of a non-price rationing mechanism (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Binks and Ennew, 
1996; Bester 1987; Bester and Hellwing, 1989). One example of this mechanism is 
the request by banks for entrepreneurs to support their credit applications with a 
collateral security (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1986; Clemenz, 1986; and Chan and Thakor, 
1987). Another technique in resolving this asymmetric information problem is the 
application of a credible bank-entrepreneur relationship (Boot, 2000; Berger and 
Udell, 2002; Cardone et al., 2004). Banks use both the interest rate and the collateral 
to clear the market of the excess demand and to reduce credit risks. However, not all 
entrepreneurs or their businesses have the requisite collateral and are therefore credit 
rationed. This creates a financial gap in the debt market (Storey, 1994). 
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1.5 Gaps in the knowledge base 
Despite the large body of theoretical literature concerning credit rationing, 
there is little evidence to show about the economic significance of credit rationing in 
the economies of developing countries (Bigsten et al., 2000; Atieno, 2001; Azam et 
al., 2001). Empirical tests on the theories of equilibrium credit rationing in developing 
countries are scant. This is mainly due to the paucity of micro data on the contractual 
terms of individual commercial bank loans. Most empirical tests have used macro data 
sets rather than micro data in their investigation of the existence and significance of 
credit rationing, and this has lead to inconsistent results (Berger and Udell, 1992). 
Besides, the main empirical tests conducted within the last decade have 
focused mainly on the United States and Europe. Notably among these works are: 
Steijvers and Voordeckers (2005) for SME's in Belgium; Lehmann and Neuberger 
(2001) for SME's in Germany; Capra et al. (2002) for SME's in Spain; Carling and 
Lundberg (2005) for businesses in Sweden; Blumberg and Letterie (2008) for 
businesses in Holland, Freel (2007) for businesses in Scotland; Russo and Rossi 
(2001), Trovato and Alfo (2006) and Piga and Atzeni (2007) for businesses in Italy; 
and Berger and Udell (1992), Petersen and Raj an (2002) and Mushinski and Pickering 
(2007) for small businesses in the USA. The studies on Africa are mainly focused on 
the informal sector. Examples include Okurut et al. (2005) for SME's in Uganda and 
Azam et al. (2001) for manufacturing businesses in Cote DTvoire. 
However, this study differs from previous studies on credit rationing, in that 
micro data was applied. This allows the study to analyse the empirical implications of 
the credit rationing results. One other way in which this study differs from other 
studies is that it used data on the entrepreneur's access to bank credit rather than the 
business (Baydas et al., 1994). Parker (2002) has called for more empirical research 
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on the existence of credit rationing, its impact and extent among socio-economic 
groups. 
This study, therefore, attempts to fill the academic gap in the African region 
and empirically investigate the empirical significance of credit rationing of 
entrepreneurs of small businesses in a Ghanaian context. This study also attempts to 
replicate and extend previous research by focusing on the human and social capital 
profile of entrepreneurs and their access to external finance. Also, this study attempts 
to investigate which type of entrepreneur is actually more likely to be credit rationed. 
Based on this background, the next section outlines the objectives of this study. 
1.6 Focus and purpose of this study 
This study explored the presence of credit rationing in Ghana and explain its 
impact on bank credit availability to small business entrepreneurs. Secondly, the key 
unit of this study is to examine how the experienced entrepreneur compared to the 
novice and start-up entrepreneur utilises general and specific human capital and social 
capital to access external finance in the presence of credit rationing situations. 
Specifically, this study with respect to extending previous studies, aims at exploring 
entrepreneurs prior ownership experience, education, location, reputation and trust 
and how these factors influences an entrepreneur's access to external finance at the 
start and growth stages of their businesses. 
A number of studies have examined the resources of the entrepreneur and how 
these resources influence the entrepreneurial access to external resources (Westhead 
and Wright, 2000, Ucbasaran et al., 2001). The performance and successes of 
entrepreneurs are largely dependent on their level of education, training, prior work 
experience and the social ties, social bonds and social networking skills they possess 
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(Wright et al., 1997a). Entrepreneurs with higher levels of education, productivity 
skills and work experiences are considered to possess a higher competitive advantage 
over inexperienced entrepreneurs in terms of information search, opportunity 
identification, exploitation and pursuit (Bruderl et al., 1992; Davidsson and Honig, 
2003; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). The presence of social ties and bonds between two 
parties facilitates information flow and generates trustworthy behaviours (Aldrich and 
Zimmer, 1986; Gulati and Garguilo, 1999; Adler and Kwon, 2002). Together, all 
these factors provide the experienced entrepreneur with a much easier access to bank 
credit compared with the inexperienced entrepreneur (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Hsu, 
2003). 
The study aimed to explore and collect adequate data to address the research 
questions and also test the research hypotheses outlined in the empirical chapters on 
entrepreneurs' access to bank credit over the three year period January 2004 -
December 2006. The primary data used in this study comes from a survey of small 
businesses located in the 6 districts of the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. The survey 
started with a stratified random sample of 1200 entrepreneurs who have a banking 
relationship with banks in Ghana, between January 2004 and December 2006. A face-
to-face administration of the questionnaires was carried out with a follow-up in-depth 
interview on selected entrepreneurs and senior bank officials. 
Of the 1200 entrepreneurs sampled, 750 entrepreneurs were short listed for the 
survey. During the five month survey, 522 questionnaires were completed. Of this 
number 9 responses were eliminated because the businesses were found to have fallen 
outside the selection criteria. Another 13 responses were eliminated because almost 
all the responses were unsatisfactorily answered. In total, 500 valid questionnaires 
were obtained. From this number, 4 responses were excluded because the 
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respondents' responses were inconsistent. The final valid responses of 496 
questionnaires were achieved and yielded a 66% response rate. This rate is 
considerably higher than similar surveys of entrepreneurs and small and medium-
sized enterprises studies (Storey, 1994; Forbes, 2005). 
From the above, this study keys into the emerging studies on entrepreneurial 
possession of human and social capital and its influence on access to external 
resources and seeks to make both theoretical and empirical contributions. Based on 
these, specifically, the objectives of the study are: 
i . To identify the sources of start-up finance for small business entrepreneurs; 
i i . To establish the presence of credit rationing amongst novice, serial and 
portfolio entrepreneurs; 
i i i . To identify the impact of geographical distance on bank credit availability to 
peripherally located small business entrepreneurs; 
iv. To ascertain the role of trust in bank lending decisions under conditions of 
uncertainties. 
Following from the above objectives the following research questions will be 
examined: 
i . What are some of the challenges entrepreneurs and small businesses 
encounter in accessing external finance? 
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i i . What sources of start-up capital are available to experienced and 
inexperienced entrepreneurs at the start of their new ventures? 
i i i . In accessing bank credit which of the types of entrepreneurs - novice, 
serial and portfolio entrepreneurs is more credit rationed? 
iv. What impact does geographical distance make on bank credit availability 
to experienced and inexperienced entrepreneurs in peripheral locations? 
v. What role does trust play in bank lending decisions under conditions of 
uncertainties? 
1.7 Significance of this study 
In most developing countries bank credit is the main source of finance for 
domestic businesses (Berger and Udell, 2002; Wattanapruttipaisan, 2003). The ever 
increasing number of applications for commercial bank loans and the readiness of 
entrepreneurs to pay interest rates over and above the advertised rates is a strong 
indication of the excess demand for credit by small businesses (Aryeetey et al., 1994). 
There is also evidence that small businesses in both developed and developing 
countries have experienced some difficulties in accessing credit from the banks 
(Levitsky and Prasad, 1989; Berger and Udell, 2002). Bigsten et al., (2000) observed 
that about 90% of small businesses' credit applications are declined because they are 
unable to meet the credit application requirements such as collateral security. 
In spite of the increasing demand for bank credit, commercial banks are unable 
to supply the required credit to small businesses because of higher transaction costs, 
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high default rates, a lack of collateral and the perceived risks associated with small 
businesses lending (Binks and Ennew, 1996; Levistsky, 1997, Vogel and Adams, 
1997; Nissanke, 2001). Additionally, the acquisition of reliable information on small 
businesses is difficult to collate and the high probability of default deters banks from 
lending to small businesses (Aryeetey et al., 1994). Binks et al., (1992) asserted that 
small businesses experiencing difficulty in accessing bank credit may not be due to 
their size but due to the problems associated with information available on the success 
of their investment project. The findings of this study will provide additional guidance 
to entrepreneurs, practitioners and policy makers. 
1.8 Thesis structure 
This thesis is organised into five parts which together consists of ten chapters. 
Part one consists of chapter one which provides the introduction and overview of the 
study. Part two consists of three chapters. Chapter two, the first of the three chapters 
in part two, will provide the theories of entrepreneurship. This is followed by chapter 
three which will provide a review of the literature on the financing of small business 
entrepreneurs. Chapter four, the last chapter in part two wil l also provide a literature 
review on the credit rationing of small businesses. Part three contains chapter five as 
the methodology chapter. Part four consists of four chapters which present the 
empirical results. Part five contains chapter ten as the conclusion. 
Chapter two wil l evaluate the theories of entrepreneurship. Beginning with an 
introduction, the chapter will review the types of entrepreneurs in section two, and 
discuss the entrepreneurial activities in section three. The chapter wil l also examine 
the human capital theory in section four and the social capital theory in section five. 
Section six will conclude the chapter. 
16 
Chapter three will begin with an introduction. This will be followed by an 
examination of the capital structure of businesses in section two and the capital 
structure of small businesses and start-ups in section three. The fourth section will 
examine the determinants of the capital structure of small businesses and section five 
will examine the sources of finance for start-up businesses and set up the relevant 
hypotheses. Section six will discuss the obstacles to bank lending to small businesses 
and will also evaluate the factors affecting the availability and accessibility of credit 
to small business. Section seven will conclude the chapter. 
Chapter four will review the theoretical and empirical evidence of credit 
rationing. The chapter begins with an introduction, and this will be followed by a 
discussion of the concept of credit rationing in section two. Section three will review 
the definition of credit rationing, credit constraints and discouraged borrowers. This 
will be followed in section four by an examination of the equilibrium credit rationing, 
the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) credit rationing model and the criticisms of this model. 
A literature review will be carried out on information and bank lending decisions in 
section five, and relationship and bank lending decisions in section six. Section seven 
will review the literature on collateral and bank lending decisions. Section eight will 
examine small business's access to bank credit and set up the relevant hypotheses. 
Section nine will also review the literature on geographical distance and bank lending 
decisions and set up the relevant hypotheses. Section ten discusses the issues relating 
to uncertainties and trust in bank lending decisions and also set up the relevant 
propositions. The literature on empirical credit rationing will be reviewed in section 
eleven. Section twelve concludes the chapter. 
Chapter five outlines the methodology. The chapter will begin with an 
introduction, followed by the rationale for the study in section two. The third section 
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will outline the time frame for the study and section four will discuss the theoretical 
framework. The operationalisation of the research will be outlined in section five and 
the data collection instruments in section six. Section seven will provide the measures 
on the variables to be used. Section eight will outline the piloting and screening 
process to be used in the survey. Section nine will describe the questionnaire 
administration. Section ten will examine the non-response bias. Section eleven will 
provide the data preparation procedures and analysis. Section twelve will present the 
validity and reliability of the survey and section thirteen will outline the problems 
encountered during the fieldwork and section fourteen concludes the chapter. 
Chapter six will investigate the entrepreneur's use of internal and external 
sources of start-up capital in Ghana. The entrepreneurs' choice of start-up capital, the 
type and amount of finance used is influenced by the entrepreneur's background, level 
of education, prior business ownership experience and social network ties. More 
specifically, the chapter will aim at examining the differences between habitual 
entrepreneurs and novice entrepreneurs, their level of human capital possession and 
how this influences their sources and use of start-up capital. To achieve this objective, 
the survey questionnaire asked entrepreneurs to indicate their sources of start-up 
capital and also indicate the principle source among the sources used. 
Chapter seven will examine empirically small business entrepreneurs' access 
to external finance in Ghana. The chapter will take into consideration the human 
capital resources possessed by the entrepreneur and how the allocation of this capital 
influences their access to bank credit. To achieve the desired results the survey 
questionnaire asked entrepreneurs to indicate whether they applied for bank credit 
within the three year period. The survey questionnaire also asked the entrepreneurs to 
indicate whether they were successful or not in their credit application, whether they 
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had the ful l amount or a reduced amount or were rejected outright. They were also 
asked to indicate their level of education and number of years in business. 
Chapter eight will presents an analysis on the impact of geographical distance 
on small business entrepreneurs' access to bank credit. The chapter will present 
empirical findings on small business entrepreneur's access to bank credit using 
geographical distance variables and location variables. 
Chapter nine will evaluate the lending decisions of banks in Ghana under 
conditions of uncertainty. The chapter specifically will examine the role of trust in 
bank lending decisions under conditions of uncertainty. To achieve this objective, 
indepth interviews of heads of credit or SME departments will be carried out among 
the various banks in Ghana. The chapter will then present the findings on how trust 
characteristics are able to influence bank lending decisions on small business 
entrepreneurs. 
Chapter Ten wil l conclude the thesis. In this chapter a summary of the thesis 
findings will be presented. Discussions and conclusions on the thesis will also be 
drawn. Finally a number of recommendations will be made to support the financing of 
small businesses in Ghana. 
1.9 Conclusion 
The introduction and overview chapter introduces the thesis to the reader. In 
this chapter a general overview of small business contributions, and the challenges 
they encounter in accessing bank credit are briefly discussed. In addition to this, the 
structure of the thesis was provided. Depending on the purpose of a study, many 
countries have different forms for the definition of small businesses (Auciello et al., 
1975). It is well acknowledged that small businesses have made significant 
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contributions to economic development of many nations in terms of employment 
generation, income generation and poverty reduction (Harvie and Lee, 2002, 
Albaladejo, 2002). 
Entrepreneurs of small businesses lack the financing required to move their 
business forward (Levy, 1993; Pissarides, 1999; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). As 
such they rely on external financing such as banks to support their growth drive 
(Aryeetey et al., 1994; Nissanke, 2001). However, small businesses are unable to meet 
the bank requirement of information and collateral (UNCTAD, 2001; Wagenvoort, 
2003; Abereijo and Fayomi, 2005; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). As a result, the 
problems of information asymmetry arises making bank lending to these small 
businesses unprofitable. Banks resolve this information asymmetry problem by 
demanding collateral, which the entrepreneur lacks (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; 
Malhotra et al., 2006; Inderst and Muller, 2007). Hence most of these entrepreneurs 
are credit rationed by the banks (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Zeller, 1994; Das, 2004). 
Small businesses encounter many challenges in accessing bank credit. The 
objective of this study is to identify these challenges and offer relevant 
recommendations to policy makers, management of banks and entrepreneurs of these 
small businesses in Ghana specifically, and developing countries in general. This 
study therefore investigates the sources of start-up capital, explores entrepreneurial 
access to bank credit, evaluates the impact of geographical distance on entrepreneurial 
access to external finance and ascertains the role of trust in bank lending decisions 
under conditions of uncertainty. To achieve these objectives, the study begins with the 
review on the theories of entrepreneurship in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Entrepreneurship Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
Scholars in entrepreneurship have over the last two decades attempted to 
present a modern theory of entrepreneurship. However, these attempts have not 
yielded any meaningful conclusion mainly because of the lack of consensus on what 
must be included in the theory of entrepreneurship (Gartner, 2001; Alvarez, 2005). 
One significant role of the entrepreneur is the identification and exploitation of 
innovative ideas and the transformation of these ideas into economic opportunities. 
Entrepreneurship is about change, creativity, knowledge, innovations and flexibility. 
Entrepreneurs are therefore considered risk-takers who pursue economic opportunities 
that others either fail to recognise or view as problems or threats (UNCTAD, 2004). 
This chapter specifically examines the types of entrepreneurs, their key 
resources and their impact on the entrepreneur's access to finance. In addition, the 
chapter discusses the human capital theory and the social capital theory possessed by 
the entrepreneur and how these resources impacts on the entrepreneurial performance 
and access to resources including finance. This chapter therefore provides the 
theoretical contextualisation for the study and also provides the basis for the 
comparison of the various types of entrepreneurs and their access to bank credit in the 
empirical chapters. 
The functional role of entrepreneurship includes coordination, innovation, 
uncertainty bearing, capital supply, decision making, ownership and resource 
allocation (Barreto, 1989; Jaaskelainen, 2000; Friijs et al., 2002). Of these functional 
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roles of the entrepreneur, innovativeness, opportunity seeking and risk taking, are 
considered the major functions (OECD, 1998; Carree and Thurik, 2002). Wennekers 
and Thurik (1999 pp. 46) summed up the functional role of the entrepreneur in their 
definition of entrepreneurship as "the manifest ability and willingness of individuals, 
on their own, in terms within and outside existing organisations, to perceive and 
create new economic opportunities (new products, new production methods, new 
organisational schemes and new product market combinations) and to introduce their 
ideas in the market, in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles, by making 
decisions on location, form and the use of resources and institutions". 
The origin of entrepreneurship is seen at the individual level, with innovative 
ideas and initiates achieved at the firm level and the general entrepreneurial 
contribution to the economy is seen at the industrial and macro economic level 
(Carree and Thurik, 2002). The economic development of every nation is dependant 
to a large extent on the role played by the entrepreneur in the economy. The 
generation of new ideas, the results of innovation, the implementation of these ideas 
into new products, process or services by the entrepreneur, leads to employment 
generation, income generation, and the growth and development of the nation 
(Schumpeter, 1942; Dejardin, 2000; Jaaskelainen, 2000; Thurik and Wennekers, 
2001). 
The motives and actions of an entrepreneur are generally influenced by both 
internal and external factors. These factors include the macro economic conditions, 
the entrepreneurs' level of education, and the amount of experience (human capital), 
and cultural and social network ties (social capital). Theories of entrepreneurship 
have identified entrepreneurial successes and achievements such as human capital in 
the form of education and experience of the entrepreneur and the social and cultural 
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approaches such as norms, values, rules, kinship relationship and social ties as 
primary determinants of entrepreneurial actions and activities (Butler and Herring, 
1991). 
Policy makers have been confronted with the major task of formulating and 
implementation policies that would create an enabling environment to enhance 
entrepreneurial skills, ideas and initiatives for an effective and efficient utilisation of 
their innovative ideas and resources into social and economic products for economic 
growth (UNCTAD, 2004). In the light of this, three significant domains - access to 
finance, facilitation of entry and exit of businesses and government support schemes 
have been identified (OECD, 2002). 
This chapter examines the various factors influencing the theories of 
entrepreneurship that have attempted to explain the entrepreneur's actions and 
activities. The chapter is organised as follows. Section two discusses the types of 
entrepreneurs and section three discusses entrepreneurial activities. Section four 
reviews the human capital theory of the entrepreneur. Section five examines the social 
capital theory of the entrepreneur, the criticisms of social capital and the role of trust. 
Section six concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Types of entrepreneurs 
In explaining the activities of entrepreneurs and their businesses, a number of 
theories have been developed (Cuevas, 1994; Westhead and Wright, 2000). However, 
there is no clear cut acceptable definition for the entrepreneur. To date there is no 
universally acceptable definition of what is entrepreneurship (Westhead and Wright, 
2000; Wennekers et al., 2002). Some scholars have attempted to define an 
entrepreneur on the basis of who the entrepreneur is or what the entrepreneur does 
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(Gartner, 1990; Kolvereid and Bullvag, 1993; Birley and Westhead, 1993). However, 
various studies have shown that entrepreneurs are not homogeneous entities and are of 
different types: novice, serial and portfolio entrepreneurs (Birley and Westhead, 1993; 
Kolvereid and Bullvag, 1993; Hall, 1995; Westhead and Wright, 1998b). This study 
has therefore adopted the definition of the entrepreneur in these three forms: novice, 
serial and portfolio (Ucbasaran et al., 2001; Westhead et al., 2005a; Westhead et al., 
2005b). 
Novice entrepreneurs are defined as those "individuals with no prior business 
ownership experience but are presently having shares in businesses they have 
inherited, purchased, acquired or founded" (Ucbasaran et al., 2001 pp. 59). Serial 
entrepreneurs are difined as those "individuals who had closed or sold previous 
business in which they had shares and presently have shares in a new business they 
have inherited, purchased, acquired or founded" (Westhead et al., 2005b pp. 394). 
Portfolio entrepreneurs on the other hand are defined as those "individuals with prior 
business ownership experience and shares in several businesses they have inherited, 
purchased, acquired or foundered" (Westhead et al., 2005c pp. 111). Habitual 
entrepreneurs are "those individuals with prior business ownership experience who 
have the capacity to start new businesses and launch new products" (Westhead et al., 
2005b pp. 394). Generally, entrepreneurship theorists have viewed the entrepreneur as 
the key element in any analysis (Davidsson and Wikhund, 2001; Shane, 2000). 
Entrepreneurship is not only the creation of businesses (Birley and Westhead, 1993; 
Reynolds et al., 1994), but also involves the inheritance (Westhead, 1997) and 
purchase of already foundered businesses (Cooper and Dunkelberg, 1986; Birley and 
Westhead, 1990, 1993, Robbie and Wright, 1996). The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1998) has stressed the importance of 
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entrepreneurship in creating competition and also reducing unemployment. Regarding 
economic growth, entrepreneurs are seen as drivers (Casson, 1982; Reynolds et al., 
1994). According to Bygrave and Hofer, (1991) the entrepreneurship process consists 
of imagination and creativity, idea generation, opportunity identification and 
exploitation, assembling and utilisation of resources. 
Over the last two decades, studies have looked at the entrepreneur in various 
dimensions including their personal background, work experience, reasons for 
establishing businesses (Rosa, 1998; Westhead and Wright, 1998a; Ucbasaran et al., 
2003), assets and liabilities (Starr and Bygrave, 1991), cognition of novice, serial and 
portfolio entrepreneur (Westhead et al., 2005a), entrepreneur behaviour and 
contributions (Westhead et al., 2005b). Regarding their search for information 
(Cooper et al., 1995) and their behaviour towards opportunity identification (Shane, 
2000), entrepreneurs are seen as heterogeneous. The differences in their heterogeneity 
are as a result of the varying nature of their human capital such as skills and attributes 
(Becker, 1975, 1993), and cognitive characteristics (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). 
2.3 Entrepreneurial activities 
2.3.1 Entrepreneurial prior business experience 
Prior business ownership experience of entrepreneurs may contribute to both 
assets and liabilities of the business. Business ownership experience, acquired through 
skills in management, technical, financial and marketing may lead to an improvement 
in the growth potential and profit margins of businesses (Starr and Bygrave, 1991; 
Teece et al., 1997). The experienced entrepreneur therefore gains a competitive 
advantage over the inexperienced entrepreneur in building reputation, developing 
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expertise, opportunity identification and exploitation and accessing external finance. 
Additionally, the experienced entrepreneur gains further assets through network 
development, information search and knowledge acquisition to facilitate opportunity 
identification and exploitation (Cooper et al., 1995; Shane, 2000). Habitual 
entrepreneurs who have experienced some challenges in their prior business, such as 
accumulating debts and higher repayment costs are also likely to benefit from prior 
business ownership experience (Starr and Bygrave, 1991). Prior business ownership 
experiences are beneficial to experienced entrepreneur (Ucbasaran et al., 2003). 
Kirzner (1973) has noted that experienced entrepreneurs in possession of prior 
knowledge and relevant information have a better access to business opportunities 
compared to inexperienced entrepreneurs even i f they are not actively searching for 
these opportunities. These experienced entrepreneurs do apply their imagination, 
understanding and knowledge of the business world to identify this business 
opportunities (Witt, 1998). Thus, prior business ownership experiences have the 
advantage of providing the entrepreneur with specific human capital skills making 
them more alert than novice entrepreneurs in business opportunity identification 
(Gaglio and Katz, 2001). This alertness of the habitual entrepreneur which is often 
gained through knowledge and experience is likely to be influenced by the level of 
information processing (Kaish and Gilad, 1991; Ucbasaran et al., 2006). Gaglio 
(1997) has noted that novice entrepreneurs apply a simple basic method in 
information search compared to habitual entrepreneurs who adopt a much complex 
method in search of information. 
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2.3.2 Entrepreneurial information search 
The extent to which an entrepreneur seeks business information and identifies 
business opportunities is determined by the prior business experience of the 
entrepreneurs (Cooper et al., 1995; Fiet et al., 2000; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
Venkataraman (1997) noted that the differences in entrepreneurial opportunity 
recognition may occur as a result of the variation in an entrepreneur's knowledge 
base, information acquisition, cognitive and behavioural differences. Cooper et al., 
(1995) found that novice entrepreneurs do seek more information than habitual 
entrepreneurs. In contrast, Westhead et al. (2004) found that both portfolio and serial 
entrepreneurs in view of their prior business experience have a wider source of 
business information compared to the inexperienced novice entrepreneurs. 
2.3.3 Prior knowledge and opportunity identification (recognition) 
One of the key elements of a successful entrepreneur is the identification of 
opportunities (Soo et al., 2002; Ardiclivili et al., 2003). For entrepreneurs to excel and 
survive rigorous competition, they need to always identify over and above their 
capabilities, new opportunities to meet these challenges (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989; 
MaGrath et al., 1996). Prior knowledge can be described as an entrepreneur's 
distinctive information about the business environment which provides the required 
capabilities to recognise business opportunities (Venkataraman, 1997; Shane, 2000). 
Prior knowledge consists of the entrepreneurs work experience (Cooper et al., 1994; 
Evans and Leighton, 1989), education (Gimeno et al., 1997; Ucbasaran et al., 2003a), 
and other capabilities (Shane, 2000). Entrepreneurs with prior experience on business 
operations concern themselves with the essential information regarding the potential 
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opportunity to achieve a more efficient business opportunity (Shepherd and DeTienne, 
2005). 
Gaglio and Katz (2001 pp. 95) have asserted that "understanding the 
opportunity identification process represents one of the core intellectual questions for 
the domain of entrepreneurship". Recently, much concern have been shown by 
researchers on 'why', 'when' and 'how' some entrepreneurs have been able to 
identify opportunities while others have failed (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). A 
number of factors have been recognised as an important element in an entrepreneur's 
opportunity identification. These include the entrepreneur's alertness (Kirzner, 1973; 
Kaish and Gilad, 1991; Busenitz, 1996; Gaglio and Katz, 2001), entrepreneur's prior 
knowledge (Hayek, 1945; Venkataraman, 1997; Shane, 2000), entrepreneur's 
cognitive abilities (Baron, 1998; Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001, Baron and Ensley, 
2003), entrepreneur's network abilities (Birley, 1985; Low and MacMillan, 1988; 
Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999; Singh et al., 1999), entrepreneur's learning abilities 
(Corbett, 2002; Dimov, 2003) and entrepreneur's creativity (Long and McMullen, 
1984; Amabile, 1988). The level of prior knowledge the entrepreneur possesses is a 
determining factor in the number of opportunities identified (Shepherd and DeTienne, 
2005). 
2.3.4 Entrepreneurial networking, opportunity pursuit, and exploitation 
One of the prior ownership experiences gained by the habitual entrepreneur 
over the novice entrepreneur is the ability to network. With this, the entrepreneur is 
able to link or connect with varied financial providers such as (banks, non-banks, 
venture capitalists and public sector grants), consultants and other businesses to 
identify an opportunity, pursue it and exploit it to their advantage (Zhang, 2007). 
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Networking skills gives the entrepreneur a large database of information about 
opportunities, access to vital resources including finance and human resources, and 
the ability to manage challenges (Sapienza et al., 1996; Hills et al., 1997; Floyd and 
Wooldridge, 1999). 
Through the entrepreneurial process of cognition, discovery, understanding 
market opportunities and coordinating knowledge, inputs are turned into 
heterogeneous output (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). Westhead and Wright (1998a) 
have argued that an aspect of heterogeneity of entrepreneurship is the distinction 
between novice entrepreneurs and habitual entrepreneurs. This distinction raises the 
issue about the habitual entrepreneur's possession of cognitive abilities which will 
enable them to identify and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities to create competitive 
advantage. Researchers have argued whether entrepreneurs learn from their past 
experiences and whether these experiences provide the habitual entrepreneur with a 
better opportunity compared to the novice entrepreneur (Barney et al., 2001). 
The level of education, work experience and capabilities of an entrepreneur 
has much influence on the entrepreneur's desires and abilities in pursuing business 
opportunities (Ucbasaran et al., 2006). Further, an entrepreneur's positive perception 
(Palich and Bagby, 1995) and representativeness (Busenitz and Barney, 1997) about a 
business affects the desire to exploit those business opportunities. Carroll and 
Masakowski (1987) have asserted that the habitual entrepreneur's ability to transfer 
information from the previous business to the new opportunity increases the 
entrepreneur's desire to pursue that new opportunity. The habitual entrepreneur's 
advantage over the novice entrepreneur is seen in the acquired knowledge and 
experience which can reduce the cost of exploitation (Shane and Venkataraman, 
2000). Thus, at any given opportunity, habitual entrepreneurs have the ability to 
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identify more business opportunities than novice entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran et al., 
2006). 
From the above discussions on the entrepreneurial activities, performance and 
functions, there are evidences to support the notion that differences exist between 
novice, seial and portfolio entrepreneurs. This chapter further investigates some of the 
factors associated with entrepreneurs which initiate these differentials. Having 
examined the various types of entrepreneurs and their activities, it is essential that the 
study also assesses in the next two sections the relevance of human capital theory and 
social capital theory and their influence to both the entrepreneur and the small 
business. The next section therefore examines the influence of higher human capital 
possession and its impact on entrepreneurial performance. 
2.4 Human capital theory 
Human capital theory has asserted that the more an individual invests in 
knowledge and skills development, the more earning potential the individual 
possesses (Keane and Wolpin, 2001; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2002). Human 
capital can be described as the knowledge, talents and productive skills of individuals. 
It is the stock of knowledge, skills and abilities which potentially is able to assist in 
the increase of productivity and performance. It can be measured in terms of the 
value of goods and services produced. Where the values of these goods and services 
rise or fall, the value of human capital will also rise and fall respectively (Thurow, 
1970). Human capital embraces the knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes 
embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic 
well-being (OECD, 2001). 
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A critical resource in small businesses is the attributes of human capital 
(education, experience, reputation and skills) possessed by the entrepreneur (Pfeffer, 
1994) acting as a resource to the small business. The human capital resource makes 
entrepreneurs more efficient in their tasks (Brtiderl et al., 1992) which in turn 
contributes significantly to the business's performance (Rauch and Frese, 2000). The 
human resource and capabilities an entrepreneur possesses in a business venture is the 
human capital of that business (Wright et al., 2001). Human capital therefore consists 
of the education, experiences, reputation and skills of the entrepreneur and or 
employees required in the business to achieve a set goal at a given opportunity and 
time (Boxall and Steeneveld, 1999; Rauch et al., 2005). 
The social, physical, financial, and organisational resource of a business is 
dependent on the nature and level of the entrepreneur's human capital (Ucbasaran et 
al., 2003a). The key resource of a small business is the human capital of the 
entrepreneur (Westhead, 1995; Brown and Kirchhoff, 1997) and this has an influence 
on the entrepreneur's ability to undertake opportunities (Becker, 1975). In addition to 
the human capital possessed by the entrepreneur is the business ownership experience. 
Scholars have argued that two aspects of business ownership experience exist; firstly, 
the static aspect referring to the entrepreneurs' experience with assets and liabilities 
(Starr and Bygrave, 1991), and secondly, the dynamic aspect referring to the various 
learning techniques and cognitive behaviours the entrepreneur exhibits from a 
previous business ownership experience (Ucbasaran et al., 2003). Entrepreneurs can 
be founders of new businesses, owners of purchased or inherited businesses (Cooper 
and Dunkelberg, 1986; Ucbasaran et al., 2001). 
The human capital theory asserts that individuals through the knowledge they 
possess are able to increase their cognitive abilities which allows them to be more 
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effective and efficient in their productive activities (Schultz, 1959; Becker, 1964; 
Mincer, 1974). This assertion presupposes that those individuals with higher 
education, more work experience and skills are likely to have superior abilities, 
achieve higher performance and become more successful in their economic ventures 
than those with a lower or less human capital (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Dimov 
and Shepherd, 2005). 
2.4.1 General and specific human capital 
Knowledge is said to be either tacit or explicit (Polanyi, 1967). Tacit being the 
know-how and the explicit the know-what are both utilised by an entrepreneur in 
problem solving and decision making. Knowledge acquisition or its increase can be 
achieved through formal and informal education such as obtaining a university degree 
or gaining work experience (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Davidsson, 1995; Gimeno et 
al., 1997; Reynolds, 1997). Prior studies have made a distinction between different 
types of human capital categorising it into general and specific (Florin and Schultlze, 
2000). 
General human capital is acquired knowledge and skills applicable to a broad 
range of activities. General human capital is acquired from one's formal level of 
education and general experience (Pennings et al., 1998). Specific human capital on 
the other hand is acquired skills or knowledge that is useful for particular context or 
single employer or industry. Among start-up and small businesses the specific human 
capital required for the operation and activities of the business resides in the skills and 
capabilities of the entrepreneur (Gartner et al., 1999). This implies that the success 
and growth of the small business is largely dependent on the entrepreneur (Cooper et 
al., 1994; Welbourne and Andrews, 1996). 
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2.4.2 General human capital and entrepreneurial performance 
General human capital has traditionally been measured in terms of an 
individual's gender, age, education and parental background (Becker, 1975; Cooper et 
al., 1994). Scholars have argued that there is a relationship between human capital and 
superior performance in an organisation. They assert that competencies that achieve 
competitive advantage must be valuable, rare, inimitable, unique, non-transferable and 
non-substitutable (Barney, 1991; Lepak and Snell, 1999; Neal and Hesketh, 2002). 
These qualities can be achieved through knowledge which is evenly distributed 
among businesses and can be acquired within an organisation through cooperation, 
participation and development (Spender, 1996; Boxall and Steeneveld, 1999). The 
ability of entrepreneurs in identifying, integrating and accumulating new knowledge, 
as well as exploring new ventures is dependent on the level of human capital acquired 
through education and work experience (Starr and Bygrave, 1991; Weick, 1996). 
Entrepreneurs during their career acquire adequate information and contacts 
relating to business opportunities and develop networks to their advantage (Starr and 
Bygrave, 1991; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2003). This acquired information 
therefore guides them in their decision making and access to finance and labour 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2003). In contrast, entrepreneurs with little or no 
business experience are deficient in decision making and are very often prone to 
making major mistakes. Gaglio (1997) has pointed out that the generation of business 
ideas may be facilitated or thwarted by the entrepreneur's expectation and 
interpretation of market stimuli. In identifying these business opportunities, 
entrepreneurs required some unique level of insight, aptitudes and skills 
(Venkataraman, 1997) and this gives them a greater advantage over other 
entrepreneurs who lack this qualities (MacMillan, 1986). 
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2.4.2.1 Education and entrepreneurial performance 
In studying education under human capital theory, scholars have identified and 
categorised several types and means of education. Formal education is argued to 
consist of primary, secondary and tertiary (higher) levels (Cohn and Geske, 1990), 
informal education which could be acquired either at home or at the work place 
(Schultz, 1961), by means of apprenticeship or on the job training (Mincer, 1974) and 
also through vocational or technical education (Corazzmi, 1967). 
Studies on the impact of education on entrepreneurial activities have been 
inconclusive. Some studies have found that well educated individuals are more likely 
to become successful entrepreneurs (Fairlie and Meyer, 1996) and also education has 
a positive association for both male and female entrepreneurs (Robinson and Sexton, 
1994; Carr, 1996). Kilkenny et al. (1999) suggested that the success of a business is 
positively related to the entrepreneur's level of education, training, and business 
experience. 
In contrast, Butler and Herring (1991) found that education was negatively 
related to self-employment. Greene (2000) also found that education had either no 
effect or a negative effect on entrepreneurship. In spite of these findings some 
scholars have found education to impact positively on entrepreneurial activities. 
Formal education is said to provide the entrepreneur access to social networks and an 
easier access to resources, increased opportunity recognition and entrepreneurial 
success (Anderson and Miller, 2003; Davidsson and Honing, 2003). 
2.4.2.2 Gender and entrepreneurial performance 
Female entrepreneurs have generally been associated with lower levels of 
human capital regarding education and training indicators (Becker, 1993). Female 
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entrepreneurs generally have fewer opportunities to develop relevant experience, have 
fewer contacts and have greater difficulty in assembling resources. Brush (1992) has 
also asserted that women entrepreneurs are less likely than male entrepreneurs to 
solely pursue economic goals. Due to the disadvantages they face, as well as the 
industrial sectors they select, some females entrepreneurs are unable to access finance 
(Verheul and Thurik, 2001; Cavaulluzzo et al., 2002; Fletschner, 2006; Muravyev et 
al., 2007). 
2.4.3 Specific human capital and entrepreneurial performance 
2.4.3.1 Work experience and entrepreneurial performance 
The background and business ownership experience of the entrepreneur, the 
level of education, age, sex, track record and reputation, size and sector of the 
business are significant determining factors in the type and amount of finance used by 
the entrepreneur (Becker, 1993; Westhead et al., 2003b; Westhead et al., 2005b). 
Financial institutions do perceive entrepreneurs with proven track records as being 
more credible than those having failed in their initial venture or start-ups. 
Entrepreneurs who possess substantial business ownership experience and successful 
track records are expected to have made adequate personal savings, and with greater 
reputations, have better access to external sources of funds than the inexperienced 
entrepreneurs (Wright et al., 1997a). Additionally, experienced entrepreneurs rely on 
their networking abilities and availability of collateral in accessing funds from 
external sources including co-investors. 
On the other hand, entrepreneurs who lack proven track records, business 
reputation and collateral are expected to rely more on internal sources of finance such 
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as having personal savings, gifts and loans from relations and friends to start or 
expand their businesses (Westhead et al., 2003b). Entrepreneurs with higher levels of 
human capital have less binding constraints in starting new ventures. Most small 
business entrepreneurs have difficulties accessing formal credit because they lack the 
proven track record, business information and collateral to support their credit 
application (Acs, 1985; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006; 
Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). 
Wright et al. (1997a) argued that experienced entrepreneurs rely mostly on 
their past business ownership experience, reputation, ability to identify appropriate 
networking, and the adoption of new techniques in running a new business. The 
business ownership experience of entrepreneurs gives them an added advantage in 
terms of information and knowledge about the business world (Carter and Ram, 
2003), social and economic network (Ehrenfeld, 1993; Witt, 2004) and this enables 
them to identify better business opportunities (Ucbasaran et al., 2003). Shane (2000) 
pointed out that the extent and depth of knowledge and experience the entrepreneur 
possesses influences the entrepreneur's ability to identify diverse business 
opportunities. 
2.4.3.2 Innovation and entrepreneurial performance 
The survival and growth of any business is dependent on the ability of 
management to learn, change the production process and to develop or introduce new 
ideas and/or products. The achievement of this innovative process by and large is 
dependent on the business' human capital resources, access to financial resources, 
organisational skill and capabilities, technology and marketing skills. There is also the 
need for the entrepreneur to invest a substantial amount of capital into new plant and 
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equipment, research and development, cooperation and networking, marketing 
research, new production techniques, new and innovative ideas, product and service 
innovation (Baldwin et al., 2002). Studies have shown that the factors that distinguish 
failed enterprises from surviving ones are the attainment of basic skills relating to 
human resources, finance, production, management and marketing by the 
entrepreneurs (Johnson et al., 1998). 
In developing countries, access to finance is cited as a major challenge to 
small businesses. Unlike large businesses, small businesses are described as 
constrained in raising debt and equity finance. For the growth and development of any 
businesses there is the need for the entrepreneur to invest a substantial amount of 
capital into new plant and equipment, research and development, firm cooperation, 
marketing research, new production techniques, new and innovative ideas, and 
product and service innovation (Baldwin et al., 2002). 
Innovation is of central importance in entrepreneurship (Marvel and Lumpkin, 
2007; Zahra and Covin, 1995). Entrepreneurs who invest in creativity and innovation 
can enhance their technological and market opportunities. Innovation output studies 
have found that innovators are more likely to be credit rationed (Freel, 2007). Hewitt-
Dundas (2006) argued that because small busineses often lack the technically 
qualified labour, and have a poor management of business information they face 
several constraints. These constraints are even more pronounced when these small 
businesses are undertaking innovative products or services as a result of their inability 
to raise the requisite finance, spread risks and also manage the high cost of 
production. 
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2.4.3.3 Exporting and entrepreneurial performance 
For the reasons of generating foreign exchange which could be used as 
collateral for borrowing (Tornell and Westermann, 2002), trading on the international 
market signifies efficiency and competitiveness (Ganesh-Kumar et al., 2001), and the 
achievement of economies of scale and an increase in sales and profitability, 
exporting businesses are considered more creditworthy than non-exporting businesses 
in accessing finance (Gelos and Werner, 2002). Export financing is the provision of 
credit facilities to meet the export requirements of exporters (Branch, 1995, Albaum 
et al., 1998). Branch (1995) noted that for any exporter to perform creditably in the 
export market, that exporter wil l in addition to relying on the quality, price and timely 
delivery of product will also consider the availability of credit or access to export 
finance as a major determining factor. 
The work experience of entrepreneurs increases their network opportunities 
into developing customer and supplier relationships, accessing information, finance 
and requisite labour. Similarly, managerial experiences of entrepreneurs are useful for 
the identification, exploitation, coordination and utilisation of resources for the 
establishment of start-up businesses (Aldrich et al., 1998; Boden and Nucci, 2000). 
Most small business entrepreneurs have managed to overcome these 
challenges regarding access to external finance through their interaction with social 
groups including family ties, friendship, financial institutions, other businesses and 
entrepreneurs and government agencies with the view to benefiting from these 
interactions. The next section therefore considers the relevance of social capital to the 
entrepreneur and its impact on performance and access to resources. 
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2.5 Social capital theory 
A number of researchers have questioned why some entrepreneurs have had 
the ability to exploit opportunities and some have failed to do so (Sexton and 
Bowman, 1984; Begley and Boyd, 1987; Cooper and Dunkleberg, 1987). Various 
attempts have therefore been made to explain this phenomenon. Some scholars have 
proposed that the major differences in entrepreneurial abilities are the results of 
psychological variables, personal traits and some demographic factors (Low and 
MacMillan, 1988; Shaver and Scott, 1991). 
An entrepreneur's human capital in the form of education, experience and 
financial capital provides the entrepreneur with greater capabilities to recognise, 
exploit and utilise varying opportunities in their business venture. However, the 
entrepreneur's human capital is inadequate to ensure a successful venture without the 
collaboration and connectivity to other social ties such as family and friends, 
community-based or organisational relationships (Bourdieu, 1983; Loury, 1987; 
Coleman, 1988, 1990). This social relationship is broadly referred to as social capital. 
Different Scholars have attempted to define social capital since Loury (1977) and 
Coleman (1988) introduced the topic. 
Social capital is defined "as the resources embedded in social network 
accessed and used by actors for action" (Lin 2002 pp. 25), "accruing to the 
entrepreneur through social structure" (Gabbay and Leender, 1999 pp. 2), "facilitating 
the attainment of entrepreneurial goal" (Coleman, 1988 pp. 304), "for mutual 
acquaintances and recognition" (Bourdieu, 1986 pp. 249). These embedded resources 
entails trust, norms, networks (Putnam et al., 1993), share of knowledge, 
understanding, feeling of gratitude, reciprocity, respect and friendship (Burt, 1992; 
Adler and Kwon, 2002). The embedded resources shared between entrepreneurs 
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should of a necessity be of positive values such as telling the truth, the meeting of 
obligations and reciprocity to produce social capital as negative values are more likely 
to produce disaffection and non-cooperation among entrepreneurs (Fukuyama, 1997; 
Putnam, 2000). 
Putnam (2000) suggested that social capital is the connection between 
individuals, their social networks, their norms of reciprocity, and the trust arising from 
the connection. Similarly, Cohen and Prusak (2001) describe social capital as a set of 
connections between people, which covers the trust, mutual understanding, and shared 
values and behaviours that binds the group. There is no clear cut definition of social 
capital as various scholars have attempted to define it. Thus, social capital definitions 
can be categorised into two groups: structural dimension and content dimension. 
Structural dimension refers to the basic elements of the network such as types of 
social ties, and connections (Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998; Woolcock, 1998). On the other hand, content dimension of social capital 
includes the types of norms, trust, shared understanding and those variables that bind 
the group (Fukuyama, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Cohen and Prusak, 2001). 
2.5.1 Benefits of social capital 
The entrepreneur can generate numerous benefits from social capital. Amongst 
these are: access information, influence, control, power, contacts, connections, 
discovery and exploitation of opportunities, knowledge acquisition, trust and 
collective obligations. Firstly, information is critical to an entrepreneurial opportunity 
identification and exploitation. The informational benefits of social capital to the 
entrepreneur are not only seen in the access to the information, but also its quality, 
relevance and timeliness (Coleman, 1988; Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
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The process and utilisation of business information will not only enhance the 
entrepreneur's chances but also will facilitate business opportunities (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000). Through the social capital network, the amount of time and 
resources required by the entrepreneur to search and collect the necessary information 
is greatly reduced (Nahapiet and Goshal, 1988; Cohen and Prusak, 2001; Davidsson 
and Honig, 2003). This process creates advantages for the entrepreneur in a 
competitive environment thus providing higher rates of returns to the entrepreneur's 
business (Burt, 1992). Besides, the informational benefits of social capital are not only 
limited to the entrepreneur, but also to the business as a whole. An inter-business 
network of social capital also enhances business's access to relevant information and 
skills, allowing businesses to exchange vital information which are mutually 
beneficial (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Uzzi, 1997; Podolny and Page, 1998). 
Social capital also promotes a better knowledge sharing as a result of trust 
relationships and shared goals (Prusal and Cohen, 2001). 
Secondly, social capital through its network ties also facilitates the 
entrepreneur's access to scarce resources. The entrepreneur gains access to vital 
information and contacts from their social relationship to identify, collect and utilise 
scarce resources (Birley, 1985; Greene and Brown, 1997; Uzzi, 1999). Again, through 
its social network ties, entrepreneurs gain access to vital knowledge of business 
opportunities (Boxman et al., 1991; Meyerson, 1994; Fernandez and Weinberg, 1997) 
and other innovative ideas (Burt, 1987; Rogers, 1995). 
Thirdly, social capital is also beneficial to the entrepreneur through its 
elements of influence, control and power. Entrepreneurs are more likely to benefit 
from the more experienced and influential entrepreneurs in their social groups through 
the use of their influence, contacts and connections to get things done enabling them 
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to achieve their goals (Leana and Van Buaren, 1999; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; 
Adler and Kwon, 2002). For example, Coleman (1988) found that some senators 
having built up their set of obligation from their senior colleagues, use these 
influences to get legislation passed, thereby achieving their goals. Burt (1992) argued 
that some powerful entrepreneurs can use their influential powers to secure favourable 
negotiations for their members in a social group. 
Fourthly, social capital is also beneficial to the entrepreneur through the 
existence of certain vital rules and norms within the membership. Both internal and 
external values such as trust, truthfulness gratitude, respect, friendship and network 
provide the entrepreneur with confidence and mandates obligation and reciprocity 
(Putnam, 2000; Adler and Kwon, 2002). Putnam (2000) suggested that social capital 
offers the individual an opportunity to resolve their differences among themselves in a 
much easier way through cooperation. 
Fifthly, social capital also facilitates the establishment of start-up businesses 
through the concept of multiple ownership (Teach et al., 1986). Entrepreneurs with 
varying networks abilities are able to source relevant information to their advantage. 
Through social network ties entrepreneurs are exposed to new and different ideas, 
references and suggestions to potential business information and resources for their 
business formation and growth (Aldrich et al., 1998). 
Sixthly, one other benefit of social capital to the entrepreneur is the solidarity 
element between members of the association or group. With a strong solidarity 
existing among the members, there is a high degree of compliance on the group's 
values, rules and norms by the members (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Also, the solidarity 
element of social capital allows entrepreneurs to have a quicker resolution of disputes, 
grievances and grudges, thus preventing its accumulation (Nelson, 1989). However, 
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social capital is not only beneficial to the entrepreneur; there are associated risks that 
the entrepreneur may encounter. The next section assesses the risks associated with 
social capital. 
2.5.2 Risk of social capital 
One major risk associated with social capital is the element of 
overembeddedness of individual members in the group. As Powell and Smith-Doerr 
(1994 pp. 393) have stated "the ties that bind may also turn into ties that blinds". This 
weakness is capable of reducing the flow of information and new ideas into the group, 
thus resulting in discrimination and inertia among members (Gargiulo and Bernassi, 
1999). 
Secondly, Portes (1998) has also noted that strong norms among social groups 
may influence the distribution of resources among extended relations, thereby 
reducing capital accumulation and discouraging entrepreneurial activities. Besides, 
the bonding of friendship and membership obligations among entrepreneurial groups 
may affect their decisions in identifying and exploiting business opportunities 
elsewhere even i f the present contracts are not entirely beneficial (Uzzi, 1997). 
Thirdly, the risk of social capital can also be found in the unethical behaviour 
and conspiracies of the membership of a social group (Brass et al., 1998). Members of 
a social group can be divided into factions with ideas, values, norms and rules pushed 
to the background. I f this situation is allowed to continue, the group is likely to 
degenerate into multiple groupings, hence, group members are likely to miss the 
benefits of social capital (Foley and Edwards, 1996). 
Lastly, a very high cost is involved in establishing and maintaining 
relationships among members. Social capital is therefore expensive and requires effort 
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and time to build and maintain. Thus, the task of building social capital becomes very 
complex i f individual members have many contacts and these contacts themselves are 
also ties to other contacts. This will affect membership commitment and obligations 
(Hansen, 1998). 
2.5.3 Dimensions of social capital 
Scholars have argued that social capital is multidimensional and occurs at both 
the individual and organisational levels (Nahapiet and Ghosal's, 1988; Yli-Renko, 
1999; Lesser, 2000; Puhakka, 2002; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Although these three 
dimensions of social capital are not mutually exclusive, they could be interrelated 
(Liao and Welsch, 2003). To gain a clearer understanding of the dimensions of social 
capital, the chapter adopts the Nahapiet and Ghosal's (1988) three dimensions of 
social capital: Structure, Cognitive and Relational. 
2.5.3.1 Structural dimension 
The structural dimension of social capital refers to the pattern of connections, 
the presences or absence of social interaction ties between entrepreneurs. This social 
interaction through network ties, network configuration and network abilities create 
opportunities for social capital transactions (Nahapiet and Ghosal's, 1988; Yli-Renko, 
1999; Puhakka, 2002; Adler and Kwon, 2002; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). An 
entrepreneur's investment into the acquisition of relevant business information and 
the amount of time required to gather this information is greatly reduced by the 
entrepreneurial social relations (Nahapiet and Goshal, 1998; Cohen and Prusak, 2001; 
Davidsson and Honig, 2003) and network ties (Coleman, 1990; Greve and Salaff, 
2003). Network ties create an opportunity for social capital transactions in which the 
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entrepreneur gains access to information, scarce resources and finance (Birley, 1985; 
Green and Brown, 1997, Uzzi, 1999; Adler and Kwon, 2002). On the other hand, 
where the network ties are unstable, entrepreneurs are likely to miss opportunities 
because some members of the social group may leave the network and thus break the 
social ties (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). 
Through social relations and network ties, banks are able to offer products and 
services to meet the varying needs of their customers across differential economic 
sectors and locations (Batjargal, 2003). This social interaction builds customer 
loyalty, dependence and durable lender-borrower relation and therefore facilitates 
easier access to bank credit and lower loan rates (Burt, 1992; Uzzi, 1999). 
2.5.3.2 Cognitive dimension 
The cognitive dimension of social capital refers to the resources that represents 
shared representations, shared understanding of common goals, interpretations and 
systems of meaning (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Yli-Renko, 1999). This dimension 
involves the resources providing shared meaning and understanding of common goals 
and proper ways of acting such as shared languages, shared culture and codes. Among 
members of a particular network, shared language and conversation influences the 
exchange of ideas, norms, shared goals and culture (Nahapiet and Goshal, 1998; 
Cohen and Prusak, 2001). 
The shared goals of members in a particular network are the degree to which 
the members have a collective understanding of issues, adopt similar methods or 
approaches in resolving the issues, performing the tasks, or overcoming the 
challenges. Shared culture on the other hand is the degree to which the pattern of 
behaviour directs the entire relationship (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Banks, through the 
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lender-borrower relationship have succeeded in creating the norms of credit discipline 
(Dowla, 2006). Using the norms of credit discipline, financial transparency and on 
timely repayment of loans, banks have established the norms against credit defaults, 
by requesting for collateral security in various forms and pursuing defaulters to every 
length to show them that credit is not charity. By these norms and culture, banks have 
reduced the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
2.5.3.3 Relational dimension 
The relational dimension of social capital refers to the behavioural assets such 
as trust and truthfulness (Yli-Renko, 1999; Kohtamaki, 2003), norms and sanctions 
(Coleman, 1988), obligations and expectations (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; 
Burt, 1992) rooted in a relationship that influences the entrepreneur's behaviour. This 
dimension involves the nature of the personal relationship that develops between 
particular entrepreneurs such as weak or strong ties (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
The focus of the relational dimension of social capital is the particular relationship 
existing between members of a social group such as trust, respect, friendliness and 
trustfulness (Liao and Welsch, 2003). 
Relational trust plays a key role in the lender-borrower relationship where both 
parties irrespective of their position, do expect a mutual benefit in their relationship 
(Saparito et al., 2004). Banks build trust for small businesses through the development 
of durable relationships overtime (Dunkelberg et al., 1984) and other interactions such 
as regular visits to the business premises of the borrower and constant business 
contacts to seek the welfare of the borrower (Yli-Renko et al., 2001; Dowla, 2006). 
The banks provision of services and advice to the borrower signifies an act of 
'goodwill' and 'intimacy' on the part of the borrower (Das and Teng, 1998 pp. 505). 
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Borrowers also develop some confidence and trust in their banks through the 
interactions they receive from their bankers (Doz, 1996; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) 
and the products and services the bank offers the borrower (Berlin and Mester, 1998; 
Binks and Ennew, 1997). Thus the relational trust between the bank and the 
entrepreneur is enhanced through the provision of bank services and the acceptance of 
these services by the entrepreneur. 
The above review of social capital theory has demonstrated that entrepreneurs 
in possession of this capital have some advantages in terms of identification and 
exploitation of opportunities. Additionally, accessibility of resources and performance 
of the business is also enhanced with the possession of social capital resources. 
However, in spite of these advantages of social capital, some scholars have criticised 
the concept. The next section therefore reviews some of these criticisms. 
2.5.4 Criticisms of social capital 
The varying definitions put across in the social capital literature have not been 
without criticisms. The vagueness and inconsistency in the definition of social capital 
has been questioned (Portes, 1998; Dasgupta, 2000; Durlauf, 2000; Manski, 2000) 
with Arrow, (2000) advocating its abandonment. In recent times, scholars have 
questioned the ambiguity regarding the precise definition of social capital (Portes, 
1998; Manski, 2000; Kadushin, 2004; Fischer, 2005). As a result of this ambiguity, 
Fischer (2005), has asserted that social capital is counterproductive because it's 
difficult to describe it as a capital. 
The concept of social capital has been criticised as being too broad in that, it 
fails to provide a definite concept for any theoretical framework (Putzel, 1997). In 
spite of the numerous benefits associated with social capital, there is no clear cut 
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definition of social capital, and also there are too many different aspects, 
characteristics, indicators and dimensions of social capital making the concept of 
social capital difficult to understand (Van Deth, 2003). Similarly, Arrow (2000) 
argues for the concept of social capital to be abandoned. He asserted that capital has 
three forms; usage over time, investment of the present for future benefits, and 
alienability. Arrow (2000) argues that reputation and trust can be beneficial over time. 
However, a little trust is almost useless and therefore cannot be regarded as capital. 
The use of social capital has been associated with the entrepreneurial process. Social 
capital provides the entrepreneur with network facilities that provide business 
information, opportunity identification, entrepreneurial exploitation process, 
identification, collection and allocation of resources (Cohen and Prusak, 2001; 
Davidsson and Honig, 2003). 
The availability and cost of credit to a small business entrepreneur is 
dependent on the degree to which the entrepreneur is socially attached to the external 
sources of finance. Previous studies have shown that the more socially attached 
entrepreneurs are to their banks the greater the pool of financial resource made 
available to them (Eccles and Crane, 1988; Baker, 1990). Credit availability is also 
dependent on the characteristics of the entrepreneur and the business as well as the 
social network ties existing between the entrepreneur and the bank (Uzzi, 1999; Biggs 
et al., 2002; Storey, 2004). The literature on trust have examined the role it plays in 
risk and uncertainty situations (Hohmann and Malieva, 2005; Nguyen et al., 2006). 
The next section therefore assesses trust and ascertains its importance in bank lending 
decisions. 
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2.5.5 Trust 
The usefulness of trust can be found in the role it plays in lubricating the 
inevitable frictions of social life (Putnam, 2000), in economic and financial 
transactions and the promotion of organisational forms (Uzzi, 1996; Gulati and 
Garguilo, 1999). A review of the literature reveals the existence of numerous 
definitions of trust (Zand, 1992; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Mayer et al., 1995; 
Boersma et al. 2003). There is however no single universally accepted definition of 
trust. Several definitions exist within disciplines (Hosmer, 1995; Welter and 
Smallbone, 2006). It is therefore important that for this exploratory study a definition 
of trust needs to be made. 
In this study trust is defined as the expectation that an entrepreneur can be 
relied on by the bank as having the requisite experience, capacity and reputation to 
perform rationally and competently, irrespective of the banks ability to monitor the 
entrepreneur in order to meet the repayment schedules and the loan contract 
agreement. 
2.5.5.1 Dimensions of trust 
The dimensions of trust not surprisingly, have also been diverse and subject to 
much debate. Trust has been considered in terms of; personal trust (Williamson, 1993; 
Zucker, 1986; Chen and Barnes, 2007), institutional trust (Williamson, 1993; Raiser, 
1999; Hudson, 2006), emerging trust (Zucker, 1986; Ring and Van den Ven, 1992; 
Kumar and Becerra-Fernandez, 2007), inherited (Granovetter, 1985, Coleman, 1988; 
Redding, 1990; Nguyen et al., 2005), calculus trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; 
Lewicki et al., 2005), and unconditional trust (Jones and George, 1998; Howorth and 
Moro, 2006). 
49 
Personal trust can be described as a record of prior exchange, which develops 
on the initial knowledge of others from outcomes of previous transactions to provide 
reliable information for future transactions (Zucker, 1986). On the other hand, 
institutional trust is often embedded in acceptable conventional ways (Raiser, 1999) 
with benefits, consequences and sanctions upon failure going beyond the agreed 
parties (Putnam, 2000). Trust is said to be a complex concept (Kramer, 1999; 
Nooteboom, 2002). It is believed to emerge from a gradual process of a relationship, 
often evolving from repeated business transactions (Zucker, 1986; Ring and Van den 
Ven, 1992). However, other studies have noted that individuals can act in faith by 
trusting others without much knowledge about them (Luhmann, 1988; Craswell, 
1993). On the other hand, trust is also described as being inherited from previous 
relationships and also from other third party referrals. (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 
1988). 
Calculus trust involves the systematic development and sustenance of a 
relationship which is built on repeated transactions (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) and 
also depending on future behaviour (Jones and George, 1998), reliability and 
dependability (Lewicki et al., 2005). Where transactions between parties involve 
risks, sanctions are applied to serve as a deterrence or punishment (Barney and 
Hansen, 1994) rather than promising a reward or reputation (Dasgupta, 2000). 
Knowledge-based trust thrives on effective communication, reputation and reciprocity 
between two parties (Beugelsdijk, 2006). Unconditional trust evolves around ideas, 
values, desires, intensions and standards of behaviour (Jones and George, 1998; 
Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Unconditional trust brings out cooperation and 
reciprocity (Powell, 1996). Even though unconditional trust is much easier to be built 
on common interest, agreements, desires and ideals (Doney et al., 1998), when the 
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shared values and norms are violated, it is very difficult to repair (Bies and Tripp, 
1996; Burt and Knez, 1996; Dasgupta, 2000). Banks draw inferences from the account 
operations of entrepreneurs about their trust characteristics to determine their quality 
as a measure of reducing uncertainties associated with lending transaction (Coulter 
and Coulter, 2006). The next section examines the characteristics of trust. 
2.5.5.2 Characteristics of trust 
The strength and form of trust is affected by the degree of risk involved in the 
transaction (Mayer et al., 1995). For trust to be maintained and sustained in a 
transaction or relationship there is the need for both the trustor (bank) and trustee 
(entrepreneur) to assess their level of trustworthiness. This assessment is to be based 
on certain characteristics between the two parties. These include; reputation, 
similarity, ability, integrity, benevolence and communication. 
Reputation is the information about an entrepreneur's past performance 
(Podolny, 1994), signifying the entrepreneur's ability to perform in future ventures 
(Blois, 1999). An entrepreneur's reputation is a characteristic of trust in a relationship 
which shows the entrepreneur's integrity and reliance (Pohle, 1995; Dasgupta, 2000). 
Acquisition is a gradual process accumulating over time, but can easily be destroyed 
upon failure to perform (Dasgupta, 1988) leading to a bad reputation (Ridley, 1995; 
Kitcher, 1993) which may result in liquidity constraints (Martinelli, 1997). Two 
individuals or groups of persons are more likely to develop trust between them i f they 
have or share similar characteristics. These characteristics could be based on shared 
values and norms within a social group with similar language, culture, religion or 
institution (Creed and Miles, 1996; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001). 
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Ability involves the knowledge and skills applied by an individual to influence 
a transaction or a performance in a particular situation (Mayer et al., 1995; Jones, 
1996; Harrison et al., 1997; Bejou et al., 1998). In transactions involving risks, trust 
evolves from the ability or competence of the trustee to perform or honour an 
obligation (Butler, 1991; Rosen and Jerdec, 1977). Integrity is an act of consistency 
and an adherence to rules and regulation and agreements between parties (Howorth 
and Moro 2006). This characteristic is built from acts of consistency based on prior 
performance, reliable communication and the desire to repeat such performances in 
the future (Butler and Cantrel, 1984; Shaw, 1997; Velez, 2000). 
Benevolence is said to be a characteristic of trust in that the trustor is believed 
to be willing to do good to the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995). Wintoro (2000) noted that 
benevolence in financial transactions occurs where both parties are willing to share 
knowledge, ideas for mutual benefits rather than self interest gains. The act of 
benevolence can be recognised in actions such as showing consideration and 
sensitivity to the needs of the others the avoidance of exploitation of others and 
seeking the welfare of members in a group (McAllister, 1995). For trust to be 
maintained and sustained between parties there must be a regular and effective 
communication. This communication must be for the exchange of knowledge, 
information and resources for mutual benefits (Bhati, 2006). 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the theoretical background for the study. The main 
focus has been with the types of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial activities, the role 
of human capital theory, social capital theory and the influence of trust in bank 
lending decisions. The chapter considered the various types of entrepreneurs, their 
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resources and how it impacts on their performance. Entrepreneurs possessing higher 
levels of education and prior ownership experiences exhibits comparative advantages 
in terms of information acquisition, opportunity identification and exploitation as well 
as access to finance compared to the inexperience novice entrepreneur (Cooper et al., 
1995; Shane, 2000). 
The human capital theory asserts that the more the knowledge, talents and 
productive skills entrepreneurs possesses the more their performance and earning 
potential (Thurow, 1970; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2002). The human capital of 
the entrepreneur consists of the education, training, work experience and productive 
skills (Boxall and Steeneveld, 1999; Rauch et al., 2005). The theory also reveals that 
the ability of entrepreneurs to identify, exploit, pursue opportunities and acquire 
resources is dependent on the level of education, training and work experience of the 
entrepreneur (Starr and Bygrave, 1991; Weick, 1996). The theory also asserts that the 
possession of these human resources is necessary for higher performance and 
successes. However, these resources are not sufficiently enough to give the 
entrepreneur the maximum output. There is therefore the need for collaboration and 
networking between the entrepreneur and other organisations (Bourdieu, 1993; 
Coleman, 1990). 
The social capital theory therefore provides these networking, values and 
norms. A social network between two parties ensures adequate information flows 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002) and also facilitates the acquisition of resources (Green and 
Brown, 1997; Uzzi, 1999). The theory chapter therefore asserts that entrepreneurs 
involve in social ties benefit from elements of influence, control and power (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000). Shared norms, values and cultures represent shared 
responsibilities and goals (Nahapiet and Goshal, 1998; Cohen and Prusak, 2001). The 
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social ties and bond also develops trust, truthfulness and mutual respect for both 
parties (Liao and Welsch, 2003). Finally, the chapter examined the role of trust in 
bank lending decisions. 
The next chapter examines the financing of small business entrepreneurs, 
capital structure, sources of start-up capital and the challenges associated with small 
business financing. 
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Chapter 3 
Financing Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has examined the types of entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial 
activities, and the influence of human and social capital on these entrepreneurial 
activities. The issues of credit availability and accessibility to small businesses have 
generated considerable interest in recent times among scholars and policy makers. 
This is due to the important role small businesses played in economic development of 
many countries. Previous studies have shown that in most developing countries, small 
business entrepreneurs encounter major challenges when accessing external finance in 
support of their businesses to promote growth and development (Sowa et al., 1992; 
Levy, 1993; Parker et al., 1995; Abor and Biekpe, 2007b). There is also evidence that 
small business entrepreneurs in both developed and developing countries have 
experienced some difficulties in accessing credit from banks (Aryeetey et al., 1994; 
Levitsky and Prasad, 1987; Berger and Udell, 2002). 
This chapter, financing micro, small and medium-size enterprises, will 
examine the issues associated with the capital structure of small business, the sources 
of finance for small business, the factors affecting the availability of and accessibility 
of bank credit to small business entrepreneurs, as well as the challenges banks 
encounter in making lending decisions. This chapter forms the background literature 
on small business financing for the study. 
Depending on the growth stages of the small businesses, their financial 
requirement vary in size, frequency and maturity (Boomgard, 1989) and the sources 
of finance available to the small business changes overtime (Liedholm, 1989; 1991; 
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Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; Berger and Udell, 1998). The financing sources for the 
small business very often begins with the entrepreneur's personal savings, followed 
by gifts and loans from friends and relations (Findings Africa Region, 1994; 
Nissanke, 2001). As the business grows, other financing sources are sought including: 
banks' loans and overdrafts, co-investors, venture capitalists and lastly equity 
(Manigart and Struyf, 1997). 
A number of factors have been identified as being the main obstacles to bank 
lending to small businesses. These include: a lack of entrepreneurial equity in the 
business, poor business information, unreliable financial data and vulnerability to 
market fluctuations (UNCTAD, 2001; Wagenvoort, 2003). Besides these, banks have 
also consistently referred to small business lending as a high risk venture in view of 
the high transaction costs involved in the processing of credit applications and the 
monitoring of credit offered (Steel, 1994; Wagenvoort, 2003; Tagoe et al., 2005), 
information asymmetry problems (von Eije et al., 2003), the lack of collateral to 
enforce repayment (Mambula, 2002; Sacerdoti, 2005). Banks are therefore reluctant in 
lending to small business entrepreneurs (Binks et al., 1992; Tucker and Lean, 2003). 
When raising finance in the formal financial market small businesses face market 
inequalities (Binks and Ennew, 1996; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). These market 
inequalities are the results of information asymmetry that might occur between the 
lender and the small business (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Greenwald et al., 1984). 
The sources, choice and availability of finance for small businesses are a 
determining factor in the performance and contributions of small business to the 
economy of developing countries. The understanding of the financing preference of 
entrepreneurs of small businesses is essential as the choice of finance at varying 
stages of business growth affects the performance and contribution of small 
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businesses. Studies have shown that small businesses prefer to use internal sources of 
finance at the initial stages of establishment and supplement these sources with 
external finance at a later stage (Binks et al., 1992; Hughes, 1997; Berger and Udell, 
1998). The next section of this chapter therefore reviews the capital structure of small 
businesses to determine their choice and preference for finance in their business life 
cycle. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the second section the capital structure 
of small businesses is presented. Section three outlines the capital structure of small 
businesses and start-ups. Section four discusses the determinants of capital structure 
of small businesses. Section five examines the sources of finance for the small 
business at start-up. Section six discusses the obstacles to bank lending to small 
business entrepreneurs and discusses the factors affecting the availability and 
accessibility of bank credit to the entrepreneur. Section seven concludes the chapter. 
3.2 The capital structure of businesses 
A number of theories have emerged to explain the concept of business capital 
structure (Chittenden et al., 1996; Reid 2003). Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) 
initiated the discussions on capital structure and favoured the view that capital 
structure was irrelevant but later modified this view that debt financing alone was 
optimal. Subsequently, theories have emerged under the capital structure: agency, 
pecking order, market timing and trade-off theories. Within these theories, a number 
of factors or attributes are said to influence firm leverage. These include measures of 
firm value or size, growth, industry classification, the nature of the assets, taxation, 
and financial constraints, earning volatility, profitability, stock market conditions, 
debt market conditions and microeconomic factors (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
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Studies of the financial structure of businesses typically revolve around the 
external sources of finance which are determined by the factors that affect the pricing 
and availability of the mix of debt and equity finance. The desire and readiness of the 
entrepreneur to pay the quoted price for the financial mix of debt and equity can also 
be a determining factor (Baldwin et al., 2002). The price and availability of external 
sources of finance for the small business is dependant on the perceived risk associated 
with the small business and in particular the start-up business. This perceived risk 
arises from the problems of information asymmetry (adverse selection and moral 
hazard) and transaction and monitoring costs associated with small business lending 
(Storey, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998; Huyghebaert, 2003). These are likely to affect 
the cost and availability of credit (Huyghebaert, 2003; Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006; 
Huyghebaert and Gucht, 2007). 
Studies have also shown that businesses in raising funds adopt different 
approaches including the agency approach (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Binks et al., 
1992), the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984, Myers and Majluf, 1984; Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999) or the financial growth cycle approach (Berger and Udell, 
1998). The financial growth cycle approach contends that the firm's age, size and 
availability of information determines the capital structure adopted by the small 
businesses. These studies have been limited to established listed firms which depend 
on historical operating performance. Small businesses and in particular start-up 
businesses however are devoid of this dependency (Huyghebaert and Gucht, 2007). 
The next section therefore examines the four theories of capital structure - the 
agency theory, the pecking order theory, the market timing and trade-off theory. 
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3.2.1 The agency theory 
The agency theory argues that under conditions of information asymmetries, 
self-interest and uncertainty, principals lack reasons to trust their agents and will 
therefore adopt measures to align the interest of agents to those of the principal 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Myers, 2001). The two agency problems arising from 
information asymmetries are adverse selection and moral hazard (Chittenden et al., 
1996). Adverse selection is the condition under which the principal cannot ascertain i f 
the agent accurately represents his/her ability to do the work for which he/she is being 
paid. Moral hazard on the other hand, is the condition under which the principal 
cannot be sure i f the agent has put forth maximum effort (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Under conditions of adverse selection and moral hazard, fixed wage contracts 
cease to be the only means by which a relationship can be organised between banks 
and entrepreneurs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To ensure agents' cooperation 
principals may adopt measures such as: monitoring and rewards tied to an agent's 
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Chittenden et al., 1996). These measures are expected 
to reduce the problems of information asymmetries and agent opportunistic behaviour. 
The motives of agents are likely to differ from those of their principals. Factors such 
as financial rewards, labour market opportunities and other relationships outside the 
agent-principal relationship may influence the agent's motives. 
3.2.2 The pecking order theory 
According to the pecking order theory, initiated by Myers (1984) and Myers 
and Majluf (1984) small businesses finance their investment in a hierarchical way. 
This implies that businesses will priorities their sources of financing, first by 
preferring internal financing when available, followed by debt financing when the 
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internal financing is depleted and the equity financing as the last resort. Businesses 
therefore have three main sources of funding for investment: retained earnings, debt 
and equity. According to Myers (1984) capital structure has no optimal debt ratio and 
i f there is, it is insignificant as compared to the cost of external financing. 
Entrepreneurs have more information about the prospects of the business than outside 
investors; hence, raising external finance is very costly (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
Whilst retained earnings avoid all of the problems associated with adverse 
selection, debt has a minor adverse selection problem and equity on the other hand has 
serious adverse selection problems. Thus, in the mind of an investor, equity is 
considered riskier than debt; and, hence the investor will demand higher rates of 
return for equity investment than on debt (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Frank and Goyal, 
2003). This preference is also due to the high cost and cumbersome nature of floating 
shares on the stock market and the possibility of under pricing the shares (Buckland 
and Davis, 1990). In addition to the above, small businesses will avoid the use of 
equity finance because share flotation requires a wider ownership which will mean 
entrepreneurs may lose control of their business to the new shareholders (Chittenden 
et al., 1996). 
The ideas of the pecking order theory were refined into a testable prediction by 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). They noted that a large proportion of the financing 
deficits of businesses are made up of debts. Chirinko and Singha (2000) however, 
disagreed with Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and have asserted that as funding 
requirements increase businesses move from a domain of internal finance to debt and 
then to equity; thus differentiating clearly the role of debt and equity in various 
regions. Frank and Goyal (2003) also disagreed with Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) on the choice of established companies and asserted that their results were 
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biased. They further asserted that small businesses are much more dependant on 
equity finance than they have suggested. 
Chirinko and Singha (2000) posited that the pecking order theory is made up 
of two forms: strong and semi-strong. With the strong form, businesses finance their 
investments using internal funding and debt finance and do not issue equity. The 
semi-strong form however posits that businesses in this form issue equity. The 
pecking order theory does not ignore the issuance of new shares (Medeiros and Daher, 
2004). 
3.2.3 The market timing theory 
The theory of capital structure 'evolves as the cumulative outcome of past 
attempts to time the equity market' (Baker and Wurgler, 2002 pp: 27). There are 
basically two versions of market timing. The first version deals with entrepreneurs, 
investors and adverse selection costs which varies across businesses. Information 
asymmetry is reduced when businesses announce equity issues (Korajczyk et al., 
1991). The second version involves irrational investors and time-varying mis-pricing. 
In this version when entrepreneurs believe the cost of equity is irrationally low, they 
will issue the equity. They only buy-back this equity when they believe the cost is 
irrationally high (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). In the survey by Graham and Harvey 
(2001 pp: 189) entrepreneurs have admitted to considering the importance attached to 
the 'amount by which their stocks are undervalued or overvalued'. 
In making a financing choice for the business, an entrepreneur considers the 
current situation in both the debt and equity market and financing decisions are made 
based on the current condition which is more favourable to him or her. Where both 
debt and equity markets are unfavourable, the business is likely to defer fund raising. 
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However, where the current conditions are favourable, funds may be raised even 
when they are not needed (Frank and Goyal, 2003). The semi-strong form of market 
efficiency is not an assumption of the market timing theory. When the equity risk 
premium is negative it is assumed that equity issues are more costly than debt finance. 
3.2.4 Trade-off theory 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) have shown that in perfect and efficient markets 
capital structure is irrelevant. In adding various imperfections, optimal capital 
structure is determined by the trade-off theory. The Trade-off Theory states that 
'businesses decide for a certain capital structure and that they move towards it through 
time' (Medeiros and Daher, 2005 pp. 4). The trade-off theory argues that in building 
their capital structure, entrepreneurs take into consideration the costs and benefits of 
both debt and equity financing. The selection of a particular finance type, by an 
entrepreneur also involves a consideration of the balance between the dead-weight 
costs of bankruptcy and the tax saving benefits of debt (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; 
Frank and Goyal, 2005). 
The theory further explains that businesses' choice to finance partly with 
debts and partly with equity is based on the advantages that accrue from each type of 
finance. However, questions have been raised about the empirical relevance of the 
trade-off theory. Miller, (1977) questioned why businesses are not having higher debt 
levels on their balance sheet i f the trade-off theory was true. Fama and French (2002) 
also questioned the use of understated standard errors that leads to the clouding of 
inferences. The trade-off theory introduces taxation, cost of financial distress and 
agency costs but maintains the market efficiency and symmetric information 
assumption (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). The theory 
62 
focuses on: (a) the trade-off between taxes and bankruptcy costs; (b) agency conflicts; 
and (c) stakeholders' co-investments (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
This section has examined the capital structure theories of businesses in 
general. The examinations of the theories reveal that entrepreneurs raise finance for 
their businesses taking into consideration the costs, benefits, availability and 
accessibility of the finance. The next section, therefore, examines the capital structure 
of small businesses and start-up businesses. 
3.3 The capital structure of small businesses and start-ups 
The choice of a business' capital structure is dependent on the financing 
pattern (Myers, 1990), the debt-asset ratio (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and the fixed 
assets of the small business (Heshmati, 2001). In explaining the relevance of the small 
business capital structure, three main costs are considered. These are: bankruptcy 
costs, agency costs and information asymmetry costs. According to Modigliani and 
Miller (1963), businesses increase their value through debt financing as interest 
payments are deducted from corporate tax. However, the probability of bankruptcy 
costs increases as debt finance increases and this may hinder the small business from 
accessing bank credit (Pettit and Singer, 1985). 
As a result of imperfect information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and risk 
aversion, problems of agency costs arise. These problems are more prominent among 
small businesses (Chittenden et al., 1996). The conflicts between owners of 
businesses and financial intermediaries are the result of different information 
possession (Harris and Raviv, 1990). However, Norton (1991a) noted that bankruptcy 
costs, agency costs and information asymmetries have little or no influence on the 
capital structure decisions of small businesses. He asserted that small business 
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entrepreneurs finance their business's needs by following the hierarchical fashion of 
the pecking order theory. 
The theories of capital structure has generally been focused on established 
businesses and more so to medium and large size businesses to the neglect of small 
businesses and to a large extent on start-up businesses. The determination of capital 
structure of a business is varied and this depends on the nature and type of the 
business under consideration (Harris and Raviv, 1991). The type of finance used by 
start-up businesses is dependant on the price and availability of internal and external 
finance sources (Huyghebaert and de Gucht, 2007). A number of empirical studies 
have shown that start-up businesses mainly use internal (informal) sources of finance 
as their principal source of capital and over time introduce external (formal) sources 
of finance to augment their expansion drive (Acs, 1985; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; 
Aryeetey et al., 1994; Findings Africa Region, 1994; Manigart and Struyf, 1997; 
Hamilton and Fox, 1998; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006; 
Heino, 2006; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). 
The financial growth cycle approach contends that the firm's age, size and 
availability of information determines the capital structure adopted by the small 
business. These studies have been limited to established listed firms which depend on 
historical operating performance. Start-up businesses, however, are devoid of this 
dependency (Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007). The choice and size of finance 
utilised by the start-up business can be significantly influenced by the firm's size, 
asset structure, type of organisation, growth orientation and the characteristics of the 
owner (Cassar, 2004). The use of external finance by the start-up businesses is greatly 
impeded by the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard problems caused by 
their lack of a proven track record and prior business reputation (Huyghebaert, 2003; 
64 
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007). Start-up businesses, therefore, choose to 
finance their financial needs from a pecking order approach: first, the owners' 
savings, gifts and loans from family, friends and business associates; second, there are 
short-term borrowing; third, there are long-term debt and equity as the least preferred 
option (Myers, 1984, Hamilton and Fox, 1998; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). 
Because of their lack of experience and no track record to show their potential, 
start-up businesses are very often seen as informationally opaque (Berger and Udell, 
1998). As a result of asymmetric information and the lack of collateral, access to 
finance becomes a major constraint to the growth of small businesses (Binks and 
Ennew, 1996). Entrepreneurs at start-up thus, find it difficult to secure any start-up 
capital from external sources; and hence, their overwhelming dependence on internal 
sources (Huyghebaert, 2001). Berger and Udell (1998) argued that as a result of 
information asymmetry, asset structure, economies of scale and demand for finance, 
the financing alternatives available to small businesses vary throughout their financial 
life cycle. 
The capital structure of a small business at any stage of the growth-cycle is a 
function of the characteristics of the entrepreneur, the business and the 
macroeconomic environment (Michaelas et al., 1999). The next section examines the 
determinants of the capital structure of small businesses. 
3.4 Determinants of the capital structure of small businesses 
3.4.1 Entrepreneur characteristics 
The strong desire by entrepreneurs to maintain business ownership and 
independence may influence the entrepreneur's financing decisions (Neubauer and 
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Lank, 1998). Hence, entrepreneurs with a desire to maintain ownership of their 
business will prefer using internal sources of capital (Dailey et al., 1997). Similarly, 
entrepreneurs with a strong desire to retain total control of their business may choose 
to reduce their use of external finance (Kotkin, 1984; Hutchinson, 1995; Poutziouris 
and Chittenden, 1996). The use of covenants to control entrepreneurs' access to 
external finance may influence their choice and capital structure decisions (Kotkin, 
1984; Shrivastava and Grant, 1985). These factors may influence the entrepreneur's 
capital structure and financing decisions (Barton, 1989; Harvey and Evans, 1995). 
Secondly, the level of education and work experiences of the entrepreneur 
provides the business with adequate human and social capital (Bates, 1997; Coleman 
and Cohn, 2000). Zingales (2000) noted that human capital plays a central role in the 
development of start-up businesses. Entrepreneurs with higher levels of education are 
more likely to source and use external finance (Coleman and Cohn, 2000). The age of 
the entrepreneur is more likely to influence the capital structure decision of the 
business (Romano et al., 2001). Older entrepreneurs would prefer the use of internal 
sources of capital to external sources (van der Wijst, 1989) in view of their risk 
adverse nature (Barton, 1989; Harvey and Evans, 1995). 
3.4.2 Business characteristics 
The sources of capital for any business are largely dependant on the age of the 
business (Dollinger, 1995). Older businesses have the capacity to accumulate 
internally generated funds and are thus less likely to depend on external sources of 
capital to support their business operations (Hall et al., 2004). On the other hand, new 
and younger businesses may lack the internally generated capital and are more likely 
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to borrow from external sources to support their business operation (Berger and Udell, 
1998). 
Secondly, the asset composition of small businesses also influences the capital 
structure decisions of small business entrepreneurs (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris 
and Raviv, 1991). Small businesses in possession of greater tangible assets are able to 
use these assets as collateral security, to resolve the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems associated with small business lending (Chan and Kanatas, 1985; 
Besanko and Thakor, 1987a). 
Thirdly, profitable businesses have access to retained earnings from within the 
business and are therefore more likely to utilise this internal source of capital than to 
source for external capital (Myers, 1984; Van Auken and Carter, 1989; Casser and 
Holmes, 2003). Even though profitable businesses have a better access to external 
sources of capital, studies have shown that they would prefer using internal sources of 
capital because it's cheaper and readily available. Business's profitability will 
therefore influence the entrepreneur's choice of finance (Jordan et al., 1998; Coleman 
and Conn, 2000). 
Fourthly, businesses experiencing higher growth potentials are likely to rely 
on external sources of capital ((Michaelas et al., 1999; Cassar and Holmes, 2003). 
This has a tendency to influence the capital structure decision of the business as the 
entrepreneur will seek to establish a lending relationship with their banks in 
anticipation of future borrowing (Cassar, 2004). Growth opportunities in small 
businesses exerts pressure on internally generated funds within a business and pushes 
entrepreneurs to look for external sources of capital to meet the growth requirements 
(Hall et al., 2004). However, Myers (1977) noted that growing businesses encounter 
some challenges in accessing external finance as their growth opportunities produces 
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moral hazard situations and this increases the risks associated with small business 
lending. 
Fifthly, the financing decisions of businesses are largely influenced by the 
goals, objectives, and aspirations of the business (Barton and Gordon, 1987; Storey, 
1994) as well as the legal form (Storey, 1994; Coleman and Conn, 2000). Sixthly, 
other factors influencing the capital structure decision of small business entrepreneurs 
are the ratio of debtors to creditors and nature of business operations (Chittenden et 
al., 1996; Cassar, 2004), the state of the economy (Michaelas et al., 1996b), and the 
type of sector (Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
Seventhly, smaller businesses face a major challenge in resolving the 
information asymmetry problems in view of the high costs involved in tackling these 
challenges, thus influencing their choice and access to external finance (Berger and 
Udell, 1998; Cassar and Holmes, 2003). Eighthly, the transaction costs for small 
businesses borrowing is higher compared to that of larger businesses and this 
influences their financing choice and use of external financing (Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Wald, 1999). 
The use of external finance by the start-up business is greatly impeded by the 
presence of adverse selection and moral hazard problems caused by their lack of 
proven track record and prior business reputation (Huyghebaert, 2003; Huyghebaert 
and Gucht, 2007). Small-sized and start-ups businesses, therefore, choose to finance 
their financial needs from a pecking order approach. A number of studies have 
examined the sources of capital used by small businesses (Norton, 1991a; Norton, 
1991b; Harvey and Evans, 1995; Hutchison, 1995; Romano et al., 2001; Cassar, 
2004). In the light of the above discussions, the next section reviews the various 
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sources of finance available to entrepreneurs of small businesses including start-up 
businesses. 
3.5 Sources of finance for small businesses 
Finance plays a significant role in the development of small businesses (Davila 
et al., 2003; Cassar, 2004). However, compared to large businesses, small businesses 
have encountered limited access to financial resources at every stage of their 
development (Walker, 1989) as a result of challenges they encounter (Holtz-Eakin et 
al., 1994; Raj an and Zingales, 1995). These difficulties have hindered their growth 
and development, and hence their contribution to economic development of nations 
(Levy, 1993). An analysis of the financial structure of small businesses has revealed 
that small business entrepreneurs depend on internal sources of capital including 
personal savings and retained earnings in financing their small business start-up 
(Weston and Brigham, 1981; Johns et al., 1989; Thompson Lighthouse et al., 1996; 
Kotey, 1999; Ou and Haynes, 2003; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Kutsuna and 
Honjo, 2006; Heino, 2006; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). In later stages, as the business 
expands, entrepreneurs rely on external sources of capital such as debts from formal 
financial institutions and lastly to non-bank financial institutions (Vos et al., 2007). 
As the business increases in age and size they acquire assets to collateralise loans, 
develop proper management of business information and track record to seek external 
sources of finance (Berger and Udell, 1998, Gregory et al., 2005). 
Depending on the growth stages, the financial requirement of the small 
businesses vary in size, frequency and maturity (Boomgard, 1989) and the sources of 
finance available to the small business also change overtime (Liedholm, 1989; 1991; 
Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; Berger and Udell, 1998). The next sections now 
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examine the internal and external sources of finance available to the small business 
entrepreneur and the types available within each source. 
3.5.1 Internal sources 
3.5.1.1 Personal (own) savings and retained earnings 
Personal saving is that part of personal income left over after payment of taxes 
and interest, personal consumption expenditures and net transfers. Personal savings 
are the contributions an entrepreneur accumulates to reinvest in the business for 
working capital, fixed assets and for raw materials purchase. Personal savings of the 
entrepreneur are a major source of finance for most start-up businesses (Acs, 1985). 
In many instances, entrepreneurs have sold or integrated their personal assets 
directly into starting or growing their businesses (Van Auken and Neeley, 1996), or 
have used their homes as offices or factories at the start of business (Landstrom and 
Winborg, 1997). Others have forgone taking personal salaries at the initial stages 
depending on salaries from other sources such as formal employment (Winborg and 
Landstrom, 2001), or spouse (DeLuca, 1998). 
Profits from a business can be used by the entrepreneur for the payment of 
dividends or can be reinvested into the business. Where these profits are retained and 
reinvested into the business, they are referred to as retained earnings. Retained 
earnings are profits of a business left after taxes and dividend are removed (Walker, 
1989). Small businesses encounter severe liquidity constraints and are very unlikely to 
make dividend payments (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). Even though entrepreneurs 
reinvest their retained earnings into their businesses, priority is given first to financing 
working capital to make more profit before investing for the purposes of expansion of 
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business capacity (Nissanke, 2001). As businesses expands the demand for additional 
financing increases. The search for additional finance normally begins with loans and 
gifts from friends and relations, before this is then supplemented by supplier's credit 
and customer advances. 
3.5.1.2 Friends and relatives 
Entrepreneurs have benefited from the social connections between them and 
their relatives and friends. Gifts, loans and the guaranteeing of institutional loans have 
been part of the internal sources of start-up capital for most entrepreneurs (Fraser, 
1999). Loans from family and friends are different from bank loans in that they are 
significantly small in nature, short-term and have low or no interest rates, in return for 
some benefits later (Basu and Parker, 2001). Loans from family and friends are 
offered without screening because informal lenders are assumed to be in possession of 
private information about the entrepreneur which is normally not available to formal 
lenders (Casson, 2003; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005). 
3.5.2 Entrepreneurship and sources of start-up capital 
In this section the types of start-up capital used by the entrepreneur are 
examined. The availability and cost of finance affects the performance of the 
entrepreneur. Limited access to finance retards the entrepreneurial activity (Holtz-
Eakin and Rosen, 1999), impedes start-up process and retards growth and 
development of start-ups enterprises (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Schreiner and 
Woller, 2003). Again entrepreneurs facing limited access to start-up capital may be 
forced to utilise their savings and assets (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999). 
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Entrepreneurs in their attempt to raise external capital are confronted with a 
number of challenges such as developing their business concept, identifying potential 
sources of start-up capital, high monitoring costs, bonding costs and interest rate 
(Landstrom, 1992; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). These 
challenges are the results of a lack of information about financing sources (Gibson, 
1992), problems of information asymmetry and transaction costs encountered when 
accessing the finance (Watson and Wilson, 2002; Cassar, 2004; Ebben and Johnson, 
2006) and the inability of small businesses to provide relevant business information to 
the lender (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). As a result, banks view start-up businesses 
as risky businesses to finance and therefore charge a higher interest rate, increase 
collateral requirement or offer reduced amount or decline the application all together 
(Levenson and Willard, 2000; Shane and Cable, 2002). 
A major factor in the choice of an entrepreneur's start-up capital, the type and 
amount of finance used is influenced by the entrepreneur's background and business 
ownership experience (Westhead et al., 2003b; Westhead et al., 2005b). The use of 
debt and equity in the financing decision of start-up businesses has implications for 
the business' performance, business expansion and future cash flow. The financing 
decision of the entrepreneur is also influenced by the entrepreneur's characteristics 
(age, education, work experience, sex), risk tolerance, business characteristics (age, 
growth, location, sector, size, innovation, exporting) and managerial skills and 
preferences (Barton and Mathews, 1989, Gibson, 1992; Petty and Bygrave, 1993; 
Monroy and Folger, 1993; Cressy, 1996; Kuratko et al., 1997). Novice entrepreneurs 
are more likely to depend on internal sources of finance in view of their perceived risk 
nature compared to habitual entrepreneurs (Winborg and Landstorm, 2001; Carter and 
Van Auken, 2005). Habitual entrepreneurs by virtue of their business ownership 
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experience and track record are more likely to depend on external sources of finance 
(Cressy, 1995) compared to novice entrepreneurs who lack the requisite business 
experience. 
3.5.2.1 Entrepreneurship and internal sources of start-up capital 
At start-up, entrepreneurial and business characteristics of a small business 
have a significant influence on the ability, type and amount of start-up capital the 
small business is able to raise (Thorne, 1989; Van Auken and Neeley, 1997). The 
challenges entrepreneurs encounter in raising start-up capital may lead to illiquidity 
and cash flow constraints at the start of a new venture. This further implies that 
entrepreneurs will have to abandon market opportunities; they will be unable to meet 
market demands and supplier requirements, encounter limited growth potentials and 
eventually die (Storey, 1994; Van Auken, 2001 pp. 243). Bechetti and Trovato (2002) 
observed that the challenges entrepreneurs encounter in raising finance prohibit the 
growth potential of the small business. Similarly, both Cooper et al., (1994) and 
Davila et al., (2003) have emphasised that the inability of the entrepreneur to raise 
adequate start-up capital from external sources effects the growth and survival of the 
small business. Even in situations where entrepreneurs are able to raise external 
capital, the high interest rates payment on these finances puts constant pressure on the 
already dwindling cash flows of the small business. This will eventually impact 
negatively on the business' performance which will again impede their chances of 
raising external finance (Marlow and Patton, 2005). 
In view of the challenges entrepreneurs encounter in raising start-up capital 
from external (formal) sources, it is both essential and preferable for entrepreneurs to 
consider internal (informal) sources. Hence in raising start-up capital, the entrepreneur 
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will consider internal sources first and later seek external sources such as debt and 
equity (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). This financing choice therefore coincides with 
the pecking order model of finance proposed by (Myers, 1984). It is expected in this 
study therefore that experienced entrepreneurs with proven track records, business 
reputation and collateral will report a lower usage of internal sources of start-up 
capital compared with inexperienced entrepreneurs at the start of their new ventures 
(Westhead et al., 2003b). From the above discussion, the following hypothesis can be 
derived: 
H ] : Experienced entrepreneurs will report a lower level usage of internal sources 
of start-up capital than novice entrepreneurs at the start of a new venture. 
At the formation stage of the business the capital requirement for the small 
business is modest with the main sources coming from internal sources - the 
entrepreneur's personal savings, gifts and loans from friends and relations (Findings 
Africa Region, 1994; Nissanke, 2001). As the business grows, other financing sources 
are sought including banks loans and overdrafts, venture capitalists and lastly equity 
(Manigartand Struyf, 1997). 
As the business expands and the business experiences increased demand for its 
goods and services, its cost of production and services also increases. The business' 
financial requirements wil l also increase and this puts pressure on the internally 
generated sources of capital. In an attempt to resolve this, the entrepreneur seeks 
financial support from external sources both debt and equity to meet this additional 
requirement. The next section examines the various types of external sources of 
finance available to the entrepreneur. 
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3.5.3 External sources 
3.5.3.1 Co-investors (Business Angels) 
Co-investors (Business Angels) are high net worth individuals with either 
managerial or entrepreneurial skills who invest their capital, knowledge and time in 
small and young business ventures (Freear et al., 2002; Brettel, 2003; Stedler and 
Peters, 2003; Kollmann, 2004) in return for a proportion of the company equity 
(Berger and Udell, 1998; Aernoudt, 1999). Co-investors are individuals who invest in 
businesses looking for a higher return than they would see from more traditional 
investments (Brander et al., 2002). Co-investors play an important role in providing 
financial support for business start-ups (Wetzel, 1981; Harrison and Mason, 1996) and 
high risks and high return ventures (Seymour and Wetzel, 1981; Tashiro, 1999). 
Co-investors are successful entrepreneurs with entrepreneurial and managerial 
experience who want to help other entrepreneurs get their business off the ground 
(Aram, 1989; Aernoudt, 1999). They take a high personal risk in the expectation of 
owning part of a growing and successful business (Freear and Wetzel, 1990) and 
occasionally syndicate their investments with other co-investors where necessary to 
acquire risk reduce information (Kelley and Hay, 2000). In addition to finance, co-
investors also offer expertise (Brettel, 2003), managerial experience (Stedler and 
Peters, 2003) and personal contacts and networking (Mason and Harrison, 1996; 
Brettel, 2002). Co-investors by acting as non-executive directors can add value to the 
venture through monitoring and consulting (Bhide, 2000), by sharing expertise, 
entrepreneurial skills and technical know-how (Gifford, 1997; Lau, 1999; Harrison 
and Mason, 2000). 
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3.5.3.2 Supplier's (Trade) credits and customer advances 
Supplier's credit exists when one business provides goods or services to a 
customer (entrepreneur) which does not require immediate payment, or receive a 
shipment or service from a supplier under an agreement to pay them later (Elliehausen 
and Wolken, 1993; Cunat, 2007). Supplier's credit may provide access to capital for 
businesses that are unable to raise it through more traditional channels. It is an 
important source of short-term external finance for businesses (Raj an and Zingales, 
1995). Asymmetric information between banks and small businesses can preclude 
financing of valuable projects. Supplier's credit can alleviate this problem by 
incorporating in the lending relation the private information held by suppliers about 
their customers (Burkhart and Ellingsen, 2004). 
Businesses without relationships with banks resort more to supplier's credit, 
and sellers with greater ability to generate cash flows provide more trade credit 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Similarly, businesses which are less likely to be bank 
credit constrained tend to rely less on supplier's credit. On the other hand, small 
businesses which are more likely to be credit rationed tend to rely more on trade 
credit. Sellers, by the nature of their relationships with the small businesses have an 
information advantage over banks and are therefore able to ensure repayment better 
than banks do (Mateut et al., 2006). By offering supplier's credit, a seller can identify 
a prospective default more quickly than i f financial institutions were the sole 
providers of short-term financing. Supplier's credit is extended on a more regular 
basis to small businesses with good track records of payment at no cost and with little 
documentations (Walker, 1985). 
Customer advances on the other hand is that advance payment made by a 
customer to a supplier or producer of goods or provider of services in anticipation of 
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future supply of goods and services. Customer advances may serve as a source of 
finance for a start-up business as the advance payment may be used in financing 
working capital for other businesses far in advance of the anticipated supply date for 
the actual customer who made the payment (Nissanke, 2001). Customer advances 
may be in the form of licenses or royalties, advance payments made on purchases or 
on service contracts (Freear et al., 1995; Fraser, 2001), and letters of credit for foreign 
transactions (Stevenson et al., 1985). 
3.5.3.3 Bank credit (overdrafts and loans) 
Bank credit, as the term used in this study consists of bank loans and bank 
overdrafts extended to entrepreneurs (Phillips and Bruchey, 1981). In developing 
countries where the financial and capital markets are underdeveloped, bank financing 
plays an important role in small business growth and development (Galindo and 
Schiantarelli, 2002). Entrepreneur activities are retarded by limited access to bank 
credit (Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 1999). Borrowing from the banks is therefore an 
important source of finance to many small business entrepreneurs (Brewer et al., 
1996). Biggs et al. (2002) noted that the size of a business, possession of a collateral 
security and proven track record are important determinants to small business 
entrepreneur's access to bank loans and overdrafts. Avery et al. (1998) also noted that 
bank loans to small business entrepreneurs are personally guaranteed by the 
entrepreneurs. 
Banks cite reasons such as the poor quality of financial information, a lack of 
collateral, no proven track records and poor repayment abilities to ration credit to 
small business entrepreneurs (Stephanou and Rodriguez, 2008). Similarly, the high 
cost of gathering information about a business affects banks screening activities which 
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also affects bank lending to small business entrepreneurs (Dell'Arricia and Marquez, 
2004; Sengupta, 2007). Small business entrepreneurs can help in reducing information 
asymmetry problems and hence, financing constraints by sharing information with 
their banks and also documenting all their business transactions (Jappelli and Pagano, 
2001). Banks resolve these challenges by requesting for collateral from the 
entrepreneur to support the credit application (Keasey and Watson, 2000; Levenson 
and Willard, 2000) and also through the building of a durable relationship with the 
small business (Cole, 1998; Machauer and Weber, 2000). 
3.5.3.4 Venture capital 
Venture capital involves the combination of equity participation and active 
involvement in the management and development of a venture (Kunze, 1990). 
Venture capital is also the financing of independently owned businesses in the form of 
equity and serves as a conduit between the investors and the entrepreneur (Schilit, 
1991; Brander et al., 2002). Venture capital financing occurs in varying states of 
venture development. These include: seed investment, start-up financing, early-stage 
financing, expansion financing, later stage financing and special purpose financing 
(Brander et al., 2002; EVCA, 2004). The investment process of venture capital 
include; deal generations, screening of enterprises, valuation of assets, structuring of 
the deal, monitoring of the investments and exit from the investment (Timmons and 
Sapienza, 1992; Fried and Hisrich, 1988; Wright and Robbie, 1998). 
Similarly, the mode of financing by venture capitalists involves active 
management participation in the ventures being financed, the use of experience, 
contacts and reputation to support entrepreneurs (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Kaplan 
and Stromberg, 2001). It also involves the investment of capital at varying stages of 
78 
the business according to need (Gompers, 1995) and relies on equity as security for 
the investments (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1997). The investments of venture 
capitalists play an important role through their capital infusion, managerial expertise 
and networking and contribute significantly to employment generation, innovation, 
and economic growth of the economy (Mason and Harrison, 1999). 
3.5.4 Entrepreneurship and external sources of start-up capital 
The experienced entrepreneurs by virtue of their cumulative business 
experience may have generated a set of resources which places them in a better 
position to gain credit than the novice entrepreneurs for whom the business process of 
setting up and applying for their own businesses' credit is a comparatively new 
process (Wright et al., 1997a). In other words, the experienced entrepreneurs are able 
to establish more resources to attain and then sustain resources and capabilities 
(Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959) than the novice entrepreneurs, and this translates into 
the entrepreneurs being in a better position than novice entrepreneurs to successfully 
gain the external credit which they are seeking (Cressy, 1995; Westhead et al., 2004). 
Entrepreneurs who possess substantial business ownership experience and 
successful track records are expected to have made adequate personal savings, and 
with greater reputations, have better access to external sources of funds than the 
inexperienced novice entrepreneurs. Additionally, entrepreneurs rely on their 
networking abilities and availability of collateral in accessing funds from external 
sources including co-investors, supplier's credit, customer advance (bootstrap 
financing). Entrepreneurs with higher levels of human capital have less binding 
constraints in business start-ups. Financial institutions may perceive entrepreneurs 
with proven track records as being more credible than those having failed in their 
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initial venture. The expectations from the above discussions is that experienced 
entrepreneurs with proven track records and business reputations and collateral to 
report a higher level of use of external sources of start-up capital including co-
investors. From the above discussion, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
H2: Experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to report a higher level usage of 
external sources of start-up capital than inexperienced novice entrepreneurs at 
the start of a new venture. 
Education can be an important source of knowledge, skills, problem-solving 
ability, discipline, motivation and self-confidence (Cooper et al., 1994). Highly 
educated entrepreneurs do have their expectations raised and enhanced problem-
solving skills. It is argued that education provides the basis for the acquisition of the 
required skills for business development and success. Storey (1994 pp. 129) noted that 
'education is a key constituent of the human capital needed for business successes'. 
The level of education which is an attribute of the general human capital 
resource of the entrepreneur was included in the model. It is expected that 
entrepreneurs with university degrees are more likely to report a lower uasage of 
internal sources of capital but rather a higher usage of external sources of start-up 
capital due to their networking ability. From the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis can be derived: 
H3: Entrepreneurs with a higher level of education are more likely to report a 
lower usage of internal sources of start-up capital. 
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Access to finance for innovation has remained a challenge to small businesses 
in many developing countries because banks perceive an innovative project to be too 
costly and too risky to finance (Hall, 1989). Access to finance for innovative activities 
is even worse where peripheral location is considered as most banks and venture 
capitalists are located in conurbations and large towns (Martin et al., 2003; Mason and 
Harrison, 2002). The selectivity of financing innovative projects is also pronounced in 
regards to business size, as banks consider small business innovation projects as too 
risky (Mason and Harrison, 1994). Entrepreneurs engaged in process innovation are 
expected to rely on external sources of start-up capital to finance their new 
technology, new equipment, plants and machinery and improved raw material (Freel, 
2000). From the above discussion, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
H4: Entrepreneurs who introduced a process innovation are more likely to report a 
higher usage of external sources of start-up capital. 
The main sources of credit for Ghanaian exporters include personal savings, 
retained earnings, friends and relations, supplier's credit, advance payments, export 
financing schemes, and formal financial institutions (Ghana Export Promotion 
Council, 1986 pp. 2-3). Businesses engaged in exporting activities require additional 
finance beyond the owner's savings and retained profit (Buasti, 2002). It is therefore 
expected that entrepreneurs engaged in exporting activity wil l rely more on external 
sources of start-up capital - including the co-investors and suppliers credit, rather than 
on using personal savings and other internal sources of start-up capital. The exporting 
activities of entrepreneurs are expected to influence the source of start-up capital. 
From the above discussion, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
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Hs: Entrepreneurs engaged in exporting activities are more likely to report a higher 
usage of external sources of start-up capital. 
3.6 Obstacles to bank lending to small business entrepreneurs 
When raising finance in the formal financial market small business 
entrepreneurs face market inequalities (Binks and Ennew, 1996; Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006). These market inequalities are the result of information asymmetry that 
might occur between the lender and the small business entrepreneur (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Greenwald et al., 1984). This information asymmetry problem is likely 
to lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Zeller, 1994; Das, 2004). 
To resolve this situation, the bank will introduce screening devices to sort out 
high risk and low risk entrepreneurs. However, the high costs associated with 
screening and monitoring makes this activity unattractive to the banks. Hence, banks 
may charge higher interest rates to compensate for the screening activity (Tucker and 
Lean, 2001; Malhotra et al., 2006). This high interest rate also has the tendency of 
discouraging low risk entrepreneurs from seeking credit and will leave the credit 
market allowing only high risk entrepreneurs to remain. This will lower the bank's 
expected return and thus increase its risk (Hallberg, 2000). 
Other factors identified as being major obstacles to bank lending to small 
business entrepreneurs include: a lack of entrepreneurial equity in the business, high 
credit risk, poor business information, unreliable financial data, unavailability of 
collateral, and vulnerability to market fluctuations (UNCTAD, 2001; Wagenvoort, 
2003). Besides these, additional factors such as a lack of a significant credit history, 
inadequate equity capital on the balance sheet, limited market power and the lack of 
management skills affects the risk profile of the entrepreneur (Abereijo and Fayomi, 
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2005). Moreover, the entrepreneurial characteristics such as level of education, prior 
ownership experience, and the wealth of the individual or family resources will play a 
significant role in the entrepreneur's access to credit (Cavalluzo, 1999). Bates (1991) 
has noted that commercial banks have lending preferences for small business 
entrepreneurs with higher human and social capital, higher profitability and a viable 
market associated with business viability. 
To avoid the above scenarios banks will request for collateral to enable them 
to sort out high risk and low risk entrepreneurs (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003) or reject 
the application outright (Malhotra et al., 2006; Inderst and Muller, 2007). This action 
of the bank will lead to adverse selection - that is 'honest' entrepreneurs reject the 
loan offer and exit the credit market leaving the lender with a higher risk portfolio 
(Jaffee and Russell, 1976). On the other hand 'dishonest' entrepreneurs will prefer a 
higher risk project with an increased interest rate than a lower risk project. The failure 
of the small business to perform to meet the required standard and the inability of the 
bank to effectively monitor the project will lead to the problem of moral hazard 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This is likely to decrease the expected return for the bank. 
The use of collateral is therefore seen as a measure by the lender to insure against 
credit default and also to ensure the entrepreneur's quality and repayment capability 
(Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Cowling and 
Westhead, 1996). The use of collateral is inevitable in credit contacts as this is 
positively related to the observably riskier entrepreneurs (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
and banks very often base their collateral requirements on the perceived risk (Berger 
and Udell, 1990) which will not only hinder access to credit (Cowling and Westhead, 
1996) but, credit wil l actually not be granted i f the entrepreneur fails to provide 
collateral (Manove et al., 2001). Additionally, collateral usage depicts the quality of 
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the entrepreneur which is positively related to the value of the collateral offered (Chan 
and Kanatas, 1985). In a lender-borrower relationship, the presence of the above 
challenges and the inability of the entrepreneur to provide collateral security may lead 
to the lender either rationing credit or rejecting the credit application outright (Bester, 
1987; Binks and Ennew, 1996; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). The next sections 
examine the factors affecting the availability and accessibility of bank credit to small 
business entrepreneurs. 
3.6.1 Factors affecting the availability of bank credit to small business 
entrepreneurs 
The ability of entrepreneurs to access finance is positively correlated to the 
availability of a well-structured financial market and the economic climate which is 
able to link up these entrepreneurs to the suitable lenders who are willing to finance 
their business activities (Observatory of European SME, 2003; Malhotra et al., 2006). 
Additionally, the capability and willingness of banks to lend to entrepreneurs is 
dependant on the viability of the financial institutions structures and the lending 
infrastructure in which both the bank and the entrepreneurs operate (Berger and Udell, 
2002). 
The attitude of most banks towards lending to entrepreneurs especially in 
developing countries as a result of the perceived risk and high transaction costs of 
lending to these entrepreneurs led to the discovery of a 'credit crunch' in most 
developing countries (Atieno, 2001; van Eeden et al., 2003; Ogujiuba et al., 2004; and 
Okurut et al., 2005). Very often, this lack of lending is not due to the lack of funds to 
lend by the banks, but rather an evidence of a more cautious lending approach as a 
consequence of higher bank profitability requirements. Banks do compete intensively 
for investors (shareholders) who are expectant of a higher return for their investments. 
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Thus, in order to prove their efficiency and favourable rating, banks adopting a 
shareholder value culture, will therefore lend to the entrepreneur with a low risk 
attitude and a higher profitability returns (European Commission, 2003). 
Commercial bank loans are mostly short-term (within a year) and often limited 
to the urban areas i f not the capital cities (UNCTAD, 1995). Besides, their financing 
activities are concentrated on established large enterprises and creditworthy 
entrepreneurs (Webster, 1991). In view of these developments, the banks are reluctant 
to consider small business and particularly entrepreneurs in the agricultural sector, 
rural areas and start-ups which they consider highly risky (Webster, 1991; Levy, 
1993; UNCTAD, 1995; Asian Development Bank, 2003). The availability of bank 
credit to entrepreneurs is largely influenced by the following factors: - the costs of 
capital, the costs associated with enforcement and bankruptcy, the financing of 
government deficits, competition from state-owned enterprises, the bank-entrepreneur 
relationship and the geographical distance between the entrepreneur and the bank. 
This section now examines in details these factors and their effect on credit 
availability to the entrepreneur. 
3.6.1.1 The costs of capital 
The cost of capital is a major determining factor in the accessibility of bank 
credit by entrepreneurs and small businesses. Banks set their interest rates based on 
the average cost of funds, market competition and transaction costs (Aryeetey et al., 
1994). Additionally, banks take into account in setting the interest rate the sector in 
which the business operates, the collateral offered, the previous experience of the 
borrower and the track record of the business (Monge-Naranjo et al., 2001). External 
finance tends to be more expensive for small businesses than for larger businesses 
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because the fixed costs of lending are not proportional to the size of the loan 
(Wagenvoort, 2003c). This price differential is largely caused by the perceived risk 
profile of the entrepreneur by the banks (European Commission, 2003). Banks 
therefore tend to charge a commission on this perceived risk and apply rigid screening 
measures to increase the costs of capital to the small business (Abereijo and Fayomi, 
2005). 
3.6.1.2 Enforcement and bankruptcy costs 
In almost all bank lending there is the probability of default. However, the 
default rate is normally high with small businesses and in particular amongst novice 
entrepreneurs compared to habitual entrepreneurs (Westhead et al., 2003). Thus, 
banks tend to secure their lending with collateral security. In a case of a default by an 
entrepreneur, a bank wil l file for bankruptcy in order to execute the guarantee. In 
situations where the judicial system is imperfect with numerous delays and 
adjournments, the lender wil l have to wait for a long period to receive judgement and 
execute the guarantee for repayment of the loan. In view of this imperfect 
enforcement of contracts, bank will prefer to limit an entrepreneur's leverage in order 
to improve its incentives and increase its probability of repayments. Therefore, the 
bank will deliberately impose credit constraints on the small business. 
3.6.1.3 Financing government deficits 
Another determining factor of the availability of bank credit to entrepreneurs 
is the financing of government budget deficits. Banks in many developing countries 
find it easier, convenient, less risky and more profitable to finance government 
deficits (Levitsky, 1997). Financing a government deficit is considered to be a safe 
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investment of banks deposit and to provide higher returns on this investment. This 
practice will eventually increase the lending rates and reduce the amount of funds 
available for on ward lending to small businesses (Sacerdoti, 2005; Aberreijo and 
Fayomi, 2005). 
3.6.1.4 Competition from state-owned enterprises 
Furthermore, competition from State-Owned Enterprises affects the 
availability of bank credit to small businesses. State-Owned Enterprises have 
relatively easy access to bank finance because there is the belief that the state is 
unlikely to default and normally large amounts in one credit transaction is more 
profitable to the bank in terms of transaction costs and monitoring than lending to 
numerous entrepreneurs in different locations with different projects and different 
entrepreneurial ideas and behaviours. Banks are therefore willing to lend to State-
Owned Enterprises at the expense of small businesses. Although in many cases, the 
interest rates are below the market rate for small businesses, the large volume of credit 
transaction compensates the reduction in interest rates (World Bank, 2004b). 
3.6.1.5 Government policies on loan pricing and lending directives 
Government policies on interest rates and lending most often affect the 
availability of bank credit to small businesses negatively than positively. The capping 
of interest rates by monetary authorities have the tendency of discouraging banks 
from lending to perceived high risk small businesses (Aryeeyey et al., 1994). Again, 
the directives by government for banks to lend to a particular sector also have the 
tendency of reducing bank lending to small businesses. 
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3.6.1.6 Bank - entrepreneur relationship 
A bank-entrepreneur relationship it is argued ensures the availability and 
transparency of information between banks and entrepreneurs. This is useful in 
combating the problems of information asymmetry. A durable and efficient 
relationship will therefore be beneficial to both the bank and the entrepreneur. The 
bank receives adequate and reliable information on the entrepreneur's quality thereby 
reducing information asymmetry and this reduces credit rationing of the entrepreneur 
(Angelini et al., 1998). 
The entrepreneur on the other hand enjoys a lower lending rate, a reduced 
collateral requirement and an improved credit availability (Diamond, 1991; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994; Boot and Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berger and Udell, 
1995; Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Bodt et al., 2005) and is therefore not credit 
constrained (Hoshi et al., 1990a). In contrast to this view, other researchers have 
found that the price of credit increases as the banking relationship matures 
(Greenbaum et al., 1989; Sharpe, 1990; and Wilson, 1993). It is argued that in the 
bank-entrepreneur relationship banks initially subsidise the credit price and are 
reimbursed later when the banking relationship matures. Lehmann and Neuberger 
(2001) find that loan rates do not depend on the duration of the banking relationship. 
A bank has the advantage of using the patronage of its products and services to 
determine the entrepreneur's quality. By monitoring its customer's use of these 
services, the bank is able to generate additional information on the entrepreneur's 
financial position (Cole, 1998). The dependence of a bank's financial services by the 
entrepreneurs determines the availability of credit for the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs 
can reduce their credit constraints and increase credit availability by building a 
durable relationship with their banks which will help overcome the asymmetric 
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information problems. Lower quality entrepreneurs have to look around for a source 
for credit from multiple sources. Thus, banks will be reluctant in extending credit to 
entrepreneurs with multiple sources of bank credit. Entrepreneurs with multiple 
sources of banks credit are charged higher interest rates (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
3.6.1.7 Distance between business and bank 
Geographical distance between banks and entrepreneurs is a determining 
factor in the bank lending decision stressing the importance of distance in the 
availability and pricing of bank loans (Alessandrini et al., 2006). When banks are 
unable to observe businesses' locations or are debarred from pricing loans differently 
to different entrepreneurs, the loan will be priced uniformly. On the other hand, i f 
banks are able to observe the entrepreneur's location and price the loan based on this 
knowledge, then the bank wil l be practicing spatial price discrimination. In bank 
lending - especially to small businesses, distance plays a major role in determining 
whether a bank wil l lend or not in a community (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Brevoort 
and Hannan, 2006). 
With an increase in competition banks are forced to concentrate their lending 
on small businesses within their community. With the advent of improved 
communication technology and the use of computing and technology to increase the 
availability and timeliness of hard information, banks are now able to lend more to 
businesses located in distant areas without making poorer decisions (Petersen and 
Rajan, 2002). However, the probability of loan default by small businesses is likely to 
increase with the lender-borrower distance (DeYoung et al., 2008b). Distance is also a 
determining factor in the bank's cost of monitoring the entrepreneur. The 
transportation costs involved in visiting the premises of the entrepreneur increases 
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with distance. This additional cost will influence the pricing of the loan to the 
borrower. 
3.6.2 Factors affecting the accessibility of bank credit by small business 
entrepreneurs 
A number of factors can be identified as being the main obstacles to bank 
lending to small businesses. These are: a lack of entrepreneurial equity in business, a 
high credit risk, poor business information, unreliable financial data, unavailability of 
collateral, and vulnerability to market fluctuations (UNCTAD, 2001; Wagenvoort, 
2003c). When raising finance in the formal financial market small businesses face 
market inequalities (Binks and Ennew, 1996; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). These 
market inequalities are the results of information asymmetry that might occur between 
the lender and the small business (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Greenwald et al., 1984). 
This information asymmetry problem is likely to lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Zeller, 1994; Das, 2004). Banks consider small businesses as higher risk 
ventures and therefore charge them higher interest rates compared to large firms 
(Pissarides, 1999). This arises partly because small businesses are unable to provide 
adequate collateral to support their loan applications, have poor credit history, 
uncertainty about the entrepreneur's ability and repayment capacity (Abereijo and 
Fayomi, 2005; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). 
In an entrepreneur-bank- relationship, the presence of information asymmetry 
may lead to a higher transaction and monitoring costs (Tucker and Lean, 2003). This 
information asymmetry problem may lead to quality borrowers being denied credit or 
the acceptance of riskier borrower's application. To resolve this, the bank will 
introduce a screening device to sort out high risk and low risk borrowers. However, 
the high costs associated with screening and monitoring makes this activity 
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unattractive to the banks. Hence, banks may charge higher interest rates to 
compensate for the screening activity (Tucker and Lean, 2001; Malhotra et al., 2006). 
However, the high interest rate wil l discourage low risk borrowers from seeking credit 
and will leave the credit market allowing only high risk borrowers to remain. This will 
lower the bank's expected return and thus increase its risk (Hallberg, 2000). To avoid 
this, the bank will make a request for collateral to enable them to sort out high risk 
and low risk borrowers (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003) or reject the application outright 
(Inderst and Muller, 2007; Malhotra et al., 2006). 
A number of studies have argued that the main problem in bank lending to 
small businesses is the issue of moral hazard (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995). 
Hence, bank demand for collateral is to minimise or eliminate possible loss of 
investment (La Porta et al., 1998). The protection of creditor rights which includes the 
right to repossess collateral helps banks mitigate the problem of moral hazard (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). A number of factors may influence the type and size of collateral 
demanded by the bank. Among these are the size of the loan (Leeth and Scott, 1989), 
the size of business (Avery et al., 1998), a durable relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Boot, 2000) and the reputation of the entrepreneur 
(Diamond, 1989). 
This action of the bank will lead to adverse selection; that is, 'honest' 
borrowers reject the loan offer and exit the credit market leaving the lender with a 
higher risk portfolio (Jaffee and Russell, 1976). On the other hand 'dishonest' 
borrowers will prefer a higher risk project with an increased interest rate than a lower 
risk project. The failure of the small business to perform to meet the required standard 
and the inability of the bank to effectively monitor the project will lead to the problem 
of moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This is likely to decrease the expected 
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return for the bank. Hence, the bank will react by rationing credit to the small business 
(Binks and Ennew, 1996; Bester, 1987). 
Overtime, the financial needs and requirements of small businesses change 
and develop, hence their sources change as they journey through the growth stages 
(Steel and Webster, 1992). Start-up businesses depend heavily on internal sources of 
finance. Notably these are personal savings, contributions from friends and relations, 
business associates, retained earnings, supplier's credit and consumer credit for 
business growth and development (Aryeetey et al., 1994; Okoh and Ping, 2000; 
Bigsten et al., 2000; Nissanke, 2001; Atieno, 2001). Over the years, these businesses 
build a track record which attracts both private and public investors into their 
businesses that is business angles and venture capitalists. 
Most empirical work done in developing countries on small business access to 
external finance has shown that small business entrepreneurs face a myriad of 
challenges (Aryeetey et al., 1994; Baydas et al., 1994; Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; 
Okurut et al., 2005; Tagoe et al., 2005). These formal financial institutions which 
includes; commercial banks, finance companies, loans and savings companies, 
brokerage firms, leasing companies and venture capitalists have been reluctant in 
financing small businesses for a number of reasons. The next section examines some 
of these reasons. Notably these include the perceived high risk associated with small 
business borrowing, the high interest rate payment, the high administrative costs 
involved in small business lending, and the absence of business information leading to 
information asymmetric problems, the unavailability of collateral and the competition 
in the banking sector. 
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3.6.2.1 Perceived high risk borrowers 
Most small businesses encounter several challenges in their day to day 
business transactions. They face problems such as insufficient assets, increasing 
liabilities and low capitalisation, a lack of tangible collateral, vulnerability to market 
fluctuations, inadequate managerial skills, a lack of demand, and a shortage of 
working capital, poor turnover, and high mortality rates (Sarder, 2001; Ting, 2004; 
UPS, 2005). Banks and other financial institutions therefore regard small businesses 
as high risk borrowers (Schiffer and Weder, 2001; Lieholm, 2002) and as such are 
reluctant in financing them (UNCTAD, 1999). Lending to small businesses is 
perceived to be high risk because banks face difficulties collecting relevant business 
information to assess their credit applications and most of these businesses lack the 
requisite collateral to secure the facility. Even where credits are granted, monitoring 
of these credits is not only difficult but costly especially with micro enterprises, they 
keep relocating from their known locations, and sometimes even disappear. This 
leaves banks with numerous non-performing loan portfolios (Aryeetey and Fenny, 
2006). 
Additionally, most banks are basically urban located with a few of their 
branches located within the rural areas. They consider lending to a small business as a 
high risk venture and are therefore reluctant in serving small businesses with small 
credit request but, rather deal with larger businesses with larger loan request (Abereijo 
and Fayomi, 2005). Banks prefer offering loans to larger and well established 
businesses which they consider more profitable compared to small businesses often 
considered to be associated with high default rates (Wagenvoort 2003). Moreover, 
banks perceive small business's credit requests as difficult to process inview of the 
problem of asymmetric information. Most inexperience novice entrepreneurs are 
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unable to convince their banks about the viability of their projects (Binks and Ennew, 
1996). 
3.6.2.2 High interest rate payment: 
Compared to large businesses, small businesses do pay higher interest on loans 
they secure from banks and other formal financial institutions and also have to comply 
with more restrictive requirements in order to obtain credit (World Bank, 2004b). For 
instance, in a survey of 33 countries on a World Bank project on financing small 
businesses, it was noted that in absolute terms, small businesses pay higher interest 
rates ranging between 24-33 percent (Webster, 1991; Aryeetey et al., 1994). It is 
argued that access to finance, rather than the cost of finance, constitute a constraint to 
small business's growth and development (Wattanapruttipaisan, 2003). It is also 
argued that these small businesses will prefer having access to bank credit at even a 
double the interest rate which is still lower than obtaining these loans from finance 
houses and informal sources such as money lenders or grey markets (Asian 
Development Bank, 2003). Rates from these markets may be as high as 30% per 
month on a short term monthly loan and between 5 and 10% per month for a long-
term loan of a year's maturity (UNCTAD, 1995; Aryeetey et al., 1994). 
Besides the interest rate, banks charge additional fees such as application fees, 
service fees and administrative expenses when extending credit to potential borrowers 
(Atieno, 1999; Monge-Naranjo et al., 2001). In addition to these fees, the entrepreneur 
is confronted with expenses for the use of expertise such as business advisory service 
provider, an accountant, valuation expert, a guarantor (co-signer in the case of micro-
firms), borrower's time and the transportation cost involved in credit negotiations 
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(Danos et al., 1989). The distance between the entrepreneur and the bank also 
determines the transaction costs (Degryse and Ongena, 2005). 
3.6.2.3 High administrative cost of small business lending 
Generally, administrative costs of lending are fixed irrespective of the size of 
the facility. Administrative cost normally includes the visitation to the entrepreneur's 
business site to gather information, processes the credit application and the 
monitoring of the credit facility granted (Binks and Ennew, 1997; Hallberg, 2000; 
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Berger and Frame, 2007). However, the administrative 
cost for the small business is higher compared to that of larger enterprises for reasons 
such as unavailability of business information leading to information asymmetry, the 
location of small businesses - often further away from the banks, and the reluctance of 
bank officers to serve the numerous small businesses compared to a one off deal with 
a larger enterprise (Green, 2003). 
As a consequence banks do charge higher interest when lending to small 
businesses to generate the required return (Pissarides, 1999). Therefore, banks charge 
a relatively lower interest rate to larger and well established businesses with adequate 
assets for collateral and more reliable business information (Wagenvoort 2003). The 
next section therefore examines the effect of an absence of business information in a 
bank-entrepreneur lending transactions. 
3.6.2.4 Absence of business information 
A lender-entrepreneur relationship provides the lender with adequate 
information on the entrepreneur's creditworthiness, managerial style, and 
entrepreneur's strengths and weaknesses through negotiations. Banks examine all 
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potential borrowers by analysing the information the entrepreneur provides. The 
absence of good record keeping and credible financial data makes it difficult for banks 
to evaluate their potential borrowers and to be able to distinguish good and bad 
projects. Banks are therefore reluctant in financing entrepreneurs who will pretend to 
be submitting high quality projects but keep all negative information about the project 
(von Eije et al., 2003). This information wil l allow the bank to determine the terms 
and conditions the credit must take. The availability of information will enable the 
lender to monitor the operations of the business to avoid moral hazard problems 
(Cole, 1998). The absence of business information on the other hand will induce the 
information asymmetry problem between the lender and the entrepreneur. In effect the 
entrepreneur wil l pay a higher interest rate, pledge more collateral and this is likely to 
reduce the availability of credit. The next section examines the effect of information 
asymmetry on entrepreneur's access to bank credit. 
3.6.2.5 Asymmetric information: 
One of the prerequisites of lending is that relevant information must be shared 
by both lender and borrower; however, this is not the case in bank lending. Most 
entrepreneurs have more knowledge about the viability of their projects and their 
ability and preparedness to repay than the banks. Banks are therefore confronted with 
the situation of uncertainty with its associated risk of default. This information 
asymmetry leads to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (von Eije et 
al., 2003). The presence of information asymmetry between the banks and small 
businesses causes the reluctant of banks to lend to small businesses (Binks et al., 
1992; Angelini et al., 1998), thus leading the banks to react in three ways (Tucker and 
Lean, 2003); (i) the bank wil l accept a loan application from the small businesses, but 
96 
with an increasing collateral requirement to solve the moral hazard problem; (ii) the 
bank will accept a loan application from the small businesses, but with a higher 
interest rate to solve the adverse selection problem and; (iii) the bank will reject the 
loan application to solve moral hazard and computer credit scoring problems. The 
total exclusion of these types of borrowers from the credit market is commonly 
referred to as Redlining. 
In a loan contract between a bank and small business entrepreneurs, a situation 
may arise where the probability of default increases with the interest rate. This may 
imply that the quality of an entrepreneur worsens with a rising cost of borrowing. This 
situation is referred to as adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Besley, 1994; 
Winker 1999). In a typical loan contract the entrepreneur's effort is a determining 
factor in the probability of success of the project, which however is unobservable to 
the bank. An increase in the leverage ratio of the small business leads to a fall in the 
effort of the entrepreneur, because the entrepreneur receives less of the gain while the 
lender receives more (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Besley, 1994; Winker, 1999). 
The presence of the information asymmetry problem between the lender and 
the entrepreneur wil l result in the bank rationing credit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Zeller, 1994; Das, 2004). Banks therefore require entrepreneurs to provide collateral 
as a sign of determining their creditworthiness (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003), and 
reject the application without collateral support (Inderst and Muller, 2004; Malhotra et 
al., 2006). The following section therefore examines the effect of collateral 
availability. 
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3.6.2.6 Availability of collateral 
Collateral plays a significant role in the bank-entrepreneur relationship by 
decreasing the riskiness of a given credit and by giving the lender an opportunity to 
claim the collateral and still maintaining its power to claim against the entrepreneur 
(Barro, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Berger and Udell, 1990). The quality of the 
entrepreneur is positively related to the amount of collateral pledged in the loan 
contract (Chan and Kanatas, 1985). Collateral is a significant factor in a bank-
entrepreneur relationship to the extent that without the pledging of collateral or the 
right to claim the collateral in times of default and dispute, the credit will not be 
extended to the entrepreneur by the bank (Manove et al., 2001). In situations were the 
bank has little or no knowledge about the quality of the entrepreneur, the bank uses 
collateral as a device to sort out entrepreneurs (Jimenez and Saurina, 2003). 
Entrepreneurs signal their quality by the assignment of collateral to the bank 
and are known to the entrepreneurs that a default on the loan triggers loses of the 
assigned collateral (Barro, 1976; Green, 2003). There is a negative correlation 
between collateral and the price of a loan in that, with given collateral, a good 
entrepreneur will demand a lower loan rate. At a higher interest rate, a good quality 
entrepreneur is willing to pledge more collateral in exchange for a lower interest rate. 
On the other hand a bad quality entrepreneur is willing to pledge less collateral with a 
rise in interest rate (Aivazian et al., 2004). A bank is therefore likely to deny credit to 
the entrepreneurs i f the entrepreneur lacks collateral (IFC, 2000; Miller, 2001; Inderst 
and Muller, 2007). The acceptance of the collateral by the bank is dependent on proof 
of ownership, the value of the collateral, the marketability of the collateral and the 
absence of other interested parties. 
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In developed economies such as the United States, 92% of all commercial 
loans are secured (IFC, 2000), therefore in the developing counties collateral 
requirements in small business financing is not only a necessary condition but, also a 
rigid requirement for lending, repayment and for offsetting losses in case of a default 
(Otero and Lopez, 2001; Aryeetey et al., 1994). In some cases an upfront (refundable) 
deposit as penalty for late repayment are charged in addition to the high interest rate 
and collateral requirements (Webster, 1991; Holtmann et al., 2000). 
3.6.2.7 Competition in the banking sector 
Besides these factors, small businesses are confronted with other challenges 
that make the accessibility to bank credit difficult or impossible. Recent competition 
and technological and regulatory changes in the banking sectors has lead to greater 
market concentration (Petersen and Ragan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2004; Berger 
and DeYoung, 2006). Banks are merging to become universal and also closing down 
most of their branches in distant locations (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2001). The 
important impact of this change is that these new banks are focusing on international 
and large businesses and at the same time being unable to meet the relationship 
banking required by small businesses to access credit. The result is that most banks 
are unable to meet the financing requirements of these small businesses (Alessandrini 
et al., 2006). 
Another impact of these changes is that most banks as a result of the universal 
banking system have resort to centralise their credit lending decisions (Berger et al., 
1999). The final credit decision maker is therefore further away from the small 
business entrepreneur, and hence a poorer chance of accessing credit. Again the 
technological changes means banks are adopting more complex and sophisticated 
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methods of processing credit applications (Berger and Frame, 2007). The implication 
of this new approach is that higher credit scores and entrepreneurial quality are 
required. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The chapter has examined the financing of small businesses in relation to the 
structure of financing used by small business, their sources of finance specifically at 
start-up stages, the availability and accessibility of bank credit by the small business 
entrepreneur. Small businesses play an important role in the national economies of 
most countries. The financing of small business therefore is of great interest to policy 
makers. 
Four theories of the capital structure of the small businesses were examined. 
These included: the agency theory, the pecking order theory, the market timing theory 
and trade-off theory. Of these theories, empirical studies have shown that small 
businesses follow the pecking order theory in financing their business. The 
determinant of a small business capital structure is also dependents on both the 
entrepreneur and business characterictics. 
The chapter revealed that small business source their finance first with internal 
sources of capital such as personal savings, pensions, gifts and loans from relations 
and friends (Acs, 1985; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; 
Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006). As the business grows the entrepreneur supplements the 
financing needs of the business with external finance notable co-investors, supplier's 
credit and customer advances, bank overdraft and loans, (Aryeetey et al., 1994; 
Findings Africa Region, 1994; Manigart and Struyf, 1997; Hamilton and Fox, 1998; 
Heino, 2006; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). 
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The chapter also discussed the obstacles of bank lending to small business 
entrepreneurs which revealed the information asymmetry problems and its 
contribution to credit rationing. The availability of bank credit to small business 
entrepreneurs is dependent on the costs of capital, the financing of government 
deficits, competition from state-owned enterprises, the policies of government on loan 
pricing and lending, the relationship between banks and entrepreneurs and the 
distance between the banks and the entrepreneur business (World Bank, 2004b; 
Abereijo and Fayomi, 2005; Bodt et al., 2005; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006). Similarly, 
the accessibility of bank credit to the small business entrepreneur is also dependent on 
the perceived high risk of borrowers, the high interest rate payment by entrepreneurs, 
the high administrative costs involved in small business lending, the problems of 
information asymmetry and the availability of collateral (Inderst and Muller, 2007). 
The availability and accessibility of external finance to small business 
entrepreneurs is an important aspect of the operations of small business as this 
complements the internal sources of capital for growth and development. However, 
small business lending is associated with information asymmetry and the lack of 
collateral. As a result banks are unable to determine the creditworthiness of the 
entrepreneur and therefore resort to rationing credit in an attempt to resolve the 
information asymmetry problems. The next chapter reveals the concept of credit 
rationing, by first examining the theoretical basis for its existence and the empirical 
evidence of credit rationing in both developed and developing economies. 
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Chapter 4 
Credit Rationing 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the financing of small businesses. More 
specifically the previous chapter outlined the capital structure and sources of finance 
and the problems small businesses and entrepreneurs face in accessing finance. 
Throughout the review it was evident that access to finance has been and continues to 
be a major constraint to small business performance, growth and development. 
Researchers and policy-makers have acknowledged the difficulties small 
businesses encounter in accessing external finance, in particular debt finance (Sowa et 
al., 1992; Levy, 1993; Parker et al., 1995; Pissarides, 1999; Levitsky and Prasad, 
1989; Berger and Udell, 2002; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). The challenges 
confronting small businesses in accessing finance has been attributed to the problems 
of information asymmetry which leads to the rationing of bank credit to small 
businesses (Winker, 1999; Fioretti, 2005). The theoretical arguments explaining the 
existence (Blinder and Stiglitz, 1983; Besanko and Thakor 1987a, 1987b) or 
otherwise (Williamson, 1987; De Meza and Webb, 1987; Milder and Riley, 1988; 
Parker, 2002) of credit rationing has well been established. 
This chapter reviews the literature on credit rationing. The previous literature 
on credit rationing had focused on market imperfection or information asymmetry. 
Some empirical results have shown the existence of excess demand over supply or 
credit rationing of loan applicants (entrepreneurs). However, the problem has been 
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which particular entrepreneur is actually credit rationed (Amano, 1999). This study 
therefore attempts to f i l l this gap in the literature. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In section two the concept of credit 
rationing is reviewed. Section three presents the various definitions of credit rationing, 
credit constraints and discouraged borrowers. Section four discusses the equilibrium 
credit rationing which examined the Stiglitz - Weiss (1981) credit rationing model 
and their criticisms. Section five discusses information availability and bank lending 
decisions. Section six examines the role of relationship lending in bank lending 
decisions. Section seven discusses the role of collateral in bank lending decisions. 
Section eight examines the literature on small business entrepreneurs and access to 
credit. Section nine discusses the impact of geographical distance and bank lending 
decisions. Section ten examines the influence of uncertainties and trust characteristics 
in bank lending decisions. Section eleven presents a review on empirical evidence on 
credit rationing. Section twelve concludes the chapter. 
4.2 The concept of credit rationing 
Over the last 50 years, the concept of credit rationing has received 
considerable attention in both the theoretical and empirical literature. The credit 
rationing argument plays an important role in the transmission of monetary policy. 
Proponents of the availability doctrine in the 1950s have explained that monetary 
policy operations may be suitable through a rationing channel rather than an interest 
rate channel (Roosa, 1951; Kareken, 1957; Scott, 1957). The motivation for this 
argument was attributed to an adhoc price rigidity concept. Scott (1957) has argued 
that irrespective of the elasticity of demand for borrowed funds, a restrictive monetary 
policy on money supply is likely to cause a reduction in the availability of bank credit 
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to individual borrowers. Arrow (1963) has also demonstrated how the presence of 
information asymmetry in competitive markets can generate an inefficient allocation 
of resources. 
The availability doctrine emphasized the reductions in the money supply 
which would have significant restrictive effects on spending, even i f they result in 
only a small interest rate increase or i f spending is not or only insufficiently curtailed 
by such an increase (Baltensperger, 1978). An understanding of the nature of credit 
rationing and its role in the allocation of credit is important. This will aid an 
explanation for the entire array of market behaviour ranging from how monetary 
policy can influence the economy even i f demand for money is relatively interest rate 
inelastic to issues of credit allocation (Vandell, 1984). The earlier researchers made 
efforts to explain the existence of credit rationing by means of a ful l information 
framework and various market imperfections. 
Hodgman (1960) pointed out that the earlier explanations on credit rationing 
resulted from assuming that interest rates are sticky for one reason or another, an 
approach that more or less amounts to assuming what is to be explained. Hodgman 
(1960) essentially concentrated in showing that a bank's supply of credit to an 
individual entrepreneur could and was likely to become perfectly inelastic or even 
backwards bending. At a particular rate of interest, no increase in the loan rate can 
induce the bank to increase the amount of credit the bank is willing to extend. This 
hypothesis was essentially based on the existence of default risk. In essence it is 
important to state that after a certain loan size is reached, no increase in the rate of 
interest can compensate the bank for the increased default risk associated with a 
further increase in the size of the loan (Hodgman, 1960). This, however, is based on 
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the assumption that the entrepreneur's final wealth and ability to repay the loan is 
finite. 
Hodgman's (1960) paper received comments from Chase (1961), Ryder 
(1962) and Miller (1962). Chase (1961) criticised Hodgman's (1960) analysis on the 
grounds that ability to repay is not independent of the size of the loan. He argued that 
the respective assessments by the entrepreneur and the bank of the profitability of an 
investment are unlikely to differ to the degree required to explain credit rationing. 
Information possession affects the behaviour of people in many situations. 
Where two parties in a transaction do not possess the same level of information about 
the transaction, then the situation of information asymmetry arises. The ground laying 
works of George Akerlof (1970), Michael Spence (1973) and Joseph Stiglitz (1975) 
outlined the concept of information asymmetry. Akerlof s (1970) market for lemons 
argues that both sellers and buyers may possess different information about a 
particular product in the market. The seller may be in possession of private 
information about the product for which the buyer is uninformed. He further argued 
that the absence of any probability of screening, signalling or bargaining gives the 
seller of the product (car) an incentive to sell inferior goods to the buyer as well as a 
reduction in the size of the market. 
Spence (1973) in his signalling model considered the market where the 
individual signaller interprets the market under conditions of uncertainty. Spence 
(1973) posits that in the labour market, the employer hires an employee under the 
condition of uncertainty about the employee's productive capabilities. He argued 
further that this information is unlikely to be available to the employer immediately 
after hiring, and the employer will require some amount of time to identify the 
employee's productive capabilities. The uncertainty about the employee's productive 
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capabilities is considered an investment decision under uncertainty. The employer's 
probability of gaining a good investment is dependent on prior work experience. On 
the other hand, employees in the market manage their wage schedules based on their 
signals and indices. 
Stiglitz (1975) explored the employer's ability to screen the potential 
employees into various groups of productive capabilities. He considered screening as 
the identification of qualities and argues that without screening individual employees 
are likely to receive wages proportional to the average productivity of employees. 
However, where screening is applied in identifying high quality employees, then their 
wages are more likely to be higher. Stiglitz (1975) further observed that, the presence 
of lower productivity employees reduces the income of higher productivity 
employees. On the other hand, the presence of higher productivity employees 
increases the income of lower productivity employees. 
Thus, Akerlof s (1970) market for lemons theory, Spence's (1973) signalling 
model and Stiglitz's (1975) screening model laid the ground work for the concept of 
information asymmetry to explain many economic phenomena including the concept 
of credit rationing. Credit rationing is associated with market failure which occurs in a 
competitive market where lenders are unwilling to lend to specific borrowers as a 
result of information asymmetry (Besley, 1994) or where demand for credit exceeds 
the supply (Petrick, 2005). The definition of credit rationing is therefore reviewed in 
the next section. 
4.3 Definition of credit rationing, credit constraint and discouraged borrowers 
Based on different focuses researchers have defined theoretically the concept 
of credit rationing in diverse ways. In their article 'A Theory and Test of Credit 
106 
Rationing' Jaffee and Modigliani (1969 pp. 851) defined equilibrium rationing as 'a 
situation occurring when the loan rate is set at its long-run equilibrium level'. They 
referred to a dynamic rationing 'as a short run situation in which the loan rate has not 
been fully adjusted to the long-run optimal level' (Jaffee and Modigliani, 1969 pp: 
851). According to Baltensperger (1978 pp. 172) credit rationing signifies 'a condition 
where the demand for loans exceeds the supply at the ruling price'. This credit 
rationing condition occurs where prices persistently remain at the level where demand 
exceeds supply. This condition will allow lenders to ration credit instead of increasing 
the interest rate. A review of the literature on the definition of credit rationing, credit 
constraints and discouraged borrowers are presented below. This is supported by the 
table in Appendix 1 on the definition of credit rationing. 
4.3.1 Credit rationing 
In defining credit rationing, various factors have been used in the literature 
(Petrick, 2005). Kochar (1997), Turvey and Weersink (1997), Perez (1998), Okoh and 
Ping (2000), Foltz (2004), Petrick (2005), Steijvers and Voordeckers (2007), all 
defined credit rationing as a situation in which the demand for credit exceeds the 
supply of credit at the prevailing interest rate. Other scholars such as Baydas et al. 
(1994), Parker (2002), Pruteanu (2004), Abor and Biekpe (2006), Piga and Atzeni 
(2007), Freel (2007), and Nykvist (2008) have defined credit rationing based on the 
willingness of borrowers to pay an interest rate much higher than the prevailing 
market rate, but were turned down. 
Other definitions of credit rationing have been made in relation to the cost of 
finance (Nissanke, 2001) or the availability of collateral (Ikhide, 2003) for the 
borrower to support the credit application or both (Barham et al., 1996; Mushinski and 
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Pickering, 2007). Besides these, still other definitions of credit rationing have been 
related to a less amount of credit being received or that the applicant was partially or 
completely rejected (Chakravarty and Scott, 1999; Atieno, 2001; Blumberg and 
Letterie, 2008; Omonona et al., 2008). 
4.3.2 Credit constraints 
Again from the literature the definition of credit constrained was varied 
depending mostly on the nature of the study being carried out. Jappelli (1990), Crook 
(1996), and Bigsten et al. (2000) considered an entrepreneur or small business as 
credit constrained when those individual who had their request for credit rejected by 
financial institutions. Other studies by Jappelli et al. (1998), Rizov (2004), and 
Fletschner (2008) all defined credit constrained as those entrepreneurs or businesses 
who had their request for a loan completely turned down. Still other scholars used the 
lack of finance from any source to undertake profitable investments (Winter-Nelson 
and Temu, 2005) a business lacking the financial flexibility to change its exposure 
according to its need (Russo and Rossi, 2001) and a business request for a large 
amount of loan even at a higher interest rate is turned down (Guiso, 1998). 
4.3.3 Discouraged entrepreneurs 
On the issue of discouraged borrowers, definitions have mainly been on 
borrowers not applying for credit for fear the application might be turned down, hence 
a change of mind in applying (Jappelli, 1990; Crook, 1999; Bigsten et al., 2000; 
Levenson and Willand, 2000; Kon and Storey, 2003; Fletschner, 2008). The 
availability of credit or access to credit can be said to be a decision making process 
(Zeller, 1994). The process starts with the demand perspective of the borrower to 
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identify whether there is a need for credit or not. Secondly, the borrower would have 
to make a second decision to either apply for credit or not. Potential borrowers may 
have need for credit and are willing to pay the market price of the credit; however, the 
lending terms and conditions put forward by the lending institutions prevent them 
from applying for these credits (Atieno, 1999). A number of obstacles therefore exist 
that prevents borrowers from turning potential demand into actual demand in Africa 
(Aryeetey 1997). 
Among the factors that would determine the demand for bank credit is the 
decision of the entrepreneurs to expand the business and the type of financing they 
want to adopt, and whether to use internal sources or external sources (Bigsten et al., 
2000). Using survey data on manufacturing firms in African countries including 
Ghana, Bigsten et al. (2000) found that the large number of businesses which did not 
apply for bank loans was not because they were credit constrained, but rather that they 
were suspicious of their applications being declined and would therefore not want to 
incur transaction costs. Their research noted that 79% of the businesses surveyed did 
not apply at all for bank loans. Analysis of that group showed that 40% indicated that 
they had no need for the loan, and 12% did not want to incur debt. It also showed that 
11% of respondents did not apply because of high interest rates, 8% because they 
lacked adequate collateral and 70% indicated that the application process was too 
difficult. 
Another constraint to small business refusal to access external finance is the 
unwillingness of entrepreneurs to have external investors invest into their business. 
The idea of having an external investor implies one has lost total control of the 
business. One important motivating factor for entrepreneurs starting their own 
business is the desire for total independence (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998). The 
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desire for independence is basically the reason for small businesses' preference for 
internal sources of finance as against external sources (Cosh and Hughes 2003). 
Additionally, most small businesses avoid external debt because they prefer to have 
total control of their business (Curran, 1986; Jarvis, 2000) and thereby not opting for 
rapid growth (Curran, 1986; Hakim, 1989). 
Another factor that explains the reasons for a small business not applying for 
bank credit is the lack of information about the credit availability. Limited awareness 
of the availability of a bank facility will keep potential borrower away from applying 
for this facility (Kashuliza and Kydd, 1996; Atieno, 2001). The lending terms and 
conditions imposed by banks on small business' credit applications determine the 
participation of small businesses in loan application. These terms and conditions 
include; application fees, transaction costs, collateral value, the application processing 
period, interest rates, credit maturity, repayments period and covenants (Atieno, 1999; 
Monge-Naranjo et al., 2001). The lending decision of the small businesses is likely to 
be affected by the banks' terms and conditions. 
From the above discussions, this study provides a common definition of credit 
rationing as "a situation where banks grant credit to entrepreneurs they regard as 
creditworthy borrowers, while other entrepreneurs receive much less than they apply 
for and still other entrepreneurs are completely rejected even though they are willing 
to pay higher interest rates". 
4.4 Equilibrium credit rationing 
Equilibrium is that market point where demand equals supply of goods and 
services. However, in the credit market, equilibrium is said to occur when the bank-
optimal interest rate is reached and not at the point where demand for loans equals the 
110 
supply of loans (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). At the bank-optimal interest rate, the 
expected return of the loan is highest. Even though demand may exceed supply at this 
stage, the bank wil l be unwilling to increase its interest rate. At this stage any increase 
in the banks interest rate will lead to a decline in the banks expected returns (Ikhide, 
2003). A further increase in the interest rate will worsen the expected returns (Craig et 
al., 2007). 
In its attempt to resolve the excess demand over supply, i f the bank decides to 
increase its interest rate, lower risk borrowers will drop out of the market (Hellmann 
and Stiglitz, 2000) leaving only the higher risk borrowers (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). 
The increase in the interest rate will also have an effect on the borrower's choice of 
investment projects (Basu, 1992; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2005). A higher interest 
rate implies a higher repayment for the borrowers (Bester and Hellwig, 1987). Thus, 
to meet this high interest rate, the entrepreneur will prefer a higher risk investment 
project with a higher expected return but with a lower probability of success (Winker, 
1999). Since the bank is a profit maximizing firm, it wil l prefer to apply a non-price 
rationing mechanism to address the excess demand over supply (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). The probability of default by the entrepreneur is dependent on factors such as: 
market imperfection, the terms of the loan, the entrepreneur characteristics and the 
expected returns of the loan (Okurut et al., 2005). Where entrepreneurs are unable to 
meet the collateral requirement or have poor projected cash flows, they are denied 
credit by the banks. This is mostly referred to as redlining (Parker, 2002; Ikhide, 
2003). The next section briefly examines this original credit rationing model proposed 
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
I l l 
4.4.1 The Stiglitz - Weiss (1981) credit rationing model 
A risk-neutral competitive bank faces credit demand from businesses. These 
businesses apply for credit to undertake individual investment projects. These 
investment projects will have either successful or unsuccessful outcomes. The 
expected returns of all investment projects are identical even though all projects have 
different degrees of risk. The expected return of the bank is non-monotonic. Initially, 
the bank's profit margin increases as interest rates are increased to meet the increasing 
credit demands, resulting from higher repayments. At the bank's optimal-interest rates 
the expected return is maximized. Any further increase in the banks interest rates 
above its optimal-interest rates will lead to a decline in the banks expected returns in 
view of the increased default rate. 
At the initial interest rate both 'good' and 'bad' businesses apply for credit. An 
increase in the demand for credit for investment projects will cause the bank to 
increase its interest rate. The bank's expected returns increases with higher 
repayments with all businesses being able to access the credit and repay. The increase 
in the interest rate may continue with an equal increase in the bank's expected returns 
until the rates reach the bank's optimal-interest rate. 
Figure 4.1 below shows an equilibrium credit market with asymmetric 
information. In a competitive equilibrium banking sector all returns are transferred to 
the depositors, where the expected rate of bank return is equal to the deposit rate. In 
quadrant 3 savings deposit becomes an increasing function of the deposit rate. 
Assuming all loanable funds are received from the savings deposit, then in quadrant 4, 
there is a 45 line. 
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Figure 4.1: showing an equilibrium credit market with asymmetric information 
(Source: Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, pp. 397) 
Key: 
f m = Is the interest rate at which the expected return to the bank is maximised 
An interest rate at which the demand for bank loan equals the supply of bank 
Loan 
r = Is the interest rate charged by the bank 
^ = Is the mean return to the bank from the set of applicants at the interest rate r 
Z = Measures the excess demand for bank loans 
L D = Demand for bank loan 
L s = Supply of bank loan 
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In quadrant 1, it is shown that credit demand is a monotonically decreasing 
function of the repayment level. At the maximum of the credit supply curve, demand 
for loans will exceed the supply for loans, and this wil l result in credit rationing. 
Credit Rationing will be of type I , i f all the businesses both good and bad apply for 
loans with some having access and others being denied. In view of the adverse 
selection effect, the bank will be unable to eliminate the excess demand through an 
increase in its interest rate. Credit Rationing of a type I I nature will occur i f all 
businesses applying for loan receive a much smaller size of the requested loan. 
The demand for credit is dependant on f , which is the interest charged by 
banks and the supply of credit is dependent on p, the mean return on the credit. The 
demand for credit at ^* exceeds the supply of credit at . When the bank increases its 
interest rate beyond '"the expected return on the credit would be reduced. The excess 
demand for credit is depicted by the letter Z. The bank would therefore charge interest 
rate ^* and not the interest rate r m because r m is not the equilibrium interest rate and at 
the bank would attract more borrowers and thus make more profit. 
4.4.2 Criticisms of credit rationing 
Various criticisms have been raised on the adverse selection and moral hazard 
model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Among the critics are Diamond (1984); Bester 
(1985); De Meza and Webb (1987); Williamson (1987); Basu (1992); Cressy (1996) 
and Parker (2002). 
De Meza and Webb (1987) examined the effects of asymmetric information on 
aggregate investment and on the financial structure of businesses. They asserted that 
asymmetric information gives rise to an adverse selection problem that causes good 
projects to be driven out by bad ones. De Meza and Webb's (1987) findings showed 
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that in the presence of asymmetric information, the financial structures of businesses 
and the efficiency properties of the level of investment depend upon the distribution 
of project returns. They disagreed with Stiglitz and Weiss' (1981) assumption that an 
increase in a loan interest rate may lead to an automatic rise in the riskiness of the 
investment project. De Meza and Webb (1987) argued that a high interest rate is likely 
to be associated with a low risk investment project and thus at equilibrium credit will 
not be rationed. 
Williamson (1987) questioned the adverse selection effect of Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) and disagreed on the assumption of an exogenous nature of the 
formation of debt contracts. Williamson (1987) asserted that the rationed debt contract 
is a mechanism to maximize the return of the lender with a monitoring costs effect. 
Diamond (1984) asserted that the appropriate response to the moral hazard problems 
in the credit market with asymmetric information is the use of financial intermediation 
and not credit rationing. Bester (1985) demonstrated the use of both the interest rate 
and collateral to distinguish between entrepreneurs with different risk levels. Bester, 
1985 (pp: 852) concluded that 'a signalling equilibrium in the credit market 
necessitates a monotone relationship between the riskiness and the preference of 
different entrepreneurs'. He however stated that i f the necessary conditions for market 
signalling are not fulfilled, then there is a high possibility of adverse selection arising. 
In his paper 'Asymmetric Information, Credit Rationing and the Stiglitz-
Weiss, (1981) Model', Basu (1992) argued that the description of both adverse 
selection and moral hazard (incentive) as mutually exclusive is not entirely conclusive 
but, rather the two effects can occur in a large scale to provide an explanation only for 
the special case of credit rationing. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) addressed the 
uncertainty arising from asymmetric information by referring to the individual's 
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preference and attitudes towards risk which are unknown to the bank. They, however, 
failed to address the uncertainty arising from the time duration between the 
entrepreneur's intension and his success to access loans. Basu (1992) disagreed with 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on the basis that an individual entrepreneur with a 
preconceived notion that his/her ability to repay his/her loan is low and would not be 
concerned with a higher level of interest rate. He/she posited that changes in the 
direction of interest rate should not affect the total number of risky entrepreneurs 
since a higher interest rate will lead to less risky entrepreneurs dropping out of the 
loan market, and a lower interest rate attracting less risky entrepreneurs into the loan 
market. 
Cressy (1996) examined whether start-up businesses are credit rationed. He 
argued that a false impression is likely to be made under certain assumptions that 
start-ups are finance constrained based on an assertion that human capital factors are 
correlated with both start-up's survival and assets. Cressy (1996) further argued that 
the provision of finance to start-ups is made based on demand driven factors. For any 
new enterprise to grow and make an economic impact in any economy, that new 
enterprise must have the availability of start-up finance at its disposal. The creation 
and growth of new enterprise can be facilitated by a developed financial market. In 
many economies, finance for large businesses posses no major problems. However, in 
terms of small businesses the situation is different, especially for those who lack the 
needed track record or collateral to support their application. Parker (2002) also 
stressed that small businesses, particularly start-ups are more prone to being credit 
rationed because they are considered risky ventures. 
Scholars have argued that banks in their attempt to resolve the information 
asymmetry problems may adopt two main measures. These measures are the demand 
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for collateral from the entrepreneur to secure the credit facility. Inderst and Muller 
(2007) noted that the provision of collateral security by the entrepreneur signifies high 
quality and reputation. The inability to provide the collateral security may lead to 
bank rationing credit to the entrepreneur. Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) asserted that 
through a durable bank-entrepreneur relationship, banks are able to gather relevant 
information on the entrepreneur and the business. Besides these measures, scholars 
have also argued that the increase in geographical distance is more likely to worsen 
the information asymmetry problems between the bank and the entrepreneur. 
The next four sections therefore review the literature on business information, 
relationship lending, collateral and geographical distance and their impact on credit 
accessibility by the entrepreneur. 
4.5 Information and bank lending decisions 
Information plays a major role in bank lending decisions as it provides the 
bank with knowledge about the entrepreneur, reduces information rents, operating as 
an entrepreneur discipline device and eliminates entrepreneur incentives (Jappelli and 
Pagano, 2000; Padilla and Pagano, 2000). Banks derive their hard information from 
past financial statements and through credit scoring techniques (Berry et al., 2004; 
Berger et al., 2005; Kano et al., 2006; Berger and Frame, 2007), while soft 
information are derived from private information on the entrepreneur or other external 
sources (Danos et al., 1989; Stein, 2002, Cole et al., 2004; Agarwal and Hauswald, 
2006). 
Banks have difficulty distinguishing between entrepreneurial risks (Blumberg 
and Letterie, 2008; Brown et al., 2009) and doing any meaningful monitoring. In 
making a distinction between 'honest' and 'dishonest' entrepreneurs who had 
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knowledge about the likelihood of default of their investment, Jaffee and Russell 
(1976) compared the equilibrium of the loan market with or without rationing. They 
observed that 'honest' entrepreneurs in order not to default on their loan have 
preference to rationing loans. Where the interest rate is high, they wil l decline the loan 
offer and will leave the market. On the other hand, the 'dishonest' entrepreneurs are 
willing and ready to pay a higher interest rate for the loan. The market therefore 
reaches an equilibrium position when the amount the individual can borrow is 
rationed (Jaffee and Russell, 1976). 
According to Vandell (1984) rationing, in the sense of surplus demand at the 
market-determined price, will only occur when certain circumstances representing 
disparities between the entrepreneur and the bank are present. These include: 
divergent expectations of default, different degrees of risk aversion or perceptions of 
risk, differential tax treatments, or institutional restrictions that result in an 
asymmetric distribution of the proceeds from default are present. Vandell (1984) also 
asserted that even in the above cases, such rationing may not be an objective market 
phenomenon i f bank's a prior default expectations are upheld ex post. 
Imperfect information in the credit market forces entrepreneurs to react 
adversely to changes in the interest rate. In economic theory, equilibrium is reached 
when the market demand equals the market supply (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). However, in the debt market, the situation is different. Here 
equilibrium is established when the banks' optimal interest rate is reached 
(Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2005). The return to the bank is a concave function of the 
return to the investment project. The margin on investment is considered to be 
negatively related to the risk of the investment. Where the possibility of default is 
higher, then the expected profit to the bank will be lower. On the part of the 
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entrepreneur, the expected return is a convex function. A large cash flow is expected 
to be generated from a more volatile investment project. 
At a lower interest rate, both good and bad entrepreneurs wil l apply for a loan. 
However, when the interest rate is increased, the good entrepreneurs leave the loan 
market, leaving the bad entrepreneurs and this leads to adverse selection (Okurut et 
al., 2005). Furthermore, a situation may occur where an increase in interest rates will 
affect the selection of investment projects. Entrepreneurs will prefer a higher risk 
project with an increased interest rate than a lower risk project. This is likely to 
decrease the expected return for the bank. This concept therefore induces the incentive 
effect (moral hazard). To avoid these situations the bank wil l prefer to ration credit 
rather than increase the rate of interest (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Freixax and Rochet, 
1997; Winker, 1999). 
Scholars have argued that the use of an entrepreneur's historical data and past 
credit performance in assessing the entrepreneur's credit worthiness is essential 
(Fraser et al., 1996). Banks also use credit scoring models to assign weighted scores 
on the entrepreneur's quality (Hubbard and Gregg, 2001; Berger and Frame, 2007). 
However, this is not enough to determine the future capacity and willingness of the 
entrepreneur to honour credit repayments (Rose, 1995). The analysis of past financial 
data is not enough to indicate the entrepreneur's character, integrity, reputation, 
commitment and benevolence to repay the facility (Ferrary, 2003). Secondly, the 
increasing globalisation and competitiveness of the banking industry has increased 
geographical distance leading to an increase in information asymmetry amongst small 
business entrepreneurs and hence less access to bank credit (Sapienza, 2002; Carow et 
al., 2005; Degryse et al., 2005). The loan contracts between the bank and the 
entrepreneur is characterised by the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
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(Stiglitz, 1989). In view of this the banks need to gather additional information 
through social and lending relationships with the entrepreneur in order to minimise 
defaults (Ferrary, 2003; Bharath, 2007; Brown et al., 2009). 
4.5.1 Adverse selection and bank lending decisions 
When lending to small businesses banks face uncertainty as they are unable to 
observe the quality of the entrepreneur's characteristics and actions (DeH'Ariccia, 
2001). This is as a result of an information asymmetry problem between the 
entrepreneur and the bank and may lead the bank to ration credit to the entrepreneur 
(Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2005; Gregory et al., 2005). The effects of information 
asymmetry on bank lending have long been recognised (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981, Binks et al., 1992; Shailer 1999). Information asymmetry is a situation 
where an entrepreneur knows more about the probability of success of their business 
and the associated risks facing the business than do the banks. The existence of 
information asymmetry signifies that banks are more likely to tighten their lending 
conditions through increased interest rate settings and increasing collateral 
requirements (Zeller, 1994; Binswanger et al., 1989). 
The lending activities of banks comprise the screening of an entrepreneur's 
loan applications and the monitoring of loans granted to entrepreneurs (Diamond, 
1984; Coleman et al., 2006; Aintablian et al., 2007). The activities include the 
gathering of information on the characteristics of the entrepreneur, measures to ensure 
that entrepreneurs adhere to the agreed contract and the taking of probable actions 
towards the loan repayment (Longhofer and Santos, 2000; Paglia, 2002). These 
actions also include the taking of enforcement actions through collateral requirement 
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to increase the likelihood of the entrepreneur meeting repayment obligations (Stiglitz, 
2000). 
4.5.2 Moral hazard and bank lending decisions 
Entrepreneurs possess information about their characteristics and about the 
expected return on their investments (Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000). Banks on the 
other hand may not have adequate information about the characteristics of each 
entrepreneur or the riskiness of their projects (Jaffee and Russel, 1976; Ikhide, 2003). 
Even though the entrepreneurs may have a reasonable probability of success for their 
projects, the entrepreneur might slacken their effort or change the type of investment 
for a more risky one (Brealey and Myers, 1991; Besley, 1994). In dealing with this 
problem, the bank is unable to use the interest rate as a sorting device because an 
increase in the interest rate will result in honest entrepreneurs leaving the credit 
market with only the dishonest entrepreneurs remaining (Amit et al., 1990). 
Assuming that both the bank and the entrepreneur are risk neutral and the 
entrepreneur has a choice of investing in either a safe project or a risky one. The 
choice of the entrepreneur is however induced by the level of the interest rate offered 
by the bank (Winker, 1999). The higher interest rate induces the entrepreneur to select 
riskier projects in exchange for higher net returns (Gale and Hellwig, 1985). Banks 
adopt varying measures to address the increasing credit demand and to manage the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Banks resolve information asymmetry 
problems through relationship lending, imposition of stringent collateral requirements, 
restrictive covenants, and acquisition of additional information on the project or 
capacity to repay the credit facility (Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff 
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and Korting, 1998a; Black et al., 1996). The next two sections examine the role of 
relationship lending in bank lending decisions. 
4.6 Relationship lending and bank lending decision 
A customer relationship is 'that strategic nexus of customer service loans and 
deposits which gives to commercial banks their unique character' (Hodgman, 1963 
pp: 113). A bank relationship is 'the connection between a bank and customer that 
goes beyond the execution of simple, anonymous, financial transaction' (Ongena and 
Smith, 1998). The benefits of a bank-entrepreneur relationship may include the 
exchange of vital information, a commitment to do business together and the offer and 
delivery of efficient financial services (Cole, 1998). A bank-entrepreneur relationship 
may also be influenced by a variety of external factors. These may include the degree 
of technological development, competitive environment and the type of banking 
regulations (Ongena and Smith, 1998). Boot (2000 pp. 10) defined the bank-
entrepreneur relationship as 'the provision of financial services by a financial 
intermediary overtime, enabling it to obtain specific, relevant and private information 
about the client, and evaluating the profitability of these types of investments'. 
In a bank-entrepreneur relationship, small businesses are very often seen as 
informationally opaque (Berger and Udell, 1998). The opacity of these small 
businesses renders them vulnerable and therefore unable to secure adequate credit 
from the bank as a result of the problem of information asymmetry. Even though these 
small businesses may have profitable projects they are unable to access credit because 
information about the investment project is unavailable (adverse selection problem). 
Again the bank's inability to ensure the entrepreneur uses the credit for the intended 
purpose (moral hazard problem). Small businesses largely depend on financial 
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institutions to provide them with credit which they are unable to raise either by 
themselves or through the capital market (Berger and Udell, 2002). 
In accessing these credits, small businesses approach their banks with 
insufficient and poor quality information. As a result asymmetric information is 
increased, and the degree of increase largely depends on the stage or life cycle of the 
business when making the application (Norton, 1991b). These asymmetric 
information problems and the lack of understanding between small businesses and 
their banks may lead to credit rationing. It is argued that businesses with close ties 
with their banks have value, do not undergo credit constraints and are able to access 
credit and invest even during financial distress (Hoshi et al., 1990a, 1990b; James and 
Weir, 1990; Shockley and Thakor, 1993; Uchida et al., 2008). 
In resolving this difficulty, one major technique which can be applied is a 
credible bank-entrepreneur relationship (Boot, 2000; Berger and Udell, 2002; 
Cardone, et al., 2004). Relationship lending is basically the accumulation of 'soft' 
information of a small business in particular over time through contacts with the 
business, its owner(s) and the locality where the business operates (Berger and Udell, 
1995; Ongena and Smith, 2000). One advantage of relationship lending is that it 
allows small businesses the opportunity to access credit from their lenders even 
though they may not have available adequate collateral, a proven track record and 
impressive financial statements to support their loan application (Strahan and Weston, 
1998; Bodt et al., 2005). A strong lending relationship between banks and small 
businesses play a significant role in the determinant of credit rationing. In spite of the 
high cost associated with small business information processing to ascertain their 
credit worthiness, they are regarded as important customers of the banks (Dufey and 
Hommel, 1999). 
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Bank lending entails the gathering of information about the quality of the 
entrepreneur and one way of gathering this information is through the development of 
a durable bank-entrepreneur relationship (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004). This is 
achieved over a period of time through regular bank transactions (Petersen and Raj an, 
1994; Mester et al., 1998; Degryse and van Cayseele, 2000). Relationship lending is 
dependent on the characteristics of the entrepreneur, the business, the duration of the 
banking relationship, the scope of financial services purchased by the entrepreneur 
and the financial and economic conditions in which the entrepreneur operates (Boot, 
2000; Cardone et al. 2005). 
Various empirical studies have provided evidence in support of the importance 
of lending relationships in terms of credit availability, pricing and collateral 
requirements (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1994, 1995; Cole, 
1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Korting, 1998a; Howorth et al., 2003; 
Bodt et al., 2005; Uchida et al., 2008). Hoshi et al. (1990) argued that entrepreneurs 
with lending relationships with their banks have less information asymmetry problems 
and hence have less liquidity constraints to worry about compared to entrepreneurs 
without any banking relationship. They further argued that entrepreneurs who broke 
off lending relationships with their banks in favour of the bond market became more 
liquidity constrained. 
Several scholars have also shown that entrepreneurs with durable banking 
relationships enjoy credit availability (Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Strahan 
and Weston, 1998; Scott and Dunkelberg, 1999; Machauer and Weber, 2000) better 
credit pricing (Boot and Thakor, 1997; Degryse and van Cayseele, 1998; Boot 2000), 
and minimise collateral requirements (Harhoff and Kbrting, 1998a). 
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4.6.1 Credit availability and quantity 
Banks show no preferential treatment when pricing loans even with 
experienced entrepreneurs who have made regular loan applications. These 
entrepreneurs are more likely to pay the same interest rates as first time loan 
applicants i f not higher (Greenbaum et al., 1989). However, entrepreneurs are more 
likely to have a lower interest rate though it is mostly insignificant when they 
patronise other financial services from the bank. Similarly, a bank-entrepreneur 
relationship promotes an increase in the availability of credit to the entrepreneur 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Banks are more likely to extend credit to an already 
established relationship, and the duration of that relationship is not considered when 
making the decision (Cole, 1998). 
The micro structure on the decision to lend to small businesses by large banks 
is mainly based on a function of financial variable. However, with small banks this 
decision is based on variable functions such as the already established lender-
borrower relationship (Cole et al., 2004). Berger and Udell (1995) observed that small 
businesses with durable bank relationship pay a lower interest rate and also have 
ready access to bank credit. 
4.6.2 Prices and collateral 
There has been a different shade of opinion on the pricing of loans by banks. 
In an earlier bank-entrepreneur relationship, some banks are believed to subsidise the 
entrepreneur's interest rates and are later compensated as the relationship matures 
(Greenbaum et al., 1989). Conversely, banks are said to offer entrepreneurs higher 
interest rates in their earlier bank-entrepreneur relationship because the entrepreneurs 
are unknown. However, these entrepreneurs later in the relationship tend to enjoy 
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lower interest rates (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Relationship lending plays a vital role 
in the determination of loan pricing. In the initial lending relationship, entrepreneurs 
pay higher interest rates and with an increased collateral requirement (Boot and 
Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). However, as the relationship matures, and 
the business establishes a successful investment projects, then lower interest rates and 
collateral pledge is reduced (Berger and Udell, 1995). Small businesses experience 
lower interest rates on their loan when they keep a continuous lending relationship 
with their lenders (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
4.6.3 The duration of a lender-borrower relationship 
A vital element in the bank-entrepreneur relationship is the duration of the 
relationship. A matured relationship offers the bank an opportunity to observe, learn 
and use the 'soft' information of its customer for contract enforcement and building a 
formidable reputation for quality service. A bank-entrepreneur relationship is made 
good and preserved by the quality of services offered, the type of products available, 
the price of these products and services (Cole, 1998), the entrepreneur's quality and 
the bank's competitive environment (Ongena and Smith, 1998). 
Using a sample of 357 bank relationship over a period between 1979 and 1994 
in investigating the determinants of the duration of a banking relationship, Ongena 
and Smith, (1998) observed that long term relationships are more likely to be 
terminated than short term relationships. Ongena and Smith, (1998) also noted that 
new, young and small businesses often have shorter relationships with their banks. 
One of the determining factors for banks to offer credit to small businesses is the 
existence of a durable bank-entrepreneur relationship. However, using data from a 
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large German bank, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Harhoff and Korting (1998b) 
concluded that there was no significant impact of duration on the cost of credit. 
The age of a business is a vital explanatory variable in explaining the cross-
sectional variation in interest rates. Thus businesses with shorter relationships tended 
to rely more on trade credits than businesses with longer bank relationships (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994). An entrepreneur with a durable bank-entrepreneur relationship is 
more likely to be offered a less collateral requirement in a loan contract (Berger and 
Udell, 1995). Similarly, entrepreneurs with durable bank-entrepreneur relationships 
are more likely to be offered a lower interest rate and have a decline in collateral 
requirement (Boot and Thakor, 1996; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 1998; Boot, 2000). 
Cole et al. (2004) however found no significant relationship between loan approval 
and the duration of a relationship. 
4.6.4 Multiple bank relationships 
A business is defined as having a multiple bank relationship ' i f the business 
maintains more than one simultaneous bank relationship during the sample period' 
(Ongena and Smith, 1998 pp: 9). The available findings on the impact of multiple 
bank relationships on credit availability, cost of credit, collateral requirement and the 
performance of small businesses have be varied. Businesses with multiple bank 
relationships are more credit constrained and pay higher interest rates than those with 
a single bank relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Angelini et al., 1998). 
Businesses with multiple bank relationships are often denied credit (Cole 1998) or 
their access to credit is lower than businesses with single relationship (Harhoff and 
Korting, 1998b). 
127 
Businesses with multiple bank relationships tend to have less value for the 
bank-entrepreneur relationship and hence are more likely to break this relationship 
sooner than businesses with single relationship (Ongena and Smith, 1998). Cole et al. 
(2004) examined the effect of a multiple bank relationship and loan approval. He 
observed that while the effect is negative but significant for large banks, with small 
banks; the effect is negative but not statistically significant. Degryse and Ongena 
(2001) observed a negative trend between sales profitability and a multiple bank 
relationships. They also observed that in deciding to switch from single to multiple 
bank relationships, small but younger businesses on the average choose to switch than 
older businesses. 
Castelli et al., (2006) used a regression analysis on data from Italian 
manufacturers and examined the consequences of firm's financing strategy in terms of 
the firm performance and the relationship between the number of banks. They 
concluded that as the number of bank relationship increases, the performance of 
businesses in terms of return on assets and equity decrease and this is strongest among 
small businesses. They also asserted that multiple relationships results in increased 
interest expense over assets indicating a higher interest rate. 
4.6.5 Small businesses and relationship lending 
The financing of small businesses has recently been a major concern for 
monetary policy authorities as a result of the recent mergers and acquisitions. Earlier 
research works have concluded that larger banks as a result of mergers or acquisitions 
tend to be reluctant to offer credit to small businesses (Berger et al., 1998; Berger and 
Udell, 2002). Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2004) re-examined the bank-entrepreneur 
relationship with much emphasis on the effect of the relationship on the interest rate 
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charged by the bank. They considered the overall loan granting process; the 
application stage, the rate setting stage and the decision stage in their re-examination. 
Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2004) observed that the bank-entrepreneur relationship 
was only vital in the entrepreneur's decision stage to apply or not and the bank's 
decision stage to approve or decline the loan application. They however asserted that 
the bank-entrepreneur relationship plays no significant role in the setting of the bank's 
interest rate. Small businesses operating multiple banks, utilising their banks products 
and having a durable relationships are more likely to have a better access to credit, 
enjoyed lower interest rates and reduced collateral requirements (Cardone et al., 
2005). 
4.7 Collateral and bank lending decision 
4.7.1 The use of collateral 
Collateral is vital in all loan applications particularly in commercial and 
industrial loans, accounting for nearly 70% of all commercial and industrial secured 
loans in the United States (Berger and Udell, 1990) and about 85% of loans granted to 
small businesses are secured with collateral in the United Kingdom (Black et al., 
1996). The efficiency of a bank's credit decision can be improved with the support of 
collateral. Banks are likely to increase both interest rates and collateral requirements 
for investments with lower cash flow projections. On the other hand, where expected 
cash flows are higher, banks are more likely to reduce interest rates and collateral 
requirements. Collateral assures the bank of the entrepreneur's willingness to repay 
the loan and thus raises the probability that credit will be granted to the entrepreneur 
(Inderst and Muller, 2007). 
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Recent arguments in economic literature have indicated the central role played 
by collateral in the bank-entrepreneur relationship. It is said that without collateral 
especially on the part of small businesses it is impossible to access credit (Manove et 
al., 2001). Entrepreneurs can pledge two types of collateral: the use of an asset within 
the investment project or the use of an asset outside the investment project (Chan and 
Kanatas, 1985). There are several hindrances to the efficient use of collateral 
especially in Africa. Difficulties associated with the use of collateral may include 
legal and monitoring costs (Chan and Kanatas, 1985), cultural and political factors 
(Platteau 1994a) and pervasive corruption (Biggs and Stivastava, 1996). To ensure an 
efficient use of collateral in bank lending, four key conditions must be present. These 
are: (i) allocation of property rights; (ii) a prompt enforcement of contracts; (iii) 
efficient and effective courts and registries systems; and (iv) an enabling environment 
for credit lending (Cadwell and Meagher, 1996). 
Moral hazard is considered to be the main problem of accessing credit 
particularly among small businesses. Entrepreneurs may choose to misapply the 
accessed credit in unproductive ventures, thereby defaulting in repayment. Thus the 
right to repossess collateral enables the bank to secure the loan and also ensure that 
the entrepreneur applies the credit in a productive manner for fear of failure and loss 
of collateral (Myers 1977; Smith and Warmer, 1979; Sultz and Johnson, 1985; Hurt, 
1995). The pledge of collateral by an entrepreneur in a loan application assists in 
eliminating the adverse selection and moral hazard effects and gives a candid opinion 
about the entrepreneur's creditworthiness (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985; 
Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; and Chan and Thakor, 1987). 
Barro (1976) develops a theoretical model in which he used collateral as a 
mechanism for enforcing a loan contract. He asserted that the default of a loan by the 
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entrepreneur triggers the loss of the collateral which has a stochastic value at the time 
of loan negotiation. Wette (1983) used Stiglitz and Weiss' (1981) model on the effect 
of adverse selection and incentive effects on the loan market with imperfect 
information to demonstrate a similar effect when banks increase their collateral 
requirement for loans. Banks that choose to increase their interest rate in situations of 
excess demand are likely to suffer adverse selection since only the risky entrepreneurs 
will accept loans at that high rate. Banks are unlikely to use an increase in collateral 
requirement as a rationing device to eliminate excess demand even amongst risk-
neutral entrepreneurs, simply because such an action can lead to adverse selection 
which has a negative influence on the bank's expected return on the loan (Wette, 
1983). 
In situations where loans have already been granted by the bank, the role of 
collateral is still vital. Collateral ensures that the moral hazard problems are 
eliminated (Boot et al., 1991). It also ensures that the entrepreneur applies the credit 
efficiently to the investment project. The ability of the borrower to repay his/her loan 
is directly proportional to value of collateral pledge (Rajan and Winton, 1995). The 
entrepreneur is aware that on default of the project, the bank has the right to claim the 
collateral (Aghion and Bolton, 1992: La Porta et al., 1998). 
4.7.2 The impact of collateral on credit risk 
Two schools of thought have interpreted the impact of collateral on credit risk. 
One school of thought considered the impact of collateral on the problem of adverse 
selection during loan decision making (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985; Chan 
and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a, 1987b; and Chan and Thakor, 1987). 
Higher quality or lower risk entrepreneurs are willing to pledge adequate collateral for 
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a lower interest rate credit investment (Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; Chan and 
Kanatas, 1985). However, Morsman, (1986) have claimed that it is rather riskier 
entrepreneurs who are more likely to pledge collateral. On the other hand higher risk 
entrepreneurs will prefer higher interest rates with no collateral (Capra et al., 2002). 
The banks are therefore able to resolve the adverse selection problem (Jimenez and 
Saurina, 2003). The other school of thought examines the effect of collateral on moral 
hazard problems once the loan has been granted (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; La Porta 
et al., 1998). 
Bester (1985), in contrast to other studies, assumed that a bank will make a 
simultaneous decision upon their collateral and interest rate rather than a separate one 
as emphasized in earlier analysis. Bester (1985) showed that the lender using a 
combination of interest rate and collateral has the capacity to distinguish between 
entrepreneurs with different risk levels. The importance of collateral can be seen in a 
situation where lenders are unable to determine the default probabilities of the 
borrower. Banks ration credit when faced with information asymmetry. However, this 
decision is mitigated by the use of collateral offered by the entrepreneurs to prove 
their quality (Besanko and Thakor, 1987a). An entrepreneur contracting a loan under 
asymmetric information is likely to encounter issues of loan quality, interest rate, 
increased collateral requirement and credit rationing. 
4.7.3 Collateral risk-relationship 
Researchers have found a negative correlation between collateral and default 
risk. An adverse selection problem arises when banks using a fixed loan rate increase 
their collateral requirement (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Wette, 1983). The bank is 
unlikely to use an increase in collateral requirement as a rationing device to eliminate 
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excess demand even i f entrepreneurs are risk neutral, simply because such an action 
can lead to adverse selection which has a negative influence on the banks expected 
return on the loan (Wette, 1983). The bank is better of f rationing credit than to 
increase collateral requirements since this has the potential of driving out good 
borrowers with successful projects (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Subsequently, different arguments have been put forward from that of the 
above. Banks are better off using simultaneously the interest rate and collateral rather 
than credit rationing since this approach is more likely to eliminate the adverse 
selection problems. Entrepreneurs with a higher risk project wil l be reluctant to pledge 
more collateral and this will serve as a screening device for the bank to sort out 
entrepreneurs with unsuccessful projects (Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Bester, 1985; 
1987; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Boot et al., 1991, 1994; Coco, 2000). Yet another 
argument is that collateral is still not an efficient and effective way of eliminating 
risky projects. Collateral can be used to enforce adherence to straight investment 
projects for which credit has been granted (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1986; Clemenz, 1986; 
and Chan and Thakor, 1987). This approach however it is argued leads to high 
monitoring cost and thus provides an incentive for credit rationing (Aivazian et al., 
2004). 
Besides the above negative correlation between collateral and risk, other 
arguments have been put forward to demonstrate that a positive correlation between 
collateral and default risk exist. Entrepreneurs with high risk projects are willing to 
pledge more collateral. The use of collateral prevents entrepreneurs from diverting 
project funds into alternative projects (De Meza and Southey, 1996), because the 
threat of liquidating the collateral when the entrepreneur defaults prevent 
opportunistic behaviour (Hubbard, 1998). It also succeeds in eliminating the moral 
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hazard problems (Black and De Meza, 1992; Bester, 1994). The relationship between 
collateral and credit risk is positive when riskier than average businesses borrow on a 
secured basis, and also the average secured loan tends to be riskier than the average 
unsecured loan (Berger and Udell, 1990). 
The inefficiency and effectiveness of the courts and registries systems limit the 
use of collateral and credit lending to small businesses because of high legal fees, 
administrative delays, and the cumbersome nature of enforcing the collateral (Bigsten 
et al., 2000; Daumont et al., 2004). For instance in Africa, although there are high 
levels of default, banks hardly resort to the courts to enforce the collateral for reasons 
of costs and time (Fafchamps, 1996; Aryeetey et al., 1997; Fafchamps and Minten, 
1999; Bigsten et al., 2000). Additionally, appropriating collateral after an entrepreneur 
has defaulted is difficult because of cultural and political reasons (Biggs and 
Srivastava, 1996; Isakasson and Wihlborg, 2002; Daumont et al., 2004). 
In a bank-entrepreneur relationship, banks face uncertainties when lending to 
small businesses and are therefore unable to determine the quality of the entrepreneur 
(Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2005). This uncertainty arises from the lack of 
information and the unavailability of collateral to support the credit application 
(Inderst and Muller, 2007). Previous studies have shown that this information 
asymmetry problem is compounded by the distance between the entrepreneur and the 
bank, leading the banks to ration credit to entrepreneurs located further away from 
them (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; Alessandrini et al., 
2006). The next section therefore assesses the effect of geographical distance on 
entrepreneurs' access to finance. 
134 
4.8 Small business entrepreneur and access to credit 
The financing of small businesses has received considerable academic interest 
over the last three decades (Hughes and Storey, 1994; Storey, 1994). However, the 
interest in the financing of novice, serial and portfolio entrepreneurs have not received 
that much attention (Danson, 1999). An entrepreneur requires diverse skills in order to 
put together all the needed resources to start a venture or take advantage of an 
opportunity (Venkataraman, 1997). These skills may be natural gifts or acquired 
through formal education and informal training (Lazear, 2005; Zhang, 2007). 
Access to finance plays an important role in the growth and development of an 
entrepreneur's business (Black and Strahan, 2002). The availability and cost of 
finance affects the performance of the entrepreneur. Limited access to finance retards 
the entrepreneurial activity (Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 1999). In financing the 
entrepreneur, financial institution encounter an agency problem arising from condition 
of imperfect market and asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Berger 
and Udell, 1993; Denis, 2004). The presence of adverse selection and moral hazard in 
entrepreneurial financing creates the potential for financial institutions to ration credit 
(Binks and Ennew, 1996). The problems of information asymmetry can be overcome 
through the pledging of collateral by the entrepreneur to secure the credit facility 
(Cowling and Westhead, 1996; Hart, 2001), and also through the use of relationship 
lending in which the financial institution builds a good working relationship with the 
entrepreneur (Shane and Cable, 2002). These two approaches increase the availability 
of credit to the entrepreneur (Uzzi, 1999; Shane and Cable, 2002). The degree of 
information asymmetry may differ between the novice, serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs, therefore the potential for credit rationing is more likely to also differ. 
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Exploring the new business gestation process among novice, serial and 
portfolio entrepreneurs, Alsos and Kolvereid (1998) observed that portfolio 
entrepreneurs adopt a gradual step in their business start-up process taking much time 
in decision making and ensuring a successful implementation of business before 
incurring costs. Initial business start-up capital is mostly from internal sources and 
only requires external funding much later. Serial entrepreneurs on the other hand, are 
more active in their business start-up process. Initial start-up capital is from the sale of 
previous businesses and sought external funding much earlier than portfolio 
entrepreneurs. Novice entrepreneurs are also more active in their business start-up 
process. The initial start-up capital is mostly from personal saving, family and friends. 
They are very slow in decision making and carefully incur costs during the business 
gestation period. 
4.8.1 Habitual entrepreneurship and access to credit 
The habitual entrepreneurs by virtue of their cumulative business experience 
may have generated a set of resources which places them in a better position to gain 
credit than the novice entrepreneurs for whom the business process of setting up and 
applying for their own businesses' credit is a comparatively new process (Wright et 
al., 1997a). In other words, the habitual entrepreneurs are able to establish more 
resources to attain and then sustain resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 
1959) than the novice entrepreneurs, and this translates into the habitual entrepreneurs 
being in a better position than novice entrepreneurs to successfully gain all the 
external credit which they are seeking (Westhead et al., 2004). 
In addition, there is the possibility that the habitual entrepreneurs may have 
been very unprofessional and made poorly presented written documents and poor oral 
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presentations to secure external credit. In those circumstances the habitual 
entrepreneurs' reputation could have suffered and they now have stigmas attached to 
their names. This notwithstanding, the entrepreneurs may have learned the error of 
their ways and could become more successful in their next enterprise (McGrath, 
1999). 
Entrepreneurial behaviours are often shaped by their human capital profiles 
(Reuber and Fischer, 1999). Prior studies on human capital have argued that an 
entrepreneur's demographic characteristics, achieved attributes and prior work 
experience can have a positive (or negative) effect on productivity. Entrepreneurs 
with broader pool of human capital resources will report superior levels of 
productivity (Becker, 1975). Habitual entrepreneurs during their career develop 
durable relationships and social networks to their advantage (Starr and Bygrave, 1991; 
Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2003). 
With these social connections and durable relationships, habitual entrepreneurs 
generate easier access to information, and possess influence, control, power, contacts, 
and connections (Coleman, 1988; Adler and Kwon, 2002). Habitual entrepreneurs are 
able to process, utilise and provide relevant business information which enhances the 
entrepreneur's chances and also facilitate business opportunities (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000; Cohen and Prusal, 2001). Social network ties also facilitate the 
habitual entrepreneur's identification, access and utilisation of scarce resources 
(Birley, 1985; Greene and Brown, 1997; Uzzi, 1999). Studies have also documented 
that habitual entrepreneurs can use their durable relations and social connections for 
greater influence and also to secure favourable negotiations (Burt, (1992; Leanna and 
Van Buaren, 1999; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
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Earlier studies have concentrated upon generic comparisons between novice 
and habitual entrepreneurs (Birley and Westhead, 1993; Kolvereid et al., 1991, 
Kolvereid and Bullvag, 1993). Ucbasaran et al. (2008) have provided a 
comprehensive review of habitual entrepreneurs. This notwithstanding it is important 
to note that subsequently to the research which appeared in the early 1990s the more 
recent research upon habitual entrepreneurship has looked at examining sub-
categories of habitual entrepreneurship, particularly portfolio and serial 
entrepreneurship against novice entrepreneurship (Westhead and Wright, 1998a, 
1999). Wright et al. (1997) looked at sources of finance. 
Habitual entrepreneurs, by virtue of their cumulative business experience may 
have generated a set of resources which places them in a better position to gain credit 
than the novice entrepreneurs for whom the business process of setting up and 
applying for their own businesses' credit is a comparatively new process. In other 
words, the habitual entrepreneurs are able to establish more resources to attain and 
then sustain resources and capabilities (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991) than the novice 
entrepreneurs, and this translates into the habitual entrepreneurs being in a better 
position than the novice entrepreneurs to successfully gain all the external credit 
which they are seeking. 
The habitual entrepreneurs have gone through the process of starting a 
business before, and most of them will have had experience of applying for credit, 
rather than just confining resources to those which can be obtained from sources such 
as friends and family. Thus, they will have learned from applying for credit, and 
whether they were previously successful, or they were not given all, of the sought 
finance, or perhaps even any, of their desired credit it would be likely that the 
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entrepreneurs are more experienced and wiser after the events. From the above 
discussion, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
H$: Habitual entrepreneurs will be less likely to be credit rationed than the novice 
entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurial performance is largely influenced by the personal 
characteristics, aspirations and experience of the entrepreneur (Ucbasaran et al., 
2001). Prior knowledge of financial sources by the entrepreneur increases the 
probability of successful recognition of opportunities (Ardichvili et al., 2003). 
Similarly, portfolio and serial entrepreneurs with enhanced resources are less likely to 
encounter major difficulties in exploiting business opportunities (Alvarez and Barney, 
2004). Westhead et al. (2005a) argued that portfolio entrepreneurs were more likely 
than novice and serial entrepreneurs to identify opportunities. Wiklund and Shepherd 
(2008) have also noted that portfolio entrepreneurs with enhanced human and social 
capital resources are more likely to be successful in their business organisation 
compared with novice entrepreneurs. From the above discussion, the following 
hypotheses can be derived: 
H7: Serial entrepreneurs will be less likely to be credit rationed than the novice 
entrepreneurs. 
Hs: Portfolio entrepreneurs wi l l be less likely to be credit rationed than the novice 
entrepreneurs. 
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Previous studies have suggested that entrepreneurs with higher levels of 
education are more likely to perform better and are therefore more successful 
compared to those with low levels of education (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Dimov 
and Shepherd, 2005). Sapienza et al., (1996) have argued that entrepreneurs with 
higher levels of education stand a better chance of networking as they are able to 
contact varied sources for information and other resources. Due to wider social and 
business networks these entrepreneurs are more aware of a greater range of sources of 
finance and how to access these sources. From the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis can be derived: 
H9: Entrepreneurs with higher levels of education are less likely to be credit 
rationed. 
Securing finance is increasingly becoming a difficult and a risky activity which 
is essential for the establishment, investment and growth of businesses (Levine et al., 
2000; Love, 2003; Hanson, 2003; Tucker and Lean, 2003; World Bank, 2004a). 
Entrepreneurs with previous work experience are generally likely to accumulate a 
broader managerial and technical knowledge (Buame, 1996; Hausman, 2005). This 
accumulated specific human capital can be utilized in creating and exploiting new 
business opportunities (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka et al., 1996). Businesses owned by 
experienced entrepreneurs have accumulated resources which are both tangible and 
intangible that give them a kind of competitive advantage over novice entrepreneurs 
(Kay, 1993). These resources which are difficult to duplicate include organisational 
culture, education, experience, knowledge, know-how, reputation and capabilities 
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(Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Devinney et al., 2001; Grant, 2002; McEvily and 
Chakravarty, 2002; Galbreath, 2005). 
Other resources possessed by the experienced entrepreneur are the ability to 
build relationships (Fahy, 2002) and social networks that enhances the business 
competitive advantage (Slater, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Previous studies have 
shown that entrepreneurs use their prior business ownership experience to 
successfully obtain external financial resources from banks and venture capitalists for 
their subsequent ventures (Wright et al., 1997a, b). The track record and the greater 
level of resources available in the existing businesses may then help portfolio 
entrepreneurs to have a higher likelihood of securing finance and avoiding being 
credit rationed or constrained. 
Scholars have argued that the background and business ownership experience of 
entrepreneurs, their level of education, track record and reputation, contributes 
significantly to their business performance (Bruderl et al., 1992; Kilkenny et al., 1999; 
Rauch and Frese, 2000) and access to external credit (Westhead et al., 2003b; 
Westhead et al., 2005b). Similarly, banks perceive entrepreneurs with proven track 
records and possessing collateral security as high quality borrowers and therefore 
offer them credit on a much better terms compared to the inexperienced novice 
entrepreneurs (Wright et al., 1997a). These arguments suggest that experienced 
entrepreneurs may be more likely to be able to access finance successfully than novice 
entrepreneurs. From the above discussion, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
Hio: Entrepreneurs with prior business ownership experience are less likely to be 
credit rationed. 
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It is often cited that the most common barrier to small business innovation is 
access to finance; debt or equity. The immediate reason mostly offered is the problem 
of information asymmetry, which leads to formal financial institutions either tighten 
their lending terms and conditions or rationing credit to small businesses (Binks and 
Ennew, 1996). Hall (1989) has argued that small businesses encounter difficulty in 
innovation financing because of the high borrowing cost, higher monitoring costs, use 
of short term financing for long-term research, lending institutions inability to assess 
either the technological validity or project viability of the new idea or product. 
Entrepreneurs engaged in product or service innovation may encounter 
difficulties in obtaining finance because of the high borrowing costs, higher 
monitoring costs, lack of long-term credit, and inability of banks to assess the 
technological validity of the new idea or product (Hall, 1989) and also because of a 
lack of collateral (Freel, 2000). From the above discussion, the following hypotheses 
can be derived: 
Hn: Entrepreneurs who introduced a process innovation are more likely to be credit 
rationed. 
Hu : Entrepreneurs who introduced a product innovation are more likely to be credit 
rationed. 
Most exporters are unable to meet their financing requirements from internal 
sources, and hence they tend to rely on banks and other financial institutions as their 
main source of export finance (Alando, 1991; Baah-Nuakoh et al., 1996). However, 
these sources are not only difficult to access, but also the application procedures are 
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cumbersome, interest rates are high, increasing collateral requirement and most 
credits are short-term (Buatsi, 2002; Abor, 2005). Baah-Nuakoh et al. (1996) observed 
in their study that exporters in the manufacturing sector cited unavailability of credit 
for working capital as the most constraint to export growth and development in 
Ghana. Besides the availability, high interest rate was also cited as a constraint to 
export finance. They also observed that even tough exporters were in need of export 
finance, they did not believe that their application would be successful. 
Buatsi, (2002) found that of the 37 exporters interviewed, 29% had need for 
pre-shipment finance, commercial banks were the most important source of export 
finance, exporters cited high interest rate and collateral requirements to be high. Also, 
most small business exporters were unable to meet the bank requirements to access 
credit. Furthermore, most exporters were unable to transact business with the Export 
Finance Company for lack of information on their activities, that most banks cited 
high default rates among exporters. From the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis can be derived: 
H13: Entrepreneurs engaged in exporting activities are more likely to be credit 
rationed. 
4.9 Geographical distance and bank lending decisions 
In recent times, both theoretical and empirical literature has demonstrated the 
importance of distance to availability and pricing of bank loans. Various studies have 
asserted that the condition of lending is dependant on both the distance between the 
bank and the entrepreneur, and the distance between the lending bank and the closest 
competing banks. Two rationales have been emphased. First, the travel cost of 
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entrepreneurs to their banks. Entrepreneurs incur costs in travelling to transact 
business with their banks (Hotelling, 1929; Salop, 1979; Chiappori, et al., 1995; Park 
and Pennacchi, 2009). In view of the imperfect information in the credit market 
characterised by information asymmetry associated with small business lending, 
banks do incur additional costs in gathering information and monitoring loans to these 
small business entrepreneurs. Multiple site visits as well as specialised knowledge is 
required when providing loans to small business entrepreneurs (Berger and Udell, 
1998). 
4.9.1 Bank-entrepreneur distance 
Over the last two decades, several studies have demonstrated an increase in 
geographical distance between banks and their small businesses (Cyrnak and Hannan, 
2003; Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Wolken and Rohde, 2002; Hannan, 2003; Degryse 
and Ongena, 2005; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; DeYoung et al., 2008a). Using a data 
sample drawn from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF), 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) explored the effect of an increasing distance between 
banks and small businesses borrowing in the United States between 1973 and 1993. 
They found that the geographical distance between banks and their small businesses 
have increased over the two decades and that the average distance have increased by 
about 3 to 4 per cent per year. They attributed this to the improvements in bank 
productivity. They also found that the lender-borrower communication has become 
more impersonal and that banks acquire quality information through improved 
communication technology. 
Also, Wolken and Rohde (2002) documented a marginal increase in distance 
between the small business and their banks in 1998. These results were as a 
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comparison between the 1993 and 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF). 
Similarly, Degryse and Ongena (2005) in addressing the issue of changing distance 
between entrepreneurs and their banks concluded in their study of the geographical 
distance between entrepreneurs, their lending bank and closest competitive banks that 
no substantial increase in distance occurred between 1975 and 1997. They stressed the 
occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending and noted that loan rates 
decrease with distance between the business and the lending bank and increase with 
the distance between the business and competing banks. 
Moreover, studies by Brevoort and Hannan (2006) have shown that banks are 
willing to lend to entrepreneurs in increasing geographical areas. Using a new data 
set, they examined the relationship between lending decision and distance between 
banks and entrepreneurs. They concluded that: (i) even in local markets; distance 
operates as a deterrent to lending, (ii) again within the local market distance is more 
of a deterrent for small businesses than for large businesses and (iii) distance is still 
relevant in bank lending to entrepreneurs. 
Besides these studies, DeYoung et al. (2008a) demonstrated that recent 
innovations in small business lending have contributed to an increase in the 
geographical distance between banks and small businesses. Using a large random of 
27,429 commercial loans from 5,081 banks guaranteed by Small Business 
Administration (SBA) to small businesses between 1984 and 2001 in the U.S. to 
examine commercial lending distance between banks and small businesses. They 
emphasised an increase in lending distance between banks and small businesses and 
documented a new observed phenomenon that "a fundamental re-ordering of 
borrower-lender distance by the borrowers' neighbourhood income and race 
characteristics" (DeYoung et al., 2008a pp. 19). 
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4.9.2 Spatial pricing 
Most spatial models assume that entrepreneurs do visit the closest bank to 
their businesses for banking transactions. However, this assumption is not always true 
with small businesses as most entrepreneurs may not be aware of the location of 
competing banks, their products offer and conditions of service (Grossman and 
Shapiro, 1984; Bester and Petrakis, 1995). In addition to this, location is only one 
factor (Elliehausen and Wolken, 1990), and these are other factors such as 
convenience, hours of operation, bank reputation, quality and reliability of bank 
services and products and the bank-entrepreneur relationship. Thus, an entrepreneur 
may choose a distant competitive bank i f their condition of service and loan offers is 
cost effective (Pinkse, et al., 2002). Entrepreneurs are likely to move from their banks 
i f another bank is offering a more competitive loan price and better banking service 
(Tirole, 1998). 
Based on two empirical predictions, spatial price discrimination models have 
documented that, (i) a negative relationship exists between interest rate and small 
business - bank distance and (ii) a positive relationship exists between the interest rate 
and small business-closest competing bank distance (Cerquiro et al., 2007). Degryse 
and Ongena (2005) also noted that a spatial price relationship exists between distance 
and the lending period. They utilised detailed contract information from more than 
15,000 bank loans to small businesses from a large Belgian bank to examine the effect 
of geographical distance on bank loan rates between firms, their banks and other 
competitive banks in the community. Degryse and Ongena (2005) found that loan 
rates decrease with the distance between the business and the lending bank, but 
increase with distance between the business and competing banks (Degryse and 
Ongena, 2005). They also observed that 'loan rates decrease more with lender-
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business distance for transactional (single-product), short-term, uncollateralized, term 
(not line of credit), and non-capital expenditure loans' (Degryse and Ongena, 2005 
pp.262). Another of their findings was that the spatial price discrimination is largely 
caused by transportation cost, but did not rule out the probability of adverse selection. 
Similarly, Agarwal and Hauswald (2006) investigated the determinants of the 
lending decision by examining loan price discrimination in relation to the lender-
borrower distance. They observed that businesses closer to the lending bank payed on 
average 195 basis points more than a firm located 2.6 miles from the lending bank. 
Besides, they argued that an increase in the travel distance between a business and the 
competing bank raises the loan rate by 55 basis points. Thus the loan rate and the 
availability of credit decrease with the distance between banks and entrepreneurs, but 
increases with the distance between entrepreneurs and competitor. Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2006) emphasised that by controlling for the quality of the entrepreneur, 
distance has no effect on the availability of credit. This implies that the problems of 
adverse selection relates to the quality of the business and not the distance between 
the business and the bank. 
DeYoung et al. (2008b) found that the rate of default on small business loans 
increases with distance between bank and entrepreneur. They however emphasised 
that this effect is reduced by the introduction of a credit scoring technique. Cerqueiro 
et al. (2007) surveyed the effects of both a bank-business distance and bank 
organisational structure on lending decisions. They observed that banks do engage in 
spatial pricing which may be caused by both transportation costs and information 
asymmetries and stressed that a bank's ability to discriminate is dependent on the 
reach of the lending technology of surrounding competitors. 
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The pricing of a loan can affect an entrepreneur's access to external finance as 
this can influence repayment ability and the rate of default. The distance between 
entrepreneurs and their banks can also determine the risk level associated with the 
external finance. The higher the risk, the more likely an entrepreneur is to be credit 
rationed. The next section therefore examines the influence of geographical distance 
and entrepreneur's access to external finance. 
4.9.3 Spatial rationing 
Carling and Lundberg (2005) used a quarterly data set of 53, 383 Swedish 
limited companies between the second quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 2000, to 
examine the relevance of geographical distance between borrowing businesses and the 
lending bank find no support for the existence of geographical credit rationing and the 
lowering of interest rate between the bank and the borrowing businesses citing 
technological changes as being the contributory factor. 
Using an empirical data set from Israel, Felsenstein and Fleischer (2002) 
determined the risk level of the peripheral or remote business, and compared the 
collateral requirements of the banks for the businesses in proximity and those in 
remote areas by the amount of loan guarantee demanded by the commercial banks. 
They found that the collateral demanded by the bank in financing the small business 
was higher for businesses located in peripheral location than those located in the 
closer proximity of the bank. Felsenstein and Fleischer (2002) observed that banks 
considered loans to peripherally located businesses as a higher risk venture and 
therefore demanded increased collateral. 
Using data on small business lending patterns from the Federal Reserve Board 
for the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), Brevoort and Hannan (2006) examined 
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the relationship between lending decisions and the distance between a bank and an 
entrepreneur. They reported three basic findings: (i) within local markets, distance 
operates as a deterrent to lending, (ii) within the local market, distance acts as more of 
a deterrent to small businesses than to large organisations, and (iii) within the local 
market, distance is not declining in importance. 
Bonaccorsi and Gobbi (2001) using Italian data, find that the concentration of 
bank branches in a particular locality is positively associated with the availability of 
credit for small businesses and also negatively associated with increased loan default. 
Alessandrini et al. (2006) used a panel dataset containing information on firms, bank 
office locations, bank types, credit market, institutional characteristics and macro 
variables in Italy to test the impact of operational and functional distance on financing 
constraints for businesses. They found that, the number of bank branches have 
increased reducing geographical (operational) distance, but at the same time 
increasing functional distance between the banks and the local communities. In 
addition the increased functional distance makes financing constraints more binding 
to the small business. 
Agarwal and Hauswald (2006) found that distance is an important factor in the 
lending decision of banks to offer or deny credit. They showed that 'the likelihood of 
obtaining credit decreases in the distance between entrepreneurs and bank but 
increases in that between entrepreneurs and nearest competitor' (Agarwal and 
Hauswald, 2006 pp. 14). Businesses closer to their bank branch are more likely to 
obtain loans, whilst businesses located further away from their bank branch are less 
likely to obtain loans. 
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4.9.4 Distance and information asymmetry 
The provision of finance to small businesses by banks for their investment 
projects are often considered highly risky and its unit transaction costs is equally 
expensive in view of their high default rate and lack of information (Binks et al., 
1992). The unavailability of information and the high cost associated with its 
gathering often leads to information asymmetry. Due to these imperfect information 
flows, banks very often restrict the provision of loans to specific projects as well as 
the firm size, entrepreneurial experience, firm's track record, provision of collateral 
and location. 
The problems of asymmetric information are severe with small businesses 
lending as a result of financial institution's inability to assess their credit worthiness 
and this makes their access to credit difficult (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and 
Udell, 1998). Banks are able to resolve these problems by gathering and processing 
soft information, through long-term relationship lending and by setting loan prices 
and collateral requirements to determine entrepreneur quality (Berger and Udell, 
1995). 
Banks acquire the private information about the small business through regular 
site visits, screening and monitoring of small business performance. The exercise of 
collecting private information is expensive and cumbersome where the small business 
has no proven track record (Felsenstein and Fleischer, 2002) and this is even 
worsened i f the geographical distance between the business and the bank is further 
away (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006; Mian, 2006; 
DeYoung et al., 2008b). 
Banks price their products uniformly and entrepreneurs pay the same interest 
rate with the difference mainly on the distance between the entrepreneur and the bank 
150 
(Degryse and Ongena, 2004). The costs of monitoring investment projects increases 
with the distance between the bank and entrepreneur as a result of the additional 
communication and travelling costs (Sussman and Zeira, 1995). Therefore the 
proximity of borrowing businesses to the bank will reduce the costs involved in 
gathering information and monitoring investment projects. Entrepreneurs are therefore 
likely to receive favourable loan terms from their banks (Boot, 2000; Almazan, 2002). 
The theoretical analysis of credit rationing has been well documented since the 
seminal works of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). A number of empirical studies have also 
been carried out to verify the existence or otherwise of the credit rationing concept 
(Berger and Udell, 1992; Baydas et al., 1994; Zeller, 1994; Levenson and Willard, 
2000; Blumberg and Letterie, 2002; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2005; Blumberg and 
Letterie, 2008). 
4.9.5 Geographical distance and entrepreneurs' access to bank credit 
This section is concerned with the the relevance of geographical distance and 
their effects on business information and the availability of credit to small business 
entrepreneurs. Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979) both demonstrated how borrowers 
incur transportation costs through visits to their banks for business transactions. They 
argued that banks price their loans uniformly in the absence of borrower location 
differential or that the banks are in a statutory manner prohibited from practicing 
spatial price discrimination. However, i f banks become aware of borrower location 
differentials, they are likely to practice special price discrimination by setting loan 
prices based on the acquired information. 
It is argued that borrowers closest to their bank branches are charged higher 
interest rates than borrowers located further away from these banks (Petersen and 
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Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) because it is 
assumed that closest borrowers enjoy lower transportation costs (Lederer and Hurter, 
1986; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006). This gives the bank some form of market power 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Cerqueiro et al., 2007) and thus allowing them to charge 
higher interest rates (Alessandrini et al., 2006). 
Similarly, the availability of credit to the entrepreneur it is argued decreases in 
bank-entrepreneur distance and rather increases between the closest competitive bank 
and the entrepreneur (Brevoort and Hannan, 2006). However, Carling and Lundberg's 
(2005) analysis of a single Swedish bank found no evidence of geographical credit 
rationing. Monitoring costs which is associated with transportation, communication 
and administrative costs increases with the distance between lender and borrower. 
Banks incur monitoring costs when assessing their borrowers for credit and, therefore, 
price their loans taking into account the distance between them and the borrower. 
Hence loan prices are expected to increase with an increase in distance (Sussman and 
Zeira, 1995). 
Reforms in the financial sector have eroded the legal barriers to entry and have 
enlarged the scope of banking activities and functions. The competitive structure of 
banks in communities has been reshaped and reorganised making the allocation of 
bank credit more competitive (DeH'Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). Banks all over the 
world have sought to increase their branches, thus, reducing the operational distance 
between them and their customers. On the other hand, banks have also begun to 
centralise or concentrate their decisional and strategic functions in few areas. An 
increase in bank branch concentration has the tendency to reduce credit rationing of 
entrepreneurs whilst functional distance increases the probability of credit rationing 
(Alessandrini et al., 2006). 
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The consolidation of the banking sector and the geographical concentration of 
decisional and strategic centres have led to an increase in the functional distance 
between bank decisional centres and peripherally located businesses (Collender and 
Shaffer, 2003; Bonaccorsi di Parti and Dell' Ariccia, 2004; Alessandrini et al 2006). 
This situation has created informational asymmetry between businesses located 
further away from these decisional centres. 
Various studies have emphasised that the consolidation and concentration of 
bank decisional centres have curtailed the managerial authority of local branch 
managers in loan approvals. Branch managers are allowed to use standard appraisal 
forms to perform only initial screening of loan applications for onward transmission 
to the decisional centres for the bank's credit committee to make the final credit 
decision (Keeton, 1995; Avery and Samolyk, 2000; Liberti, 2005). 
Bank branch concentration in conurbation and large towns has an adverse 
effect on the credit availability of small businesses located further away from these 
banks. This arises because these banks are unable to gather adequate business 
information about peripherally located businesses and hence have poor credit 
screening and appraisals of their credit applications. They are, therefore, reluctant in 
financing businesses located further away from their decisional and administrative 
centres (Berger et al., 2005; Carter and McNulty, 2005, Mian, 2006). Bank 
concentration has also affected the credit availability to small businesses especially to 
peripherally located ones (Cole and Walraven, 1998; Sapienza, 2002; Alessandrini et 
al 2006) and has also increased loan defaults in these areas (Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Gobbi, 2001). From the above discussions the following hypotheses are derived: 
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Hi4.' The greater the distance between the entrepreneur and its lending banks the 
more likely the entrepreneur will be credit rationed. 
H15: Entrepreneurs located in conurbations are less likely to be credit rationed 
than those located in large towns. 
Hi6: Entrepreneurs located in small towns are more likely to be credit rationed 
than their counterparts in large towns. 
4.10 Uncertainties and trust characteristics in bank lending decisions 
A bank's lending decision requires that the bank takes into consideration the 
entrepreneur's capacity and willingness to meet the obligation of repaying the credit 
facility (Reed et al., 1976). The assessment of the entrepreneur's ability to repay the 
credit facility is the most important criterion banks base their lending decisions on 
(Newton, 2000). This is based on the availability of information on the entrepreneur's 
business (Brockner et a., 1992) which includes the cash flow projections suggesting 
adequate liquidity to meet repayment obligations. In addition, the decision is also 
based on the capacity and benevolence of the entrepreneur to secure the credit facility. 
Entrepreneurs lacking collateral to support their credit applications and also showing 
poor cash flow projections exhibit higher levels of uncertainty (Blumberg and 
Letterie, 2002). The entrepreneurs exhibiting these higher levels of uncertainty in a 
transaction are more likely to have their credit applications rejected (Kitcher, 1993; 
Ridley, 1995). Following from the above discussion, the following is proposed: 
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Pi: The higher the level of uncertainty in a bank-entrepreneur transaction the 
more likely the entrepreneur will be credit rationed. 
In a bank-entrepreneur relationship, the bank exercises confidence in the 
entrepreneur to act in good faith and take actions that will be mutually beneficial to 
both parties (Rousseau et al., 1998). Trust is not built overnight, it is developed 
gradually during a durable relationship, on repeated transactions and also requires acts 
of reciprocity (Lesser, 2000; Alder and Kwon, 2002; Sapanito et al., 2004). Trust is 
built on mutual knowledge shared between the bank and the entrepreneur giving both 
parties some level of confidence and anticipation of reasonable behaviour (Gulati, 
1995; Ferrary, 2003). As the relationship improves, shared information increases at a 
much lower cost, thereby reducing uncertainty in the lending decision and thus 
increasing trust between the bank and the entrepreneur (Burt, 1992). 
In relationship lending, the loyalty of the entrepreneur is a competitive 
advantage for the bank over its competitors (Reicheld and Sasser, 1990). Banks 
therefore build durable relationships with entrepreneurs to prevent defections (Doz, 
1996; Ring and Van den Ven, 1994) and to maintain loyalty through the sharing of 
information (Dunkelberg et al., 1984; Berlin and Mester, 1998) and the provision of 
products and services to meet entrepreneur's specific needs (Binks and Ennew, 1997; 
Berlin and Mester, 1998). Das and Teng (1998) also noted that bank services such as 
advice and support to entrepreneurs signifies 'goodwill and intimacy'. Similarly, 
regular visits and frequent communication between the bank and the entrepreneur 
portrays an attribute of 'goodwill and benevolence' (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Bornstein, 1996; Dowla, 2006). The act of building a 
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dependable relationship is the beginning of trust building between the bank and the 
entrepreneur (Hirschman, 1984). 
Research has shown that building a durable bank-entrepreneur relationship 
increases credit availability and reduces the interest rate (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Binks and Ennew, 1997). A durable lending relationship between the bank and the 
entrepreneur is said to generate trust, which in turn provides the bank with a high 
degree of confidence that the entrepreneur will utilise the credit facility for the agreed 
project. Higher levels of trust improve the relationship (Gulati, 1995) and cooperation 
(Doz, 1996). Trust is said to improve the information flow between entrepreneurs and 
their banks and thus helping to reduce information asymmetry between them 
(Brockner et al., 1992). Following from the above discussion, the following is 
proposed: 
P2: The higher the level of trust in a bank-entrepreneur transaction the less 
likely the entrepreneur will be credit rationed. 
The lending decision on an entrepreneur's probability of default is determined 
on the basis of an assessment of the entrepreneur's character, capacity, capital, 
collateral, and conditions (Keasey and Watson, 2000; Biggs et al., 2002; Storey, 
2004). An assessment of an entrepreneur's capacity, ability and integrity is very vital 
in credit risk evaluation before a lending decision is made. During the credit 
evaluation process, the bank gathers information about the quality of the entrepreneur 
by assessing the entrepreneur's level of education, training, prior business experience, 
competence and commitment (Vernier, 1996). Experienced entrepreneurs with good 
reputations and competences are more likely to enjoy greater credit availability 
156 
compared with inexperienced entrepreneurs who lack the required reputation to be 
trusted (Dei Ottati, 1994). 
Collateral plays an important role in entrepreneurs' credit applications and 
banks' lending decisions (Berger and Udell, 1990; Black et al., 1996; Manove et al., 
2001), as it mitigates the decision of the bank to ration credit in the face of 
information asymmetry (Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; La 
Porta., 1998). The pledging of collateral in credit applications reduces the impact of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Chan and Kanatas, 1985) and thereby increases 
an entrepreneur's chances of obtaining credit (Black et al., 1996; Keasey and Watson, 
2000; Levenson and Willard, 2000). 
In the case of adverse selection, collateral plays a signalling role solving the 
adverse selection problem (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a). Thus, banks 
are able to determine the riskier entrepreneurs as higher risk entrepreneurs will prefer 
higher interest rates to no collateral (Capra et al., 2002; Jimenez and Saurina, 2003). 
On the other hand, Boot et al. (1991), Black and De Meza (1992), Bester (1994), 
Pozzolo (2004) have all noted that collateral ensures the elimination of moral hazard, 
forces entrepreneurs to take actions that will ensure positive net returns on their 
investments, hence repayment of the credit facility. 
The bank-entrepreneur relationship is developed as a gradual process and it is 
based on trust and respect for each other (Boot, 2000). The offer of collateral by the 
entrepreneurs signifies the commitment by the entrepreneur to ensure positive net 
returns on the investment and also to take actions that will ensure the safety of the 
investments (Blumberg and Letterie, 2002). It also signifies the entrepreneur's 
willingness to repay and benevolence to do well (Inderst and Muller, 2007). Thus, the 
durable bank-entrepreneur relationship and the offer of collateral are two elements 
157 
depicting trustworthiness on the part of the entrepreneur as well as building the 
entrepreneur's reputation. Following from the above discussion, the following is 
proposed: 
P3: The higher the level of entrepreneur reputation in a bank-entrepreneur transaction 
the less likely the entrepreneur wil l be credit rationed. 
4.11 Empirical evidence on credit rationing 
Levenson and Williad (2000) examined the extent to which small businesses 
in the United States in the late 1980s were able to access external finance they 
desired. They argued that it is not only the businesses ability to access external 
finance that matters, but also the duration of the application process. This they argue 
is likely to affect the businesses effective investment into profitable projects. Using 
new evidence on small business loan applications, Levenson and Williad (2000) 
concluded that constraint businesses are smaller, younger and more likely to be owned 
by their founders than those businesses that successfully applied for external finance. 
They found that the total number of credit constrained businesses was quite small and 
thus the extent of true credit rationing is limited. 
Blumberg and Letterie (2002) used survey conducted among 1223 individuals 
living in the Southern part of Limburg, a Dutch province who intended to start a 
business in 1998 or 1999. They observed that 994 of the respondents started a 
business while 229 refrained from their original idea to become an entrepreneur. 
Based on a sub-sample of 347 respondents who applied for credit at a bank Blumberg 
and Letterie (2002) observed that 30% of these applications were rejected outright. 
They concluded that home ownership, experience obtained in previous jobs, 
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education, family composition, nationality, parental self-employment, multiple-
ownership and income derived from previous occupation affects access to external 
financial resources. They argued that business plans and support obtained from an 
accountant are effective ways to signal credibility to a bank. 
Voordeckers and Steijvers (2005) considered the empirical significance of 
credit rationing in their empirical work. They made a distinction between long term 
and short term bank debts. To ensure their growth and continuity, small businesses 
require financial resources. Since most of these small businesses are unable to raise 
the needed finance neither from their own source nor through the capital market, they 
rely mostly on debt finance and mainly through the banks for both their working 
capital loan for short term investments and long term loan for investment projects. 
This heavy reliance on bank debts has created an excess of demand over supply of 
credit. This situation is expected to raise the interest rate until credit demanded equal 
credit supplied. However, this does not occur since banks prefer to ration credit than 
increase the interest rate. 
In developing countries, the financial sector is generally characterized by a 
non-market clearing interest rate, which is heavily dependent on the institutional 
credit and hence very often credit rationing (Das, 2004). Bigsten et al. (2000) used a 
panel data on businesses in the manufacturing sector from six African countries in 
investigating whether businesses in the manufacturing sector in Africa are credit 
constrained. Bigsten et al. (2000) argued that not withstanding the fact that few 
businesses obtain credit, it was not sufficient evidence to prove that businesses were 
being credit constrained. They further argued, that some businesses may not have 
applied for credit because they had no demand for bank credit, while others are likely 
to be refused credit as part of the banks profit maximising behaviour. Using direct 
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evidence to determine whether businesses had a demand for bank credit and whether 
these demands were satisfied in the formal credit market. They observed that more 
than half of the firms in the sample had no demand for credit. Of those businesses 
with a demand for credit only a quarter obtained a formal financial institution loan. 
They concluded that outstanding debts is positively related with obtaining further 
lending and that micro and small businesses are less likely to obtain a bank credit than 
large businesses. 
Using a data set from 140 manufacturing businesses from Cote DTvoire, 
Azam et al. (2001) examined the credit needs of businesses to finance positive 
investment projects. Azam et al. (2001) considered the business size measured by the 
number of employees, the sector of the business, ethnic background of the managers 
and the type of industry. They observed that 43 businesses out of the 140 declared 
they did not need financing; whilst out of the 97 remaining businesses, which needed 
funds, 23 obtained a loan from the formal sector, but only 12 obtained a loan from the 
informal credit market. The 62 remaining businesses did not obtain credit either 
because they had bad projects or that they were credit rationed. 
Atieno (2001) used mainly primary data from individual entrepreneurs and 
farmers who have either received or not received credit from both formal and informal 
credit institutions. The July -August 1998 survey was carried out in the market 
centres in the rural areas of five districts of Western Kenya. A total of 334 small-scale 
entrepreneurs engaged in farming, wholesale, retail trade and primary processing of 
agricultural products were interviewed for the study. Atieno (2001) showed that 51% 
of enterprises had not used credit before. Of the 49% who had used credit before, 67% 
had used informal sources. They cited lack of information about credit and the lack of 
required security. Atieno (2001) attributed loan rationing in the informal credit market 
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to the limited resource base, and the lending terms and conditions reflected in the 
collateral requirement, application procedure and repayment periods for the formal 
credit market. 
Baydas et al. (1994) used data obtained from a survey of an in-depth interview 
of 447 small-scale enterprises randomly selected from participants in special micro 
enterprise programme conducted in Ecuador in 1990. They observed that a total of 
248 entrepreneurs applied for loan of which 172 had their loan request approved. The 
remaining 76 entrepreneurs had their loan request rejected. They further observed that 
80% of the loan applicants owned the enterprises and 40% of the loan applicants were 
female. Also 40 % of the entrepreneurs were involved production activities, 25% in 
commerce, 24% in services and only 2.5% in agriculture. Baydas et al. (1994) 
identified a number of variables that may influence the risk perception of the 
entrepreneur and the loan demand. These included the number of years in business, 
reflecting the experience of the entrepreneur, the legal status of the business and the 
sector in which the enterprise is operating. They observed that owners of businesses 
significantly demanded larger loans than non-owners, and entrepreneurs in agriculture 
demanded lesser loans than those in the non-agricultural sector. 
Entrepreneurs with higher levels of education demanded larger loans than 
those with lower level of education. Male entrepreneurs also demanded larger loans 
than female entrepreneurs. They argued that the negative but insignificant coefficient 
for age signified that older entrepreneurs may have less demand for bank credit. They 
concluded that i f small-scale enterprises are profitable, are operated by educated 
entrepreneurs who are willing to pay higher interest rates, their access to credit will be 
improved. 
161 
Aryeetey et al. (1994) used a two-pronged approach which focused on both the 
supply and demand in relationship to the financing of small firms in Ghana. Their 
study investigated the apparent contradiction between the high propensity of small 
businesses to identify finance as a primary constraint and the view of banks that small 
businesses lending remains low for lack of effective demand for credit. They observed 
that credit for start-up business was relatively non-existent, with internal sources of 
finance as the main capital for business expansion. They also noted that external 
borrower increased with the size of the firm. On the demand for financing, Aryeetey 
et al. (1994) emphasised an indication of a strong excess demand as a result of the 
high rate of application for loans and the readiness of small firms to pay above-market 
rate of interest. On the availability of credit from the banks for small businesses, they 
noted a limited access to credit by small businesses. 
Tagoe et al. (2005) examined the impact of financial sector liberalization 
policies on the financial management of small businesses in Ghana. Using six case 
studies, they reviewed documents and interviewed owner-managers of small 
businesses, banks, non-bank financial institutions and advisory service providers in 
Ghana. These institutions were included in order to compare their views with those of 
the small businesses. Tagoe et al. (2005) observed that all the interviewees identified 
lack of credit as the main small business constraint. They argued that small businesses 
could not afford the high interest rate (cost); banks preferred short-term to long-term 
financing (duration); and often, the banks rather reduced the loan amount (adequacy). 
They also indicated that banks' reluctance in lending to small businesses were mainly 
due to the risk perception of the banks on the small businesses in relation to large 
businesses, the inability of small businesses to provide collateral security and the risk 
free nature of government bills and bonds. 
162 
4.12 Conclusion 
The chapter has reviewed the credit rationing concept beginning with the 
availability doctrine from the 1950s which proposed a rationing measure to an interest 
rate measure in the transmission of a monetary policy (Roosa, 1951; Kareken, 1957; 
Scott, 1957). Proponents of the availability doctrine argued for a reduction in money 
supply to restrict spending in situations of increasing demand (Scott, 1957; Hogman, 
1960; Baltensperger, 1978). This doctrine was followed by the introduction on 
information possession in a transaction between two parties and the impact on the 
transaction where a lack of information existed. 
The possession of different information by the two parties in a transaction 
leads to information asymmetry, where one party has information advantage over the 
other party. Akerlofs (1970) market for lemons theory, Spence's (1973) signalling 
model and Stiglitz's (1975) screening process provided the framework for the 
introduction of information asymmetry into the concept of credit rationing. The 
definition of credit rationing was established and the concept of adverse selection and 
moral hazard as well as the Stiglitz and Weiss 1981 credit rationing model were 
reviewed. 
Specifically, the chapter examined the impact of information asymmetry on 
bank lending and credit accessibility by entrepreneurs. It also examined the role 
relationship lending plays in credit availability and quantity, in pricing of a credit and 
collateral demand. The impact of durable relationships and multiple relationships on 
credit availability to the entrepreneur were also reviewed. The role of lending 
relationship in small business credit accessibility was also assessed. The chapter also 
examined the habitual entrepreneur's possession of business ownership and work 
experience and how these influence their performance and access to credit. 
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In addition, the chapter looked at the use of collateral in bank credit 
accessibility by entrepreneurs and the role collateral plays in reducing risks or 
mitigating information asymmetry problems. Also, the chapter examined the impact 
of geographical distance on credit pricing and accessibility by entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, the chapter reviewed the empirical literature on credit rationing in both 
developed and developing countries. Lastly the chapter discussed the role of trust in 
bank lending decisions under conditions of uncertainties. 
The review of the credit rationing literature provides the study with the 
background knowledge on the concept of credit rationing. It further provides a 
detailed knowledge on information asymmetry, relationship lending, the role of 
collateral and the impact of geographical distance and their impact on credit 
availability and accessibility by the entrepreneur. This chapter therefore serves as a 
solid foundation for the empirical chapters on credit rationing. The next chapter 
provides the methodology used by this study to provide the empirical findings. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The three chapters preceding the research methodology chapter have reviewed the 
literature on the Entrepreneurship theories {Human capital theory (HCT) and Social 
capital theory (SCT), small business financing, and credit rationing}. Together, these 
chapters provide the theoretical framework and the literature review for this study. 
The methodology chapter discusses the operationalisation of the research models and 
examines the issues and arguments behind the choice of the strategy adopted for the 
research, the research design and the data analysis. 
The data used for the empirical analysis were obtained from a survey 
conducted in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana between January 2007 and May 
2007. Of the 1200 entrepreneurs sampled, 750 entrepreneurs were short listed for the 
survey. During the five month survey, 522 questionnaires were completed. Of this 
number 9 responses were eliminated because the businesses were found to have fallen 
outside the selection criteria. Another 13 responses were eliminated because almost 
all the responses were unsatisfactorily answered. In total, 500 valid questionnaires 
were obtained. From this number, 4 responses were excluded because the 
respondents' responses were inconsistent. The final valid responses of 496 
questionnaires were achieved and yielded a 66% response rate. In addition, in-depth 
interviews were held with 20 Credit Managers of some selected banks in Ghana with 
the view of exploring the research questions and testing the propositions. Further, the 
operationalisation of the model, the reasons behind the choice of sample, the data 
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collection methods and the techniques used in analysis are discussed, along with the 
efforts made to ensure as well as substantiate the validity, reliability and 
generalisability of the findings. The major difficulties encountered during the survey 
are highlighted in the appropriate section. 
5.2 The rationale for the choice of the study 
More recently, studies have emphasised the significant role played by small 
businesses in national development - particularly those of developing nations as many 
have described them as the backbone of the economy (Green, 2003; 
Wattanapruttipaisan, 2003), as the engine for growth (Boocock and Shariff, 2005), as 
the principal driving force for economic development (Szabro, 1996 pp. 1) and the 
lifeblood of most economies (Luetkenhorst, 2004). Besides these, studies have also 
emphasised that, small businesses in many countries face a myriad of challenges, 
particularly access to finance (Sowa et al., 1992; Levy, 1993; Aryeetey et al., 1994; 
Kayanula and Quartey, 1999; Hall, 2002). 
Additionally, studies have also shown that the entrepreneur is the key resource 
of the business (Pfeffer, 1994; Shane, 2000; Rauch and Frese, 2000; Davidsson and 
Wiklund, 2001; Wright et al., 2001). The nature of the entrepreneurial experience 
impacts greatly on the businesses access to resources and performance (Briiderl et al., 
1992; Boxall and Steeneveld, 1999; Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Rauch et al., 2005). 
Building on previous work (Westhead and Wright, 1998a; Westhead et al., 2005b) 
this research work makes a distinction between types of entrepreneurs and their access 
to start-up capital (Aryeetey et al., 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998; Hernandez-TriHo et 
al., 2005) and bank credit (Steel and Webster, 1992; Levy, 1993; Pissarides, 1999; 
Okoh and Ping, 2000; Westhead et al., 2003). 
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Furthermore, the research examines the impact of geographical distance on 
the entrepreneur's access to bank credit (Binks et al., 1992; Mason and Harrison, 
1993; Felsenstein and Fleischer, 2002; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; Agarwal and 
Hauswald, 2006) and lastly, the use of social capital (trust) by entrepreneurs and 
banks to access and provide bank credit, respectively (Uzzi, 1999; Mizruchi and 
Stearns, 2001; Ferrary, 2003; Saparito, 2004). The type of finance used at start-up, 
and access to credit to meet business goals can be greatly influenced by the 
entrepreneur's business ownership experience (Westhead et al., 2003). 
Studies on the empirical evidence of credit rationing of small businesses have 
been well documented, especially in the advanced economies (Levenson and Williad, 
2000; Blumberg and Letterie, 2002; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2005). However, very 
little has been done on the developing nations (Bigsten et al., 2000; Atieno, 2001) and 
in particular Ghana. In addressing this gap, the researcher draws on a new cross-
sectional survey undertaken in Ghana to establish the existence, or otherwise, of credit 
rationing amongst inexperienced and experienced entrepreneurs and their access to 
bank finance. Secondly, to demonstrate and recommend far reaching policies towards 
the financing of novice, serial and portfolio entrepreneurs in developing countries and 
in particular Ghana. 
5.3 Time frame 
The study covers a period of three years (January 2004 - December 2006). 
This implies that the bank should have been operating within the stated three year 
period (2004-2006) in order to approve or decline credit applications from 
entrepreneurs. Stated differently, the bank should have been operating for at least one 
year. In the case of the small business entrepreneurs they need to have applied for 
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bank credit within the three year period (January 2004 - December 2006). This 
implies that the credit applications could have been done in any one of the three year 
period or any two or all three years. 
5.4 Theoretical framework 
Chinn and Kramer (1999 pp. 258) define a theory as an "expression of 
knowledge, a creative and rigorous structuring of ideas that project a tentative, 
purposeful, and systematic view of phenomena." Concepts are the major components 
of theory and convey the abstract ideas within a theory (Chinn and Kramer, 1999). A 
framework is simply the structure of the idea or concept and how it is put together. A 
theoretical framework, then, is an essay that interrelate the theories involved in the 
question. A theoretical framework therefore is a collection of interrelated concepts 
that guides the researcher in determining how methods for measuring variables are 
selected, how analyses are planned and what statistical relationships to look for in the 
study. The theoretical framework reviewed in this section include: the sources of 
entrepreneurial start-up capital, access to bank credit by novice, serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs, geographical distance and entrepreneurial access to bank credit and the 
role of trust in bank lending decisions. 
5.4.1 Entrepreneur's sources of start-up capital 
Previous empirical studies have showed that start-up businesses mainly use 
internal (informal) sources of finance as their principal source of capital and over time 
introduce external (formal) sources of finance to augment their expansion drive (Acs, 
1985; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Aryeetey et al., 1994; Findings Africa Region, 
1994; Manigart and Struyf, 1997; Hamilton and Fox, 1998; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 
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2005; Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006; Heino, 2006; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). A major 
factor in the choice of an entrepreneur's start-up capital, the type and amount of 
finance used is influenced by the entrepreneur's background, business ownership 
experience and social network ties (Westhead et al., 2003b; Westhead et al., 2005b). 
The study used the attributes of human capital (education, experience and 
skills) possessed by the type of entrepreneur (Pfeffer, 1994) as a resource to the small 
business in examining the type of and access to start-up capital used by both 
experienced and inexperienced entrepreneurs at the start of their businesses. To 
achieve this objective, the study matched the sources of start-up capital (personal 
savings, co-investors, gifts and loans from relations, bank loans and overdrafts, 
supplier's credit, customer advance, and pensions) with the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur (sex, age, degree, relative role model) and the characteristics of the 
business (sector, size, age, employment growth, location, innovation and exporting). 
5.4.2 Novice, serial and portfolio entrepreneur and access to bank credit 
Access to finance has consistently been identified by a number of studies as 
the major constraint to small business's start-up, expansion, growth and development 
in both developed and developing countries (Steel and Webster, 1992; Levy, 1993; 
Pissarides, 1999; Okoh and Ping, 2000; European Commission, 2002; European 
Commission, 2003; van Eeden et al., 2003; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). 
The study brings together entrepreneurship and credit rationing, and draws 
attention to the need to focus upon the human capital resources of the entrepreneur, 
and the nature of these resources which influences the entrepreneur's access to bank 
credit in Ghana. More specifically the study utilises the Human Capital Theory (HCT) 
of the entrepreneur (Becker, 1975; Star and Bygrave, 1991; Westhead, 1995; Brown 
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and Kirchhoff, 1997) and the nature of the entrepreneurs to investigate whether 
specific types of businesses and entrepreneurs have a higher probability of being 
credit rationed. To achieve this objective the study examines the extent to which the 
resources of the business (sector, size, age, employment growth, location, innovation, 
exporting and experience) and the entrepreneurs (sex, age, degree, and relative role 
model) are associated with credit rationing in three times periods: the last year, 1-2 
years ago, and then 2-3 years ago. 
5.4.3 Geographical distance and entrepreneurial access to bank credit 
Recent studies have shown an increase in geographical and functional distance 
between entrepreneurs and their banks and entrepreneurs and their closest competitive 
banks (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Cyrnak and Hannan, 2003, Degryse and Ongena, 
2005; Hannan, 2003). This increase in geographical and functional distance has been 
attributed to structural changes in the banking industry resulting in technological 
progress, communication technologies, consolidation and concentration of banking 
functions and services (Degryse and Ongena, 2004; Berger and DeYoung, 2006; 
Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; Alessandrini et al., 2006; DeYoung et al., 2007; 
Cerqueiro et al., 2007). 
As a result of the above changes in the banking industry, bank lending 
decisions have gradually been centralised creating both geographical and functional 
distances between entrepreneurs and their banks. This has created two main 
challenges; the problems of information asymmetry and increases in transaction costs 
in lending to small businesses located in peripheral areas. In order to evaluate the 
impact of these challenges on peripherally located small businesses, the study 
developed a model of credit rationing to determine the impact of geographical 
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distance, and match these causal variables against the control variables of the 
entrepreneur and the small business. 
5.4.4 The role of trust in bank lending decision 
A number of studies have identified the problems of information asymmetry as 
the major challenge facing bank lending decisions in small businesses (Binks et al., 
1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Angelini et al., 1998; 
Harhoff and Korting, 1998a; Angelini et al., 1998). The problems of information 
asymmetry limit the banks ability to effectively evaluate the creditworthiness of small 
business entrepreneurs (Berger and Udell, 1995; Binks and Ennew, 1997; Frame et 
al., 2001). As a result of these challenges, banks regard small business lending as a 
risky venture and are often reluctant to offer credit to these entrepreneurs (Nissanke 
and Aryeetey, 1998; UNCTAD, 1999; Abereijo and Fayomi, 2005). 
In resolving the inherent risks and uncertainties associated with small business 
lending, banks gather relevant information regarding the entrepreneur and the small 
business (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985), demand collateral (Bester, 1994; Besanko 
and Thakor, 1987; Black and De Meza. 1992), and develop a durable relationship 
with the entrepreneur (Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). Developing a durable 
relationship between a bank and an entrepreneur is argued to improve the flow of 
information (Newton, 2000) which also brings along the issue of trust and the 
availability of credit (Scott and Dunkelberg, 1999; Machauer and Weber, 2000). 
The study aimed at evaluating the role of trust in bank lending decisions under 
conditions of risks and uncertainty. The characteristics of trust were employed to 
evaluate the role that trust plays in bank lending decisions to small business 
entrepreneurs under conditions of uncertainty. To achieve this objective, the study 
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matched relationship variables (duration, scope account, experience, capacity, 
performance, security) and collateral variables (cash, outside collateral, inside 
collateral, institutional guarantee, personal guarantee) with the characteristics of trust 
(reputation, similarity, ability, integrity, benevolence, communication) which the 
entrepreneur is expected to possess. 
5.5 Operationalisation 
The main objectives of this study are the examination of entrepreneurial 
sources of finance, the identification and the evaluation of financing constraints 
entrepreneurs encounter and offering recommendations of policies towards the 
mitigation of these challenges. This section outlined the choice of research strategy 
used; the reasons for using a face-to face questionnaire and in-depth interviews, the 
reasons for not choosing other methods, and the use of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods. Besides these, this section also outlined the choice of site and 
sample population, negotiating access for interviews, together with the questionnaire 
administration, the criteria for sample size selection and how the research was 
designed. 
5.5.1 Choosing a research strategy 
A research strategy is about the data collection tactics applied in gathering the 
research data, which is different from the data collection method. The research 
strategy must define the method to be used in carrying out the survey. In deciding on 
the research strategy, the researcher takes into consideration the most cost-effective 
approach in gathering the data and the most appropriate responses to the research 
questions (McNabb, 2004). In the social science field, a number of methods for 
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empirical research exist. These include face-to-face questionnaire administration, in-
depth interviews, postal questionnaires, telephone surveys, internet surveys and 
observation. Any of these methods or various combinations can be adopted for any 
research. Each of these strategies would provide the researcher with a variety of 
approaches in gathering the data, and the techniques in processing and analysing the 
data. 
In addressing the research questions outlined above, and testing the hypotheses 
of this study, the researcher set out an objective approach of establishing a correlation 
between the variables and constructing statistical models in an attempt to explain the 
relationships between the causal and controlled variables of the entrepreneur and the 
small business. . To perform this function, the researcher designed a questionnaire and 
administered these questionnaires to gather primary data for the empirical analysis. To 
ensure a more efficient analysis and be able to test the hypotheses to address the 
research questions, a researcher can adopt a variety of methods including: 
quantitative, qualitative research methods or mixed research techniques (Perren and 
Ram, 2004). 
5.5.1.1 Reasons for choosing face-to-face questionnaire and in-depth interview 
In order for the findings of this study to achieve more confidence in 
representativeness, the study adopted a methodological integration to enhance the 
generalisability of findings (Evans, 1971; Gilmore and Carson, 1996; O'Donnell and 
Cummins, 1999). The face-to-face questionnaire administration and in-depth 
interview approaches were selected based on the following advantages. The face-to-
face questionnaire administration is said to have a lower sampling frame bias and 
response bias. Unlike the other approaches, the selected approach allows for a greater 
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degree of control of the respondent's situation. The researcher or interviewer has the 
opportunity to prevent any interference or unwanted inputs from others. Again the 
interviewer has the opportunity to build a good relationship with the respondent 
thereby ensuring trust. Interviewees usually respond favourably when confronted in 
person. This could lead to a better response and much easier follow-ups where 
necessary. Respondents may also have the advantage of cross-checking their facts and 
records (Czaja and Blair, 2005). 
A face-to-face questionnaire administration technique is an efficient and a 
relatively more reliable means of collecting data. Where a large data sample is 
required, the face-to-face questionnaire administration is cheaper compared with the 
telephone survey and quickest compared with a postal survey. Lastly, the approach 
allows for a comparison of respondents answers. Additionally, the face-to-face in-
depth interview achieves a higher response rate. The researcher has the opportunity to 
clarify questions the respondents are unable to understand and also seek clarification 
on unsatisfied answers provided by respondents. The use of in-depth interviews 
provides the researcher with a greater understanding of why respondents provide 
certain responses and the meaning and significance of their responses (Jones, 1985). 
The in-depth interviews also provides a greater framework for respondents to express 
themselves in their own terms according to their understanding (Patton, 1987) and 
also give details on their responses to questions (Till and Hawkins, 1990). The face-
to-face and in-depth interview provides the researcher with an increased depth of 
information, flexibility and high response rate (Pedgett, 2008). 
In spite of these advantages, face-to-face questionnaire administration is not 
without its limitations. The limitations of this approach are that it is time consuming 
and also the researcher's ability to be biased or to influence the responses. I f the 
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questionnaire is posted, the rates of responses are very often lower (Walsh and 
Wigens, 2003). 
5.5.1.2 Reasons for not choosing the other methods 
Even though telephone surveys are convenient and quicker, where the survey 
questions are lengthy, telephone interviews are expensive (Kempt and Remington, 
2007). Secondly, not all entrepreneurs have access to a reliable telephone network, 
mostly entrepreneurs located in small towns are very difficult to contact on the phone 
- i f not impossible (Ford, 1998). Thirdly, telephone directories are unreliable in Ghana 
and many entrepreneurs prefer using mobile phone whose reach are equally unreliable 
(Tucker et al., 2007). Fourthly, most of the entrepreneurs especially in the small towns 
and agricultural sector do have a lower level of education and may require the 
assistance of the researcher or an interpreter to understand the questions and also 
provide appropriate responses. Fifthly, with the telephone interview, the researcher is 
not sure who may be providing the responses and also is unable to determine i f the 
respondent is speaking the truth. 
Postal and e-mail questionnaires although among the least expensive and 
methods which saves time, are associated with delays in responses (Couper, 2000). 
Secondly, most small businesses do not have reliable postal or e-mail addresses to 
enable questionnaires to be posted or mailed to them. Thirdly, postal services in 
Ghana are not only unreliable, but could be quite impossible to carry out as most 
small businesses do not have reliable postal addresses (Dillman, 2000). Fourthly, 
there is a high rate of non-response associated with postal and e-mail questionnaires 
because of the least contact with respondents (Kaplowitz et al., 2004). This low 
response rate is likely to introduce a bias into the sample as most of the responses may 
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not be a true representative of the target population. Fifthly, as indicated earlier, the 
lower level of education wil l also affect responses. Lastly, the researcher is unable to 
tell who actually responded to the questionnaire. 
5.5.1.3 Quantitative research method 
In order to address the research questions a large sample of data was required 
to enable the researcher to gather adequate responses to the research questions. To 
achieve this, a quantitative research method was adopted since this method is deeply 
rooted in numbers and statistics and can statistically measure individual responses 
(Aliaga and Gunderson, 2002). Quantitative research is objective, controlled, 
systematic, valid and reliable (Punch, 2005). The research defines the study and the 
data used is structurally gathered and evaluated to avoid errors and also ensure 
validity and reliability (Muijs, 2004). However, quantitative research is not without 
limitations. Large samples are often required to draw meaningful conclusions. Apart 
from its expensive nature, large sample gathering can also encounter logistical 
difficulties. The accuracy and validity of the data can be undermined i f the sampling 
and weighting of the data are not properly managed. 
5.5.1.4 Qualitative research method 
Qualitative research is a highly subjective research discipline, designed to look 
beyond the percentages to gain an understanding of the respondent's feelings, 
impressions, opinions and viewpoints (Myers, 2000). In dealing with smaller, more 
focused samples, qualitative research proves that more effective. I f well structured, 
the qualitative research comes along with a rich, in-depth data laden with insight 
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unobtainable from quantitative market research techniques (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994). Qualitative research has many strengths. It is flexible, highly-focused, and 
designed to be completed quickly (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). The use of 
qualitative techniques opens up the possibility of more than one valid explanation 
(Padgett, 2008). Qualitative research is not without its weaknesses and limitations. 
Because it is uncontrolled and subjective, findings cannot be measured by validity or 
reliability tests. Data is likely to be less representative. Unlike quantitative research, it 
also does not allow us to predict or generalize a population beyond what is found in 
observation. The above section has outlined the research strategy adopted for the 
study and having made the choice, the next section of this study now outlines the 
reasons for choosing Ghana as the research site. 
5.5.2 Choosing a research site (area) 
Ghana is a sub-Saharan African nation which is located on the west coast of 
Africa, and it is approximately 750km north of the Equator on the Gulf of Guinea. 
The Ghanaian economy is basically driven by the agricultural, industrial and service 
sectors. According to an ISSER (2005 pp.16) report on the Ghanaian Economy, the 
contributions of these sectors are significant to the growth and development of the 
economy. 
The agricultural sector grew by 7.5% in 2004 contributing 46.7% of overall 
growth. The industrial sector grew by 5.1%, contributing 22.1% to overall growth and 
the service sector grew by 4.7%, contributing 24.3% to overall growth. The 
agricultural sector is the largest sector in the Ghanaian economy accounting for nearly 
half of GDP and employing about 60% of the total labour force. Rising cocoa 
production has masterminded the growth in the agricultural sector. 
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The industrial sector has shown signs of significant recovery growing at an 
average of 5.1% over the last three years. The manufacturing sub-sector is the largest 
component of the industrial sector, however growth has been slow. The sector has 
been growing at an average of 4.7% over the last three years. The other components in 
the industrial sector - construction, mining and quarrying have all experienced slow 
growth. 
In 2005, the service sector grew at an estimated rate of 5.4% from 4.7% in 
2004. The Tourism sector is the fastest growing sub-sector within the service sector. 
With an average annual increase of visitors of 11%, the sub-sector has improved in 
receipts by 17% in 2004 and 16% in 2005 (African Economic Outlook, 2006 pp. 284). 
The financial sector reform has led to an improved financial sector. The 
central bank is in charge of the money market namely the commercial banks, non-
banks (leasing companies, discount houses, finance houses, loans and savings 
companies) and the Securities and Exchange Commission is in charge of the Ghana 
Stock Exchange and the Brokerage firms. The choice of Ghana for the study was as a 
result of the following reasons: 
(i) Ghana is a developing nation with great potential of attaining middle-
income status within the next decade. The financial sector reforms 
(FINSAP I & II) has brought to bear in the country vast opportunities for 
financial institutions to provide varying credit facilities to businesses at all 
levels of their growth cycle; 
(ii) Additionally, small businesses are springing up throughout the country at a 
very fast rate and their contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and employment is significant; 
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(iii) Some form of study has been done on small businesses and their access to 
credit in Ghana. Most of the results have shown that small businesses have 
encountered difficulties in accessing credit facilities. This situation is even 
more pronounced for micro and small businesses and in particular for start-
ups. However, to the best of the researcher's knowledge no studies have 
been conducted on entrepreneurship and access to finance; 
(iv) The issue of information asymmetry has been identified as one of the 
major problems banks in developing countries and for that matter Ghana 
are facing. In an attempt to solve these problems banks demand collateral 
from businesses seeking credit with them, the absence of collateral implies 
that the banks would have to ration credit in order to avoid bad 
investments. Again, no empirical studies have been done to identify which 
group of entrepreneurs encounter credit rationing the most; 
(v) Studies have been done in the area of credit rationing in some African 
countries such as South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria and Cote' DTvoire. 
However, in the case of Ghana no major studies have been done on the 
issues of entrepreneurship, small business and credit rationing; 
(vi) Lastly, the researcher had had some considerable experience dealing with 
small businesses and entrepreneurs and their access to credit. Also the 
researcher hails from Ghana and will have some comparative advantage in 
terms of access to information and sources of data when conducting a 
research in his home country. 
The absence of data on small business activities in Ghana made the choice of a sample 
a difficult task. In collecting the data for the study the researcher set out some criteria 
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to sample the population. The next three sections outline the steps taken to gather this 
data. 
5.5.3 Choosing a sample frame (population) 
One of the challenges in conducting small business or entrepreneurship 
research is the selection of a suitable sample frame. Scholars, even in developed 
nations have conceded the difficulty in having access to an adequate and/or a 
comprehensive list of small businesses from state owned, quasi-state owned and 
private owned businesses (Buame, 1996; Jay and Schaper, 2003; Westhead et al., 
2005b). Curran and Blackburn (2001) stressed the lack of a suitable register for small 
businesses in the UK. Even in cases where the lists exist, the information on the list is 
inadequate (Jay and Schaper, 2003). This scenario therefore leaves a researcher with 
no other alternative than to compile an up to date list by way of contacting various 
associations, agencies, groups and bodies that has a working relationship with small 
businesses and individual entrepreneurs within the Ghanaian economy. 
5.5.4 Criteria for sample size selection 
The participants were selected based on the following criteria: 
(i) The business must have at least four employees and at most 50 employees; 
(ii) The business must be in operation for at least one year and must have applied 
to its bankers for a credit facility; 
(iii) The respondent must be the owner/founder or major partner in the case of a co-
investment; 
(iv) The business must be independently or privately owned (Rauch et al., 2005); 
(v) The business must be engaged in activities within the agricultural, manufacturing 
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and servicing sectors (Westhead et al., 2005b); 
(vi) The business must be located within the six districts of the Greater Accra 
Region. 
5.5.5 Negotiating access 
There are serious challenges and major hindrances to carrying out small 
business surveys in developing countries (Vulliamy et al., 1990). These challenges 
culminate from the lack of an adequate and/or a comprehensive list of small 
businesses. It is even more challenging where the sampling frame is reduced to the 
category of size, sector and location. To negotiate access, the researcher considered 
the four major problems encountered in doing a survey in a developing country put 
forward by Stephens (1990): 
(i) Access to individuals to interview or administer questionnaire and 
documents to support responses; 
(ii) Establishing and maintaining relationship on the research field; 
(iii) Managing the available time; and 
(iv) Operating effectively in a complex environment. 
To overcome these challenges, the researcher obtained an introductory letter 
from Durham Business School in addition to a note introducing the research topic, the 
purpose of the research, the importance of interviewing each entrepreneur, the usage 
of the data collected, the benefits to be derived from the exercise and the assurance of 
confidentiality on answers provided. In order to gain access to the entrepreneurs, the 
researcher first approached the heads of associations, agencies and the various 
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financial institutions working with the small business entrepreneurs to seek their 
permission in administering the questionnaire. The introductory and supporting notes 
from the associations and financial institutions proved to be very effective as this gave 
the researcher a much easier access and audience to the membership of the various 
associations and customers of the financial institutions. 
In developing the sample frame for the survey, a list of associations, agencies 
and government institutions were contacted to obtain lists of their members (Hall, 
1995; Delmar et al., 2003). Most of the lists provided by the association and agencies 
contained names of the business, their location, postal address, business activities and 
contacts. The associations and agencies contacted for their lists of members to assist 
in administering the questionnaire included the following: 
• Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) 
• Federation of Association of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE) 
• Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industries (GNCCI) 
• Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) 
• The Ghana Association of Consultants (GAC) 
• Ghana Association of Women Entrepreneurs (GA WE) 
The Association of Ghana Industries was the first association to be contacted. 
The Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) is a not-for-profit organisation, registered 
in Ghana. AGI was established 1958 by a group of indigenous manufacturers a 
membership of over 1000 throughout the country. Not-for-profit organisations can 
become associate members. AGI's main objectives are to contribute substantially to 
the growth and development of industries in Ghana and to create a business climate 
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which will allow Ghanaian companies to be internationally competitive. The aim of 
AGI is to: enhance the effectiveness of markets; strengthen the competitiveness of 
local industries; generate opportunities for private business; and create employment in 
all regions of Ghana. Sectors covered by AGI members include: Advertisements; 
Automotive Services; Banking and Finance; Drugs and Chemicals; Electrical and 
Electronics; Energy; Food, Drinks and Beverages; Garments and Knitting; 
Information Technology (IT); Leather, Rubber and Plastic; Metals and Building 
Products; Miscellaneous Services; Printing, Stationery and Packaging; 
Telecommunications; Textiles; Toiletries & Cosmetics; Transport Utilities; and Wood 
Processing. 
Following from AGI, the Federation of Associations of Ghanaian Exporters 
(FAGE) was the next source. FAGE is a private, non-governmental organisation of 
Ghanaian exporters and exporter associations. The membership of FAGE comprises 
of over 2,500 exporting firms in a range of sectors, including agriculture, seafood, 
crafts, timber, textiles, minerals, and industrial materials. Their primary goal is to be 
the premier provider of technical and information services to facilitate transactions 
between Ghanaian firms and their global partners. Services provided by FAGE 
include provision of market information, business news, notices on upcoming 
conferences, and special services to enable members to become a premier exporting 
enterprise. Some of the organisations under FAGE include Ghanaian Handicraft and 
Furniture Exporters; The furniture and Wood Products Association of Ghana 
(FAWAG); National Fisheries Association of Ghana; Ghana Tropical Food Exporters; 
Ghana Assorted Food Stuff Exporters Association; and Vegetable Producers and 
Exporters Association. 
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The third source was the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(GNCCI). It was established in 1961 under an Act of Parliament (Executive 
Instrument No. 196) following the amalgamation of the then four existing Chambers 
of Commerce. The GNCCI seeks to promote the interest of companies and 
organizations engaged in investment, trade, commerce, agriculture, industry and 
manufacturing in Ghana with total commitment to play a leadership role in the 
promotion of the healthy growth of the Country's economy, establishing a strong 
international linkage and projecting a good image for Ghana. 
The fourth source of contact was the Ghana Export Promotion Council 
(GEPC). It was established by the National Liberation Council Decree 369 in 1969 as 
an agency of the Ministry of Trade and Industry with the mandate to develop and 
promote Ghanaian exports. GEPC is the National Export Trade Support Institution, 
facilitating the development and promotion of Ghana's Non-Traditional Exports. Its 
sole responsibility is to develop and promote exports of non-traditional products. Its 
focus has primarily been to diversify Ghana's export base from the traditional export 
products of Gold, Cocoa Beans, Timber Logs and Lumber and Electricity. Currently, 
there are over 300 different non-traditional Export products categorized into 
Agricultural, Processed/semi Processed and Handicrafts. 
The goal of GEPC is to ensure that export trade contributes to economic 
growth through increased and sustainable production and competitive export market 
access. And as such its aims is to facilitate the development and expansion of the 
production base, and the promotion of Non-Traditional Exports from Ghana; to 
provide relevant trade information to support competitiveness of Ghanaian exporters 
and other stakeholders; to develop programmes and activities for institutional capacity 
building of export community to meet the challenges of the global market; to develop 
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a coordinated national export agenda through the harmonization of export related 
activities by private and public sector agencies and other development partners. 
The f i f th source was the Ghana Association of Consultants (GAC). The Ghana 
Association of Consultants (GAC) was established in 1989 at the end of a 
UNDP/Government of Ghana Project - Developing local consulting capacity (1988). 
GAC was duly registered in 1992 as a company limited by guarantee under the 
company code, 1963 (ACT 179). It currently boasts of over 150 corporate and 
individual members. Members of the GAC are recognised professionals who have 
practical experience with their respective industry's rapidly changing operation. A key 
aim of GAC is to ensure a professional code of practice, as well as the well-being and 
prosperity of consultants in Ghana. 
The sixth source of contact was the Ghana Association of Women 
Entrepreneurs (GAWE). GAWE was established through the initiative of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 1993. It is made up of more 
than 500 self-employed women manufacturers and exporters of goods and services. It 
aims at facilitating the development of women entrepreneurs through capacity 
building with support policies that would enhance active participation of Ghanaian 
women in both the national and the global economy such as the United Kingdom, 
United States, Germany, France, Japan, China and others. Besides these organisations, 
other associations and unions were also contacted. Having determined the criteria for 
sampling the population and the mode of having access to these entrepreneurs, the 
next section outlines the research design. 
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5.5. 6 Research Design 
In ensuring that the survey sampling was the representative of the population, 
the researcher grouped the population into a stratum. The advantage of forming the 
strata was to enable the researcher have an easy choice of selecting businesses from 
any of the groups. From the list provided by the associations, agents and banks, 
stratified random sampling frames of businesses were constructed comprising of: 
location, size and sector (Scheaffer et al., 1996). The use of a stratified random 
sampling was adopted for the reasons of ensuring adequate representation of all sub-
groups in the population, for administrative convenience, to meet the time schedule, to 
provide cost reduction and to achieve an increase in precision of the estimates. Thus, 
as stated by Fowler (1988 pp. 25) "stratification only increases the precision of 
estimates of variables to which the stratification variables are related". Also, 
stratification may be employed to produce an increase in precision of the 
representative of the population (Cochran, 1977 pp. 89). 
The survey demarcated the six districts within the Greater Accra Region of 
Ghana into conurbation, large towns and small towns. Businesses located only within 
Accra and Tema in the Accra Metropolis District and Tema Municipal District 
respectively with a population of between 250,000 - 500,000 inhabitants were tagged 
conurbation. Businesses located outside Accra and Tema, but were within the Accra 
Metropolitan District (Accra), Tema Municipal District (Tema), Ga East District 
(Abokobi) and Ga West District (Amasaman) with a population of between 50,000 -
250,000 inhabitants were tagged large towns and businesses located within Ga East 
District (Abokobi), Ga West District (Amasaman), Dangme East District (Ada), 
Dangme West District (Dodowa) with a population of between 20,000 - 50,000 were 
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tagged small towns. The map of Ghana and the map of the six districts of the Greater 
Accra Region are shown below as figure 5.1 and figure 5.2 respectively. 
Second, businesses were also stratified into sizes using the number of 
employees. There are no accurate or precise numbers in a sample for a given study. 
However, Fowler, (1988) has suggested that i f the sample is too small, it is likely to 
affect the generalisability of the study. Some scholars have, however, offered useful 
mark-ups. In determining the sample size in a survey, several factors must be 
considered such as the type of research involved, the stated hypotheses of the study, 
the number of variables, the data collection methods, the required accuracy and 
precision levels, the relevance of the results, the time schedule and the financial 
requirements for the study (McMillan and Schumacher, 1989). 
Third, regarding sector, businesses were stratified into agriculture, 
manufacturing and services. From the list of businesses provided by the associations 
and agencies, a stratified random sample of 1,200 independent small businesses was 
drawn up. From the drawn sample, 750 business founders or principal owners 
(entrepreneurs) accepted to participate in the survey, and to answering the 
questionnaire and granting interviews upon request. 
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Figure 5.2 
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The research designed for conducting the survey focused mainly on the 
location, size and sector of the small business. The next section outlines the structure 
of the questionnaire for both the small businesses and the bank managers. 
5.6 The data collection instruments 
5.6.1 Structured questionnaire 
Taking into consideration the large sample required to give a representative 
view pertaining to small businesses access to credit facilities, the survey opted for the 
use of structured questionnaires instead of unstructured questionnaires. Secondly, it is 
much easier to analyse a structured questionnaire than an unstructured questionnaire. 
Thirdly, different interviewers were to administer the questionnaire at different 
locations and to reduce the likelihood of bias from interviewing variations the survey 
opted for a structured questionnaire. 
In constructing the structured questionnaire, the survey adhered to three 
principles namely focus, wording and structure (Gill and Johnson, 1997). 
Consideration was given to the hypotheses to be tested and the issues to be addressed. 
It therefore focused on the major questions the survey wished to address; identifying 
the sources of start-up finance for small businesses; testing for the presence of credit 
rationing amongst novice, serial and portfolio entrepreneurs; identifying the impact of 
geographical distance and business information on the availability of bank credit to 
habitual entrepreneurs; and ascertaining the impact of adverse selection and moral 
hazard on bank financing small businesses. 
Secondly, consideration was given to the wording of the questions. It was 
ensured that the questions were as simple as possible, that they did not lose their focus 
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and intended purpose and where necessary certain terminologies were defined and 
explained for easy understanding by respondents. As much as possible leading and 
empty questions were avoided. This was done by providing multiple choice answers, 
with some in scale form ranging from one to four points. 
Thirdly, the questions were ordered in a well structured form keeping the 
length down to a practicable form. There were two sets of questionnaires one for the 
small businesses and the other the banks. The small business questionnaire contained 
six sections. Section A contained questions relating to the business characteristics 
namely, year of business establishment, what did the firm make or do, legal status, the 
number of employees and whether the firm was an exporter. Section B contains 
questions relating to business innovation and cooperation. Section C had questions 
relating to the business' sources of start-up capital. Section D was on the human 
capital resource of the business namely, sex, age, education and family background. 
Section E contained questions relating to lender-borrower relationship. Sections F had 
questions relating to credit rationing. Section G had questions relating to business 
information and geographical distance. Lastly, section H had questions relating to 
collateral security. 
The second questionnaire was for the banks, and this was made up of five 
sections. Section A contained questions relating to bank lending processes and factors 
influencing the lending decisions. Section B contained questions on bank's gathering 
of both 'hard' and 'soft' information from entrepreneurs. Section C focused on issues 
relating to information asymmetry, risks and uncertainties in the bank lending process. 
Section D contained questions relating to the bank-borrower relationship and the 
issues on trust. Section E had questions on collateral and credit guarantees. 
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The sample data is limited to small businesses that have a deposit, service and 
credit relationship with formal financial institutions (banks, loans and savings 
companies, and non-banks - finance companies, leasing companies, brokerage firms 
and venture capitalists). The questionnaire included a series of questions on finance 
which allowed us to ascertain whether the businesses had applied for external finance 
and whether or not they had been totally successful, received less than they desired, or 
were totally unsuccessful; and, whether they had been discouraged from applying for 
external finance when they warranted receipt of credit; and the remainder had no 
need, or no case to apply for external credit. 
The questionnaire contained questions which allowed the researcher to know 
the business sector in which they operated, their size in terms of the number of 
employees, their geographic location within the region and whether they were in a 
conurbation, large town or small town, and also the age of the business. The 
entrepreneurs were asked to indicate whether they had introduced an innovation to 
their business with regard to their products and services, and another looked at 
whether they had introduced an innovation in their processes. Other questions covered 
employment growth, and exporting activity. Whilst for the entrepreneurs' questions 
there were questions on their age, sex, educational background, and entrepreneurial 
experience. The sample was deliberately focused upon businesses which employed 
between 4-50 employees because these are the type of businesses which are the target 
of Ghanaian government policies. 
The above search has outlined the detailed structure of the questionnaire. The 
next section provides descriptions and explanations adopted by the study to measure 
the dependent variable, independent variable, control and demographic variables. 
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5.7 Measures 
5.7.1 Dependent variables 
5.7.1.1 Sources of start-up capital 
The formation and growth of small businesses are dependent on their access to 
start-up capital (Curran and Blackburn, 1993; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005). 
Businesses that lack access to capital are more likely to encounter major obstacles to 
their growth and development (Schreiner and Woller, 2003). To examine the sources 
of start-up capital of small businesses, the survey questionnaire asked respondents to 
indicate their source of start-up for their business and also to indicate the principle 
source among these sources used. The respondents were presented with nine sources 
of start-up capital to choose from (own savings, pension, gifts from relations and 
friends, loans from relations and friends, bank loan, bank overdraft, supplier's credit, 
co-investors, and customer advance) and there was another category as a safeguard. 
Each respondent who reported a particular source(s) of start-up capital were allocated 
a score o f ' 1' for each source. The other sources not reported were allocated a score of 
'0'. 
5.7.1.2 Credit rationing of the entrepreneur 
A number of surveys have identified access to finance as the major constraint 
to small business's expansion, growth and development (Steel and Webster, 1992; 
Levy, 1993; Pissarides, 1999; Okoh and Ping, 2000; European Commission, 2002a; 
van Eeden et al., 2003). In assessing the credit rationing of entrepreneurs, the study 
described a constrained business or entrepreneur as one that lacked the required credit 
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from the bank to undertake an investment drive for a positive returns (Winter-Nelson 
and Temu, 2005). The study further defined an unconstrained business as those 
businesses that indicated that they had no need for bank credit or those whose credit 
applications were approved (Bigsten et al., 2000). On the other hand, the study 
defined constrained entrepreneurs as those entrepreneurs with credit applications 
rejected by their banks (Jappelli, 1990; Levenson and Willard, 2000). Discouraged 
entrepreneurs were those entrepreneurs who felt their credit applications would be 
rejected and as such avoided the application (Jappelli, 1990; Bigsten et al., 2000; 
Levenson and Willard, 2000). 
Respondents were presented with five sets of statement asking them to 
indicate whether they had applied for bank credit in the last year, last two years and 
last three years, never applied and discouraged. They were further asked to indicate 
whether they had received all the required credit they needed from their banks. In 
addition, respondents were asked to indicate whether they had experienced within the 
three year period any rejection to their credit application. Furthermore, respondents 
were presented with a set of possible occurrences to their credit application and were 
asked to indicate the number of times they had applied for credit within a particular 
year, whether they were successful by receiving full amount, reduced amount, and 
number of failures before success or never successful. Respondents were asked to 
report a 'yes' or 'no' to these questions and those who reported 'yes' to these 
questions were allocated a score o f ' 1' and those who reported 'no' were scored '0'. 
5.7.1.3 Geographical distance and credit rationing 
In measuring the geographical distance between the business and the preferred 
bank and the geographical distance between the business and the closest competitive 
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bank, respondents were asked 'how far is your business from your preferred bank?' 
Secondly, they were asked 'how far is your business from the closest competitive 
lending bank?' Respondents were asked to indicate the distances in kilometers. To 
measure the type of relationship between the entrepreneur and their preferred banks, 
respondents were presented with seven different types of relationship. The 
relationship could be a credit relationship (borrowing credit from the institution), a 
service relationship (purchasing an institution's financial products and services), and a 
deposit relationship (having a current or a savings account with the institution), or a 
combination of any of these relationships. Respondents who reported 'yes' to any 
particular relationship(s) were allocated a score of ' 1 ' . Relationships which were not 
reported were allocated a score o f ' 0 ' for each respondent. 
5.7.1.4 Uncertainty and trust 
In evaluating the role trust plays in the lending decision of banks as they 
process small business credit applications, the study measured trust based on the study 
by Howorth and Moro (2006) and Nguyen et al. (2006). Respondents were asked to 
describe the bank's lending processes and factors influencing the lending decisions 
(Monge-Naranjo et al., 2001). Respondents were also asked to explain the steps they 
used in gathering information from the entrepreneur. Thirdly, respondents were 
presented with statements pertaining to information asymmetry, risks and 
uncertainties and were asked to indicate which of the statements influence credit 
availability. 
Fourthly respondents were presented with statements pertaining to relationship 
lending to small businesses and collateral security and credit guarantees and were 
asked to indicate which of these statements influence the credit availability to the 
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entrepreneur. Respondents were not asked to comment directly on trust as their 
responses were more likely to be subjective rather than objective (Glaeser et al., 2000; 
Offe, 2001). The responses they provided regarding relationship and collateral were 
matched with the characteristics of trust, namely: reputation, similarity, ability, 
integrity, benevolence and communication. 
5.7.2 Independent variables 
5.7.2.1 Entrepreneur 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they had started a new venture for 
the first time, had ever sold or closed a previous venture before starting a new one or 
maintaining the previous one and starting a new venture. A dummy variable of 
whether or not the entrepreneur was a habitual or a novice entrepreneur was included 
in the model. 
(i) Habitual entrepreneur 
Respondents who reported having prior business ownership experience with 
the capacity to start new businesses and launch new products were coded as habitual 
entrepreneurs (Westhead et al., 2005b). Habitual entrepreneurs were separated into 
portfolio and serial entrepreneurs. 
(ii) Portfolio entrepreneur 
Respondents who reported having prior business ownership experience and 
have started, inherited, purchased, acquired a new venture in addition to the existing 
one were coded as portfolio entrepreneurs (Westhead et al., 2005c). 
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(Hi) Serial entrepreneur 
Respondents who reported having closed or sold previous business they 
owned and have started, inherited, purchased, or acquired a new venture were coded 
as serial entrepreneurs (Westhead et al., 2005b). 
(iv) Novice entrepreneur 
Respondents who reported having no prior business ownership experience but 
have started, inherited, purchased, or acquired a new venture were coded novice 
entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran et al., 2001). 
Three binary variables were computed. Serial entrepreneurs were allocated a 
value of ' 1 ' , whilst other (i.e., novice and portfolio) entrepreneurs were allocated a 
value of '0 ' (SERIAL). Portfolio entrepreneurs were allocated a value of T , whilst 
other (i.e., novice and serial) entrepreneurs were allocated a value of '0' 
(PORTFOLIO). Novice entrepreneurs were allocated a value o f ' 1', whilst other (i.e., 
serial and portfolio) entrepreneurs were allocated a value of '0' (NOVICE). The 
SERIAL and PORTFOLIO variables were included in the regression models as 
HABITUAL entrepreneurs and the reference or excluded category was NOVICE 
entrepreneurs. 
5.7.3 Control variables and demographic variables 
5.7.3.1 Education 
'Education is a key constituent of the human capital needed for business 
success'(Storey, 1994 pp.129). It is argued that education provides the basis for the 
acquisition of the required skills for business development and success. Davidsson 
and Honig (2003) noted that education can enable individuals to generate ideas and to 
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cope better with problems. Educational attainment was used as a proxy for the 
entrepreneur's human capital (Becker, 1975). The educational variable was coded in 9 
categories from (no education, junior secondary school, senior secondary school, 
ordinary level, advance level, vocational and technical, professional qualification, first 
university degree, second university degree, and others). Respondents were presented 
with the above criteria and were asked to indicate their educational attainment. 
Respondents who reported 'yes' to a university degree were allocated a score of T 
(DEGREE) and those who reported 'no' were score '0' . 
The number of years in business by the entrepreneur was used as a proxy for 
the entrepreneur's human capital (Becker, 1975). Work experience of entrepreneurs 
enhances their access to information and finance (Boden and Nucci, 2000). 
Respondents were asked to indicate the number of years in which they have been 
engaged in the business. The reported years was used as an indication of the level of 
experience of the entrepreneur. 
5.7.3.2 Innovation 
Innovation is concerned with the application of new ideas. Often these ideas 
take the form of new products and services or new production processes. There is no 
universally utilized indicator of innovation (Cohen, 1995). Most innovation studies 
solely focus upon the latter technological innovations (Freel, 2005; Becheikh et al., 
2006). Innovation also relates to new work practices and workforce organization, to 
new sources of supply or materials (or new ways of working with key suppliers), to 
the exploitation of new markets or means of reaching these markets (including 
innovations in marketing, selling and distribution) and to new administration and 
office systems (Cosh and Wood, 1998). 
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The latter types of innovation are relevant within a developing economy 
context because they can provide a platform for technological innovations and 
competitive advantage. A distinction can also be made between incremental and 
novel (or radical) innovation (Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007). Studies suggest that 
incremental innovation is more prevalent in developing nations (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 
et al., 1996; Adeboye, 1997). Innovation activities are said to have a limited access to 
credit because they have poor collateral value and in the event of a commercial failure 
innovation has little salvage value (OECD, 2004b pp.8). Studies have shown that the 
factors that distinguish failed enterprises from surviving ones are the attainment of 
basic skills relating to human resources, finance, production, management and 
marketing by the entrepreneurs (Johnson et al., 1998; Baldwin et al., 1997). 
Respondents were asked, "In the last 3 years, has your business undertaken 
any form of innovation as regard to seven statements relating to the following" -
product or services, production processes (including storage), work practices or 
workforce organization, supply and supplier relations, markets and marketing, 
administration and office systems, and products or services distribution were 
presented (Cosh and Hughes, 1998). With reference to each statement the reported 
responses were coded as: innovation not tried scored as ' 1 ' ; innovation tried and 
failed scored as '2 ' ; innovation new to firm but not new to industry scored as '3'; 
innovation new to industry scored as '4' . 
5.7.3.3 Exporting 
Entrepreneurs that have previously worked for large international 
organizations and conducted regular overseas travel may have accumulated broader 
market and technological knowledge (Buame, 1996; Hausman, 2005). This specific-
199 
human capital can be leveraged to create and pursue new opportunities (Oyelaran-
Oyeyinka et al., 1996). Export financing is the provision of credit facilities to meet the 
export requirements of exporters (Branch, 1995, Albaum et al., 1998). The inability of 
exporters to access export finance will very much affect their products and delivery 
(Morna et al., 1990). Respondents were asked Ms your business an exporter?' 
Entrepreneurs with no exporting experience were allocated a score of '0' , whilst those 
citing exporting experience were allocated a score o f ' 1' (Export). 
5.7.3.4 Sector 
The Ghanaian economy is basically driven by the agricultural, industrial and 
service sectors. According to an ISSER (2005) report on the Ghanaian Economy, the 
contributions of these three sectors were significant to the growth and development of 
the economy. The agricultural sector in particular is perceived to be a high risk sector 
and thus most banks and other financial institutions are unwilling to finance any 
project within the sector, even though its contribution to the national economy is 
significant (Aryeetey and Fenny, 2006). 
In the questionnaire respondents were asked to indicate 'what does your 
business do or make?' Respondents who reported 'yes' to agricultural activities were 
allocated a score o f ' 1 ' , (AGRICULTURE) whilst 'no' were scored '0 ' . Respondents 
who reported 'yes' to manufacturing sector were allocated a score of ' 1 ' 
(MANUFACTURING) whilst 'no' were scored '0' . Respondents who reported 'yes' 
to services were allocated a score of ' 1 ' (SERVICES) whilst 'no' were scored '0' . 
Manufacturing and service dummies were included in the models and the excluded 
comparison variable dummy was the AGRICULTURE sector. 
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5.7.3.5 Size 
The size of a business determines the source of finance used by the business at 
start-up and also access to external finance (Aryeetey et al., 1994; Nissanke, 2001; 
Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006). The size of the business was 
measured by the number of employees as at the time of the survey. Respondents were 
asked to indicate the number of employees in their business as at the time of 
responding to the questionnaire. The responses reported were coded into three 
categories. Using dummy variables of micro, small and medium, respondents who 
reported employees numbers of between 4 and 9 were coded MICRO business. 
Respondents who reported employee numbers of between 10 and 19 and those who 
reported between 20 and 50 were coded SMALL and MEDIUM size businesses 
respectively. 
5.7.3.6 Location 
The location variable saw two dummy variables of conurbation and small 
towns included in the models. The excluded comparison dummy variable was those 
businesses located in large towns. The location variables were used as indicators of 
the location of the small businesses. The survey demarcated the six districts within the 
Greater Accra Region of Ghana into conurbations, large towns and small towns, 
respectively. Businesses located only within Accra and Tema in the Accra Metropolis 
District and Tema Municipal District, respectively, with a population of between 
250,000 - 500,000 inhabitants were tagged as CONURBATION. Businesses located 
outside Accra and Tema, but which were within the Accra Metropolis District 
(Accra), Tema Municipal District (Tema), Ga East District (Abokobi) and Ga West 
District (Amasaman) with a population of between 50,000 - 250,000 inhabitants were 
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categorised as LARGE TOWN and businesses located within Ga East District 
(Abokobi), Ga West District (Amasaman), Dangme East District (Ada), Dangme 
West District (Dodowa) with a population of 20,000 - 50,000 inhabitants were 
categorised as SMALL TOWN. 48.8% of the entrepreneurs were from conurbations, 
24.2% were from large towns and 27.0% were from small towns. The variables 
capturing demographic characteristics included: general human capital: education, 
gender, age of the entrepreneurs, and relative role models. 
5.7.3.7 Employment growth 
Storey (1994) identified three basic constraints that affect the growth of small 
businesses. These are finance, labour market issues and markets. Hall et al., (2004) 
argued that the growth of small businesses is likely to exert pressure on the internally 
generated funds and force the firm into borrowing. Growth is measured by absolute 
(t2-tl) measures (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000). In the questionnaire, respondents 
were asked to indicate the number of employees they have at the time of the survey, a 
year before the survey, and three years before the survey. 
5.7.3.8 Gender 
A male or female entrepreneur in this study is referring to 'a person who has 
initiated a business, is actively involved in its management, and owns a majority share 
of the enterprise' (Marlow and Patton, 2005 pp. 718). The sex of the entrepreneur, by 
and large, influences access to and use of external finance (Birley et al., 1987; Van 
Uxem and Bais, 1996). Traditionally with regard to education and training, women 
are associated with lower levers of human capital (Becker, 1993). In accessing finance 
female entrepreneurs are expected to encounter several challenges compared to male 
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entrepreneurs (Verheul and Thurik, 2001). Male entrepreneurs are expected to have 
better access to external sources of finance compared to female entrepreneurs. 
Various reasons account for this trend, notably the lack of collateral (Zeller, 
1994; Baden, 1996), the nature and type of work (Van Uxem and Bais, 1996; Carr et 
al., 2000; Van Straveren, 2001), the acquisition of relevant experience (Cooper et al., 
1994), the lack of a proven track record and access to information about financial 
sources, products and services (Kashuliza and Kydd, 1996; Atieno, 2001). 
Respondents were asked to indicate their sex. Male respondents were allocated a 
value o f ' 1' and female respondents a value of '0'. 
5.7.3.9 Age of the entrepreneur 
Older entrepreneurs generally have more work experience (Aldrich, 1999). 
This experience can enable more mature individuals to accumulate skills required for 
firm ownership (Bates, 1990; Cooper et al., 1994). As part of the ageing process, an 
individual's human capital stock can depreciate over time. Middle-aged individuals 
may have more human capital (Cressy, 1996). The age of the entrepreneurs were 
coded in four binary indicators of age: 18-30 years, 31-45 years, 46-60 years and 61 
or more years. The age groupings were adopted because it is quite difficult to have 
entrepreneurs indicating their exact age, but they were willing to indicate their age 
group. The reference category was Age 46-60 years. In the questionnaire, respondents 
were asked 'which age group do you belong?' The respondent's reported age group 
was allocated a score o f ' 1' for a 'yes' response and '0' for a 'no' response. 
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5.7.3.10 Relative role model 
Curran et al. (1991) noted that individuals with parents as owners of 
businesses were more likely to follow the footsteps of their parents by owning their 
own business. It is argued that entrepreneurs with a relative role model engaged in 
business are risk averse and fear loosing control of the business (Sonnenfeld and 
Spence, 1989). They also prefer minimising risks and maintaining family reputation, 
independence and control of their business (Neubauer and Lank, 1998; Romano et al., 
2000). Respondent were asked to indicate whether they had family members involved 
in business in the past. Respondents who reported 'yes' were allocated a score of T 
and those who reported 'no' were allocated a score of '0'. Respondents were also 
asked to indicate whether they had any family member employed in their business. 
Respondents who reported 'yes' were allocated a score o f ' 1' and those who reported 
'no' were allocated a score o f ' 0 ' . 
In addition, the concept of specific human capital variables were 
operationalised in entrepreneurial prior work experience, innovation and exporting. 
5.7.3.11 Age of business 
Age is a determining factor in small business' access to bank credit (Abor and 
Biekpe 2006). Hall et al. (2004) asserted that older businesses possess good track 
records, more internally generated profit and are therefore less likely to apply for 
external finance. The age of the business were measured by the year in which the 
business was established. Two dummy variables were incorporated for the age of 
business. Businesses age between 0 years and 5 years was termed YOUNG business 
and all other businesses above 5 years were termed OLDER business. 
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5.7.3.12 Distance variables 
For each entrepreneur, the geographical distance is calculated for the business-
preferred bank branch and the business - closest competitive bank branch located in 
the same community as the entrepreneur. During the survey, 129 bank branches were 
identified, operated by 30 different financial institutions comprising of 23 
Commercial Banks, 6 Rural Banks and 1 Savings and Loan Company located in the 6 
districts of the Greater Accra Region. The geographical distance between the business 
and their preferred bank branch and also between the business and the closest 
competitive bank branch was determined by asking respondents to indicate the 
distance in kilometers between their respective banks ( G i l and G12). Thus, each 
respondent provided information on the distance between their preferred bank branch 
and also the closest competitive bank branch. The distance in kilometers between the 
business and their preferred bank ranged from 0.0 kilometers to 45.0 kilometers and 
the closest competitive bank branch ranged from 0.0 kilometers to 40.0 kilometers. 
Alternatively, the geographical distance between their business and their 
preferred bank, and their closest competitive bank branch could have been measured 
on the basis of the entrepreneurs providing their office location and indicating the 
location of the bank. This information would then have been linked to its geographical 
co-ordinates using Geographical Information Software (GIS) and the distance 
measured in kilometers. The problem, however, with this method is that postal codes 
in Ghana are either non-existence or unreliable, and, hence the adoption of the first 
method by asking respondents to indicate the geographical distance. 
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5.7.3.13 Social capital 
Public and private sector practitioners can be a source of bridging social 
capital. Respondents were asked to indicate whether "in the last 3 years, has your 
business co-operated with other businesses or organizations for innovation related 
activity (including marketing, training, production techniques, management training 
and / or technology)". Those who reported a 'yes' response were provided with a list 
of ten specified public and private sector firms and organization that had been 
utilized. In addition, respondents were asked to specify the name of 'other' 
organizations used. A distinction was made between public (i.e., NBSSI, IFC) and 
private sector (customers, suppliers, competitors and other firms, Empretec Ghana 
Limited, Technoserve Ghana Limited, APDF) sources of assistance. 
Entrepreneurs that had not used any sources of external support, those that 
solely used private sector organizations and those that used a mixture of public and 
private sector organizations were allocated a value of '0' , whilst those that had solely 
used public organizations were allocated a value o f ' 1' PUBLIC ONLY. Respondents 
that did not use any sources of external support, those that solely used public sector 
organizations and those that used a mixture of public and private sector organizations 
were allocated a value of '0 ' , whilst those that solely used private sector organizations 
were allocated a value of ' 1 ' PRIVATE ONLY. Entrepreneurs that did not use any 
support from public and private organizations and those that solely used support from 
a public or private organization were allocated a value of '0' , whilst those that used 
support from a mixture of public and private organizations were allocated a value of 
' 1' PUBLIC AND PRIVATE. 
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5.7.3.14 Uncertainty and trust variables 
The concept of trust is not an objective phenomenon, making its 
understanding, interpretation and measurement a very difficult task. The meaning of 
trust differs from country to country and from culture to culture (Welter and 
Smallbone, 2006). The empirical methods used by scholars in measuring trust vary 
from one study to the other. In large scale surveys, respondents have been questioned 
about their opinion on whether they trust a person or not. For example, "Do you trust 
your boss to honour his promise". The behavioural validity of these methods of 
measuring trust has been questioned by some scholars as they argue that these 
questions measure trustworthiness rather than trusting behaviour (Glaeser et al., 
2000). 
Other scholars have emphasised the gradual process of developing trust which 
is often based on habits and norms and argued that trust cannot be observed in a single 
behaviour (Smallbone and Lyon, 2002). Offe (2001) disagrees with the use of direct 
trust questions in view of the varying cultural differences. Scholars also differ in the 
approach to be adopted in measuring trust. Whilst some scholars use quantitative 
methods, others prefer qualitative methods. Depending on the researcher and the type 
of research being carried out, one could use either a quantitative or a qualitative 
approach. For the purposes of this chapter which is based on exploring the role of 
trust in the bank-entrepreneur relationship, the researcher adopted a qualitative 
approach (Howorth and Moro, 2006; Nguyen et al., 2006). 
The primary data from the bank questionnaire was compiled from an in-depth 
interview of Credit Managers of the various Banks in Ghana. There were 23 banks in 
Ghana as at the time of the study. The in-depth interview of Credit Managers in 20 of 
the 23 banks was conducted between February 2007 and April 2007. The remaining 
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three banks have not been in existence for up to a year at the time of the survey, so 
they were excluded. To gain access to the Credit Managers, the researcher contacted 
the Managing Directors of these banks by an introductory letter apprising them of the 
nature of the research (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). A request was made for an 
interview with the head of the credit or Small and Medium-size Enterprise (SME) 
department of each bank. The methodology adopted for this chapter was similar to 
earlier studies by Berry et al., (1993a; 2004); A summary of the key characteristics of 
the banks interviewees are presented in table 5.1 below. 
In order to collect specific responses from the respondents, the researcher 
adopted a one-hour face-to-face in-depth interview using semi-structured questions as 
a guide and also for uniformity. The questions were relatively open-ended which 
allowed for follow-up questions where necessary. The interview process began with 
questions about the interviewee's background and experience. The second stage of the 
interview concentrated on the lending process towards lending decisions (Monge-
Naranjo et al., 2001). In section A the interviewee was asked to describe the bank's 
lending processes and factors influencing the lending decisions. Section B contained 
questions on how banks gathered information to make lending decisions. Section C 
focused on issues on information asymmetry, risks and uncertainties banks encounter 
in their lending process. Section D covered issues on relationship lending to small 
businesses. Section E was on collateral security and credit guarantees. The 
questionnaire did not raise the issue of trust directly simply because when participants 
in an interview are asked about matters relating to trust, their responses are subjective 
rather than objective (Glaeser et al., 2000; Offe, 2001). 
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Table 5.5: Summary of Coding Schemes for Responses to the Questions 
Uncertainties and Trust in Lending Decisions 
Process Uncertainties 
Respondents 
Lending process 
• Information 
• Screening 
• Interest rate 
• Security 
• Monitoring 
Trust 
Relationships Collateral 
No. o f Respondents No. o f Respondents No. o f 
15 
12 
7 
18 
12 
Relationship Characteristics 
• Duration 
• Scope 
• Account 
• Education 
• Abi l i ty 
• Reputation 
Collateral Characteristics 
• Cash 
• Outside collateral 
• Inside collateral 
• Institutional guarantee-
• Personal guarantee 
15 
8 
10 
14 
20 
15 
15 
13 
11 
17 
9 
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The responses provided were hand recorded and this information was later 
coded (Howorth and Moro, 2006). The coded data was summarised as: information 
gathering, screening, collateral assessments, approval process and monitoring as 
shown in Table 5.2 above. Two forms of variables were identified using relationship 
elements and forms of collateral to develop trust characteristics. The relationship 
variables included: duration, scope, account, experience, capacity, performance and 
security as presented in Table 5.3 above. The collateral variables included cash, 
outside collateral, inside collateral and guarantee as presented in Table 5.4 above. 
The responses o f the bank interviewees are presented in Table 5.5 above. 
5.8 Piloting and screening 
The pilot study was conducted with academics, experienced bankers, 
business executives, and entrepreneurs (Boocook and Shariff, 2005). The objectives 
were: firstly, to ensure the comprehensibility of entrepreneurship, innovation and 
finance among Ghanaian entrepreneurs, and, secondly to assess the content and face 
validity o f the survey. A few suggestions were made by the respondents regarding 
the length, form, content, and phrasing of some questions. Modifications and 
refinements to the questionnaire were subsequently made (Westhead et al., 2005a). 
Having being satisfied with the responses on the piloting process, the questionnaire 
administration and in-depth interview were carried out. The next section examines 
these methods. 
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5.9 Questionnaire administration 
The survey adopted a face-to-face administering of the questionnaires using 
three trainee researchers in addition to the researcher. The approach has the 
advantage of ensuring a higher response rate and also to collect as much as possible 
vital information and responses compared to the mailing and postal methods. The 
advantages of using this approach include: (i) easy collection of responses within a 
locality over a short period of time; (ii) doubts about specific responses can easily be 
clarified on the spot; and ( i i i ) the research has the opportunity to introduce the 
research topic, its purpose and significance and also motivate the respondent to 
participate. 
In Ghana postal questionnaires are not a culturally acceptable methodology -
there is a reluctance to complete such postal questionnaires because some 
entrepreneurs are reluctant in providing responses to questionnaires for fear of 
giving away some vital information to state agencies, for instance the revenue 
agencies. However, a face-to-face introduction by one of the research team to 
explain the survey and why they were being asked to participate soothed away 
anxieties. To achieve this purpose, introductory letters were then sent to the heads of 
the various associations, agencies and groups in December 2006 seeking permission 
to administer questionnaire to the members. The approval o f this request made 
access to their members much easier as the endorsement from the executives 
received acknowledgment from the members. Without this endorsement most of the 
businesses engaged in manufacturing and consultancy services would have declined 
participation. Another batch of introductory letters were sent to all the financial 
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institutions operating in the country in December 2006 seeking permission to 
administer questions to the head of credit department or the head of the small and 
medium-size enterprises department of the bank. 
Before the questionnaire administration began, a three-day training 
programme was organised for the interviewees on the structure of the questionnaire 
and the mode of interviewing and questionnaire administration. After the first two 
days briefing on the context of the questionnaire, the interviewees and the researcher 
had a practical sample on the administering questionnaire on the third day. 
Having sought permission and receiving the support o f the leadership of 
these association and institutions, the questionnaires were distributed using a 
stratified random sampling approach between January 2007 and May 2007. The 
distribution followed a stratification of size, sector and location. In order to have an 
efficient and cost effective survey, the distribution of the questionnaire was done on 
a locality basis. The researcher moved from one locality to another distributing 
questionnaire to small business entrepreneurs that fell within the criteria. At the 
business premises the researcher wi l l introduce himself, show an introductory letter 
from Durham University and where necessary a note from the businesses' 
association leadership. The researcher wi l l then seek permission to conduct a 60 
minutes standardized face-to-face administration of the questionnaire. However, i f 
the entrepreneur is not ready, the researcher books an appointment and makes at 
least two telephone reminders. 
On the other hand, some entrepreneurs requested the questionnaire be left 
behind and be allowed some time to personally f i l l the questionnaires and offered to 
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grant an interview to the researcher for clarification and any additional information 
requested (Rauch et al., 2005). Since the data from the survey was to be treated 
quantitatively, all the researchers were to stick closely to the structured questionnaire 
in order to generate equivalent responses. 
5.9.1 Questionnaire sampled 
From an initial sampling list of 1,200 entrepreneurs, a stratified random 
sample o f 750 small business entrepreneurs was drawn (Hair et al., 1995). In total, 
522 entrepreneurs completed the questionnaire. 9 responses were eliminated 
businesses were found to have fallen outside the selection criteria. A further 13 
responses were eliminated because of non-completion. An additional 4 responses 
were excluded for inconsistencies in their responses. A final response o f 496 was 
used for the study representing a 66% response rate. During the survey, 129 bank 
branches were identified, operated by 30 different financial institutions comprising 
of 23 commercial banks, 6 rural banks and 1 Savings and Loan Company located in 
the 6 districts o f the Greater Accra Region. 
In total, the survey of 496 small businesses entrepreneurs produced 169 
micro-sized enterprises (34%), 136 small-sized enterprises (27%) and 191 medium-
sized enterprises (39%). 87 businesses were from the agricultural sector (17%), 264 
businesses were from the manufacturing sector (53%), and 149 businesses were 
from the services sector (30%). Regarding location, the survey produced 244 
businesses located in conurbations (49%), 121 businesses were located in large 
towns (24%), and 135 businesses were located in small towns (27%). The survey 
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also produced 298 businesses owned by novice entrepreneurs (60%), 198 businesses 
were owned by habitual entrepreneurs of which 61 businesses were owned by serial 
entrepreneurs (12%), and 137 businesses were owned by portfolio entrepreneurs 
(28%). 
In addition, 384 of the respondents were male entrepreneurs representing 
(77%), whilst 112 respondents were female entrepreneurs representing (23%). The 
survey identified 169 respondents representing (34%) with 4-9 employees (micro-
size), 136 respondents representing (27%) with 10-19 employees (small-size) and 
191 respondents representing (39%) with 20-50 employees (medium-size). 179 
respondents representing (36%) indicated they had started or purchased the surveyed 
business with others. On average, the survey businesses employed 19 employees 
(standard deviation o f 13). The average age of the surveyed business was 13.2 years 
old (standard deviation o f 8). 
5.9.2 The in-depth interviews 
The primary data for the bank survey was conducted using a semi-structured 
questionnaire which was administered to the Credit Managers o f the various banks 
in Ghana. 20 out o f a total o f 23 banks in Ghana as at the time of the survey 
participated in the in-depth-interview. The Credit Managers were interviewed 
between February 2007 and Apri l 2007. The remaining three banks were excluded 
because they had not been in existence for up to a year at the time of the survey. In 
gaining access to the Credit Managers, the researcher contacted the Managing 
Directors o f these banks using an introductory letter appraising them of the nature o f 
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the research (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). A formal request was made for an in-depth 
interview with the head of the credit department or the head of the small and 
medium-size enterprise department of each bank. Each interview was conducted 
within 60 minutes and the qualitative data collected was used for the bank lending 
decision investigations. 
Besides the bank interviews, other interviews were conducted on small 
business entrepreneurs in order to supplement the responses on the questionnaire and 
to eliminate any self administered questionnaires by the three trained interviewee. 
The researcher conducted a random selection of respondents for an in-depth 
interview to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the responses and also to further 
understand the nature of small business financing and credit rationing in Ghana. 
Separate interviews with some selected entrepreneurs were costly in terms of time 
and resources, but the responses were beneficial to the survey data required. To 
confirm views expressed by the respondents, the researcher collected some 
supporting documents with an assurance of confidentiality. In-depth interviews were 
held with Credit Managers of the banks listed below: 
(1) Ghana Commercial Bank Ghana Limited 
(2) Barclays Bank Ghana Limited 
(3) Standard Chartered Bank Ghana Limited 
(4) Agricultural Development Bank Ghana Limited 
(5) National Investment Bank Ghana Limited 
(6) Merchant Bank Ghana Limited 
219 
(7) Societe General - SSB Ghana Limited 
(8) Ecobank Ghana Limited 
(9) The Trust Bank Ghana Limited 
(10) Prudential Bank Ghana Limited 
(11) Stanbic Bank Ghana Limited 
(12) International Commercial Bank Limited 
(13) CAL Bank Ghana Limited 
(14) Amalgamated Bank Ghana Limited 
(15) UniBank Ghana Limited 
(16) HFC Bank Ghana Limited 
(17) Metropolitan and Allied Bank Ghana Limited 
(18) United Bank for Africa Ghana Limited 
(19) Guaranty Trust Bank Ghana Limited 
(20) Zenith Bank Ghana Limited 
Besides, these interviews, heads of the following associations were also interviewed. 
(1) Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) 
(2) Federation o f Association of Ghana Exporters (FAGE) 
(3) Ghana National Chamber o f Commerce and Industries (GNCCI) 
(4) Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) 
(5) The Ghana Association of Consultants (GAC) 
(6) Ghana Association of Women Entrepreneurs (GAWE) 
(7) National Chairman, Ghana Fishermen Association 
(8) National Chairman, Ghana Poultry Farmers Association 
220 
In carrying out the fieldwork, the researcher adopted some practical measures in 
order to reduce the non-response bias. The next section examines these steps. 
5.10 Examining non-response bias 
Bose (2001 pp. 1) defined non-response bias as 'the difference between a 
survey estimate and the actual population value'. Bias is the expected value from the 
differences between the survey estimate and the actual population. There are two 
components associated with non-responses bias; the amount o f non-response and the 
differences in the estimate between the respondents and non-respondents. Bias can 
be associated with low response rates and strong differences in the estimates 
between respondents and non-respondents. Due to nonresponses at different levels 
of the survey, estimates can be subject to bias. 
Scholars have outlined three main methods o f estimating non-response bias: 
comparing known values with the population, subjective estimates and extrapolation 
(Stephan and McCarthy, 1958; Kish, 1965; Bose, 2001). An examination of a non-
responses bias is diff icult when the expected value of the population is unknown. 
Higher responses rates are very useful in survey, even though they do not necessarily 
guarantee low bias. Following Krishnan et al. (2006) a number o f steps were adapted 
to ensure that the data was of high quality and to reduce the non-response bias, the 
researcher utilised the following steps: 
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• Protection o f respondent's anonymity 
Respondents were assured of anonymity (Podsakoff et al., 2003) and given a 
promise o f confidentiality o f their responses. The introductory letter shown to 
each respondent indicated the purpose of the survey and the assurance of 
confidentiality. 
• Pre-testing the survey on entrepreneurs 
To ensure a reduction in statement ambiguity, a pilot study was carried out 
where pre-testing o f the survey questionnaire on selected entrepreneurs were 
conducted (Tourangeau et al., 2000) to solve potential problems of face 
validity (Ucbasaran et al., 2006). 
• Separation of statements 
The researcher also ensured that the statements relating to the dependent 
variables were not located close to the independent variables on the 
questionnaire (Parkhe, 1993). 
• Designed criteria 
The survey was conducted using specified criteria to select respondents. These 
criteria were adopted to ensure equity and an even distribution of respondents. 
It was also done to reduce the non-response bias. The criteria included: 
employee size, sector and locations. 
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• Multiple and same modes o f data collection 
Both a structured questionnaire and an in-depth interviewing method were 
adopted in the data collection. Using a stratified random sampling method, all 
the selected respondents were given same questionnaire. 
• Interviewer training 
To enforce the above, the research team of three was given adequate training to 
ensure uniform administrating of questionnaire and interviewing procedures. 
• Flexible scheduling 
Also to assist in trying to achieve a higher response rate a flexible scheduling 
time policy was were allowed by the researcher to ensure that the respondents 
were ready and willing to provide relevant responses at their convenience. 
The above approaches were adopted to provide a higher response rate not only 
for the entire sample, but also for the subgroups to minimise the variables of the 
response rates. In addition to the above approaches, combinations of parametric and 
nonparametric tests were used to investigate possible non-response bias. For the 
parametric test, a Bonferroni test was applied. Again, Mann Whitney and Kruskall-
Wallis tests were applied for the nonparametric tests. No statistically significant 
response bias was detected regarding industry, standard government official region, 
legal form, age o f the business and employment size between the respondents and 
nonrespondents at the 0.05 level or better. There is therefore no cause to suspect that 
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the sample o f businesses is not a representative sample of the population of 
independent private business in Ghana. 
After a successful data collection, the researcher organised a data 
presentation and analysis through data editing, coding, recording, processing and 
analysing the data to achieve results. The next two sections examined the data 
presentation and analysis. 
5.11 Data presentation and Analysis 
Data analysis is an important stage of the research process. It begins with the 
design of the study; continues through the data collection process, after the data 
collection, it becomes the focus and is completed in the report writing. The data 
analysis for this research involves three major steps; data preparation, descriptive 
statistics and inferential statistics. 
The data preparation for this research involved the editing, coding and 
entering the data into the computer which was then transformed into a database 
structure. Descriptive statistics was then used to describe the basic features of the 
data in the study to show a simple summary of the data. The central tendency -
mean, range, standard deviation and the variance was used to examine how 
respondents have reacted to the questions and how well the participants have spread 
their responses. This test was vital in that it gave the researcher an idea about the 
wording o f the question and the understanding of the respondents to the questions. 
The inferences of the statistics was then linked to each of the specific 
hypotheses and questions set out for this study before making inferences from the 
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data to arrive at a more general condition. These analyses were conducted with the 
objective of getting a feel for the data, and testing for the goodness of data and the 
hypotheses. The survey gathered both quantitative and qualitative data for the 
research. Hence the research method used in the data analysis considered both 
research methods in deciding the type of data analysis to employ (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997; Curran and Blackburn, 2001). 
5.11.1 Data editing, coding and recording responses 
After obtaining the data through questionnaires and interviews, the data was 
edited, coded, and keyed into the preferred software programme and then analysed. 
The data editing process had three main tasks: reading through each submitted 
questionnaire, handling identified problems, making updates and corrections. 
Extensive quality control procedures were used to enhance data dependability. These 
measures involved frequent consulting meetings with interviewers to check on 
progress of the survey, accurate data editing and coding procedures discuss areas o f 
ambiguity, tracing and correcting errors, carefully checking updates and conducting 
computer checks for inconsistencies or illogical patterns in the data. 
Some inconsistencies which could logically be corrected were immediately 
done, whilst others were referred back to the respondents for clarity and completion 
through either phone contacts or by revisiting their premises. However, those 
questionnaires with major omissions were either referred to the respondents for 
completion or were rejected or termed unusable where the omissions were about 
30% or more. The major omissions were as a result of respondents not knowing the 
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answer, not wil l ing to answer, or simply indifferent to the need to respond.to the 
question(s). 
To ensure a much easier coding, the researcher gave some thought to the 
coding at the questionnaire design stage. Two sets o f questionnaires were used, one 
for the small businesses and the other for the banks. To begin with the 
questionnaires for each of the six districts in the Greater Accra Region housing the 
small businesses were given identity numbers; Accra Metropolis District (Accra) -
1000; Tema Municipal District (Tema) - 2000; Ga West District (Amasaman) -
3000; Ga East District (Abokobi) - 4000; Dangme West District (Dodowa) - 5000; 
and Dangme East District (Ada) - 6000. A questionnaire for the banks was coded 
10000. 
The Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS), a well-known 
commercially available spreadsheet programme, was used in entering the set of 
coded data into the computer to form the data base. The SPSS software, was used 
because the software is one o f the most widely used programme for statistical 
analysis in Social Sciences. Second, the software has data management and data 
documentation as one of the features. Thirdly, the software can be used in setting up 
both data files and files description. 
5.11.2 Processing and data analysis 
In conducting the data analysis, the study used logit regression analysis to 
investigate the sources of start-up capital, the extent to which resources of the 
business and the entrepreneurs are associated with credit rationing and also to 
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determine the impact of geographical and functional distance, business information, 
and entrepreneur and business characteristics on small businesses access to bank 
credit. There were other statistical techniques which the researcher could have 
followed, such as probit and tobit regression analysis but logistic regression 
techniques were preferred for two main reasons. Firstly, it necessitated less stringent 
assumptions on the distribution of the independent variables. Secondly, the logit 
regression results are more comfortable to be interpreted and analysed. 
Independent, control and demographic variables were reported with only 
models significant at the 0.05 level discussed. Deviance as indicated by the log 
likelihood coefficient is a 'badness-of-fit' measure, and weak 'explanatory' models 
generally report higher deviance coefficients. The pseudo R 2 coefficient provides an 
indication o f the 'explanatory' power of the model. While similar in principle to the 
adjusted R 2 reported in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, non-OLS 
regression models generally report lower pseudo R 2 coefficients (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, 2000). The log likelihood coefficients and the pseudo R 2 coefficients are 
reported. 
In the collection, presentation and analysis of the data, certain steps were 
taken to ensure data validity and reliability. The next section examines these 
measures. 
5.12 Validity and reliability of survey findings 
For a research study to be accurate, its findings must be reliable and valid. 
This is dependent on how good the study design was at reflecting how valid and 
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reliable the measurement of exposure factors and outcomes o f interest and also the 
cooperation between the research team and the population sample. Validity is the 
best available approximation to the truth or falsity o f a given inference, proposition 
or conclusion (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Reliability is the consistency of your 
measurement, or the degree to which an instrument measures the same way each 
time it is used under the same condition with the same subjects. In short, it is the 
repeatability o f your measurement. 
The instrument used in obtaining a valid (accurate) and reliable (precise) 
measurement is vital to the survey and the study results. An unreliable and invalid 
data resulting from systematic measurement errors may lead to a false estimation o f 
a relationship (Davidsson, 2004). To avoid this and to ensure reliability and validity 
of the study results the following strategies were adopted to enhance the accuracy 
and precision of the survey. 
Firstly, at every stage o f the research, the methods of measurement were 
standardised. After a careful literature review, a structured questionnaire was 
designed to be administered by the research team. The questionnaire was structured 
in order to ensure consistency in questions to respondents and also to have reliable 
responses to be tested. Before the stratified random sampling was applied in the 
selection of respondents, a carefully thought criteria including size, sector, location 
were designed. 
Secondly, the research team was trained on the various stages o f the survey, 
the processes and the expectations from the survey. They were therefore certified as 
qualified before embarking on the survey. Before conducting the actual survey, a 
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sample survey was carried out with the research team to test the expected responses 
from the questionnaire, increase clarity and familiarity with questionnaire 
administration. 
Thirdly, in testing for the validity o f the study, the structured questionnaire 
was piloted with academics, business executives, bankers and entrepreneurs. Five 
each o f these groups were given the questionnaire to review and post their 
comments. Comments on the length, form and structure were incorporated in the 
questionnaire review. This was done to improve consistency of measurement. 
Fourthly, in managing the data collected, the questionnaire had to be edited, 
coded and entered into the software for the statistical analysis. To ensure uniformity 
and consistency, the researcher outlined the methods of editing, correcting, coding 
and entering the data. 
Fifthly, to further enhance precision and accuracy, the researcher conducted a 
randomly selected interview on the population sample. This was done to ascertain 
the quality o f information obtained, effect modification were necessary and correct 
any misclassification or misrepresentation in the earlier response. 
In addition to the above measures, the results from the study were compared 
to those of others researchers who had undertaken similar studies and had adopted 
similar operationlisation strategy. The findings of this research were mostly 
confirmed by similar studies. This was most notable in three main areas (i) the 
results of the small businesses and their sources o f start-up capital show that start-up 
businesses in Ghana have their financing preference following the pecking order 
theory. These findings complement those of previous studies (Acs, 1985; Findings 
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Africa Region, 1994; Aryeetey et al. 1994; Gray et al. 1997; Hamilton and Fox, 
1998; Nissanke, 2001; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Kutsuna and Honjo 2006; 
Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). (ii) the results of credit rationing of novice, serial and 
portfolio entrepreneurs in Ghana show that habitual entrepreneurs were less likely 
than novice entrepreneurs to be credit rationed (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; 
Bigsten et al., 2000). ( i i i ) the results of the role played by habitual entrepreneurs, 
geographical distance and business information in commercial lending decisions 
show that entrepreneurs further away from their preferred bank branch and also their 
closest competitive bank branch are more likely to be credit rationed. Also the 
further away entrepreneurs are from their banks; the more likely the banks wil l have 
difficulties gathering soft information thus providing good proxies for banks to 
ration credit. These results are consistent with those of Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
who find that in the United States, businesses located further away from their banks 
are more likely to be credit rationed. Similar results were found by (Degryse and 
Ongena, 2005; Amel and Brevoort, 2005; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; Agarwal and 
Hauswald, 2006. However, Carling and Lundberg (2005) indicate the absence of 
spatial credit rationing in Sweden. 
Furthermore, the test for accuracy and precision was undertaken by the use 
of both bivariate and multiple regression analysis. The regression results confirmed 
the bivariate results. In undertaking the fieldwork, the researcher encountered some 
challenges. The next section examines these problems. 
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5.13 Problems encountered during the fieldwork 
• Diff icul ty in obtaining permission 
Extreme difficulties were experienced in obtaining permission to interview 
entrepreneurs. For some respondents several visits and calls were made before an 
interview appointment was made. 
• Difficulty in finding the geographical location of businesses 
As experienced in most surveys, difficulties were encountered during the data 
collection period. First, the research team encountered some difficulties in accessing 
the geographical location of businesses. Even after the addresses and contact 
numbers of businesses have been secured, it was still diff icult locating businesses 
because most streets in the region especially those in large and small towns were not 
named and numbered. Regarding the agricultural sector most entrepreneurs were 
sparsely located in remote areas and the distance between farms and between 
businesses in the small towns were far apart. 
• Failure to keep appointment dates and time 
Second, some respondents especially those in the manufacturing and services 
sectors and located in conurbations failed to keep their initial interview 
appointments with the research team after all the arrangements had been made. They 
were either out o f the office or were engaged in meetings or simply gave an excuse 
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to rearrange another date. This therefore called for a second round o f appointments 
to be fixed. 
• Reluctance o f respondents to grant audience or share information 
The research team also encountered reluctance on the part o f entrepreneurs 
regarding their cooperation and the provision of relevant information during the 
fieldwork. Some of the respondents declined to participate without a prior 
appointment, and some gave vague answers and figures, others were reluctant 
because of a fear that revealed information might be used against them as grounds 
for tax fraud charges. Some were hesitant to share information because they were 
unwilling to give out relevant information regarding the financing of the business to 
the interviewers. 
• The need to interpret the questionnaire to some respondents 
The presence of the researcher was required during the survey in mostly the 
small towns and within the agricultural sector. Most of the entrepreneurs in either 
the small town or within the agricultural sector had lower levels of education or no 
education at all. As such, the researcher was required to be present to interpret and 
explain the questions to the entrepreneur. 
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5.16 Conclusion 
The main focus of this study was to identify the presence of credit rationing 
among habitual and novice entrepreneurs in Ghana. The research methodology was 
chosen to f u l f i l the objective of this study in identifying the sources of start-up 
capital, the presence of credit rationing amongst entrepreneurs and the role of trust in 
bank lending decisions under conditions of uncertainty. The rationale for this study 
was to meet the outlined objectives and provide suitable recommendations to 
address the findings. In addressing the research questions a theoretical framework 
was developed which focused on human capital resource, social capital theory and 
entrepreneurship. 
In choosing a research strategy, consideration was given to the most cost-
effective and high result oriented approach (McNabb, 2004). The questionnaire 
design and the administration of the questionnaires were done inline with the 
objectives of the study. The focus, wording and structure o f the questionnaire were 
to meet the set objectives (Gill and Johnson, 1997). Face-to-face questionnaire 
administration and in-depth interview approaches were selected based on their 
advantages such as: higher responses rate, lowering of sample frame bias, greater 
control, building good relationship with respondents and ensuring suitable responses 
as well as being cost effective (Czaja and Blair, 2005) compared to telephone and 
postal approaches (Walsh and Wigens, 2003). For an objective, systematic, valid and 
reliable findings, a quantitative research technique was used for the first three 
empirical chapters. In view of the smaller number of banks available in Ghana a 
qualitative research technique was used for the fourth empirical chapter. 
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In the absence of a comprehensive list of small businesses in Ghana, the 
researcher had to negotiate with associations, agencies, groups and the banks to have 
access to the various entrepreneurs in a much easier way. The selection of the 
population for the survey was done with carefully considered criteria: businesses 
with 4-50 employees, those which were a year or older businesses, the entrepreneur 
must be an owner/manager o f a privately owned business with location, size and 
sector under consideration. A pilot survey was carried out and the necessary changes 
were made before the main survey. In addition the research team were given 
adequate training to ensure efficiency and consistency. Data editing, coding, and 
recording o f responses were done to ensure reliable data. 
The measurement o f the variables for the empirical analysis were grouped 
into dependent, independent, control and demographic variables. The dependent 
variables were sources o f start-up capital, credit rationing o f entrepreneurs, 
geographical distance and business information and uncertainty and trust. The 
independent variables included portfolio, serial and novice entrepreneurs, 
employment growth. The control variables included sector, size, age of business and 
location. The demographic variables included general and specific human capital, 
social capital, sex, age o f entrepreneur, relative role model. The survey was not 
without challenges. 
In total, 496 responses were received from an initial survey o f 750 small 
business entrepreneurs drawn from comprehensive lists o f 1200 businesses. Logit 
regression analysis was employed for the analysis o f the data. In minimising the 
non-response bias and maintaining a reliable and valid measurements, the study 
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initiated a careful design criteria, trained the interviewees, used flexible appointment 
scheduling were necessary and pre-testing of questionnaire. There were difficulties 
in obtaining permission, keeping appointment time and difficulty in locating 
businesses. 
The first five chapters of this study had looked at the introduction and 
overview of the study, the financing of small business entrepreneurs, the credit 
rationing of entrepreneurs, the entrepreneurship theories and the methodology 
adopted in gathering data for the empirical investigation. The next four chapters 
provide the empirical findings from the investigations and analysis carried out on the 
primary data collected. The last chapter then provides the conclusion and some 
outlined recommendation to the small business entrepreneur, practitioners and policy 
makers. 
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Chapter 6 
Entrepreneurs and Sources of Start-ups Capital in Ghana 
6.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapter has provided the reader with the methodology which 
was used. This chapter is the first of four empirical chapters which test various 
financial related hypotheses pertaining to habitual and novice entrepreneurship, and 
human capital theory. More specifically, this chapter explores entrepreneurs and the 
sources of finance for businesses at the start-up stage in Ghana. 
One of the major expectations of start-up businesses is the promotion of 
economic growth through the creation of jobs and the introduction o f innovative 
ideas (Birch, 1979; Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006). Access to 
start-up capital is vital for the formation and growth of small businesses (Curran and 
Blackburn, 1993; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005). The lack of start-up capital is a 
major obstacle to the development and growth o f small businesses (Schreiner and 
Woller, 2003). Compared to established businesses, start-ups have no proven track 
record, credit history, reliable financial statements and most often lack the required 
collateral for securing external finance (Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007). The 
results of these contextual characteristics of start-up businesses are the unique 
problem of information asymmetry (adverse selection and moral hazard) which has a 
bearing upon the initial sources of finance (Shane and Cable, 2002). 
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Finding the right financing that fits with a businesses' goals is a continuing 
challenge for almost every small business. For start-up businesses this can be one of 
the biggest hurdles in getting o f f the ground. Inadequate funding is one of the main 
reasons that start-up businesses do not succeed: raising proper and adequate start-up 
capital is a necessity to start-up any business. An entrepreneur's background and 
business ownership experience is a determining factor in the choice of an 
entrepreneur's start-up capital, the type and amount of finance used (Westhead et al., 
2003b; Westhead et al., 2005b). The level of human and social capital acquired by 
habitual entrepreneurs in previous ventures can greatly influence their identification 
and exploitation o f business opportunities and resources (Starr and Bygrave, 1991; 
Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2003). Habitual entrepreneurs rely on past business 
ownership experience, reputation, ability to identify appropriate networking, and the 
adoption of new techniques in running their new business (Wright et al. 1997a). This 
gives them an added advantage in terms of information and knowledge about the 
business world (Carter and Ram, 2003), social and economic network (Ehrenfeld, 
1993; Witt, 2004) and enable them to identify diverse business opportunities (Shane, 
2000; Ucbasaran et al., 2003). 
The chapter aims at investigating entrepreneur's access to and utilisation of 
start-up capital at the start of their business and the influence of human capital 
(education, training and prior ownership experiences) possessed by the entrepreneur 
in accessing the start-up capital. To achieve this objective, the chapter used the 
human capital theory o f the entrepreneur and a series of logit regression models. The 
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chapter is organized as follows. Section two presents the empirical findings and 
section three concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Empirical findings 
6.2.1 Descriptive statistics results 
The results from Table 6.1 show that the most used source of start-up finance 
was own savings and this was mentioned by 62.0% of the entrepreneurs. Table 6.1 
also shows which was the most important source of finance at start-up was. 51.4% of 
entrepreneurs indicated that their own savings were the main source of finance at 
start-up, and this was by far the most mentioned source in Table 6.1. This finding is 
consistent with previous research on African business, although the magnitude of the 
importance of owns savings is less than that found in previous research. The main 
reason for the difference is that in this study, a distinction was made between a 
single entrepreneur (own savings - 51%) and two or more entrepreneurs (co-
investors - 32%). In a survey of 133 enterprises Findings Africa Region (1994) 
found that own savings formed over 80% of the initial start-up capital for the SME's 
surveyed. 
Whilst Aryeetey et al. (1994) showed that 67% of small businesses in Ghana 
mentioned own savings as the main source o f start-up capital. In other African 
countries there is a greater dependence upon own saving, compared to Ghana. For 
example, Nissanke (2001) found that 7 1 % of small businesses in Zimbabwe used 
owners' savings as the main source of capital. The dependence upon owners' 
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savings is even more acute in Kenya, with Gray et al. (1997) noting that most small 
firms cited own savings as the main source of start-up capital, and stressed that no 
business had gained their start-up capital from a formal source. 
Table 6.1: Sources of Finance and the Most Important Source of Finance at Statt-Up 
Stage. 
Use of 
Source 
Most Important 
Source 
Own saving 62.0 51.4 
Pension 4.6 3.8 
Gif t from relations 12.8 3.8 
Loan from relations 13.4 3.0 
Bank loan 11.8 2.2 
Bank overdraft 12.6 0.6 
Suppliers credit 31.6 2.0 
Co-investor 36.4 32.0 
Customer advance 3.0 1.0 
Others 0.4 0.2 
N 496 496 
(Percentage of entrepreneurs reporting the use of each source of finance, and the 
most important source of finance at start-up). 
Hamilton and Fox (1998) found that there was a trend of a reduction on the 
reliance on owners' savings. More specifically, they found that in New Zealand 
before the 1980s 76% of start-up capital was from owners' savings. The figure 
declined to 73% between 1980 and 1989, and further declined to 60% between 1992 
and 1994. Thus, the lower incidence of own savings being used as a source of 
finance, and the main source o f finance could be explained by a readiness o f start-up 
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firms to offer collateral in recent times to their external lenders in order to secure 
start-up capital (Cowling and Westhead 1996). 
Interestingly, the findings in Ghana on owners' savings are consistent with 
the findings in developed nations. In the US, 47% of small businesses relied upon 
savings as the principal source o f start-up capital, and the corresponding figure in the 
UK was found to be 43% (Dunkelberry and Cooper, 1983). Whilst Ellett et al.'s 
(2004) survey of 147 new small businesses in South East England found that over 
50% of the respondents relied upon the owners' personal savings. Other studies have 
also shown that own savings are the principal source of start-up capital and include: 
from the U.S. Acs (1985) (35%); Mexico, Hernandez-Trillo et al., (2005) (61%); 
Japan, Kutsuna and Honjo (2006) (80%); Ireland, Bhaird and Lucey (2006) (51%). 
Pensions were mentioned by only 4.6% of entrepreneurs as a source of 
finance but were viewed by 3.8% of owners as the main source o f finance. Thus, 
pensions represent an important source to a small niche of small business in Ghana. 
Aryeetey et al. (1994) reported that 9.4% and 6.5% of sampled businesses 
mentioned a pension as a source and the main source of start-up capital, 
respectively. Most o f the entrepreneurs who indicated pension as source of capital 
were formal public sector workers, who took advantage of a lump sum of money 
given to them on their retirement or retrenchment. 
Gifts from relations and loans from relations were used by 12.8% and 13.4%, 
respectively, o f entrepreneurs at start-up, and these were the fourth and f i f th most 
used sources. In other words, approximately one in eight entrepreneurs used loans, 
and a similar number used gifts from relations. However, gifts and loans from 
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relations were mentioned by 3.8% and 3.0%, respectively, o f entrepreneurs as the 
main source o f finance. These two sources were the joint third, and then the f i f th 
most important sources. Loans and gifts from friends and relations have been 
described as aid to entry into entrepreneurship in Britain (Basu 1998). Among 
ethnic-owned businesses in the UK, family loans formed about 15% of the start-up 
capital (Curran and Blackburn 1993). In the US Bates (1977) also reported that 
entrepreneurs of an Asian immigrant origin had more family support in terms of 
loans for start-up capital than bank loans. Acs (1985) noted that in the United States, 
28% of respondents sourced their start-up capital from family, friends and associates 
(co-investors). 
Basu and Parker (2001) have pointed out that besides bank loans as a source 
of start-up capital, borrowings from friends and relations is the principal source of 
start-up capital. Aryeetey et al. (1994) reported that 11% and 5% of sampled 
businesses reported that their main source of start-up capital was gifts and loans 
from friends and relations, respectively. Adams (1992) argued that gifts and loans 
from friends and relations have been used to solve the weak institutional and 
enforcement problems and are therefore increased as a result of social pressure and 
reciprocity. Others have argued that these loans and gifts are part of a 'moral 
economy' in most developing countries where individuals depend on each other and 
wi l l be wil l ing to offer help (Morduch 1999; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005). 
Co-investors were the second most used source o f finance at start-up and 
recorded by 36.4% of entrepreneurs in the survey. Co-investors were the main 
source of finance for 32.0% of businesses, slightly less than one in three 
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entrepreneurs, and this again places co-investors as the second in rank order of 
importance. In this study, co-investors are two or more entrepreneurs putting their 
resources together to establish a business. Co-investors are shareholders of the 
business who may or may not be part of the day to day management of the business. 
The advantages o f co-investors are that their contributions to the financing of the 
business are similar to those of a single entrepreneur, interest free and long term 
financing, and offer free expertise in the initial stages of business. Like the single 
entrepreneur, they may go without remuneration as long as the business is unable to 
afford that. Studies by Aryeetey et al. (1994) found that in Ghana, 7.8% of sampled 
businesses used co-investor financing as the initial source of finance. Kutsuna and 
Honjo (2006) show that 37% of sampled start-up businesses in Japan used financing 
from founding members (co-investors). 
31.6%, slightly less than one in three entrepreneurs used supplier's credit as a 
source o f finance at start-up, whilst customer advances were used by only 3.0% of 
owner managers, which represents less than one tenth of the incidence of supplier's 
credit. Suppliers credit and customer advances are both mentioned by comparatively 
few owner managers as the main source of start-up finance - 2.0% and 1.0%, 
respectively. This result is expected given that supplier's credit and customer 
advances are hardly used as a primary source of start-up capital but rather as a 
supplementary source o f finance for existing firms (Aryeetey et al., 1994) to support 
working capital requirements (Findings Africa Region, 1994; Nissanke, 2001; 
Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Heino, 2006). Customer advance is used mostly by 
microenterprises in the manufacturing and services sectors to purchase goods for 
242 
products or services they would render to their clients. Supplier's credit is mostly 
used by medium and large businesses in the manufacturing sector as a form of 
supporting working capital to increase the business' liquidity especially in times of 
increased production (Aryeetey, 1998). 
Bank overdrafts and bank loans were cited by 12.6% and 11.8%, 
respectively, o f entrepreneurs as sources which were used when they started the 
business, and this places these sources in sixth and seventh place, narrowly behind 
loans and gifts from relations. However, only 0.6% and 2.2%, respectively, of 
entrepreneurs indicated that the aforementioned sources were their main source of 
finance. The rather low use of bank loans and overdrafts are the results of 
information asymmetry (adverse selection and moral hazard problems) which are 
higher with regards to start-up businesses (Huyghebaert, 2003; Huyghebaert and 
Van de Gucht, 2007), their inability to provide collateral to support credit 
application (Manigart and Struyf, 1997; Berger and Udell, 1998; Nissanke, 2001) 
and also the lack o f a proven track record and business experience (Findings Africa 
Region, 1994). Studies by Nissanke (2001) showed that in Ghana only 3% and 25% 
of microenterprises and medium-size enterprises, respectively, use bank loans and 
overdraft. Other studies have also shown low use of bank loans and overdraft as 
sources of start-up capital (From the United States, Acs (1985) (28%); New Zealand, 
Hamilton and Fox (1998) (11%); Mexico, Hernandez-Trillo et al. (2005) (0.6%); 
Japan, Kutsuna and Honjo (2006) (12.5%); Mexico, Heino (2006) (5%). 
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6.2.2 Regression results 
Having discussed the relative use and importance o f the sources of start-up 
finance the findings o f the logistic regression models can now be reported on each 
type of the sources of start-up finance. 
6.2.2.1 Habitual entrepreneurship 
An entrepreneur requires diverse skills in order to put together all the needed 
resources to start a venture or take advantage of an opportunity (Venkataraman, 
1997). These skills may be natural gifts or acquired through formal education and 
informal training (Lazear, 2005; Zhang, 2007). Access to finance plays an important 
role in the growth and development of an entrepreneur's business (Black and 
Strahan, 2002 pp. 2810). The lack of access to finance is one of the major obstacles 
to an entrepreneur's effective operations, to the maintenance or replacement of 
machinery and equipment, and to the purchasing of raw materials for expansion, 
growth and development (UNIDO, 1999 pp. 1; Pissarides, 1999 pp.521; Holtz-Eakin 
and Rosen, 1999; Van Auken, 2001 pp. 243). These challenges may prohibit the 
growth potential and survival of start-up businesses (Cooper et al., 1994; Bechetti 
and Trovato, 2002; Davila et al., 2003) as it impacts negatively on their performance 
and impede their chances of raising external finance (Marlow and Patton, 2005). 
The results presented in Table 6.2 below shows that the habitual 
entrepreneurship variable appeared with a negatively signed coefficient regarding 
loans from relations at the 5% level. The results indicate that habitual entrepreneurs 
are less likely to depend on loans from relations compared to novice entrepreneurs. 
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The results regarding external sources of start-up capital indicate a positively signed 
coefficient at the 1% level o f significance. Habitual entrepreneurs are therefore more 
likely to depend on external sources of start-up capital such as bank loans compared 
with novice entrepreneurs. The results therefore imply that habitual entrepreneurs do 
not only utilise internal sources of capital at the start of a new venture, but also 
utilise external sources o f capital compared to novice entrepreneurs who on the other 
hand rely heavily on their own savings and those of relations at the start of a new 
venture (Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006; Heino, 2006; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). These 
results are therefore consistent with hypothesis H | . A number of reasons can be 
assigned for these results. 
Firstly, the habitual entrepreneurs by virtue of their prior business experience 
adopt a gradual process in establishing and implementing a new business. Their 
initial business start-up capital is mostly from internal sources such as personal 
savings and previous business savings (Aryeetey et al., 1994; Nissanke, 2001; 
Westhead et al., 2003a). The habitual entrepreneur wi l l then supplement this internal 
source of start-up capital with supplier's credit, customer advances received from 
previous businesses (Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Heino, 2006) and the sale of 
previous business in the case o f serial entrepreneur (Westhead et al., 2003a). In later 
stages when further funding is required, the habitual entrepreneur wi l l then approach 
the banks (Alsos and Kolvereid, 1998; Wright and Westhead, 1999). 
Secondly, in financing the entrepreneur, external investors as a result of the 
conditions of market imperfection, encounter the problem of information asymmetry 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Denis, 2004) and higher transaction costs (Watson and 
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Wil son, 2002; Cassar, 2004; Ebben and Johnson, 2006). This problem raises the 
issues of adverse selection and moral hazard thus creating the potential for rationing 
credit (Binks and Ennew, 1996). External investors therefore resolve this situation 
by building a good working relationship with the entrepreneur (Shane and Cable, 
2002) and also through the pledging of collateral by the entrepreneur to secure the 
credit facility (Cowling and Westhead, 1996; Hart, 2001). 
Unfortunately, the inexperienced novice entrepreneurs are unable to meet 
these credit requirements as they lack the requisite track record, lack reliable 
financial data, lack physical collateral or have insufficient assets to pledge as 
collateral compared to habitual entrepreneurs who are more likely to meet these 
requirements. They are therefore likely to encounter difficulties in accessing external 
credit (Steel and Webster, 1992 pp. 434; Levy, 1993 pp. 70; Aryeetey et al., 1994 
pp. 11; Santos, 2003 pp.11). In view of the above challenges, the novice 
entrepreneurs are forced to source their start-up capital from internal source as they 
fail to meet the requirements of the external investor (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). 
The novice entrepreneurs tend to depend on their own savings, gifts and loans from 
relations (Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006; Heino, 2006; 
Bhaird and Lucey, 2006) at the start of their businesses and for business growth and 
survival. 
Thirdly, at start-up novice entrepreneurs are perceived as high risk borrowers 
in view of their lack of experience, a poor lender-borrower relationship, and a lack 
of collateral to resolve the problems of information asymmetry and their inability to 
meet transaction and monitoring costs (Berger and Udell, 1998; Shane and Cable, 
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2002; Huyghebaert, 2003). These challenges therefore affect the cost and availability 
of external credit to the novice entrepreneur at start-up (Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006; 
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007). Hence, their dependence on internal sources 
of start-up capital compared to the habitual entrepreneur (Winborg and Lanstorm, 
2001; Carter and Van Auken, 2005). 
Additionally, the habitual entrepreneurship variable in Table 6.2 shows a 
positively signed coefficient for the use of co-investors which was statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Habitual entrepreneurs by virtue of their prior business 
ownership experience have accumulated a vast amount of both human and social 
capital (Zhang, 2007). Through social networks, the habitual entrepreneurs can 
expand their knowledge base, positioning and relationship (Greve and Salaff, 2003). 
Unlike the novice entrepreneurs, the acquired networking skills of the habitual 
entrepreneurs offer them a large database of information about opportunities, access 
to vital resources including capital and ability to manage challenges (Burt, 1992; 
Sapienza et al., 1996; Hills et al., 1997; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999; Hansen, 
2001). Thus by their business ownership experience, habitual entrepreneurs can use 
their networking skills to source for funding from their colleague entrepreneurs or 
other worthy friends and individuals or other members of their social group within 
their community to start a new business (Cressy 1995; Westhead et al., 2004). They 
are therefore able to utilise external sources of credit from co-investors, supplier's 
credit and customer advance. This result is consistent with hypothesis H 2 . 
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6.2.2.2 Degree 
The human capital theory asserts that entrepreneurs through the knowledge 
they possess are able to increase their cognitive abilities which allows them to be 
more effective and efficient in their productive activities and contribute to the 
growth of their business (Story, 1994; Basu, 1998; Smallbone and Wyer, 2000). This 
assertion presupposes that those individuals with higher education, more work 
experience and skills are likely to have superior abilities, achieve higher 
performance and become more successful in their economic ventures than those with 
a lower or less human capital (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Dimov and Shepherd, 
2005). 
The choice of an individual becoming an entrepreneur is insignificantly 
related to the educational level of that individual (Van Der Sluis et al., 2003). 
However, the performance of the entrepreneur's venture is directly affected by the 
entrepreneur's level o f education (Van Der Sluis et al., 2003). Thus entrepreneurs 
with higher education are more likely to be successful in their venture impacting 
positively on their performance with higher growth, profit and income (Metcalf et 
al., 1996; Basu and Goswami, 1999). 
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One advantage habitual entrepreneurs with prior ownership experience have 
over novice entrepreneurs when starting a new venture is their ability to network. 
The habitual entrepreneur with a higher level o f education is able to link up or have 
a better communication with varied financial providers such as (banks, non-banks, 
venture capitalists and public sector grants), consultants and other entrepreneurs or 
investors to identify an opportunity, pursue it and exploit it to their advantage (Basu 
and Goswami, 1999; Zhang, 2007). Networking skills gives the entrepreneur a large 
database of information about opportunities, access to vital resources including 
finance and human resources, and the ability to negotiate (Sapienza et al., 1996; 
Hills et al., 1997; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999). The importance of investing in 
human capital is very apparent from Table 6.2 where the possession o f a university 
degree was statistically significant for four sources of start up finance. Those 
entrepreneurs who had university degrees were more likely to use co-investors 
compared to those without university degrees. This result was consistent with the 
cross-tabulations where 61.1% of entrepreneurs with degrees used co-investors, 
compared to 23.1% of entrepreneurs without degrees. 
Entrepreneurs with higher levels o f education are more likely to show a 
higher performance in their venture and report lower capital constraints compared 
with entrepreneurs with a lower level of education (Parker and van Praag, 2006 
pp.12). Hence, entrepreneurs with degrees were substantially less likely to use gifts 
and loans from relatives, as well as their own savings compared to those without 
degrees. Again the regression results were consistent with the cross-tabulations 
which found: Gifts from relations (2.3%, 18.5%), loans from relations (6.3%, 
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17.2%) and own savings (40.6%, 73.5%), where the first percentage in parentheses 
refers to those with degrees, and the second value refers to those without degrees. 
This result is consistent with hypothesis H3. Entrepreneurs with degrees relied the 
most upon co-investors, and to a lesser extent on own savings, whilst nearly three 
quarters of those without degrees used own savings. The use o f co-investors by 
entrepreneurs with university degrees can also be explained by the fact that higher 
education inspires greater confidence in entrepreneurs and grants them the 
opportunity o f networking both within and also outside their business environment 
(Buatsi, 2002). 
In Ghana, most o f the businesses in the service sector such as law, 
accounting and auditing, marketing, surveying and architectural, engineering, 
communication and other general services are jointly resourced and owned. 
Entrepreneurs and associates who work in those areas are mostly degree holders; 
thus, the use of co-investor's resources and skills are common. Regarding non-
degree holders most are to be found in the micro-businesses and depend mostly on 
their own resources or those o f close relations and friends to minimize risk and 
maintain control (Romano et al., 2000). Heino (2006) pointed out that the more 
educated entrepreneurs are the more likely they wil l report a higher use o f external 
source o f start-up capital. 
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6.2.2.3 Innovation 
Product or service innovation was found not to be statistically significantly 
related to any of the models of the use of start-up finance. Thus, product or service 
innovation is not consistent with the third hypothesis. 
A number of reasons account for this. Firstly, inadequate information on the 
innovation makes it impossible for the bank to determine the uncertainty associated 
with the technology, production, marketing and the return of the project (Binks and 
Ennew, 1996). This problem is compounded by the institutional weaknesses within 
the banking sector arising from the lack o f skills in credit appraisal, risk 
management and monitoring difficulties. Secondly, the situation is further 
compounded by the inefficiencies in the legal system making loan recovery, 
bankruptcy and contract enforcement a major challenge for banks in the case of a 
bad investment. Another related problem is the absence or ineffectiveness of the 
property right for new ideals and discovery. Banks are therefore uncertain about the 
positive return from their investment as spillovers are likely to erode the innovators 
benefits. 
Thirdly, small innovation businesses are considered to have a high risk of 
default. Most small businesses especially for start-ups, access to finance is a major 
challenge, thus they tend to finance any innovative idea through own savings and 
retain earning from the business' operations. Bank financing are therefore likely to 
be indirectly channelled to the innovative project. Fourthly, most small businesses 
have a single or small management team and almost all the innovative ideas are 
embedded with the entrepreneur. This makes the small business very sensitive to 
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management change, hence the loss o f the innovative ideas or products. These 
problems are more pronounced where the small businesses are located in small 
towns and further away from the banks (Sunley et al., 2005). 
In contrast process innovation was statistically significant for five sources of 
start-up capital: own savings and customer advances, which appeared with 
negatively signed coefficients, and bank loan, bank overdrafts and co-investors 
which all appeared with positive coefficients. Process innovation involves the use of 
new technology, new equipment, plants and machinery and improved raw materials. 
These are very expensive ventures which owner's savings and customer advances 
are unable to meet. Overall, the process innovation results are consistent with 
hypothesis H 4 . 
The process innovation results confirm the pecking order theory o f small 
business finance regarding their lifecycle. Entrepreneurs wi l l prefer self-financing 
from own saving and retained earning from business operation over debt, and debt 
financing over external equity financing (Giudici and Paleari, 2000 pp. 50). Self 
financing is preferred because it is less expensive and the entrepreneur has insider 
information on the innovation process. On the other hand, debt even though 
expensive is preferred to external equity financing because, the entrepreneur wi l l 
prefer to maintain his ownership and control of the business, debt financing is much 
easier to access compared to external equity, public offerings are prohibitive to small 
businesses in view of its costs and complexity, hence the choice of debt over 
external equity. Besides these, the entrepreneur wi l l also consider accepting external 
financing from individual investors as partners compared to institutions as these 
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individuals are expected to bring along some competencies and expertise into the 
business. 
Again the results of the survey points out that most of the process innovation 
has been carried out by medium-size businesses located in conurbation and large 
towns with the entrepreneur(s) having high level of education and experience. Thus 
habitual entrepreneurs with these competencies are more likely to network and use 
co-investors to finance process innovation at start-up compared with novice 
entrepreneurs. This result is consistent with hypothesis H 4 . 
6.2.2.4 Exporting 
Most entrepreneurs are unable to meet their export financing requirement 
because buyers in developed nations delay payments upon receipt o f export 
documents for the reasons of confirming the quality of the goods and thus demand 
30 to 90 days to confirm this (Buatsi, 2002). Hence the dependance on bank credit as 
their main source o f export finances (Alando, 1991; Baah-Nuakoh et al., 1996). 
However, bank credits are not only difficult to access, but also the application 
procedures are cumbersome, interest rates are high, increasing collateral requirement 
and most credits are short-term (Baah-Nuakoh et al., 1996; Buatsi, 2002). 
Additionally, on the delayed payment, most buyers base their arguments on 
the inefficiency of the legal systems in developing countries and the challenges of 
receiving a refund. This obviously wil l affect the cash flows o f exporters as their 
production cycle is disrupted and this wi l l deteriorate their balance sheet position, 
which negatively affects their access to external finance. The inability of exporters 
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to access export finance wi l l very much affect their products and delivery (Morna et 
al., 1990). Another challenge exporting entrepreneurs face in accessing external 
credit is the asymmetric information problem. Most exporters have a better 
knowledge of their exports and the export market than do banks and other financiers. 
The differences in information restrict the entrepreneur's access to credit (Binks et 
al., 1992;Tannous, 1997). 
The regression results in Table 6.2 indicate that exporting entrepreneurs 
were related to three sources of start-up finance: loans from relations, supplier's 
credit, and co-investors. Exporting entrepreneurs were less likely to have used loans 
from relations compared to exporting novice entrepreneurs because of the financial 
requirements involved in exporting. Secondly, exporting entrepreneurs tend to 
collaborate and network with other exporters and institutions to secure co-investors 
to meet export requirements (Buasti, 2002). They also depend heavily on supplier's 
credit as a form of working capital to meet export orders (Findings African Region, 
1994; Nissanke, 2001). This result is consistent with hypothesis H5. 
The section now makes brief comments on the other explanatory variables 
which were included in the regression models. 
6.2.2.5 Sector 
Firstly, the regression models shown in Table 6.2 excluded the sector 
comparison group of agricultural businesses. Looking at the regression results it was 
found that manufacturing businesses and also service sector businesses were more 
likely than agricultural businesses to have used supplier's credit. In addition service 
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sector businesses were more likely than agricultural businesses to have used bank 
loans; and manufacturing businesses were more likely than agricultural businesses to 
have used customer advances. Entrepreneurs in both manufacturing and services 
sectors reported a higher level of human capital compared to entrepreneurs engaged 
in agriculture. This higher level of human capital gives these entrepreneurs an 
opportunity to identify, pursue, network and negotiate for external credit (Shane, 
2000; Carter and Ram, 2003; Witt, 2004). 
Start-up businesses facing access to formal credit difficulties often finance 
their growth or working capital needs through either retained earnings or other 
financing options including supplier's credit and customer advances (Aryeetey et al., 
1994; Findings Africa Region, 1994; Nissanke, 2001). Entrepreneurs in both small 
and medium-size enterprises finance their growth and working capital needs through 
suppliers credit (Aryeetey et al., 1994), whilst entrepreneurs in micro enterprise rely 
on customer advances to finance their working capital needs at start-up (Findings 
Africa Region, 1994). The results indicate that entrepreneurs engaged in both the 
manufacturing and service sectors are more likely to report a higher use of external 
sources o f start-up capital compared to entrepreneurs engaged in the agricultural 
sector. 
6.2.2.6 Size 
One of the binding constraints to small business' establishment and 
expansion is the lack of access and the cost of finance (Steel and Webster, 1991; 
Levy, 1993; Aryeetey et al., 1994; Blanc, 1997). This binding constraint is severest 
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according to the size o f the business. Aryeetey et al. (1994) showed that only a third 
of micro business' loan applications are successful, and only one in two for small 
and medium-sized enterprises in Ghana. Whilst in Tanzania, Blanc (1997) has 
shown that 84% o f micro businesses compared to 58% and 54% o f small-lower and 
small-upper businesses, respectively, had never applied for a bank loan. In Ghana, 
the use of bank credit to start-up a business is very uncommon as banks and other 
formal financial institutions have difficulties determining the quality o f these 
borrowers. 
In Table 6.2 above, the size of the business was found to be statistically 
significantly related to five sources of start-up capital: own savings, gifts from 
relations, bank overdrafts bank loans, and co-investors. The results indicated that the 
larger size businesses were less likely to depend on internal sources of start-up 
capital such as own savings and gifts from relations. On the other hand, the results 
also indicated that larger size businesses reported higher usage of external sources of 
start-up capital such as bank overdrafts, bank loans and co-investors. 
Previous research in Ghana had shown that only 10% of small businesses and 
1% of micro-businesses have access to bank loans at start-up (Aryeetey et al., 1994; 
Nissanke, 2001). Small businesses, therefore, depend on their own savings and gifts 
from relations for start-up capital (Acs, 1985; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Kutsuna 
and Honjo 2006; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). The results implies that entrepreneurs 
operating in larger businesses are more likely to report a higher level of use of 
external sources of capital compared to entrepreneurs in much smaller businesses. 
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6.2.2.7 Location 
In this section, the excluded comparison dummy variable in the regression 
models was those businesses located in large towns. The conurbation dummy 
variable was statistically significant in five models: loans from relations, co-
investors, supplier's credit, bank overdrafts and bank loans, where the loan from 
relations appeared with negatively signed coefficient and the coefficients for co-
investors, supplier's credit, bank overdraft and bank loans all appeared with a 
positive sign. 
The results in Table 6.2 also suggest that entrepreneurs located in 
conurbations were more likely to report a higher use of external sources o f start-up 
capital compared to entrepreneurs located in large towns. Most of these 
entrepreneurs are in the small and medium-size businesses engaged in the 
manufacturing and services sectors. Most of these entrepreneurs are well established 
and experienced with proven track records, credit history, financial statements and 
collateral to secure bank credit or to attract potential investors. These entrepreneurs 
are more likely to have reported a higher usage o f external sources o f start-up capital 
such as co-investors, supplier's credit, bank overdrafts and bank loans compared 
with entrepreneurs located in large and small towns. They are also less likely to use 
loans from relations and suppliers credit since their finances are either too small or 
irrelevant in meeting their financing requirements. Both Aryeetey et al., (1994) and 
Nissanke, (2001) found that 2 1 % and 25%, respectively, of entrepreneurs within 
medium-sized businesses used bank loans as their primary source o f start-up capital. 
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The small towns dummy was statistically significant in three models: own 
savings, gifts from relations and suppliers credit. Entrepreneurs located in small 
towns were less likely to have reported a higher use o f external sources of start-up 
capital compared with entrepreneurs located in large towns. On the other hand, 
entrepreneurs located in small towns were more likely to have reported a higher 
dependence on internal sources o f start-up capital. By virtue of their occupational 
engagements such as farming, poultry, animal rearing, fishing, artisan works, 
handicrafts and commerce, entrepreneurs located in small towns are more likely to 
have used personal savings and gifts from relations at the start of their ventures. 
Most of the entrepreneurs in this category are less educated, have low levels 
of income, lack collateral and possess unreliable business information to secure 
formal credit compared to their counterparts in conurbations and large towns. Hence 
access to formal credit is not only difficult, but with higher interest rates. They 
therefore rely on informal sources including local bank agents (susu agent) as 
sources of start-up capital (Aryeetey et al., 1994). The use o f supplier's credit thrives 
on trust and ability to repay the suppliers. 
6.2.2.8 Employment growth 
Employment growth was only statistically significantly related to one source 
of finance: Gifts from relatives, and that appeared with a negatively signed 
coefficient. Access to finance is a major constraint to the growth of small 
businesses. This situation arises basically because of the problem of asymmetric 
information and the lack of collateral to overcome the moral hazard problems (Binks 
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and Ennew, 1996). Most entrepreneurs often finance their growth through retained 
earnings. The unavailability of internal finance constraints the growth of most small 
businesses. 
For businesses that make little or no use of external finance the relationship 
between growth and internal finance is expected to be weak (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Entrepreneurs experiencing 
employment growth are less likely to depend on loans from relations because 
employment growth in businesses tends to increase the demand for additional 
finance which both the retained earnings, owners savings and loans from relations 
are unable to meet (Hall et al., 2004). Entrepreneurs with higher levels o f human 
capital are more likely to report an increase in employment growth, hence a higher 
use of external sources o f start-up capital. 
6.2.2.9 Gender 
Table 6.2 shows that the gender of the entrepreneur was statistically 
significantly related to three o f the sources of capital: own savings, bank loans, and 
co-investors. Men were less likely than women to use their own savings as a source 
of start-up finance. This confirms earlier analysis using cross-tabulations where 
83.0% of women compared to 55.9% of men used own savings as a source of 
finance. Men were also more likely than women to use bank loans and co-investors. 
The adverse situation o f women, relative to men in Ghana, also manifested itself in 
only 3.6% of women having used bank loans, compared to 14.2% of men; and, also 
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with only 13.4% of women using co-investors as a source o f start-up finance which 
is less than one third of the 43.0% of the corresponding value o f men. 
The difference in the financing of business by male and female entrepreneurs 
usually occurs due to the difference in their type o f business, management style and 
the level of education and experience. Female entrepreneurs encounter some 
difficulties in accessing start-up capital (Verheul and Thurik, 2001). The results 
indicated that male entrepreneurs are more likely to report a higher level o f human 
capital compared to female entrepreneurs, hence a higher usage of external sources 
of start-up capital than women entrepreneurs. 
6.2.2.10 Age of the entrepreneur 
In the models those entrepreneurs aged 18-30 years old were less likely than 
those aged 46-60 years old to have used suppliers' credit. Entrepreneurs aged 31-45 
years old were more likely to have reported a higher uasage of own savings, and 
lesser usage of co-investors than those aged 46-60 years old. Younger entrepreneurs 
very often lack the proven track record, business experience and collateral to access 
bank credit, and are therefore screened out for their inability to prove their quality. 
Thus, they tend to rely heavily on their own savings as source of start-up capital, 
rather than to apply for bank credit (Timmons, 1994; Robb and Wolken, 2002). 
A variety of reasons can be offered to explain the greater probability o f the 
use of co-investors by those entrepreneurs aged 31 -45 years old compared to those 
aged 46-60 years old. First, the older categories of entrepreneurs are more likely to 
have gained a considerable amount of experience and reputation from previous 
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employment to be able to network with other associates to enable them to put 
financial resources together to start a business. Second, the older category of 
entrepreneurs over the years may have acquired proven track records, and internally 
generated profit (Hall et al., 2004; Abor and Biepke, 2006b), and may have secured 
some physical assets to be used as collateral to access bank credit, thus they have a 
much easier access to bank credit than younger entrepreneurs. 
The oldest categories of entrepreneurs who were 61 or more years old were 
less likely to use their own savings, and more likely to use pensions compared to 
those aged 46-60 years of age. Own savings to start up a business is mostly 
accumulated from formal employment, other businesses, pension and gifts and loans 
from relations. The use of pensions by entrepreneurs aged 61 or more results from 
the fact that these entrepreneurs may have been in formal employment within the 
civil or public services and on their retirement at age 60 they would want to start 
their own business. Most of these entrepreneurs would naturally have some 
difficulty accessing formal credit for lack of collateral and proven track record. Thus 
when they have access to their pension fund, their main desire is to set up a venture 
with this lump sum to ensure adequate and regular income during their retirement. 
During the survey one such entrepreneur asserted " / served in the Ghana Army for 
25 years and on retirement, I decided to start a poultry farm which I enjoy doing. 
Getting loan from the banks was difficult, because I refuse to use my house as 
collateral. When my pension was finally paid, I invested all into the poultry 
business." 
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6.2.2.11 Relative role model 
Having a member o f the family previously being in business was only 
statistically significant in one of the models. More specifically, those entrepreneurs 
who had a member of their family who had previously been in business were more 
likely than those without to use loans from relatives. Basu and Parker (2001) 
asserted that borrowing from family and friends is a principal source of start-up 
capital in many countries including the UK. Curran and Blackburn (1993) and Bates 
(1997) observed that family borrowing at start-up was common among ethnic-owned 
businesses in the UK and Asian immigrant entrepreneurs in the USA respectively. 
Entrepreneurs running family businesses wil l prefer internally generated finance to 
debt because of their fear of loosing control of the business (Sonnenfeld and Spence 
1989; Storey, 1994). Additionally, the entrepreneur's desire to minimize risk and to 
maintain business ownership, independence and control and family reputation makes 
them avoid external finance (Neubauer and Lank, 1998; Romano et al., 2000). The 
results imply that entrepreneurs with relative role model are more likely to report a 
higher use of internal sources of capital. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the sources of start-up capital of small business 
entrepreneurs in Ghana using a new data set. The findings suggest that entrepreneurs 
with business ownership experience and proven track records do not only utilise 
internal sources of capital at the start of a new venture, but also utilise external 
sources o f capital compared to novice entrepreneurs who rely heavily on their own 
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savings and those of relations at the start of a new venture. Studies have shown that 
the entrepreneur's business background and prior ownership experience plays a 
significant role in the entrepreneur's choice o f the type and amount o f start-up 
capital (Westhead et al., 2003b; Westhead et al., 2005b). 
Besides own savings, the study results also show that more than a third of 
entrepreneurs mentioned co-investment as a source of start-up capital with 32% 
indicating co-investors as their main source of start-up capital (Aryeetey et al. 1994). 
Besides these two main sources gifts from relations and loans from relations were 
used by 12.8% and 13.4%, respectively, of entrepreneurs at start-up. The results 
further show that 31.6% and 3% of entrepreneurs mentioned supplier's credit and 
customer advances, respectively, as a source of start-up capital. Bank overdrafts and 
bank loans were cited by 12.6% and 11.8%, respectively, as sources o f start-up 
capital. This result confirms earlier findings (Aryeetey et al., 1994; Findings Africa 
Region, 1994; Nissanke, 2001; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Heino, 2006). 
The findings of this chapter were consistent with hypotheses H ( i H2, t b , H 4 
and H5 set-up in chapter three. The results confirmed hypothesis H i , showing that 
experienced entrepreneurs were more likely to report a lower use of internal sources 
of start-up capital compared to novice entrepreneurs who are more likely to depend 
on internal sources o f capital. Similarly, the results also confirmed hypothesis H2 in 
that experienced entrepreneurs were more likely to report a higher usage of external 
sources o f start-up capital compared with novice entrepreneurs. The results also 
confirmed the third hypothesis H3 that entrepreneurs with higher levels of education 
were more likely to report a lower usage of internal sources o f capital compared with 
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novice entrepreneurs. Additionally, entrepreneurs engaged in innovation and 
exports, were more likely to report higher usage of external finance compared with 
entrepreneurs not engaged in innovation and exporting. These results confirm 
hypotheses H 4 and H 5 respectively. 
Entrepreneurs in the manufacturing and service sectors were more likely to 
report a higher use of external sources o f start-up capital compared to entrepreneurs 
engaged in the agricultural sector. Entrepreneurs operating in larger businesses were 
more likely to report a higher level use of external sources of capital compared to 
entrepreneurs in much smaller businesses. The findings also suggest that 
entrepreneurs located in conurbations were more likely to report a higher usage of 
external sources of start-up capital compared to entrepreneurs located in small 
towns. Similarly, male entrepreneurs are more likely to report a higher level of 
human capital compared to female entrepreneurs, hence a higher usage of external 
sources of start-up capital than women entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs experiencing 
employment growth in their business were less likely to report a lower use of 
internal sources o f start-up capital. Entrepreneurs with relative role model are more 
likely to report a higher use of internal sources of capital. 
Policy makers and practitioners can support the growth of start-up businesses 
through technical and financial support. Secondly, the findings on innovation, 
degree and exporting are particularly significant. Policies must be made to assist 
small business entrepreneurs at the early stages of their venture in the form of 
incentives such as tax holidays. Also, policy makers must support small business 
start-ups with grants, subsides and credit guarantee schemes. 
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Besides these challenges facing small business entrepreneurs in raising start-
up capital, entrepreneurs also encounter other challenges in accessing external credit 
for working capital and capital investment. The next chapter therefore examines the 
credit rationing of the types of entrepreneurs. 
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Chapter 7 
The Credit Rationing of Novice, Serial and Portfolio Entrepreneurs in Ghana 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has explored the sources o f start-up capital for small 
business entrepreneurs in Ghana. Previous studies on entrepreneurial experience 
have not systematically considered the types of credit rationing, credit constraints 
and discouraged borrowers, as well as a broad category which includes all three of 
the aforementioned types of credit rationing and credit constraints. Despite recent 
research progress (Biggs et al., 2002; Storey, 2004), there are gaps in the knowledge 
base relating to the profiles of entrepreneurs who are or are not credit rationed. This 
chapter explores whether an entrepreneur's possession of human capital may result 
in a decreased propensity of the entrepreneur being credit rationed or constrained. 
Financial institutions and enterprise agencies use information pertaining to 
entrepreneurs' experience as a way to screen applications for assistance (MacMillan 
et al. 1985; Westhead and Wright, 1999). However, within the entrepreneurship 
literature there is an absence o f research on emerging nations as to whether 
entrepreneurial experience has a bearing upon the likelihood of successfully 
accessing external finance. The evidence of previous literature reviews on the state 
of habitual entrepreneur (Ucbasaran et al., 2008) studies shows that the vast majority 
of attention has focused upon North America and Europe. Consequently there is a 
need to better understand entrepreneurship in emerging nations such as Ghana. The 
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chapter explores this emerging debate and seeks to make several conceptual and 
empirical contributions utilising human capital theory. 
Consistently, studies have identified access to credit as one major constraint 
to small business expansion, growth and development in both developed and 
developing countries (Steel and Webster, 1992; Levy, 1993; Pissarides, 1999; Okoh 
and Ping, 2000; European Commission, 2002; van Eeden et al., 2003; European 
Commission, 2003; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Rand, 2007). Aryeetey and 
Fenny (2006) identified access to finance by small businesses as the dominant 
constraint to their business expansion, with businesses citing inadequacy o f credit 
for working capital and for the purchase of raw material and equipment. Aryeetey et 
al. (1994) observed that 42% of micro-size businesses, 38% of small- size businesses 
and 25% of medium-size businesses listed among their major constraints access to 
credit for working capital. 
Other studies have also revealed that whereas large businesses are able to 
obtain 48% of their financing needs from external sources, small businesses obtain 
only 30% of their financing from external sources (World Bank, 2004b). Generally, 
banks are reluctant in providing finance to small business entrepreneurs because 
they perceive them as having a high risk profile and are therefore unsuitable for 
investment (UNCTAD, 1999; Abereijo and Fayomi, 2005). These perceived high 
risks of small businesses arises from the fact that loans to small businesses are small 
in size, have high transaction costs associated with them, and have limited market 
power (Tagoe et al., 2005). Also, these perceived high risks are also seen in small 
businesses' lack o f managerial skills, a high share of intangible assets, the absence 
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of adequate accounting track records, unreliable financial data and insufficient assets 
to pledge as collateral (Santos, 2003). 
In considering small businesses as high risk ventures, banks tend to charge 
them higher interest rates compared to large businesses (Pissarides, 1999). These 
increased interest rate charges are due to the small businesses' inability to provide 
adequate collateral to support their loan applications, a poor credit history, together 
with uncertainty about an entrepreneur's ability and repayment capacity (Abereijo 
and Fayomi, 2005; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). In addition, small businesses 
have a high rate o f bankruptcy and depend solely on the entrepreneur for their 
survival. Consequently, the banks have been reluctant to lend to these businesses. In 
contrast, larger and well established businesses with adequate assets for collateral, 
an available market and demonstratable profitability and more reliable business 
information have easy access to bank credit at a relatively lower interest rate 
(Wagenvoort, 2003). 
In the case of start-ups and innovative entrepreneurs the access to credit 
constraint situation is even worse as banks are uncertain about the future prospects 
of these businesses (OECD, 2004). About a decade ago in Ghana, nearly one half of 
all small and medium size enterprise loan applications are likely to have been 
rejected and about 60% o f all micro-enterprise loan applications are likely to be 
rejected (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998). Bigsten et al. (2000) have argued that about 
90% of small businesses' loan applications to formal financial institutions were 
rejected on the grounds o f their inability to provide collateral security. As a result, 
most small businesses are reluctant to seek external finance from the formal 
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institutions, combined with a perception that their request might be turned down. 
They rather prefer sourcing external finance from informal sources such as the 
businesses' retained earnings, personal savings, friends and relations, suppliers' 
credit, customer advances, moneylenders, and 'susu' i.e. operators o f local banks 
(Aryeetey et al., 1994; Okoh and Ping, 2000). 
Although access to finance does not automatically solve all the problems 
confronting small businesses, it is an essential factor in ensuring their access to all 
other ingredients including raw materials, the latest technology, and potential 
markets. Levy (1993), Pissarides (1999) and Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) have 
all argued that the limited access to small business finance is an important issue in 
their growth and development. The chapter is structured as follows. Section two 
presents the empirical findings and section three concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Empirical findings 
7.2.1 Descriptive statistics results 
The focus of this chapter is upon the human resource capital and the 
entrepreneurs' experience using logit regression techniques. However, before the 
regression results are analysed it is beneficial to gain a clear understanding of the 
extent of credit rationing for all of the entrepreneurs and against the three types of 
entrepreneurial founders, and these results are presented in Table 7.1a. The extent of 
unconstrained entrepreneurs, credit rationed entrepreneurs, constrained 
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entrepreneurs and discouraged entrepreneurs are reported for three time periods: 2-3 
years ago, 1-2 years ago, and then last year respectively. 
7.5.1.1 Unconstrained entrepreneurs 
In Table 7.1a the unconstrained entrepreneurs are those entrepreneurs who 
had no need to apply for credit and those who applied and received the fu l l amount. 
In the three year period, 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and last year, the results show 
all the entrepreneurs who had no need to apply for credit as: 22.4%, 21.8% and 
26.0% respectively. Similarly, over the same three year period the percentage of 
entrepreneurs who received their ful l amount of requested credit has declined from 
22.8% to 12.3% to 9.0%, where these refer to the three time periods from the oldest 
time period examined to the most recent. 
In Table 7.1a the results show entrepreneurs with no need for bank credit, 
and hence no credit applications as: novice entrepreneurs 16.4%, 15.8% and 20.1%; 
serial entrepreneurs 44.3%, 42.6% and 47.5%; and portfolio entrepreneurs 25.6%, 
25.6% and 29.2% for the three year period, 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and last 
year respectively. Also, entrepreneurs who received the ful l amount for their credit 
request recorded novice entrepreneurs as 19.5%, 9.1% and 4.7%; serial 
entrepreneurs as 29.5%, 19.7% and 18.0% and for portfolio entrepreneurs as 27.0%, 
16.1% and 14.6% for the three year period, 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and last 
year, respectively. 
Similarly in Table 7.1b, the unconstrained novice entrepreneurs who had no 
need to apply for credit recorded 16.4%, 15.8% and 20.1% for the three year period, 
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2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and last year, respectively. Also, those novice 
entrepreneurs who received ful l amount recorded 19.5%, 9.1% and 4.7% for the 
three year period, 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and last year, respectively. On the 
other hand, habitual entrepreneurs who had no need to apply in the three year period 
recorded 31.3% for 2-3 years ago, 30.8% for 1-2 years ago and 34.9% for last year. 
Also, habitual entrepreneurs who had fu l l amount o f credit recorded 27.8%, 17.2% 
and 15.7% for the three year period, 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and last year 
respectively. 
7.2.1.2 Credit rationed and constrained entrepreneurs 
In Table 7.1a, the percentage for all entrepreneurs who received a reduced 
amount of credit than they applied for (credit rationed) was 28.8% in the period 2-3 
years ago, 35.5% in the period 1-2 years ago, and 20.0% in the last year. Whilst the 
percentage for all the entrepreneurs whose applications were rejected and no 
external credit was received (credit constrained) rose substantially from 4.8% in 2-3 
years ago to 15.3% 1-2 years ago and again increased to 19.6% in the last year. 
Similarly in Table 7.1a, entrepreneurs who experienced a reduced amount 
were credit rationed recorded for: novice entrepreneurs 30.5%, 38.3% and 18.8%; 
for serial entrepreneurs 16.4%, 19.7% and 13.1%; and for portfolio entrepreneurs 
30.7%, 36.5% and 25.6% for the three year period, 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and 
last year respectively. 
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Also, entrepreneurs who had their application rejected recorded novice 
entrepreneurs as 5.4%, 17.5% and 22.8%; serial entrepreneurs as 3.3%, 8.2% and 
9.8% and for portfolio entrepreneurs as 4.4%, 13.9% and 16.8% for the three year 
period, 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and last year, respectively. 
On the other hand, in Table 7.1b, the novice entrepreneur's results are same 
as in Table 7.1a. For habitual entrepreneurs who had received a reduced amount in 
the three year period recorded 26.3% for 2-3 years ago, 31.3% for 1-2 years ago and 
21.7% for last year. Also, habitual entrepreneurs who were rejected credit recorded 
4.0%, 12.1% and 14.7% for the three year period, 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and 
last year, respectively. 
7.2.1.3 Discouraged entrepreneurs 
The credit rationing literature talks of those entrepreneurs who are 
discouraged from applying for external credit because for a variety of reasons they 
perceive that their applications would be turned down. The survey allowed the 
identification of those businesses who were discouraged from applying and were in 
the entrepreneurs' opinions credible contenders for credit, and were thus not 'bad 
businesses'. In Table 7. la, covering the three year period, 21.2%, 15.1% and 25.4% 
of all the entrepreneurs were discouraged from applying for credit over the three 
year period representing 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and last year respectively. 
Regarding discouraged entrepreneurs, the results show that: for novice 
entrepreneurs 28.2%, 19.5% and 33.6%; for serial entrepreneurs 6.6%, 9.8% and 
11.5%; and for portfolio entrepreneurs 12.4%, 8.0% and 13.9% for the three year 
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period, 2-3 years ago, 1 -2 years ago and last year, respectively. On the other hand, 
habitual entrepreneurs who were discouraged from applying for credit in the three 
year period recorded 10.6% for 2-3 years ago, 8.6% for 1-2 years ago and 13.1% for 
last year. 
Entrepreneurs applying for bank credit are required by the banks to provide 
detailed and reliable business information and also to pledge collateral to secure the 
credit application (Malhotra et al., 2006; Inderst and Muller, 2007), hence their 
inability to apply for credit. Reasons cited by discouraged entrepreneurs include: the 
cumbersome nature of credit applications and the delays in processing credit 
applications (Webster 1991; Levy, 1993; Aryeetey et al 1994). Secondly, 
entrepreneurs who did not apply also cited the high interest rate and increasing 
collateral requirement as reasons for not applying (Blanchflower et al., 1998; Atieno, 
1999; Bigsten et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2006). 
Taken together the results in Table 7.1a and Table 7.1b show that credit 
rationing was 54.8% in the last 2-3 years, and this increased to 65.9% in the period 
1-2 years ago, and then remaining at roughly two thirds, or more precisely 65.0% in 
the period covering the last year. In Table 7.1a the extent of credit rationing within 
the five categories are presented for novice, serial and portfolio entrepreneurs. In the 
period 2-3 years ago 64.1% of novice entrepreneurs were credit rationed compared 
to 26.2% of serial entrepreneurs and 47.4% of portfolio entrepreneurs. In the period 
1-2 years ago 75.2% of novice entrepreneurs were credit rationed compared to 
37.7% of serial entrepreneurs and 58.4% of portfolio entrepreneurs. In the period of 
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last year 75.2% of novice entrepreneurs were credit rationed compared to 34.4% of 
serial entrepreneurs and 56.2% of portfolio entrepreneurs. 
In Table 7.1b, the extent of credit rationing within the five categories are 
presented for novice entrepreneurs and habitual (serial and portfolio) entrepreneurs. 
In the period 2-3 years ago 64.1% of novice entrepreneurs were credit rationed 
compared to 40.9% of habitual entrepreneurs. In the period 1-2 years ago 75.2% of 
novice entrepreneurs were credit rationed compared to 52.0% of habitual 
entrepreneurs. In the period of last year 75.2% of novice entrepreneurs were credit 
rationed compared to 49.5% of habitual entrepreneurs. Interestingly, in all three time 
periods the serial entrepreneurs were less likely to be credit constrained compared to 
the portfolio entrepreneurs, by a margin of approximately 20%. 
The consistent decline in percentage terms of the full amount received, the 
reduced amount received and the increase in credit rejections over the three previous 
years are the results of an increase in adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
banks in Ghana are encountering. The liberalisation of the formal financial sector in 
Ghana in the last 15 years has resulted in the banking industry having 15 new 
entrants and making the environment a vibrant and competitive one. Most banks 
have now acquired a universal banking status and are competing for the small 
businesses that are in the majority for bank financing. The growing use of credit 
scoring techniques by banks and the statutory requirement by the Central bank for 
all credits to customers to be collateralised is a major factor in explaining the above 
results. 
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Another possible factor is the inability of small businesses to provide the 
required business information - business plans, audited financial statements, credit 
history and proven track records (Berger and Udell, 1998) and to pledge collateral 
(Zeller, 1994; Bigsten et al., 2000). According to the entrepreneurs interviewed, 
credit applications were to be accompanied with detailed and reliable business 
information and the provision of physical structures as collateral (Levy, 1993 pp. 
72). It was the view of bank managers interviewed that the pledging of physical 
structures as collateral does not only send a favourable signal about the borrower's 
quality, but also helps to resolve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985, Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987; Cowling and Mitchell, 2003). The absence of collateral to secure a 
credit facility will lead to an outright rejection of a credit application or a reduced 
amount (Malhotra et al., 2006; Inderst and Muller, 2007). 
7.2.2 Regression results 
Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, show the regression results for the models of credit 
rationing in the last year, the past 1-2 years ago, and 2-3 years ago, respectively. In 
each of the Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 there are five sets of regression results presented. 
Model 1 shows the results of credit rationing against the control variables of sector, 
location, size and the age of the business. 
Model 2 augments the control variables with characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs and their businesses. The characteristics of the entrepreneurs were 
gender, education, age of the entrepreneur, and whether they had a relative who had 
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been in business before, where the later variable is attempting to capture whether the 
entrepreneur had a family role model of running a business. 
Other characteristics of the business introduced include: whether the business 
exported goods or services, whether the business had introduced a product 
innovation, and also whether the business had brought into practice a process 
innovation. Model 3 shows the regression results of adding the years of experience 
to the variables included in Model 2. Then, models 4 and 5 augment model 2 and 
show the results of combining whether the entrepreneur was a habitual entrepreneur, 
and then a portfolio and serial entrepreneur, against novice entrepreneurs. The 
results in Table 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 refer to the broadest definition of entrepreneurs 
unable to access finance. 
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7.2.2.1 Habitual entrepreneurship 
The results presented in Model 4 in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, show that the 
habitual entrepreneurship variable appeared with a negatively signed coefficient 
and were all statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, those entrepreneurs 
who were habitual entrepreneurs were less likely than the novice entrepreneurs to 
be credit rationed and that applied in all three time periods. These results are 
consistent with hypothesis H 6 . 
Habitual entrepreneur with prior business ownership experience gained 
through previous business set-ups, mistakes and challenges have gained 
considerable knowledge in opportunity identification and exploitation compared 
to the novice entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran et al., 2008). Through learning from 
feedbacks and repeated transactions, habitual entrepreneurs have managed to 
build durable relationships and good reputations with lending institutions and 
therefore have a greater advantage in terms of the requirements of financial 
institutions compared with the novice entrepreneur (Binks and Ennew, 1997; 
Gimeno et al., 1997). 
Secondly, habitual entrepreneur with prior ownership experience are 
more likely to provide their banks with relevant business information and 
collateral security (Ferrary, 2003; Green, 2003) than inexperienced 
entrepreneurs. Also through repeated transactions, habitual entrepreneurs are 
more likely to demonstrate consistency and integrity making them more 
favourable in accessing credit compared to the inexperienced entrepreneur who 
lacks the required track record to demonstrate capacity to perform (Williamson, 
1981). Habitual entrepreneurs in possession of higher credit worthiness put them 
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in a better light in comparison to the novice entrepreneurs (Dei Ottati, 1994; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994). This result is consistent with hypothesis H 6 . 
7.2.2.2 Serial and portfolio entrepreneurship 
Next, the results in Model 5 in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, examined whether 
a more detailed breakdown of the nature of the habitual entrepreneurs compared 
to novice entrepreneurs has any relationship with credit rationing. Serial 
entrepreneurs were less likely to be credit rationed than the novice entrepreneurs 
in the last year, the period 1-2 years ago, and the period 2-3 years ago, and the 
results were statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases. This result is 
consistent with hypothesis H7. A similar pattern emerges for portfolio 
entrepreneurs compared to novice entrepreneurs. The Portfolio entrepreneur 
variables were statistically significant at the 1% level in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 and at 
the 5% level in Table 7.4. The findings suggest that portfolio entrepreneurs were 
less likely to be credit rationed compared with novice entrepreneurs. This result 
is consistent with hypothesis Hg. 
On average serial and portfolio entrepreneurs are more entrepreneurial 
than novice entrepreneurs (Westhead et al., 2004). They are therefore more likely 
to set-up new ventures, exploit opportunities and have greater access to resources 
through their experience compared to novice entrepreneurs (Westhead et al., 
2005a). Serial and portfolio entrepreneurs through prior ownership experience 
are able to generate a much easier access to relevant information, build and 
develop business contacts and network connections with other business 
associated compared with the novice entrepreneur (Coleman, 1988; Adler and 
Kwon, 2002). 
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7.2.2.3 Education 
The models show that those entrepreneurs who possessed a degree were 
less likely than those without degrees to be credit rationed in all three time 
periods, and these results were statistically significant at the 5% level or better. 
'Education is a key constituent of the human capital needed for business success' 
(Storey, 1994 pp.129). It is argued that education provides the basis for the 
acquisition of the required skills for business development and success. In the 
models 2 to 5 for all the three time periods, it is evidently clear that greater 
human capital translates into a greater likelihood of obtaining credit. This result 
is consistent with hypothesis H9. 
7.2.2.4 Innovation 
The results show that the process innovation variable appeared with a 
positively signed coefficient in all the time periods which were investigated, but 
it was only in Models 2-5 in the period 1-2 years ago that the process innovation 
variable was statistically significant at the 5% level. This result is consistent with 
hypothesis Hn . One of the reasons cited by the process innovators in the study 
for their limited access to credit was their inability to provide collateral security 
to support their credit application (Freel, 2000). Banks therefore perceived these 
innovators as high risk businesses because they have poor collateral value and in 
the event of a commercial failure innovation has little salvage value (Baldwin et 
al., 2002; OECD, 2004). The cycle of innovation is complex. It may begin with 
an idea of a product, then a prototype development and testing. It then goes 
through the initial production, additional refinement and market testing and 
finally product sales. 
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The credit managers interviewed, cited reasons such as their inability to 
predetermine the future cash flows of these projects (Seaton and Walker, 1997). 
Financing this complex, risky and uncertain project implies making a lending 
decision under conditions of uncertainty. This is obviously an unattractive 
investment to many financiers; hence the credit rationing (Westhead and Storey, 
1997; Freel, 1999). Secondly, the bank managers also cited the perceived high 
risk associated with process innovation due to the high probability of failure 
(Jensen and McGuckin, 1997). 
Thirdly, bank managers see the lack of transparency and the technical and 
managerial competencies of the entrepreneurs in the innovative process as a 
disincentive to invest in (Hewitt-Dundas, 2006). Fourthly, the high costs of 
conducting due diligence and also the monitoring of investments are often cited 
for the lack of interest in financing process innovation (Boocock and Woods, 
1997). Fifthly, the inability of banks to determine the cash flows projections of 
the project are the results of a lack of adequate information from the entrepreneur 
to the banks leading to information asymmetry problems, hence the rationing of 
credit to small business entrepreneurs engaged in process innovation (Binks and 
Ennew, 1996). 
On the other hand, regarding product innovation the coefficients were not 
statistically significant in all the three year periods. The results show positive 
coefficients in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 and a negative coefficient in Tables 7.4. This 
results suggested that entrepreneurs who introduced product innovation were 
more likely to be credit rationed in the last year and last 1-2 years ago supporting 
the hypothesis H12. Credit Managers interviewed cited a number of reasons for 
their reluctance in financing small business innovation. One of these reasons is 
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the indivisibility of research cost and adequate knowledge base of the innovative 
product by the entrepreneurs (Bond et al., 2003). 
Secondly, the location of small businesses to the source of finance can 
also influence access to innovation finance. The further away the small business 
is from the bank, the higher the transaction costs resulting from screening and 
monitoring activities (Mason and Harrison, 2002; Martin et al., 2002). Thirdly, 
this geographical location may also influence access to high quality staff 
including managerial and technical skills (Sunley et al., 2005). Fourthly, as a 
result of the above challenges, the problem of information asymmetry is higher 
with small business entrepreneurs engaged in product innovation due to the lack 
of track record, capacities and lack of collateral leading to high default rates 
(Christensen, 2007). Lastly, the general problem of competence mis-match 
between entrepreneurs and bank officials also affect innovation financing for 
small businesses. Whilst entrepreneurs tend to focus more on the technical 
possibility of their project than the financial management, bank officials on the 
other hand focus more on the financial possibilities than gaining technical 
understanding of the innovative project. 
From the results in Table 7.4, representing the period 2-3 years, 
entrepreneurs who introduced product innovation were less likely to be credit 
rationed. Small businesses engaged in product innovation were less likely to be 
credit rationed i f they are able to overcome the challenges stated above. 
7.2.2.5 Exporting 
In all the three year period last year, 1-2 years ago and 2-3 years ago 
exporters were more likely than non-exporters to be credit rationed and this 
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relationship was only statistically significant at the 5% level as shown in Table 
7.4. This result is consistent with hypothesis H13. However, the results of the last 
year and the period 1 -2 years ago, although showing positive correlation, are not 
statistically significant. 
7.2.2.6 Sector 
Model 1 is the base set of control variables against credit rationing. The 
control variables in Model 1 to Model 5 in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that 
manufacturing businesses were less likely than agricultural businesses to be 
credit rationed and this relationship was weakly statistically significant in the last 
year (Table 7.2), highly statistically significant in the period 1-2 years ago (Table 
7.3), but not statistically significant in the period 2-3 years ago (Table 7.4). 
Wolf (2004) observed that 62% and 52% of her sampled firms in both the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors, respectively, indicated that access to 
credit and the high interest rates, respectively, were the major obstacles to their 
growth and development. She also indicated that the difficulty in accessing credit 
was mainly due to the lack of collateral (land title registration delays). The 
agricultural sector in particular was perceived to be a high risk sector and thus 
most banks and other financial institutions are unwilling to finance any project 
within the sector, even though its contribution to the national economy is 
significant (Aryeetey and Fenny, 2006). 
The risk of lending to the agricultural sector is exacerbated by the 
inability of entrepreneurs in the sector to offer any appreciable collateral to 
support their credit application. In situations of loan default or bankruptcy, the 
unrecovered loan becomes a bad debt to the bank (Turvey and Weersink, 1997). 
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In a lending relationship, where the borrower's equity position in the investment 
is not affected by the bank's profit margin, the likelihood of credit rationing is 
inevitable (Smith, 1972; Baltsenberger, 1976). Banks are only likely to offer 
credit i f the entrepreneur is willing to compensate for the risk associated with the 
lending by either paying a higher interest rate or by offering increased collateral. 
7.2.2.7 Size and Age of business 
The regression results in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 showed that the size 
variable was statistically significant with a negatively signed coefficient in all the 
three time periods, the last year, 1-2 years ago and 2-3 years ago. Regarding the 
age of business variable, the results show a positively signed coefficient and 
statistically significant in all the three time periods, the last year, 1-2 years ago 
and 2-3 years ago. The results suggest that the larger the business, and also the 
older the business the less likely that the businesses were credit rationed and 
these were statistically significant at the 5% level or better over all three time 
periods. The greater the size of the businesses the greater the amount of resources 
and experience which they will have accumulated and this could make the 
lenders look more favourably upon those businesses. Abor and Biekpe (2006a) 
have argued that the age of a business is a determining factor in small business 
access to bank credit. Hall et al. (2004) asserted that age is positively related to 
long-term debt but negatively related to short-term debt. The result that it is the 
older businesses which are more likely to be credit rationed than the younger 
aged businesses is interesting and this could be explained by the older businesses 
being perceived as 'stagnant' and lacking the vitality and enthusiasm possessed 
by younger aged workers, but this remains a conjecture. 
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7.2.2.8 Location 
The regression results in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 showed that the 
conurbation variable appeared with a negatively signed coefficient in the last 
year and 2-3 years ago, but was only statistically significant in the last year's 
time period. The results however for the small town variable were different. It 
showed that for all time periods, the small town variable was statistically 
significant wi th a positively signed coefficient in all the models 1-5. These 
results suggest that entrepreneurs located in conurbations were less likely than 
those located in large towns to be credit rationed. Similarly, entrepreneurs 
located in small towns were more likely to be credit constrained than 
entrepreneurs located in large towns. Various studies have showed that for 
reasons o f high cost transaction and perceived risks (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; 
Felsenstein and Fleischer, 2002), information asymmetry (Agarwal and 
Hauswald, 2006) entrepreneurs located further away f rom their banks are more 
likely to be credit rationed (DeYoung et al., 2008b). 
7.2.2.9 Gender 
The survey consisted o f 78% male entrepreneurs and 22% female 
entrepreneurs. One major challenge entrepreneurs' face in running their business 
is their ability to access the needed finance for their business (Marlow and 
Patton, 2005). Blanchflower et al., (2003) noted that gender discrimination in the 
credit market w i l l exist i f loan approval rates or interest rates charged differ 
amongst persons with homogeneous characteristics regarding their ability to 
repay. In all o f the models men were less likely than women to be credit 
rationed, but this was only statistically significant in Models 2 to 5 of Table 7.4 
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in the period 2-3 years ago. Evidence has shown that female entrepreneur do 
experience additional disadvantage than their male counterparts in accessing 
finance (Steel and Webster, 1992; Zeller, 1994; van Straveren, 2001). A number 
of reasons can be ascribed for this phenomenon. 
Firstly, it is argued that at the micro-level income generation is different, 
with men having higher levels o f education and occupying higher positions in 
formal employment and thus can earn more income than the women who are 
mainly engaged in informal employment activities or occupy lower positions in 
the formal sector (Steel and Webster, 1992; van Straveren, 2001). Secondly, 
female entrepreneurs often lack the required collateral to secure a bank credit 
because in most cases, their property is registered in the name of the male partner 
(van Straveren, 2001), and therefore are unable to apply for credit (Zeller, 1994). 
Thus the female entrepreneur's access to finance f rom formal institutions is 
disadvantaged because they are unable to meet the terms and conditions for these 
facilities van Straveren, 2001). 
Thirdly, female entrepreneurs are most often restricted in their control 
and access to family lands and property (Deere and Leon, 2001), and capital 
(Fletschner, 2006). Again female entrepreneurs have greater challenges 
developing relevant experiences in view of their household roles and social 
norms (Kevane, 2004; Fletschner and Carter, 2008), have access to social 
contacts and resources (Cooper et al., 1994) These challenges constrain female 
entrepreneurs in their access to credit and other resources thus affecting their 
output and efficiency compared to their male counterparts (Fletschner, 2008). 
Fourthly, Abor (2006) using data f rom a sample o f Ghanaian non-
traditional exports to determine differences in obtaining formal finance between 
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male and female-owned firms found that women are disadvantaged as a result o f 
an adverse discrimination in the lending process. Abor (2006) noted that women 
are either discouraged or unfairly denied credit during the application process 
thus l imiting their access to credit. He therefore, concluded that female 
entrepreneurs are more likely to rely on informal sources o f finance because of 
the reluctance o f formal financial institutions to lend to them. Female 
entrepreneurs are therefore more likely to be credit rationed compared with male 
entrepreneurs. 
7.2.2.10 Numbers of years of experience 
Model 3 in each o f Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 shows that in all three time 
periods the larger the number o f years o f experience then the less likely that the 
entrepreneurs were credit rationed, and these results were statistically significant 
at the 5% level or better. The results are therefore consistent with Hypothesis 3a. 
A number o f studies have shown that entrepreneurs with prior ownership 
experience are more likely to perform better than inexperienced entrepreneurs 
(Westhead, 1995; Storey, 1998; Baron and Ensley, 2006; Ucbasaran et al., 2006). 
The entrepreneur experience enhances access to and use o f relevant business 
information (Lord and Maher, 1990). 
The greater the number o f years o f experience the more mature the 
entrepreneurs may become in a business environment and on a trial-and-error 
basis the entrepreneurs may have improved their professionalism. This can be 
translated into financial institutions being more wi l l ing to lend to entrepreneurs 
with more experience than the fresh or new entrepreneurs without any experience 
of owning and running a business. Experienced entrepreneurs may therefore have 
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an improved access to bank credit compared to the inexperienced novice 
entrepreneur (Wright et al., 1997a, b). 
7.2.3 Differences in definitions of access to finance 
In order to gain a greater understanding o f access to finance and the 
sensitivity o f the results to different definitions o f credit rationing the models 
reported in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 was re-run. More specifically, in Tables 7.5, 
7.6 and 7.7 the results are reported for logit regression models o f those 
businesses which applied for finance and received no external finance in the 
periods the last year, 1 -2 years ago, and 2-3 years ago respectively. In each table 
in order to save space and for greater ease o f interpretation the coefficients are 
only reported for: habitual, followed by serial and portfolio entrepreneurs, and 
then for years in business. The models adopt the same independent variables 
which were reported in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. 
In Tables 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7 the habitual entrepreneur variable is statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better which is in support o f hypothesis H6. Whilst 
when the models were re-run with serial and portfolio dummy variables included 
instead o f habitual entrepreneurs the results are highly supportive o f hypotheses 
H7 and Hg with the coefficients all statistically significant at the 1% level with the 
exception o f serial entrepreneurs in Table 7.5. Then, the measure o f 
entrepreneurship was captured by the number o f years in business. This variable 
was weakly statistically significant at the 10% level in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 and 
was not statistically significant in Table 7.5. Thus, the evidence is only weakly in 
support o f hypothesis Hio- The coefficients for degree, product and process 
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innovation and exporting followed the same patterns o f statistical significance 
which were reported in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. 
Finally, the regression results were re-run to look at those businesses 
which had applied for finance and which had received a reduced amount o f 
external finance. These regression results are reported in Tables 7.8, 7.9 and 
7.10, respectively. The same methodology which was applied to produce 7.5, 7.6 
and 7.7 is adopted in producing the regression results. 
Habitual entrepreneurship was statistically significant at the 1% level in 
Tables 7.9 and 7.10 but was not statistically significant in Table 7.8. Thus, the 
results are generally in support o f hypothesis H 6 . The model was then re-run with 
our two entrepreneurship dummies - serial and portfolio - included, and with 
novice entrepreneurs being the comparison category. The serial and portfolio 
dummy variables were statistically significant at the 1% level in the periods 1-2 
years ago and 2-3 years ago but were not statistically significant in the most 
recent time period o f the last year. Again these results can be interpreted as 
generally in support o f hypotheses H7 and Hg. In the case o f the third measure o f 
entrepreneurship, the number o f years in business, the variable was only 
statistically significant in one model and that was the period covering 1 -2 years 
ago. Thus, there is little evidence to support hypothesis H10. Again the pattern o f 
results and the level o f significance for possession o f a degree, product and 
process innovation, and exporting for those applying for finance and receiving a 
reduced amount were similar to those reported in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 and 
accordingly are not reported in the following Tables. 
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Table 7.5 Applied for finance and received no external finance in the last year 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo Rl n % Correctly 
Classified 
Years in 
Business 
0.023 (0.038) 0.2708 241 73.86 
Habitual -0.655 (0.323) b 0.2825 241 73.44 
Serial -0.757 (0.595) 0.2826 241 73.86 
Portfolio -0.630 (0.145) a 
1 Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; Statistically significant at the 0.05 
l eve l ; 0 Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 7.6 Applied for finance and received no external finance in the period 1-2 
years ago. 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo n % Correctly 
Classified 
Years in 
Business 
-0.071 (0.041) c 0.2429 313 76.36 
Habitual -0.332 (0.028) a 0.2367 313 76.36 
Serial -0.579 (0.120) a 0.2374 313 76.04 
Portfolio -0.270 (0.051)' 
a Statistically signi leant at the 0.01 leve l ; b Statistically significant at the 0.05 
l eve l ; c Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 7.7 Applied for finance and received no external finance in the period 2-3 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo R 2 n % Correctly 
Classified 
Years in 
Business 
-0.092 (0.048) c 0.3083 273 90.84 
Habitual -0.124 (0.027) a 0.2879 273 90.84 
Serial -0.148 (0.041) a 0.2879 273 90.84 
Portfolio -0.118 (0.024) 8 
l eve l ; 0 Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 7.8 Applied for finance and received a reduced amount o f external finance 
in the last year. 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo R 2 n % Correctly 
Classified 
Years in 
Business 
-0.044 (0.033) 0.2700 241 65.56 
Habitual -0.196 (0.292) 0.2656 241 66.39 
Serial -0.569 (0.511) 0.2681 241 67.63 
Portfolio -0.096 (0.311) 
a Statistically signi ficant at the 0.01 leve l ; b Statistically significant at the 0.05 
leve l ; c Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 7.9 Applied for finance and received a reduced amount o f external 
finance in the period 1 -2 years ago. 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo R 2 n % Correctly 
Classified 
Years in 
Business 
-0.102 (0.040) b 0.2799 313 65.18 
Habitual -0.327 (0.113)" 0.2644 313 61.02 
Serial -0.640 (0.201)' 0.2660 313 61.98 
Portfolio -0.242 (0.083) a 
a Statistically signi leant at the 0.01 l eve l ; b Statistically significant at the 0.05 
leve l ; c Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 7.10 Applied for finance and received a reduced amount o f external 
finance in the period 2-3 years ago. 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo RA n % Correctly 
Classified 
Years in 
Business 
-0.013 (0.028) 0.2889 280 62.86 
Habitual -0.238 (0.043)" 0.2903 280 63.57 
Serial -0.759 (0.181) a 0.2951 280 62.86 
Portfolio -0.893 (0.211) a 
a Statistically signi icant at the 0.01 level;" Statistically significant at the 0.05 
leve l ; c Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
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7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at credit rationing in Ghana f rom a survey 
covering a period o f time up to three years prior to the time o f the survey with 
hypotheses related to the experience and level o f human capital of the 
entrepreneur. It is important to understand credit rationing because credit 
rationing can hinder the expansion and development o f businesses and in the 
context o f an emerging nation such as Ghana which needs to advance to alleviate 
poverty and create jobs that could be hindered by credit rationing. Moreover, a 
greater awareness of credit rationing can allow both businesses and policy 
makers alike to contemplate how their behaviours and actions can be reviewed to 
help reduce the extent o f credit rationing. 
The findings o f the study indicated that habitual entrepreneurs with prior 
knowledge o f business ownership were less likely compared with novice 
entrepreneurs to be credit rationed. Similarly, both serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs were less likely to be credit rationed compared with novice 
entrepreneurs (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Westhead et al., 2005). These results are 
consistent wi th hypotheses He, H 7 and H 8 . The findings o f the study also 
supported hypothesis H 9 where entrepreneurs with higher levels o f education 
were found to be less likely to be credit rationed. Entrepreneurs with prior 
business ownership experience were found to be less likely to be credit rationed 
thus supporting hypothesis H10. Similarly, H n , H12 and H13 were supported by 
the finding that entrepreneurs engaged in process and product innovation and not 
exporting were more likely to be credit rationed compared with entrepreneurs not 
involved in product innovation and exporting. 
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In addition to the above findings, the rerunning o f the logit regression 
models for entrepreneurs who applied for finance and received no external 
finance and those who received a reduced amount over the three year period 
suggested results in support o f some hypotheses. Regarding entrepreneurs who 
applied for finance and received no external finance, the results suggested that 
habitual, serial and portfolio entrepreneurs were less likely to be credit 
constrained compared to novice entrepreneurs. These results are consistent with 
hypotheses H6 , H7 and Hs respectively. Similarly, regarding entrepreneurs who 
applied for finance and received a reduced amount o f external finance, the results 
also suggested that habitual, serial and portfolio entrepreneurs were less likely to 
be credit rationed compared with novice entrepreneurs. These results are also 
consistent with hypotheses H6, H7 and Hs respectively. 
Furthermore, the results also suggested that entrepreneurs engaged in the 
manufacturing sector were less likely to be credit rationed compared with 
entrepreneurs in the agricultural sector. The results also suggested that 
entrepreneurs located in conurbations were less likely to be credit rationed 
compared to entrepreneurs in large towns. Similarly entrepreneurs located in 
small towns were more likely to be credit rationed compared to entrepreneurs 
located in large towns. Male entrepreneurs were less likely than female 
entrepreneurs to be credit rationed but this was only statistically significant in the 
models which covered the period 2-3 years ago. Entrepreneurs wi th prior 
ownership experience and higher levels of human capital were less likely to be 
credit rationed compared with inexperienced entrepreneurs (Rondstadt, 1988). 
The findings in this chapter have identified various factors as influencing 
the entrepreneur's access to external finance. The next chapter which is a 
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continuation o f this chapter examines the influence o f distance as one o f those 
factors influencing entrepreneur's access to external finance. 
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Chapter 8 
Entrepreneur-Bank Distance and Geographical Credit Rationing 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has examined the credit rationing o f novice, serial 
and portfolio entrepreneurs. The findings suggested that novice entrepreneurs 
were more likely to be credit rationed compared with serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs. One o f the factors identified as a contributing factor in the 
determination o f an entrepreneur being credit rationed was the location o f the 
individual entrepreneur in relation to the source o f external finance. This chapter 
therefore examines the relevance o f geographical distance between the 
entrepreneur and the lending banks and the entrepreneur's access to external 
finance and geographical credit rationing. This chapter is therefore a continuation 
of the previous chapter. However, the fol lowing observations need to be made: 
that in the chapter eight models, the years o f experience, the serial entrepreneur 
and the portfolio entrepreneur dummy variables were not statistically significant. 
Hence, they are not reported, rather the habitual entrepreneur variables are 
reported. Besides, as the chapter investigates the geographical credit rationing o f 
small business entrepreneurs, the distance variables were rather introduced and 
reported. 
During the last two decades several studies have shown a substantial 
increase in the geographical distance between banks and their borrowers (Cyrnak 
and Hannan, 2001; Wolken and Rohde, 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 2002; 
Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; DeYoung et al., 2008b). Structural changes in the 
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banking industry have also resulted in technological progress and have in many 
ways contributed to the widening o f the geographical distance (Petersen and 
Ragan, 2002; Hauswald and Marquez, 2003; DeYoung et al., 2004; Degryse and 
Ongena, 2004; Berger and De Young, 2006; Cerqueiro et al., 2007). Additionally, 
bank consolidations (Berger et al., 1999) and improvements in communication 
technology (DeYoung et al., 2008b) have also enhanced the geographical 
distance. 
These increases in geographical distance between entrepreneurs and their 
banks have largely occurred in the advanced economies such as the United States 
of America (Petersen and Rajan 2002), Italy (Alessandrini et al., 2006), and the 
Netherlands (Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Credit appraisals are done by applying 
credit scoring models and 'hard' quantitative information to process loan 
applications including those o f small businesses (Malhotra and Malhotra, 2003; 
Hseieh, 2005; Berger and Frame, 2007). In spite o f the increase in geographical 
distance, the improvements in communication technology and the deregulation o f 
the banking industry have impacted greatly on the acquisition o f business 
information and its influence on commercial lending decisions o f banks (loan 
pricing and credit availability) (DeYoung et al., 2004). 
However, in most developing countries, specifically in Ghana, for 
example, banks are rather increasing their branches and this is occurring mostly 
in conurbations and large towns (Acquah, 2008). However, the increases in bank 
branches are not being experienced in small towns. Secondly, almost all banks in 
Ghana have centralised their credit approval beyond the mandate o f the branch 
managers. This situation has resulted in an increase in the functional distances 
between the entrepreneurs located in small towns and their banks' credit 
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approval centres located in the capital city (conurbation); thus, adversely 
affecting the availability o f credit (Alessandrini et al., 2006). Small business 
lending is often characterised by information asymmetry problems, hence most 
lending banks adopt the process o f building a bank-entrepreneur lending 
relationship which is more effective by proximity (Meyer 1998; Stein 2002; 
Scott 2004; Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004). 
The risk level o f a business can be seen in the size, age, management, 
market, entrepreneurial experience, access to credit, and availability o f collateral 
to secure credit and the location o f the business or the entrepreneur (Binks et al., 
1992; Mason and Harrison, 1993; Felsenstein and Fleischer 2002). Banks are 
reluctant in extending credit to small businesses because they are unable to 
provide adequate information about their businesses (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), 
have no proven track record o f past performance due to poor education (Okurut 
et al., 2005; Tagoe et al., 2005), operate under very high risk conditions, have a 
high probability o f default (Binks et al. 1992), combined wi th high transaction 
costs, the unavailability o f collateral to access credit, and uncertain markets 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; H o f f and Stiglitz, 1993; Felsenstein and 
Fleischer, 2002). Banks are also reluctant in lending to small businesses because 
they encounter challenges in screening, monitoring and ensuring enforcement o f 
the contract (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Petrick, 2005). 
Further exacerbating this situation is the peripheral or remote location o f 
the small business (Binks et al 1992; Mason and Harrison, 1993). In fact, the 
problem of asymmetric information is increased where the small business is 
peripherally located (Mason and Harrison, 1993; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; 
Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006). The result of this situation is an asymmetric f low 
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of information in which entrepreneurs possesses more knowledge about their 
ability to repay the loan than the banks possess (Aleem, 1990). To mitigate the 
information asymmetry problems banks w i l l attempt to minimize the level of risk 
by requesting for collateral or a guarantor which in most cases the small business 
entrepreneur lacks (Elsas and Krahnen, 2002; Manove et al., 2001; Cowling and 
Mitchell , 2003; Inderst and Muller, 2007) or reject the application outright or 
ration the credit o f the small business entrepreneur (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Malhotra et al., 2006). 
As a continuation of the previous chapter, the definitions of credit rationed, 
credit constraint and discouraged borrowers are similar. The chapter is organised as 
follows. Section two presents the empirical findings and section three concludes 
the chapter. 
8.2 Empirical findings 
8.2.1 Geographical distance 
Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 show the logit regression results for the models o f 
credit rationing in the last year, the past 1-2 years ago, and 2-3 years ago, 
respectively, wi th each table having four models. The location o f the 
entrepreneurs is represented by three dummy variables: conurbations, large 
towns and small towns. In the models the excluded comparison location variable 
was large towns. Then the two distance variables were introduced, in separate 
models. The distance variable consists o f a natural log on the distance between 
the business, and then one at a time: the preferred bank branch (Distance-
Preferred Bank) and the business against their closest competitive bank branch 
(Distance - Closest Bank). In each o f the tables a model is presented of the 
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original model and all o f the variables it would be logical to expect to have 
relationships wi th credit rationing. Then a best fit model is reported. 
Geographical distance can create an imperfection in the competitive 
environment o f entrepreneurs and financial institutions leading to market 
imperfections. Again, the geographical distance is able to alter the market power 
closest to the business located nearest to the bank; making banks located further 
away competitively disadvantaged (Cerqueiro et al., 2007). The result is that 
banks further away f rom these businesses may require an additional effort in 
establishing a banking relationship with these businesses. Besides, banks and 
their customers further away may have to bear additional transportation costs 
between them in any banking relationship. Moreover, banks w i l l need to make 
additional efforts to gather business information about their customers and also 
to monitor previous investments. 
The availability o f credit to entrepreneurs and their businesses tends to 
decline with an increase in geographical distance (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006). 
An increase in geographical distance between the bank and the business creates 
some imperfections in the credit market as it becomes very di f f icul t for banks to 
gather strategic business information f rom entrepreneurs and more especially 
with small and novice entrepreneurs (Petersen, 2004; Stein, 2002; Brevoort and 
Hannan, 2006). 
The chapter conjectured that the impact o f credit rationing w i l l increase 
with distance. In Table 8.1, representing the last year, a positive and a significant 
coefficient was recorded in model 4 on the natural log o f the distance between 
the closest bank and the entrepreneur. This suggests that entrepreneurs located 
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further away from their closest competitive banks are more likely to be credit 
rationed (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Felsenstein and Fleischer, 2002). 
In Table 8.2, representing the last 1-2 years ago, a similar result was 
recorded in model 8 indicating that entrepreneurs further away from their closest 
competitive bank branch are more likely to be credit rationed. However, in Table 
8.3, representing the period of the last 2-3 years, the results show positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for both distance variables for the preferred 
banks and closest competitive banks. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficients results in models 9 and 10 on the entrepreneurs' preferred bank 
branch distance variables indicates that entrepreneurs located further away from 
their preferred bank branch are more likely to be credit rationed. The distance 
variables related to the closest competitive banks in models 11 and 12 were again 
statistically significant and the results are consistent with the other two time 
periods. 
Taken together the results indicated above imply that the geographical 
distance between entrepreneurs, and their preferred and closest competitive bank 
branches are good proxies for banks to ration credit. The further away businesses 
are from their banks, the more likely that they wil l be credit rationed. This result 
is consistent with hypothesis H14. The relationship between distance and the 
preferred banks is only consistent with hypothesis 1 for the period 2-3 years ago. 
The reason for this is that there has been an increase in the number of banks and 
bank branches in Ghana. By the end of 2004, there were 17 banks operating in 
Ghana. This increased to 23 banks by the end of 2006 (BOG, 2006). Bank 
branches have also increased over the years from 295 branches in 2003 to 377 in 
2005 (Bawumia, 2007). 
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The presence of banks and their branches have increased over the three 
year period (2004-2006) accounting for a reduction in the distance between 
businesses mostly located in conurbations and large towns and their preferred 
banks. 
The results are consistent with those of Petersen and Rajan (2002) who 
found that in the United States, businesses located further away from their banks 
are more likely to be credit rationed. Similar results were found by Degryse and 
Ongena (2005); Amel and Brevoort, (2005); Brevoort and Hannan, (2006); and, 
Agarwal and Hauswald (2006). However, Carling and Lundberg, (2005) indicate 
an absence of spatial credit rationing in Sweden. Using data on corporate loans 
granted between the years 1994 and 2000, Carling and Lundberg (2005) 
empirically tested the existence of credit rationing between borrowing firms and 
their lending banks and found no evidence of geographical credit rationing. 
An increase in geographical distance between entrepreneurs and their 
banks may lead to an increase in the cost of lending as credit officers or 
relationship managers may have to pay numerous visits to the sites of their credit 
applicants to gather soft information for credit decisions and also to monitor 
investments. The quality of the soft information will be dependent on the efforts 
of the relationship managers (Ozyildirim and Onder, 2008). Spatial credit 
rationing is more likely to occur where banks cost of monitoring increases with 
distance (Porteous, 1995). The costs of these visits are increased by distance and, 
thus, banks are likely to reduce these visits leading to inefficient and less quality 
business information gathering, inaccurate credit appraisal, in turn leading to a 
decline in the quality of credit screening and the likelihood of an error in credit 
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decision making (Carling and Lundberg 2005; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; 
Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; DeYoung et al., 2008b). 
Lending decisions, therefore, become inefficient as geographical distance 
increases (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). This further leads to an increase in 
loan defaults (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006; De Young et al., 2008b). Thus, the 
further away entrepreneurs are from their banks, the higher the likelihood that the 
management credit committee of the bank will disregard soft information and 
credit appraisals of their relationship managers on peripherally located 
businesses (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006). 
8.2.2 Location 
Next attention focuses upon location and the testing of the second 
hypothesis. Interestingly, the negative and significant coefficients on the 
conurbation variables were only statistically significant for last year (Table 8.1) 
suggesting that entrepreneurs located in conurbations were less likely to be credit 
rationed than entrepreneurs located in large towns. This result is consistent with 
hypothesis H15. Entrepreneurs prefer borrowing credit from banks closest to them 
in view of the advantages of a durable lending relationship that characterises this 
borrowing (Kwast et al., 1997). One main reason for this interesting result is the 
growing number of bank branches over the period (2004 - 2006) and beyond. 
Most of the banks in Ghana have increased their bank branches, and more 
specifically with the new foreign banks entering the country. Most of the 
branches launched within the period were located in conurbations and large 
towns. The presences of these branches facilitates entrepreneurs' access to 
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banking services, developing lending relationship and make access to bank credit 
much easier (Kempson and Jones, 2000; French, 2001). 
Secondly, the positive and significant coefficients on the small town 
variables were statistically significant in all three periods suggesting that 
entrepreneurs located in small towns were more likely to be credit rationed 
compared to businesses located in large towns. This result is consistent with 
hypothesis H i 6 . The results of the location variables from the three tables 
indicated that entrepreneurs located in conurbations were less likely to be credit 
rationed compared to entrepreneurs located in small towns who are more likely 
to be credit rationed. Several reasons can be assigned for these differences. 
Firstly, entrepreneurs located in conurbations are more likely to be better 
educated, operate much larger businesses and possesses greater entrepreneurial 
experience and information than their counterparts in the small towns (Binks et 
al., 1992; De Young et al., 2008a). Secondly, access to information both hard and 
soft information, and their quality decreases with distance, hence entrepreneurs 
located in small towns are more likely to encounter problems of information 
asymmetry (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). Banks wil l therefore incur additional 
costs in gathering the soft information in view of the distance - especially where 
credit decisions are centred in the capital city, Accra (DeYoung et al., 2008b). 
The information asymmetry problems will make bank's assessment of risks 
difficult and lending decisions are likely to be less efficient (Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006; Cerqueiro et al., 2007). 
Thirdly, most entrepreneurs located in small towns lack the requisite 
collateral demanded by the banks to support their credit applications (Binks and 
Ennew, 1997; Tagoe et al., 2005), and this influences their access to finance 
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(Mason and Harrison, 1993). Fourthly, the absence or lack of competition by the 
banks in the small towns may also contribute to their high probability of being 
credit rationed (Felsenstein and Fleischer, 2002). 
8. 3 Differences in definitions of access to finance 
For a greater understanding of the influence on distance and access to 
finance and the sensitivity of the results to different definitions of credit 
rationing, a rerun of the models reported in Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 was done. The 
logit regression models for entrepreneurs who applied for finance and received 
no external finance in the periods the last year, 1 -2 years ago, and 2-3 years ago 
are reported in Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 respectively. In each table in order to save 
space and for greater ease of interpretation the coefficients are only reported for: 
entrepreneurs located in conurbation, small town and dummy variables in natural 
logs representing the distance in kilometres between entrepreneurs and their 
preferred banks ( G i l ) and between the entrepreneurs and their closest 
competitive bank (G12). The models adopted the same independent variables 
which were reported in Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. 
In Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 the conurbation variable is statistically 
significant at the 10% level which is weakly in support of hypothesis Hi5. 
Similarly in Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6, the small town variables were statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better and highly supportive of hypothesis H i 6 . The 
results suggested that entrepreneurs located in small towns were more likely to 
be credit rationed compared with entrepreneurs located in large towns and 
conurbation. The results of the dummy variables on distance between 
entrepreneurs and their preferred banks was only statistically significant at the 
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5% level in Tables 8.4 and was not statistically significant in Tables 8.5 and 8.6. 
This evidence is only weakly in support of hypothesis H | 4 . Similarly, the results 
of the dummy variables on distance between entrepreneurs and their closest 
competitive banks was statistically significant at the 10% level or better for all 
three year periods. This strongly supports hypothesis H | 4 . The coefficients for 
degree, size, sex, and exporting followed the same patterns of statistical 
significance which were reported in Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. 
Finally, the logit regression results were re-run for entrepreneurs who had 
applied for finance and had received a reduced amount of external finance were 
reported in Tables 8.7, 8.8 and 8.9 representing the three year periods: last year, 
last 1-2 years ago and last 2-3 years ago respectively. Similar methodology used 
in producing the results in Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 was adopted in producing this 
regression results. The results and suggestions are similar to those of Tables 8.4, 
8.5 and 8.6 supporting hypotheses H 1 5 and H^and also hypothesis Hu. 
Again the pattern of results and the level of significance for possession 
of a degree, degree, size, sex, and exporting followed the same patterns of 
statistical significance which were reported in Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. 
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Table 8.4 Applied 'or finance and received no external finance in the last year. 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo R1 n % Correctly 
Classified 
Conurbation -0.742 (0.490) c 0.2855 241 73.86 
Small Town 0.275 (0.047) a 
Natural G i l 0.153 (0.148)b 
Conurbation -0.747 (0.388)c 0.2959 241 75.52 
Small Town 0.280 (0.052)' 
Natural G12 0.332 (0.161) b 
level; c Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 8.5 Applied for finance and received no external finance in the 
period 1-2 years ago. 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo R 2 n % Correctly 
Classified 
Conurbation 0.917 (0.824) 0.2453 313 77.32 
Small Town 1.164 (0.499) b 
Natural G i l 0.167 (0.151) 
Conurbation 0.993 (0.827) 0.2480 313 77.64 
Small Town 0.932 (0.517)c 
Natural G12 0.306 (0.157)c 
a Statistically signi: leant at the 0.01 level; b Statistically significant at the 0.05 
level; c Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 8.6 Applied for finance and received no external finance in the 
period 2-3 years ago. 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo R 2 n % Correctly 
Classified 
Conurbation -1.096 (0.918) 0.3183 280 91.21 
Small Town 0.741 (0.352) b 
Natural G i l 0.544 (0.253) 
Conurbation -1.015 (0.924) 0.3046 280 91.21 
Small Town 0.687 (0.340) b 
Natural G12 0.235 (0.070)8 
a Statistically signi: leant at the 0.01 level; b Statistically significant at the 0.05 
level; c Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 8.7 Applied for finance and received a reduced amount of external 
finance in the last year. 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo R' n % Correctly 
Classified 
Conurbation -0.212 (0.105) b 0.2724 241 68.46 
Small Town 0.250 (0.083)a 
Natural G i l 0.210(0.142) 
Conurbation -0.223 (0.110) b 0.2858 241 65.98 
Small Town 0.235 (0.083)a 
Natural G12 0.382 (0.151) b 
a Statistically signi: leant at the 0.01 level; b Statistically significant at the 0.05 
level; e Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 8.8 Applied for finance and received a reduced amount of external 
finance in the period 1 -2 years ago. 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo R1 n % Correctly 
Classified 
Conurbation -0.223 (0.320) 0.2658 313 61.98 
Small Town 0.415 (0.202)b 
Natural Gl 1 0.097 (0.126) 
Conurbation -0.245 (0.322) 0.2689 313 62.30 
Small Town 0.380 (0.188) b 
Natural Gl2 0.164 (0.081) " 
a Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; b Statistically significant at the 0.05 
level; 0 Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 8.9 Applied for finance and received a reduced amount of external 
finance in the period 2-3 years ago. 
Coefficient and Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Pseudo R2 n % Correctly 
Classified 
Conurbation -0.188 (0.337) 0.2903 280 63.57 
Small Town 0.501 (0.224) b 
Natural G i l 0.168 (0.131) 
Conurbation -0.200 (0.339) 0.2956 280 63.21 
Small Town 0.570 (0.281) b 
Natural G12 0.249 (0.082)8 
a Statistically signi: leant at the 0.01 level; b Statistically significant at the 0.05 
level; c Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
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8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter assesses the relevance of geographical distance between 
entrepreneurs and their preferred banks and entrepreneurs and their closest 
competitive banks and accessibility of bank credit. Geographical distance 
between entrepreneurs and their banks could determine the banks access to 
relevant information, the banks ability to efficiently assess entrepreneurs and 
determine their creditworthiness. It may also influence the banks ability to 
monitor investments. Geographical distance therefore matters to the banks 
lending decision, as the further away a business is from its bank the more likely 
the problem of information asymmetry and its risks increases, hence the greater 
the credit rationing probability (Felsenstein and Fleischer, 2002). 
This chapter also investigated whether information asymmetry increases 
in relation to geographical distance and explore the likelihood that banks will 
ration credit to entrepreneurs located further away from them. The chapter relied 
on a new set of data from a survey of small businesses located in the 6 districts of 
the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. The chapter draws conclusions on the spatial 
credit rationing of small business using geographical distance between the 
entrepreneur and the bank as the casual variable. 
The results of the regression models show positive and statistically 
significant coefficients suggesting that entrepreneurs further away from their 
preferred bank branch and also their closest competitive bank branch are more 
likely to be credit rationed (Petersen and Raj an, 2002; Agarwal and Hauswald, 
2006; Alessandrini et al., 2006). An increase in geographical distance between 
entrepreneurs and their banks may lead to an increase in the cost of lending 
(Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Banks are likely therefore to reduce site visits and 
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monitoring of projects leading to less quality business information gathering, 
inaccurate credit appraisal leading to a decline in the quality of credit screening 
and the likelihood of an error in making credit decisions (Carling and Lundberg, 
2005). Thus the further away entrepreneurs are from their banks, the higher the 
likelihood that the bank wil l disregard soft information and credit appraisals on 
businesses peripherally located (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006). Lending 
decisions therefore become inefficient as geographical distance increases and this 
further leads to an increased in loan defaults (DeYoung et al., 2008b), hence 
banks wil l ration credit to small business located further away from their banks 
(Brevoort and Hannan, 2006). This result is consistent with hypothesis H 1 4 . 
In addition to the above findings, the logit regression models for 
entrepreneurs who applied for finance and received no external finance and those 
who received a reduced amount over the three year period were re-run. 
Regarding entrepreneurs located in conurbations and small towns that applied for 
finance and received no external finance, the results suggested that entrepreneurs 
located in a conurbation were less likely to be credit rationed and those located in 
small towns were more likely to be credit rationed. These results are consistent 
with hypotheses H 1 5 and Hi6 respectively. Similarly, regarding the dummy 
variables entrepreneurs located further away from their banks were more likely 
to be credit rationed (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006). This result is consistent 
with hypotheses H 1 4 . Similar results were observed for entrepreneurs who 
applied for finance and received a reduced amount. 
From the above results the policy recommendations are as follows. 
Firstly, policy makers must ensure that banks in Ghana do not only concentrate 
their branch expansion in conurbations and large towns but to encourage banks to 
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at least have one main branch located in a small town to serve various 
communities. Secondly, policy makers in the banking industry should ensure that 
banks adopt modern communication and technological techniques in gathering 
soft information from entrepreneurs especially those peripherally located. 
Thirdly, policy makers must also encourage the use of collateral certificates or 
credit guarantee schemes by small businesses especially those peripherally 
located and are engaged in the agricultural sector. These policies will ensure that 
the migration of youths from small towns to conurbations and large towns in 
search of employment will be minimised. Moreover, since Ghana is an 
agricultural economy depending on both cash and food crops for export, revenue 
in this sector will increase and the contributions to GDP and employment will 
also increase. 
The first three empirical chapters have concentrated on the entrepreneur's 
access to external finance. The last empirical chapter on the other hand, examines 
the banks lending decisions in the face of uncertainties and the role trust plays in 
a bank-entrepreneur credit decision. 
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Chapter 9 
The Role of Trust in Bank-Entrepreneur Lending Decisions 
9.1 Introduction 
The first empirical chapter explored the relationship between 
entrepreneurial experience and the sources of start-up capital. The second and 
third empirical chapters were concerned with the credit rationing of 
entrepreneurs and the influence of geographical distance, respectively. As with 
the first empirical chapter the role of entrepreneurial experience featured 
prominently in the investigation. This fourth empirical chapter examines the 
lending decisions of banks on the credit applications of entrepreneurs under 
conditions of uncertainty influenced by information asymmetry problems. The 
chapter also evaluates the role of trust in influencing bank lending decisions. 
A number of studies have highlighted the importance of bank credit to 
small business entrepreneurs (Cosh et al., 1996; Cruickshank, 2000; Blackwell 
and Winter, 2000; Bougheas et al., 2006; Cull et al., 2006; Menkhoff and 
Suwanaporn, 2007), as well as the challenges entrepreneurs encounter in 
accessing bank credit (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Binks and Ennew, 1997; Freedman and Click, 2006; Singh and Belwal, 2008). 
Between the 1970s and 1980s, the banking sector in Ghana experienced a major 
financial crisis culminating from a high rate of inflation, a low level of savings, 
non-performing loans in high-risk sectors and high default rates (Sowa and 
Acquaye, 1999; Ziorklui, 2001). This phenomenon affected the capital base of 
most banks leading to large losses, meagre paid-up capital, and lower reserve 
funds and increasing dependence on loans from both the central bank and 
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external sources (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998). This made credit to small 
businesses almost non-existent (Brownbridge et al., 1998). In addition to these 
challenges the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were competing with small 
businesses for bank credit (Aryeetey et al., 1994; World Bank 2004b). During 
this period banks in Ghana were mainly state owned banks and many of these 
banks encountered several challenges lending to small business entrepreneurs, 
regarding them as high risk investments (Tagoe et al., 2005). Most of these banks 
suffered large losses on bad loans, which affected bank lending to small 
businesses (Aryeetey et al., 1994). 
To address these problems the government introduced a comprehensive 
Financial Sector Adjustment Programme - FINSAP I (1988-1991) and FINSAP 
I I (1992-1995) with support from the World Bank. The financial sector reforms 
introduced restructuring of the financial and banking sectors, a review of the 
legal and regulatory framework and the liberalising of the interest and exchange 
rates (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; Senbert and Otchere, 2006). The reforms 
encouraged private banking and by February 2008, the banking sector in Ghana 
had grown by twenty-four (24) commercial banks with four-hundred and eighty-
four (484) branches (Acquah, 2008). 
Previous studies have shown that bank lending to small business 
entrepreneurs encounter several challenges as a result of the problems of 
information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Harris and Raviv, 1991; Binks et al., 1992; Hubbard, 1998; Angelini et al., 
1998). Bank lending therefore involves several risks and uncertainties, making 
lending decisions very critical as banks are unable to determine the quality of the 
entrepreneur (Berger and Udell, 1995; Binks and Ennew, 1997; Frame et al., 
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2001; Bhati, 2006). Banks therefore tend to regard small business lending as high 
risk ventures and are often reluctant to extend credit to these entrepreneurs 
(Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; UNCTAD, 1999; Tagoe et al., 2005; Abereijo 
and Fayomi, 2005). 
A bank's successful lending activity and profitability is determined by the 
efficient and effective evaluation of risks and uncertainties characterising the 
lending process (Farrary, 2003). To operate a successful lending activity, banks 
have adopted certain pragmatic techniques to ensure the management of risks 
and uncertainties. These include information gathering (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 
1985; Berger et al., 2005), requests for collateral to secure credit applications 
(Bester, 1994; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Black and De Meza. 1992; Burke and 
Hanley, 2006; Abor and Biekpe, 2007a), developing a bank-entrepreneur 
relationship (Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998), and more recently the use of 
credit scoring techniques to minimise bad investments (Hubbard and Gregg, 
2001; Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger and Frame, 2007). 
Scholars have argued that the above measures are of assistance in 
reducing information asymmetry (Binks and Ennew, 1997; Frame et al., 2001; 
Menkhoff et al., 2006; Brewer, 2007). But these are not perfect and agency 
problems still remain (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Angelini et al., 1998; Harhoff and Korting, 1998). Trustworthy behaviours on the 
part of entrepreneurs are purported to help in reducing the adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems (Pettit, 1995; Nooteboom, 2003). This chapter therefore 
examines the role of trust in bank lending decisions. This chapter is organised as 
follows. Section two presents the empirical findings and section three concludes 
the chapter. 
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9.2 Empirical findings 
Under conditions of information asymmetry (Luhmann, 2000), 
uncertainties (Lewis and Weigent, 1985) and higher risks (Weick, 1993) banks 
rely on trust to make credit decisions. Higher levels of trust therefore encourage 
trustworthy behaviour between the entrepreneur and the bank (Pettit, 1995; 
Nooteboom, 2003). Trust further plays a significant role in reducing transaction 
costs (Macaulay, 1963); monitoring costs and controls (Lewicki and Bunker, 
1996) and the problems of information asymmetry (Ring and Van den Ven, 
1992). This section therefore examines the bank lending decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty and trust vis-a-vis the credit applications of both novice 
and habitual entrepreneurs. 
9.2.1 Bank lending process under uncertainty 
The basic principles of banking consisting of safety, adequacy, economy 
and efficiency are required for the assessment of and the spreading of risks 
(Sykes, 1928; Pressnell, 1956; Mathias, 1973). Lending to small business 
entrepreneurs involves risk taking as banks are unable to determine the quality of 
the entrepreneurs. In the event of a failure by an entrepreneur to meet repayment 
schedules, the bank looses the investment i f there is no collateral to support the 
application (Bhati, 2006). To reduce these losses, the bank pursues the lending 
process by gathering objective background information about the business, the 
entrepreneur and other relevant information to make good decisions and also to 
minimise risks (Mizruchi and Stearns, 2001). Danos et al. (1989) have noted that 
financial and background information about the entrepreneur's creditworthiness 
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impacts greatly on a bank's lending decision. The next section therefore 
examines the stages of the lending process. 
9.2.1.1 The lending process 
The first stage of the credit evaluation process consists of information 
gathering about the entrepreneur. The information gathered which is often hard 
information, includes past financial statements of the business, the credit history 
and the business plan (Berry et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005; Kano et al., 2006). 
The ability of the entrepreneur to perform is evaluated by analysing the past 
financial statements in determining the solvency, liquidity and net worth of the 
entrepreneur (Wilson, 1979). An analysis of the business plan provides the bank 
with information on the entrepreneur's capacity, competence and benevolence 
and the future prospects of the business to meet repayment obligations (Danos et 
al., 1989). 
The second stage involves the gathering of soft information about the 
background of the entrepreneur, information from third parties and referrals from 
other lending institutions (Danos et al., 1989; Stein, 2002, Cole et al., 2004). Soft 
information gathering is made through regular interactions with the entrepreneur 
and visits to the entrepreneur's premises (Newton, 2000; Monge-Naranjo et al., 
2001). In addition to regular interactions and visits, banks also use referrals from 
third parties, in the lending decision process (Blau, 1964). 
The third stage of the evaluation process involves the processing, analysis 
and screening of the information gathered. Collateral is then requested from the 
entrepreneur as a measure to secure the credit facility (Berry et al., 1993, 
Newton, 2000; Longhofer and Santos, 2000; Manove et al., 2001). Besides these, 
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banks also adopt the use of covenants as measures for monitoring and controlling 
the entrepreneur's cash flow to ensure repayment on schedule (Berger and Udell, 
1998), to oblige entrepreneurs to provide regular reports on the investment to the 
bank (Monge-Naranjo et al., 2001; Paglia, 2002). 
The screening processing evaluates the credit worthiness of the 
entrepreneur and also distinguishes between honest and dishonest entrepreneurs 
(Diamond, 1984; Wale, 1994). A creditworthy entrepreneur signifies experience, 
competence, ability, reputation and integrity to perform as well as the capacity to 
repay the credit facility (Maitland, 1997). An entrepreneur who lacks these 
qualities cannot be trusted by the bank to perform (Binks et al., 1992b Kitcher, 
1993; Ridley, 1995; Shailer, 1999). 
As shown in figure 9.1, during the screening process, habitual 
entrepreneurs by virtue of their experiences and durable relationships are able to 
provide the requisite information and collateral to support the project's viability 
and to show their business' capacity. Credit is therefore made available to the 
habitual entrepreneur as shown in final decision 18, 20 and 22. On the other hand 
novice entrepreneurs are unable to meet the requisite information and other 
contract obligations required by the banks creating an information asymmetry 
between them and the banks. These novice entrepreneurs with higher levels of 
uncertainty are denied credit outright as shown in final decision 1 for an outright 
rejection. They are also credit rationed as shown in final decision 19 for lack of 
collateral, 21 for information asymmetry and 23 for their inability to meet 
contract covenants. These evidences are consistent with proposition Pi. 
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Figure 9.1 
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During the interview, 12 interviewees indicated that novice entrepreneurs 
were unable to submit past financial statements and business plan thus creating 
information asymmetry problems. One Credit Manager stated 'even when the 
entrepreneur submits a business plan, he is unable to explain the rationale for 
the stated figures'. Another Credit Manager stated 'most of the figures are 
unjustifiable high, too optimistic about the business success, and no significant 
provisions are made for unexpected eventualities (sensitivity analysis) '. 
9.2.2 Bank lending under conditions of trust 
In spite of the screening process adopted by the bank and the use of 
collateral, guarantees and covenants, as an incentive device the banks continue to 
experience challenges in lending to small businesses (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 
1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Angelini et al., 1998; Harhoff and Korting, 1998). 
Under conditions of uncertainty and information asymmetry, banks lending 
decisions are efficient and effective through the building of social relationships 
(Podolny, 1994). These social ties and social bonds developed between the 
entrepreneur and the banks helps in resolving the uncertainties surrounding small 
business lending as it provides private information and leads to social obligation 
and reciprocity (Coleman, 1988; Larson, 1992; Ferrary, 2003). Thus the concept 
of trust evolves from the strength of the relationship, the track record and 
experience of the entrepreneur as well as the security offered by the entrepreneur 
to signify benevolence and capacity. 
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9.2.2.1 Durable relationship 
The development of cordial and intimate relationships between the bank 
and the entrepreneur results in the exchange of vital resources (Burt, 1992). 
Banks are able to gather relevant information about the entrepreneur and the 
business through regular interactions with the entrepreneur and frequent visits to 
the premises of the business (Newton, 2000). Under conditions of information 
asymmetry, the greater the social ties between the bank and the entrepreneur, the 
more the availability of information, and the better the assessment on the quality 
of the entrepreneur (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Gulati and Garguilo, 1999). In 
addition to providing vital information, social relationships between the bank and 
the entrepreneur causes a reduction in time and a lowering of the cost of 
gathering information about the quality of the entrepreneur (Burt, 1992; 
Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
The durability of the social relationship also develops a sense of 
obligation leading to fair and trusting behaviour between the bank and the 
entrepreneur (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1996). Social obligation encourages reciprocity 
between parties (Coleman, 1988; Gulati, 1995) and also reduces the degree of 
risk and uncertainty associated with lending to small business entrepreneurs 
(Ferrary, 2003). The willingness of the entrepreneur to provide information to the 
bank signifies the entrepreneur's honesty, integrity and quality (Green, 2003). 
Again, repeated transactions between entrepreneurs and their banks demonstrate 
consistency (Williamson, 1981) resulting in the development of trust among the 
parties. 
As shown in figure 9.1, during the screening process habitual 
entrepreneurs have been found to have established a long-lasting relationship 
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with their banks. This durable relationship signifies availability of information, 
portraying the integrity and consistency of the habitual entrepreneur. Besides, the 
repeated transactions and the use of other bank services by the entrepreneur 
portray the reliability and the commitment of the habitual entrepreneur. With 
these characteristics of the habitual entrepreneur, the banks are more likely to 
make credit available to the habitual entrepreneur as shown by the final 
decisions: 2 for exhibiting integrity (Green, 2003), 4 for providing adequate 
information (Ferrary, 2003), and 6 for consistency (Williamson, 1981) and 8 for 
reliability. 
On the other hand novice entrepreneurs by virtue of their inexperience 
were found not to have established any relationship with the banks. As a result, 
novice entrepreneurs were found to be facing information asymmetry problems. 
Banks were therefore unable to determine their quality, integrity, reliability and 
most of them have hardly used any other banking services. The lack of these 
qualities will lead to the novice entrepreneur being credit rationed as shown by 
the final decisions 3 for lack of integrity, 5 for information asymmetry, 7 for 
inconsistency and 9 for unreliability. The above results indicate that a durable 
lending relationship between the bank and the entrepreneur generates trust which 
results in the availability of credit to the entrepreneur. This evidence is consistent 
with proposition P2. 
One Credit Manager illustrated the benefit of a durable relationship of 
experienced entrepreneurs by saying 7 have 7 reliable customers whom I have 
known for the last twelve years. Any time their credit applications get to my desk, 
I don't normally delay the process because their repayment ability is so 
consistent that you can't simply delay approving the credit facility'. The 
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interview results in Table 9.5 also showed that many more Credit Managers will 
go for an habitual entrepreneur who exhibits the characteristics of integrity, 
ability and consistency in their business transactions with the bank. 
Another Credit Manager indicated, her preference and bias towards a 
habitual entrepreneur who has more dealings with her bank as she argued by 
saying 'Under conditions of uncertainty, when choosing between customers of 
the bank for a credit approval, I will be bias towards customers who patronises 
our products and services, because they provide us with additional income and 
are more reliable''. 
9.2.2.2 Reputation 
In addition to the social ties and social bonds, banks also consider the 
track record, experience and ability of the entrepreneur. The reputation of an 
entrepreneur is one of the major criteria banks use in lending decisions 
(Granovetter, 1985; Newton, 2000). The entrepreneur's experiences and ability 
to perform are highly considered in lending decisions (Blois, 1999; Dasgupta, 
2000). Habitual entrepreneurs with good reputations are more likely to have 
access to bank credit (Bates, 1991), as banks regard good reputation as 
"relationship collateral" (Monge-Naranjo et al., 2001). On the other hand, novice 
entrepreneurs who by virtue of their inexperience lack any good reputation are 
credit rationed by banks as their character is uncertain and unpredictable 
(Kitcher, 1993; Ridley, 1995; Martinelli, 1997). 
In figure 9.1, habitual entrepreneurs through their track records and 
possessing considerable experience exhibit good reputations and have better 
access to bank credit as shown in final decision 10 for signifying ability and 12 
for showing experience (Bates, 1991). In contrast, inexperienced novice 
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entrepreneurs exhibiting no experience and also lacking the ability to perform are 
credit rationed as shows in final decision 11 for a lack of ability and 13 for no 
experience (Ridley, 1995; Martinelli, 1997). This was confirmed during the 
interview by almost all the Credit Managers as one indicated 7 will never 
approve a credit facility for a novice entrepreneur whose reputation is uncertain 
even if that novice entrepreneur has collateral with value thrice the facility'. 
Other Credit Managers endorsed this statement because they argued that in the 
event of a default, the legal procedures involved in disposing of the assets is not 
only expensive but it is also time consuming as this could take several years. 
Habitual entrepreneurs with good reputation are less likely to be credit rationed 
compared with novice entrepreneurs with a bad reputation. This evidence is 
consistent with proposition P3. 
9.3.2.3 Security 
In lending decisions banks first ensure that the entrepreneur has the 
experience and the ability to repay the credit facility. Beyond this assurance 
banks are required to protect the credit facility with an appropriate security in the 
likely event of a default by the entrepreneur. The security could be in the form of 
collateral or a credit guarantee or personal guarantee (Chan and Kanatas, 1985). 
The pledging of collateral by entrepreneurs in a credit application signifies their 
capacity and willingness to repay the credit facility (Rajan and Winton, 1995; 
Inderst and Muller, 2007). It also signifies the loyalty, commitment and 
benevolence of the entrepreneur to ensure positive net returns to the investment 
and thus eliminating the problem of moral hazard (Bester, 1985; Chan and 
Thakor, 1987; Boot et al., 1991). In the likely event of a failure, the bank initiates 
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actions to seize and sell the collateral (Barro, 1976; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; La 
Porta et al., 1998). Thus the right to seize and sell the collateral ensures the 
entrepreneur applies the credit as agreed in the contract (Myers, 1977; Hurt, 
1995). 
Figure 9.1, illustrates the influence of security upon credit availability as 
it depicts capacity and benevolence of the entrepreneur. Habitual entrepreneurs 
who pledge collateral are more likely to have access to bank credit as shown in 
final decisions 14 for benevolence and 16 for capacity (Inderst and Muller, 
2007). Novice entrepreneurs lacking the requisite collateral cannot be trusted, 
and thus they are credit rationed as shown in decisions 15 for lack of goodwill 
(Boot et al., 1991) and 17 for lacking the capacity to support the application. This 
evidence is consistent with propositions P2 and P3. 
During the interview, almost all of the bank officials - 18 out of 20 
insisted that they will not approve an unsecured facility. One Credit Manager 
indicated 'no collateral no credit, as simple as that'. 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the lending decision of banks in Ghana under 
conditions of uncertainty resulting from the problems of information asymmetry. 
The role of trust has also been examined and in particular its influence on bank 
lending decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Before the last two decades, 
banks in Ghana were mainly state owned and were specifically geared towards 
economic development in agriculture, industry, housing, commerce, and general 
banking services. There were only two foreign banks during this period. As a 
result of a high rate of inflation, a low level of savings and investments, many of 
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the state owned banks experienced high bad debts in their books. Again as a 
result of increased competition from state owned enterprises, credits to small 
businesses was not only limited but were very expensive. 
The study examined the lending process of banks with an in-depth 
interview of 20 Credit Managers using one-hour face-to-face semi-structured 
open ended questions. The coded responses were entered into tables and a 
decision tree was used to illustrate a typical lending process under conditions of 
uncertainty. The role of trust in influencing the lending decision was also 
demonstrated. Bank lending decisions are based on an effective evaluation of an 
entrepreneur's credit applications to determine the entrepreneur's capacity and 
ability to meet repayment obligations (Reed et al., 1976; Newton, 2000). The 
effective evaluation is carried out with quality information which is both hard 
and soft from the entrepreneur and the business. The inability of banks to observe 
the quality of the entrepreneur was due to the lack of information. This created 
uncertainty in the lending decision of the banks and they were thus reluctant to 
lend to small business entrepreneurs as they were considered risky (Nissanke and 
Aryeetey, 1998). Small businesses in Ghana also lack the requisite collateral to 
secure the credit facility thus making banks reluctant in lending to small 
businesses; hence some entrepreneurs are credit rationed. 
One of the key elements in a bank-entrepreneur relationship is trust. The 
findings of this study have shown that bank lending decisions are dependent on 
the levels of uncertainty and trust associated with the entrepreneur. The results 
confirm all the three propositions that banks credit ration entrepreneurs whose 
credit applications experience higher levels of uncertainty resulting from 
information asymmetry. A durable relationship significantly increases the flow of 
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information between entrepreneurs and their banks (Burt, 1992). This increases 
the bank's confidence in the entrepreneur as this improves their relationship 
(Gulati, 1995) and cooperation (Doz, 1996). This result suggests that a durable 
relationship increases credit availability and reduces the costs of credit to the 
entrepreneur (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Binks and Ennew, 1997). The 
background training, education and experiences of the entrepreneur are vital in 
bank credit assessment to determine the entrepreneur's quality (Vernier, 1996). 
This result suggests that entrepreneurs with good reputations are more likely to 
have access to bank credit compared with entrepreneurs with a bad reputation 
(Dei Ottati, 1994). 
The findings of this chapter were all consistent with the propositions set 
up. The results support proposition Pi, in that, inexperienced entrepreneurs with 
higher levels of uncertainty were more likely to be credit rationed for reasons of 
information asymmetry and a lack of collateral. On the other hand, the results of 
propositions P2 and P3 show that experienced entrepreneurs with durable lending 
relationships; reputations and collateral security were less likely to be credit 
rationed. The findings also show that social network contracts and social ties are 
vital for the entrepreneur's access to information and resources towards the 
acquisition of information and maintenance of resources for business 
development (Ulhoi, 2005). 
The contributions of small businesses to national development in terms of 
employment generation and gross domestic product have been widely 
acknowledged (Green, 2003; Wattanapruttipaisan, 2003). The challenges facing 
small business entrepreneurs in accessing bank credits have also been identified 
(Wagenvoort, 2003). The results of this chapter provide useful implications for 
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entrepreneurs seeking to increase their accessibility to bank credit. It is also for 
both bank managers and policy makers concerned with the task of making more 
credit available to the small business entrepreneur. Policy makers and 
practitioners must therefore gear their support towards novice and start-up 
entrepreneurs to assist them to overcome the problems of information asymmetry 
and lack of collateral. 
In the light of the above, the first policy recommendation from this study 
is the need for banks to develop a durable relationship with their customers both 
the experienced entrepreneurs and the inexperienced ones. This will encourage 
the building of reputations. Second, banks must make every effort to build 
confidence in the entrepreneur to share information either good or bad. Third, 
there is a need to assist and encourage the small business entrepreneurs, 
especially the novice entrepreneurs not only to keep records but also to develop 
quality, reliable and consistent records. These measures will create norms, 
networks and trust which will fundamentally reduce risk and uncertainty 
associated with bank lending decisions on small business ventures (Dowla, 
2006). 
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Chapter 10 
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
10.1 Introduction 
Small business financing is a topic of significant research interest to 
academics and an issue of great importance to policy makers around the world 
including Ghana. The focus of this study was on the differences between 
experienced entrepreneurs and inexperienced entrepreneurs with respect to the 
composition of start-up capital and access to bank credit. This study has sought to 
make a contribution to the theoretical and practical understanding of how 
experienced entrepreneurs compared to inexperienced entrepreneurs have access to 
bank credit in Ghana. 
A human and social capital perspective was used to explore the variety of 
ways in which experienced entrepreneurs utilize their education, business ownership 
experience, skills, competencies, social ties, social bonds, social relationships and 
networking skills to access external finance. Two sets of methodological approaches 
- questionnaires and interview techniques were utilised to gather data to investigate 
entrepreneurial access to external finance. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence 
highlighted that prior business ownership experience, education, and networking 
skills of experienced entrepreneurs influenced their access to bank credit compared 
to inexperienced entrepreneurs. 
Economic, as well as social arguments warrant the promotion of small 
businesses as they contribute substantially to economic growth, the creation of 
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employment opportunities (Liedholm, 2002; Santos, 2003; Luetkenhorst, 2004), 
contribution to national output (Steel and Webster, 1991; Cook and Nixson, 2000) 
an equitable distribution o f income and opportunities (Manuh and Brown, 1987; 
Albaladejo, 2002), the promotion o f entrepreneurial skills (Born and Altink, 1996), 
the advancement of innovation (Boer and During, 2001; Goswami and Mathew, 
2005), technological transfer (Rogers, 2004), social cohesion and poverty reduction 
(Harvie and Lee, 2001; Lemer 2002; Mensah, 1996) and local and regional 
development (Smallbone and Welter, 2001). 
This study aimed at addressing the research questions and also tests the 
research hypotheses and propositions outlined in the empirical chapters on 
entrepreneur's access to bank credit over the three year period January 2004 -
December 2006. The primary data used in this study comes from a survey of small 
businesses located in the 6 districts of the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. The 
survey started with a stratified random sample of 1200 entrepreneurs who have a 
banking relationship with banks in Ghana, between January 2004 and December 
2006. A face-to-face administration of the questionnaires was carried out with a 
follow-up in-depth interview on selected entrepreneurs and senior bank officials. 
Of the 1200 entrepreneurs sampled, 750 entrepreneurs were short listed for 
the survey. During the five month survey, 522 questionnaires were completed. Of 
this number 9 responses were eliminated because the businesses had been acquired 
and have therefore ceased to be independent trading entities. Another 13 responses 
were eliminated because almost all the responses were unsatisfactorily answered. In 
total, 500 valid questionnaires were obtained. From this number, 4 responses were 
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excluded because the respondents reported that they had only inherited an 
established business and others had filled missing information. The final valid 
responses were 496 questionnaires and this represented a 66% response rate. 
10.2 Summary of literature review 
10.2.1 Small business financing 
Chapter two formed the first extensive review of the background literature on 
small business financing for this study. In this chapter, the capital structure of small 
business, the sources of finance for small business, the factors affecting the 
availability o f and accessibility of bank credit to small business entrepreneurs, as 
well as the challenges banks encounter in making lending decisions were reviewed. 
Studies have shown that businesses can raise a particular type o f capital depending 
on the nature and type of business involved (Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
Specifically the literature reviewed that small business entrepreneurs finance 
their businesses principally through the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984, Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). The entrepreneurs start with 
internal sources and then introduce external sources at a later time when the needs 
arises (Acs, 1985; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Aryeetey et al., 1994; Findings 
Africa Region, 1994; Manigart and Struyf, 1997; Hamilton and Fox, 1998; 
Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006; Heino, 2006; Bhaird and 
Lucey, 2006). The literature review also showed that small business entrepreneurs 
finance their start-ups through their own savings (Van Auken and Neeley, 1996; 
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Winborg and Landstrom, 2001), gifts and loans from family and friends (Basu and 
Parker, 2001; Casson, 2003), supplier's credit and customer advances (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1993; Fraser, 2001; Burkhart and Ellingsen, 2004), co-investors (Freear et 
al., 2000; Brettel, 2003), bank loans and bank overdrafts (Brewer et al., 1996), and 
venture capital (Brander et al., 2002; EVCA, 2004). 
In financing small business entrepreneurs the studies have identified the 
challenges that the banks face including: high transaction costs and the monitoring 
of credit investments (Steel, 1994; Wagenvoort, 2003), information asymmetry 
problems (von Eije et al., 2003) and the lack of collateral to enforce repayment 
(Mambula, 2002; Sacerdoti, 2005). Banks are therefore reluctant in lending to small 
business entrepreneurs (Binks et al., 1992; Tucker and Lean, 2003; Tagoe et al., 
2005). Besides these constraints, financing has been cited as the main obstacle to the 
growth in small businesses (Sowa et al., 1992; Parker et al., 1995; Wolf, 2004; 
Tagoe et al., 2005). 
The asymmetric f low of information between the entrepreneur and the bank 
leads to market failure in the provision of finance to small businesses (Levitsky and 
Prasad, 1987). This market failure creates an excess demand for bank credit over 
supply resulting in an imperfect market situation. The banks for reasons of the 
optimal interest rate and profitability wi l l ration credit to their borrowers rather than 
increase interest rates to resolve the increase in bank credit hence credit rationing 
occurs among some borrowers (Blinder and Stiglitz, 1983; Wette 1983; Gale and 
Hellwig, 1984, Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2005). 
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To resolve the asymmetric information problems, banks may resort to the use 
of a non-price rationing mechanism (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Binks and Ennew, 
1996; Bester 1987; Bester and Hellwing, 1989). Entrepreneurs seeking bank finance 
may be requested to support their credit applications with a collateral security 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1986; Clemenz, 1986; and Chan and Thakor, 1987). 
Alternatively, a credible bank-entrepreneur relationship is developed (Boot, 2000; 
Berger and Udell, 2002; Cardone et al., 2004). 
10.2.2 Credit rationing 
Chapter three examined the definition of credit rationing, the model and 
concept o f credit rationing and the influence of relationship lending, collateral and 
geographical distance on credit rationing. Various scholars have provided varying 
definitions for credit rationing (Baltensperger, 1978; Parker, 2002). This study 
however provided a unique definition of credit rationing as a situation where banks 
grant credit to entrepreneurs they regard as creditworthy borrowers, while other 
entrepreneurs receive much less than they apply for and still other entrepreneurs are 
completely rejected even though they are willing to pay higher interest rate. 
In the credit market, equilibrium occurs when the bank-optimal interest rate 
is reached and the expected return o f the loan is highest (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
An increase in the bank's interest rate wil l lead to a decline in the bank's expected 
returns (Ikhide, 2003). A further increase in the interest rate wi l l worsen the 
expected returns (Craig et al., 2007). In its attempt to resolve the excess demand 
over supply, i f the bank decides to increase its interest rate, lower risk borrowers wi l l 
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drop out o f the market (Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000) leaving only the higher risk 
borrowers (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). The increase in the interest rate wi l l also have 
an effect on the borrower's choice of investment projects (Basu, 1992; Voordeckers 
and Steijvers, 2005). An entrepreneur wil l prefer a higher risk investment project 
with higher expected returns but with a lower probability of success (Winker, 1999). 
A number o f critics have been raised on the adverse selection and moral hazard 
model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Among the critics are Diamond (1984); Bester 
(1985); De Meza and Webb (1987); Williamson (1987); Basu (1992); Cressy (1996) 
and Parker (2002). 
Various empirical studies have provided evidence in support of the 
importance o f lending relationships in terms of credit availability, pricing and 
collateral requirements (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Korting, 1998a; Howorth et al., 
2003). One advantage of relationship lending is that it allows small businesses the 
opportunity to access credit from their lenders even though they may not have 
available adequate collateral, a proven track record and impressive financial 
statements to support their loan applications (Strahan and Weston, 1998; Bodt et al., 
2005). 
Collateral assures the bank of the entrepreneur's willingness to repay the 
loan and thus raises the probability that credit wi l l be granted to the entrepreneur 
(Inderst and Muller, 2007). The pledge of collateral by an entrepreneur in a loan 
application assists in eliminating the adverse selection and moral hazard effects and 
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gives a candid opinion about the entrepreneur's creditworthiness (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; and Chan and Thakor, 1987). 
Over the last two decades, several studies have demonstrated an increase in 
geographical distance between banks and their small businesses (Cyrnak and 
Hannan, 2003; Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Wolken and Rohde, 2002; Hannan, 2003; 
Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; DeYoung et al., 2007). 
Distance is an important factor in the lending decision of banks to offer or deny 
credit. The probability o f obtaining credit decreases in the distance between 
entrepreneurs and bank but increases in that between entrepreneurs and their nearest 
competitor (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006). Businesses closer to their bank branch 
are more likely to obtain loans, whilst businesses located further away from their 
bank branch are less likely to obtain loans. 
10.2.3 Entrepreneurship theory 
The fourth chapter reviewed the factors influencing the entrepreneurship 
theory which affects entrepreneurship actions and activities. These include: the 
human capital theory, social capital theory and the types o f entrepreneurs. The 
human capital o f the entrepreneur is the education, experiences, reputation and skills 
of the entrepreneur and or employees required in the business to achieve set goals at 
a given opportunity and time (Boxall and Steeneveld, 1999; Rauch et al., 2005). The 
human capital resource makes entrepreneurs more efficient in their tasks (Briiderl et 
al., 1992) which may significantly contribute to the business's performance (Rauch 
and Frese, 2000). The human capital theory asserts that individuals through the 
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knowledge they possess are able to increase their cognitive abilities which allows 
them to be more effective and efficient in their productive activities (Schultz, 1959; 
Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). This assertion presupposes that those individuals with 
higher levels of education, more work experience and skills are likely to have 
superior abilities, achieve higher performance and become more successful in their 
economic ventures than those with a lower or less human capital (Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). 
Some scholars have proposed that the major differences in entrepreneurial 
abilities are the results of psychological variables, personal traits and some 
demographic factors (Low and MacMillan, 1988; Shaver and Scott, 1991). Putnam, 
(2000) suggested that social capital is the connection between individuals, their 
social networks, their norms of reciprocity, and the trust arising from the connection. 
Similarly, Cohen and Prusak, (2001), describe social capital as a set of connections 
between people, which covers the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and 
behaviour that binds the group. The theoretical review identified some benefits of 
social capital as: a reduction in time and the resources required in search of 
information (Cohen and Prusak, 2001; Davidsson and Honig, 2003) it facilitates the 
entrepreneur's access to scarce resources (Boxman et al., 1991; Uzzi, 1999), the 
benefits from influence, control and power (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Adler 
and Kwon, 2002), and internal and external values such as trust, respect, friendship 
and network providing entrepreneur confidence (Putnam, 2000). The review also 
identified three dimensions of social capital which are the structure dimension, 
cognitive dimension, and the relational dimension. 
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Generally, entrepreneurship theorists have viewed the entrepreneur as the 
key element in any analysis (Davidsson and Wikhund, 2001; Shane, 2000). Business 
ownership experience may lead to an improvement in the growth potential and profit 
margins o f businesses (Starr and Bygrave, 1991; Teece et al., 1997). The 
experienced entrepreneur therefore gains a competitive advantage over the 
inexperienced entrepreneur in building reputation, developing expertise, opportunity 
identification and exploitation (Ardiclivil i et al., 2003; Ucbasaran et al., 2003a), 
network development (Hills et al., 1997; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999), information 
search and knowledge acquisition (Cooper et al., 1995; Fiet et al., 2000), and 
accessing external finance (Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 1999). Habitual entrepreneurs 
possessing higher levels o f education and prior ownership experiences exhibits 
comparative advantages in terms of information acquisition, opportunity 
identification and exploitation as well as access to finance compared to the 
inexperienced novice entrepreneur (Cooper et al., 1995; Shane, 2000). 
10.3 Summary of empirical findings 
10.3.1 Sources of start-up capital 
Chapter six examined the relative use and importance o f the sources of start-
up finance for small business and also examined the role of human capital in the 
access and use of these sources. The results show that 62.0% of entrepreneurs 
indicated that their most used source of start-up finance was their own savings. 
Additionally, 51.4% of entrepreneurs reported that their most important source of 
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start-up capital was own savings. 36.4% of entrepreneurs reported co-investors were 
their second most used source of finance at start-up, and 32% of entrepreneurs 
reporting co-investors as their main source o f finance. 31.6% of entrepreneurs 
reported the supplier's credit as a source of finance at start-up, whilst customer 
advances were used by only 3.0% of entrepreneurs. Gifts from relations and loans 
from relations were used by 12.8% and 13.4% of entrepreneurs, respectively, at 
start-up. Bank overdrafts and bank loans were reported by 12.6% and 11.8%, 
respectively, of entrepreneurs as sources of start-up capital. Only 4.6% of 
entrepreneurs indicated pensions as a source of start-up capital. 
The regression results in Table 6.2 showed that habitual entrepreneurship 
recorded a negatively signed coefficient regarding loans from relations and this 
result was statistically significant at the 5% level. The habitual entrepreneurship 
variable was however, positively statistically significant at the 1% level for bank 
loans, bank overdrafts, supplies credit and co-investors. The results indicate that 
habitual entrepreneurs were less likely to depend on loans from relations compared 
to novice entrepreneurs, but that they are more likely to utilise external sources. 
These results were consistent with hypotheses Hi andhh. 
The possession of a university degree was statistically significant and 
appeared with negatively signed coefficients for three sources of start up finance: 
own savings, gifts from relations, and loans from relations. However, in the case of 
co-investors, the result showed a positively statistically significant coefficient at the 
1% level. This result was consistent with hypothesis H 3 . 
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Process innovation was found to be statistically significant for five sources of 
start-up capital: own savings which appeared with negative signed coefficients, and 
bank loan, bank overdrafts, customer advances and co-investors all appearing with 
positive coefficients. This result was consistent with hypothesis H 4 . 
Similarly, the results indicated that exporting entrepreneurs were related to 
three sources of start-up finance: loans from relations, supplier's credit, and co-
investors suggesting less used of internal sources. This result was consistent with 
hypothesis H 5 . 
Besides these, the results also showed that both the manufacturing and 
service sector businesses were more likely than agricultural businesses to have used 
external credit (Aryeetey et al., 1994). Again, habitual entrepreneurs located in 
conurbations were more likely to report a higher use o f bank loans compared to 
entrepreneurs located in small towns. The gender of the entrepreneur was 
statistically significantly related to four of the sources o f capital: own savings, bank 
loans, co-investors and customer advance. Men were less likely than women to use 
their own savings as a source of start-up finance, but more likely to use external 
sources than women. Also, entrepreneurs having a member o f the family previously 
having been in business were more likely than those without to use loans from 
relatives (Curran and Blackburn, 1993; Bates, 1997; Basu and Parker, 2001). 
10.3.2 Entrepreneurship and credit rationing 
Chapter seven examined the credit rationing of small business entrepreneurs 
in relation to their possession o f human capital. The chapter conjectured that 
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entrepreneurs with higher human capital and prior ownership experience are less 
likely to be credit rationed. To investigate this assession, the chapter examined the 
types of entrepreneurs and their access to bank credit and which type of entrepreneur 
is credit constrained, credit rationed or discouraged from applying for credit. The 
results in Tables 7.1 a and 7.1b suggested that 28.8%, 35.5% and 20.0% of all 
entrepreneurs in the last 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and last year, respectively, 
were credit rationed. Similarly, 4.8%, 15.3% and 19.6% of all entrepreneurs in the 
last 2-3 years ago, 1-2 years ago and last year, respectively were credit constrained. 
Regarding discouraged borrowers, the results suggested that 21.2%, 15.1% and 
25.4% of all the entrepreneurs were discouraged from applying for credit in the last 
2-3 years ago, last 1-2 years ago and the last year, respectively. 
The findings revealed that entrepreneurs with prior ownership experience -
(habitual, serial and portfolio) entrepreneurs were less likely to be credit rationed 
compared with inexperienced (novice) entrepreneurs (Ferrary, 2003; Green, 2003). 
These results were consistent with hypotheses H 6 , H 7 and H 8 . Similarly 
entrepreneurs with higher levels of education were found to be less likely to be 
credit rationed. This result was also in support of hypothesis H 9 . The findings also 
showed that entrepreneurs with prior work experience were less likely to be credit 
rationed, thus supporting hypothesis H i 0 . Also entrepreneurs engaged in process or 
product innovation were more likely to be credit rationed (Freel, 2000). 
Entrepreneurs engaged in exporting activities were less likely to be credit rationed. 
These results are in support o f hypotheses H n , H ) 2 and H ) 3 . 
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10.3.3 Geographical distance and credit rationing 
Chapter eight is a continuation of the previous chapter and conjectures that 
the impact o f credit rationing wil l increase with distance. The results in Tables 8.1 
and 8.2 representing the period of last year and last 1-2 years ago suggests that 
entrepreneurs located further away from their closest competitive banks are more 
likely to be credit rationed (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Felsenstein and Fleischer, 
2002). However, the results in Table 8.3 representing the period o f the last 2-3 years, 
showed positive and statistically significant coefficients for both distance variables 
for the preferred banks and closest competitive banks. This result indicates that 
entrepreneurs located further away from their preferred bank branch were more 
likely to be credit rationed. The results were consistent with hypotheses H ^ . 
The location variables results indicated that entrepreneurs located in 
conurbations were less likely to be credit rationed compared to entrepreneurs located 
in small towns who were more likely to be credit rationed. This result is in support 
o f hypothesis H | 5 . On the other hand, entrepreneurs located in small towns were 
more likely to be credit rationed compared to entrepreneurs located in large towns. 
This result was also consistent with hypothesis H | 6 . Several reasons can be assigned 
for these differences. Entrepreneurs located in conurbations are more likely to 
possess higher human capital than their counterparts in the small towns (Binks et al., 
1992). Access to information and their quality decreases with distance resulting in 
increased information asymmetry (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). Banks' 
transaction costs increases with distance (DeYoung et al., 2008b) and entrepreneurs 
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located in small towns lack the requisite collateral to support their credit applications 
(Binks and Ennew, 1997; Tagoe et al., 2005). 
10.3.4 The role of trust in bank-entrepreneur lending relationship 
This chapter examined the lending decisions of banks on entrepreneurs credit 
applications under conditions of uncertainty influenced by information asymmetry 
problems. One of the key elements in a bank-entrepreneur relationship is trust. The 
findings o f this study have shown that bank lending decisions are dependent on the 
levels of uncertainty and trust associated with the entrepreneur. 
The results indicated that habitual entrepreneurs by virtue o f their durable 
relationship with their banks are able to provide the banks with adequate information 
required in the loan application process (Burt, 1992). Additionally, habitual 
entrepreneurs by their background training, education and prior ownership 
experience are able to provide collateral to support their applications exhibiting 
signs o f good reputation, ability and capacity. This increases cooperation and 
confidence in the relationship (Gulati, 1995; Doz, 1996). The result therefore 
suggested that habitual entrepreneurs with prior ownership experience and the ability 
to provide collateral security are more likely to have access to bank credit compared 
with inexperienced novice entrepreneurs who may lack prior ownership experience 
and collateral security. 
On the other hand novice entrepreneurs by virtue of their inexperience are 
unable to provide the requisite information and collateral required to process their 
credit application and thus, creating an information asymmetry problem. The results 
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also indicated that inexperienced novice entrepreneurs lack the track record and the 
ability to perform. As a result, banks are unable to determine their creditworthiness 
creating higher levels o f uncertainty hence credit rationed. 
10.4 Theoretical and practical implications of the findings of the study 
This study has sought to make a contribution to both theoretical and practical 
understanding of the financing of small business entrepreneurs. New sets of 
empirical data from experienced and inexperienced entrepreneurs from Ghana have 
been applied to extend the knowledge of entrepreneurship financing using human 
and social capital concepts to explore the advantages habitual entrepreneurs have 
over novice entrepreneurs in accessing external finance. 
The focus of previous studies on human and social capital on 
entrepreneurship performance and successes has been limited to entrepreneur's 
identification and exploitation of opportunities, information search, innovation, 
networking and business advisory services. Particularly lacking is the use o f human 
and social capital to influence entrepreneurship access to external finance. This 
study therefore provides novel empirical evidence supporting earlier findings that 
habitual entrepreneurs with higher levels o f human and social capital are more likely 
to better perform or have access to resources compared to novice entrepreneurs 
(Rauch and Frese, 2000; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). The findings of this study 
have general implications for academics, financial practitioners and policy makers in 
identifying important areas for policy development regarding the promotion of 
entrepreneurship and access to external finance. 
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10.4.1 Theoretical implications 
One of the main contributions of this study is the support for previous studies 
relating to entrepreneurship performance and successes and the credit rationing 
literature. The empirical findings o f this study have demonstration adequate support 
for previous research relating to the habitual entrepreneurship concept on human 
capital, social capital entrepreneurship activity and credit rationing. This study 
therefore makes significant contributions to the academic literature in that the 
findings confirm the following: 
Firstly, regarding the capital structure of small businesses, the findings of the 
study showed that small business financing follows the pecking order theory. The 
pecking order theory has argued that small business entrepreneurs wi l l rely first on 
internal sources of capital, such as personal savings, retained earnings, loans and 
gifts from relations before falling on debt financing at a later stages. The results of 
this study confirms the pecking order theory by showing that inexperienced (novice) 
entrepreneurs at the beginning of their venture are more likely to depend on internal 
sources of start-up capital compared with experienced entrepreneurs who are more 
likely to utilise external sources of finance in addition to the internal sources o f start-
up capital. 
Additionally, in terms of the sources and the utilisation of start-up capital for 
new ventures, the study findings confirmed previous research that inexperienced 
entrepreneurs with no prior business ownership experience were more likely to 
depend on internal sources of start-up capital compared to habitual entrepreneurs 
with prior ownership experiences (Aryeetey et al., 1994; Wright et al., 1997a; 
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Henandez-Trillo et al., 2005). Besides, the results of the regression confirmed that 
small business entrepreneurs in Ghana finance their business by following the 
pecking order theory (Nissanke, 2001; Westhead et al., 2003a). 
Secondly, findings of this study also support the agency theory. The agency 
theory argues that under conditions of information asymmetry and uncertainty, 
principals (banks) wi l l adopt measures to ensure that the interest o f agents 
(entrepreneurs) is aligned to those o f the principals. The findings of this study 
confirms the information asymmetry problems small businesses encounter when 
accessing bank credit. The findings also confirm how banks use collateral 
requirements to resolve the adverse selection and moral hazard issued raised in the 
agency theory argument. 
Additionally, the study extends previous research knowledge by confirming 
earlier research findings that most small business entrepreneurs encountered 
difficulties accessing formal credit because of the problems of information 
asymmetry, a lack o f a proven track record and also a lack the collateral to support 
their credit applications (Acs, 1985; Hernandez-Trillo et al., 2005; Kutsuna and 
Honjo, 2006; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). 
Thirdly, this study has confirmed the findings in previous studies in relation 
to the suggestion that the success of a business is positively related to the 
entrepreneur's level of education, training, and prior business ownership experience 
(Kilkenny et al., 1999; Ucbasaran et al., 2003b). The findings o f this study also 
supports the propositions that habitual entrepreneurs with higher education, more 
work experience and skills are likely to have superior abilities, achieve higher 
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performance, develop good reputations and become more successful in accessing 
external finance than novice entrepreneurs with a lower or less human capital 
(Rauch and Frese, 2000; Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). 
Fourthly, the impact of geographical distance and credit rationing is more 
likely to affect the inexperienced small business entrepreneur compared with the 
experienced entrepreneurs. Most of the empirical literature revealed that the 
geographical distance between banks and their entrepreneurs have been increasing 
over the years in the developed nations as a result o f an improvement in 
technological advancement and deregulations and reductions in back branches 
(Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Wolken and Rohde, 2002; 
Hannan, 2003; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; DeYoung et al., 2008a). 
However, the findings of this study have shown that the banks in Ghana are 
rather increasing their branch networks in both conurbations and large towns. 
Additionally, banks in Ghana have centralised their banking processing and decision 
making leading to an increase in both geographical and functional distances between 
the banks and small businesses located in small towns (Binks et al., 1992; Mason 
and Harrison, 1993; Felsenstein and Fleischer 2002). This has resulted in an increase 
in information asymmetry and hence credit rationing (Mason and Harrison, 1993; 
Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006). 
Fifthly, the study demonstrated that social capital through relational trust 
played a key role in the lender-borrower relationship (Saparito et al., 2004). Through 
durable relationships, banks and entrepreneurs are able to build trust over a period of 
time for mutual benefit (Dunkelberg et al., 1984). The findings further revealed that 
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trust building is achieved through regular interactions and visits between the 
entrepreneur and the bank, regular exchanges of information, types of products and 
services the bank offers to the entrepreneur and the provision of collateral security to 
support credit applications (Binks and Ennew, 1997; Berlin and Mester, 1998; Y l i -
Renko et al., 2001; Dowla, 2006). These relationships signify confidence, goodwill 
and cooperation which build good reputations and trust making access to finance 
much easier (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Das and Teng, 1998). 
Sixthly, the overall findings of the study also confirm earlier findings on 
credit rationing o f small businesses. The findings of this study show that small 
business entrepreneurs with no track records and lacking business experience 
(Aryeetey et al., 1994; Baydas et al., 1994; Levenson and Williad, 2000; Okurut et 
al., 2005; Voordeckers and Steijvers; 2005; Tagoe et al., 2005; Blumberg and 
Letterie, 2008), and lacking collateral to support their credit application (Manove et 
al., 2001) and lacking good reputations (Dasgupta, 2000) are perceived as high risks 
borrowers (Schiffer and Weder, 2001; Lieholm, 2002) and are more likely to be 
credit rationed. The study further confirms earlier studies that small business 
entrepreneurs who are peripherally located (Felsenstein and Fleischer, 2002; 
Brevoort and Hannan, 2006) are more likely to be credit rationed compared with 
habitual entrepreneurs because of a higher probability of default (Binks et al., 1992; 
De Young et al., 2008b). 
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10.4.2 Practical implications 
Previous studies have acknowledged the contributions of small businesses to 
national development in terms of employment generation and gross domestic 
product (Green, 2003; Wattanapruttipaisan, 2003). Equally acknowledged are the 
numerous challenges confronting the small businesses especially access to finance 
(Wagenvoort, 2003). Earlier studies have identified the presence of credit rationing 
amongst inexperienced small businesses and its effect on national development 
(Binks et al., 1992; Zeller, 1994; Tucker and Lean, 2003; Abor and Biekpe, 2007b; 
Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). The findings of this study provided supporting 
evidence to the earlier findings that inexperienced small business entrepreneurs are 
more likely to be credit rationed. 
The presented evidence from this study supports the view that habitual 
entrepreneurs with higher levels of human capital were more likely to report a higher 
use of external sources o f start-up capital compared to novice entrepreneurs 
(Kutsuna and Honjo, 2006; Heino, 2006; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). Secondly, 
habitual entrepreneurs with higher levels of human capital, prior ownership 
experience and social networking ties are less likely to be credit rationed compared 
with inexperienced novice entrepreneurs (Westhead et al., 2005). 
Thirdly, the findings o f this study show that entrepreneurs located further 
away from their preferred bank branch and also their closest competitive bank 
branch are more likely to be credit rationed (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Agarwal and 
Hauswald, 2006; Alessandrini et al., 2006). Increased distance increases information 
asymmetry between banks and the entrepreneur leading to an increase in loan 
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defaults (DeYoung et al., 2008b) and bank credit rationing (Brevoort and Hannan, 
2006). 
Fourthly, the findings suggest that durable relationship increases credit 
availability and reduces the costs of credit to the entrepreneur (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994; Binks and Ennew, 1997). The results also suggest that entrepreneurs with a 
good reputation are more likely to have access to bank credit compared with 
entrepreneurs with a bad reputation (Dei Ottati, 1994). 
The study has highlighted some of the challenges small business 
entrepreneurs encounter in accessing external finance. Most notably, novice 
entrepreneurs and small business start-up entrepreneurs encounter more challenges 
and are more likely to be credit rationed. The evidence presented raised issues on 
sources o f start-up capital, access to bank credit, the influence of geographical 
distance to credit accessibility and the influence of trust and reputation in credit 
accessibility. Policy makers and practitioners must therefore adopt pragmatic steps 
and programmes in addressing these challenges. However, in so doing, policy 
makers and practitioners must tailor their policies to address specific challenges 
facing small business novice and start-up entrepreneurs and habitual entrepreneurs. 
The presented evidence also suggests that habitual entrepreneurs were more 
likely to be associated with higher levels of education, prior ownership education, 
durable banking relationships, and well structured networking ties compared with 
inexperienced novice entrepreneurs. Additionally, the findings revealed that habitual 
entrepreneurs were more likely to provide collateral security, track records and good 
reputations to signify capacity, ability and integrity towards future performance and 
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repayment. Hence, habitual entrepreneurs were less likely to be credit rationed. On 
the other hand, the presented evidence suggests that novice and start-up 
entrepreneurs were not only inexperienced, but also that they lack the track record, 
lack collateral security and lack reputations. The evidence suggested they were more 
likely to be credit rationed. 
Policy makers and practitioners seeking to increase employment generation, 
increase individual income and the standard of living as well as promote economic 
growth and development must take a critical look at their policies towards novice 
and start-up entrepreneurs. Policies must be geared towards addressing the 
availability and accessibility of external credit for novice entrepreneur and start-up 
businesses. The re-engineering of existing policies towards the development of 
entrepreneurship in general must be made to accommodate the challenges 
specifically faced by novice and start-up entrepreneurs. Practitioners in the financial 
institutions must adopt measures aimed at improving information gathering, 
developing durable relationships, and encouraging trustworthy behaviour. 
Policy makers and practitioners also need to address issues associated with 
small business lending including information asymmetry, networking and collateral 
security. This study has therefore tailored down some policy recommendations in the 
next section for consideration by policy makers and practitioners to address 
entrepreneurial access to external finance by minimising information asymmetry and 
improving credit accessibility and thus reducing credit rationing. 
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10.5 Recommendations for commercial bank managers (practitioners) and 
policy makers for the improvement of small business entrepreneur 
financing. 
10.5.1 Reducing information asymmetry 
A number of studies have shown how small businesses have encountered 
difficulties in accessing bank credit as a result of the problems of information 
asymmetry (von Eije et al., 2003; Cowling and Mitchell, 2003). The findings of this 
study have confirmed the information asymmetry problems as most small business 
entrepreneurs are unable to provide their banks with the requisite information. This 
is due to the fact that they are unable to keep records, have unreliable financial 
statements and also lack collateral. In order for the problem of information 
asymmetry to be addressed, the following steps are recommended: 
• Simplify business registration procedures, encourage regular updating of 
information and changes to business ownership and structures. The fi l l ing of 
relevant information and mandatory returns regarding taxes and other 
regulations must be strictly enforced and adhered to; 
• Improve the reliability of financial information provided by small businesses 
by adopting user-friendly accounting systems and reporting requirements 
consistent with international best practice and enforce such requirements. 
360 
The user-friendly financial information should be accessible by the varying 
types o f entrepreneurs - novice, serial and portfolio; 
• Strengthen the ability of business development service providers to make 
small businesses more creditworthy through special support measures such 
as training on book-keeping, costing, marketing skills, developing innovative 
skills, financial management and entrepreneurship and improving human and 
social capital resources to ensure reliability of financial and business 
information; 
• Accelerate the pace of reform of the legal and financial framework necessary 
for an enabling business environment; this includes more rapid dispute 
settlement and effective bankruptcy and insolvency procedures. 
• Financial institutions must proactively watch out for early warning signs of 
future loan repayment problems and initiate vigorous collection efforts to 
avoid default. This can be achieved by utilising both hard and soft 
information in their lending decisions. 
10.5.2 Relationship lending 
In view of the numerous benefits outlined in the findings regarding durable 
relationship lending, the following is recommened to commercial bank managers 
and policy makers to enhance small business entrepreneur financing: 
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Foster the development of a durable and comprehensive bank-entrepreneur 
relationship that extends beyond credit accessibility. This can be achieved by 
educating and encouraging small business entrepreneurs to practice regular 
banking and relationship building with their banks at all times and not only 
when they are in need o f additional financing; 
In building a durable relationship between entrepreneurs and financial 
institutions, policy makers and practitioners must encourage the formation of 
associations within sectors and communities to ensure uniformity in problem 
identification and structuring of solutions; 
The formation of these associations wi l l encourage the development of 
norms, values and business cultures, which wil l address issues of mistrust 
and behavioural uncertainties. These associations wi l l serve as third party 
referrals to the lending institutions where they may provide sensitive 
information regarding the quality of individual entrepreneurs. The effect here 
wi l l be for individual entrepreneurs to aspire to build good reputations in 
their business dealings; 
Policies must also be geared towards encouraging and persuading business 
associations and individual small business entrepreneurs to register and 
formalise their relationship with service providers such as business advisory 
services, legal, accounting and auditing services and other regulatory 
agencies related to their form of business. This wi l l develop a culture of 
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transparency and accountability in dealing with financial institutions and the 
reliability of financial information provided; 
• Secondly, this relationship i f well developed can help reduce the information 
asymmetry problems existing between banks and their entrepreneurs as the 
above relationship wi l l assist in providing reliable information about an 
entrepreneur's quality. 
10.5.3 Collateral security 
Nagarajian and Meyer, (1998) described a collateral as any physical asset 
whose appropriability leads to ease of liquidation in situations o f default, absence 
collateral-specific risks and the accrual of the returns to the borrower. The evidence 
presented in this study suggests that most novice entrepreneurs and start-up 
entrepreneurs do not possess the physical structure of buildings and other machinery 
and equipment to be used as collateral. In addition to this challenge, the deficiencies 
of the legal institutions prohibit the usefulness of collateral when an entrepreneur 
defaults. In situations of defaults, enforcing the collateral is not only costly but also 
involves lengthy proceedings (Daumont et al., 2004). As a result o f these difficulties, 
banks in Africa are reluctant in proceeding to the law courts despite the high levels 
of default (Fafchamps, 1996; Bigsten et al., 2000). To avoid these high levels of 
default, banks prefer rationing credit to these small business entrepreneurs (Nissake, 
2001, Tagoe et al., 2005; Abor and Biekpe, 2007b). 
In view of these difficulties, most economies, both developed and developing 
have introduced credit guarantee schemes to promote the growth and contributions 
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of small businesses. These credit guarantee schemes are designed to help address 
several barriers to credit accessibility by small businesses by altering the perceived 
high risk associated with small business lending. It is also assumed that the credit 
guarantee scheme wil l reduce the default risk associated with small business lending 
and make credit accessibility by small business entrepreneurs more feasible. The use 
of the credit guarantee scheme helps minimise adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Additionally, the schemes also help reduce the costs of transaction 
lending, lower terms of the facility and transform the entrepreneur's quality. Some 
of the credit guarantee schemes currently in use include: publicly operated national 
schemes, mutual guarantee schemes, corporate guarantee schemes and multinational 
cooperation guarantee schemes. 
The failures of most credit guarantee scheme to perform had led to some 
critics questioning the justification and effectiveness of the schemes in relation to the 
existence of market imperfections (Volgel and Adams, 1997). Others have also 
questioned the interventions of governments and the use o f public funds to support 
these schemes (Parker, 2002). Admittedly, most credit guarantee schemes in 
developing countries have suffered many challenges ranging from inadequate 
procedures, moral hazards, delays in paying claims and a lack o f adequate funding to 
increase capitalisation in order to support larger investments and also to cover wider 
sectors. 
In order to address these difficulties, this study has outlined some measures 
to help improve the procedures, reduce moral hazard, and provide adequate and 
regular funding to increase capitalisation. The study therefore recommends the use 
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of a guarantee certificate to be purchased by entrepreneurs and used as collateral in 
place of the traditional collateral securities such as buildings, lands, vehicles, 
machinery and equipments. 
The objective of this collateral guarantee scheme is to help the new and 
existing small business entrepreneur to access external credit from the formal 
financial institutions without the hassles o f producing the traditional collateral 
security. The backbone of this guarantee scheme is the setting up of a Collateral 
Guarantee Fund Trust by the government and other interested institutions. The 
scheme wi l l assist in providing availability of collateral-free credit to small business 
entrepreneurs by mitigating 70% of the credit risk o f the eligible lenders based on 
the viability of the projects. The agreed guarantee fee should range between 2.5% 
and 3.5% and also an annual service fee o f 1.5% of the outstanding credit. 
From the above discussions the recommendations for practitioners and policy 
makers include the following: 
• The first recommendation is for policy makers to set up a collateral guarantee 
certificate in place o f the traditional collateral securities such as buildings, 
lands, vehicles, machinery and equipments. This certificate when purchased 
by the entrepreneur w i l l serve as a collateral guarantee for the financial 
institution lending credit to the entrepreneur. 
• There must be a tripartite risk sharing agreement in the collateral guarantee 
certificate scheme. The guarantee company wi l l guarantee the investment 
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with an upper limit o f 70%. The lending institution must also take up a 
minimum of 10% and the small business entrepreneur taking a minimum of 
20%. 
To qualify for the certificate, the small business entrepreneur must fu l f i l all 
the information submission requirements. Failure to meet these requirements 
implies no guarantee certificate is offered. 
Policy makers and practitioners must ensure that the guarantee scheme 
employs qualified, competent and adequate professionals to provide effective 
and efficient services including processing of applications, risk analysis, 
monitoring and evaluation and efficient debt recovery and the handling of 
claims. 
Early warning signals must be adhere to effectively and immediate remedial 
actions taken to address the challenge. 
In order to ensure regular and adequate funding o f the scheme, government 
must gradually o f f load all the shares of the guarantee company on to the 
stock market for recapitalisation. Government must also avoid interference in 
the day to day management of the scheme and rather allow for professional 
management and the independence of the scheme. 
Government should rather offer the financial institutions counter-guarantees 
as in re-insurance to boost the confidence in the scheme and the assurance of 
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repayment in situations o f economic recession, natural disasters and 
unforeseen circumstances. 
• A l l financial institutions interested in the scheme must be made to hold 
shares in the guarantee scheme. Financial institutions holding shares in the 
scheme wi l l be entitled to a guaranteed scheme of 100 times their share 
value. This means banks wi l l be required to hold a minimum of 10% of the 
total o f all guaranteed credits made to small business entrepreneurs. 
Additionally, no individual financial institution wi l l be allowed to offer an 
individual entrepreneur more than the value o f its shareholdings in the 
guarantee scheme. 
• Individual entrepreneurs and small businesses must be encouraged to own 
shares in the scheme. High quality entrepreneurs with shares in the scheme 
must be offered a higher percentage guarantee cover as an incentive for 
others to desire to hold shares. 
The above measures would ensure an effective and efficient guarantee scheme to 
support credit lending to small business entrepreneurs as the above recommendation 
aims at reducing information asymmetry, minimise adverse selection and moral 
hazard and perceived risk associated with small business lending. It is also aimed at 
improving bank-entrepreneur relationships, building trust and reputations, increasing 
external credit availability and accessibility and reducing credit rationing of small 
business entrepreneurs. 
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10.6 Limitations of the study and implications for future studies 
As with other research studies, this study is associated with several 
limitations and thus offering future research opportunities. The primary data used in 
this study was gathered through responses from small business entrepreneurs 
through questionnaire administration and in-depth interviews. Doubt may be cast on 
the wider validity o f the selected dependent and independent variables. However, 
other studies have argued that individual respondents can provide reliable 
information about their businesses (De Tienne and Koberg, 2002; Ozgen and Baron, 
2007). 
The study used data gathered from one region out of ten regions in Ghana to 
generalise the results relating to small business entrepreneurs and bank credit 
rationing. This study however can be accepted as a true representation of the 
situation of credit rationing of small business entrepreneurs in Ghana as the rest of 
the regions have similar characteristics as the region used (Acquah, 2007). 
In order for policy makers and practitioners to develop more appropriate and 
beneficial policies towards novice and start-up entrepreneurs, further research must 
be conducted in relation to novice and start-up entrepreneurs. 
Future studies should consider expanding the survey in the following areas. 
Firstly, a new survey should expand the size of the small businesses by redefining 
the business size from 4-50 employees to about 4-250 employees. Secondly, a 
further study should consider breaking further down the three sector variable of 
agriculture, manufacturing and services into sub-sector groups. An example wi l l be 
for the agricultural sector into farming (cash and food crops), fishing, poultry and 
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animal rearing. Thirdly, a further study should consider gathering primary data 
covering the entire country rather than one region. This w i l l enhance a further 
assessment o f the geographical credit rationing variable. 
Fourthly, to ensure a wider spread of economic development in various 
sectors and remote locations further away from conurbation and large towns, further 
research must be conducted to explore how banks can use a collateral guarantee 
certificate scheme to lead to an improved relationship lending programme that wi l l 
lead to an increase credit to peripherally located small business entrepreneur. 
Fifthly, variables relating to trust characteristics in the bank-entrepreneur 
relationship could be gathered in future studies from the side o f the entrepreneurs in 
order to provide additional evidence on trust characteristics and their role in bank 
lending decisions. Additional research also needs to be carried out to ascertain how 
banks can develop and use trust behaviour to encourage good reputation building 
and increased access to external credit in the absence of physical collateral. 
369 
References 
Abereijo, I . O. and A. O. Fayomi, (2005). Innovative Approach to SME Financing in 
Nigeria. A review of Small and Medium Industries Equity Investment Scheme 
(SMIEIS). Journal of Social Science, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 219-227. 
Abor, J., (2005). The Relevance of Informal Finance in the Ghanaian Non-Traditional 
Export Sector. Paper Presented at the Sixth International Academy of African 
Business and Development Conference Proceedings, University of Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, Apri l , pp. 310-317. 
Abor, J., (2006). Female-owned Businesses and Access to Finance: Evidence from 
Ghanaian Non-traditional Export Sector. Gender and Behaviour, Vol . 4, No. 1. 
508-521. 
Abor, J. and N . Biekpe, (2007a). Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and 
Performance of SMEs in Ghana: Implications for Financing Opportunities. 
Corporate Governance, Vol . 7, No. 3, pp. 288-300. 
Abor, J. and N . Biekpe, (2007b). Small Business Reliance on Bank Financing in Ghana. 
Emerging Market Finance and Trade, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 93-102. 
Abor, J. and N . Biekpe, (2006a). Corporate Debt Policy of Small and Medium 
Enterprises in Ghana. University of Stellenbosch Business School, South Africa, 
Working Paper, pp. 1-17. 
Abor, J. and N . Biekpe, (2006b). How are SME's Financed? Evidence from the 
Ghanaian Non-Traditional Export Sector. Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy, Vol . 24, pp. 71 -81. 
Acquah, M . , (2007). Managerial Social Capital, Strategic Orientation amd 
Organisational Performance in an Emerging Economy. Strategic Managemet 
Journal, Vo l . 28, pp. 1235-1255. 
Acquah, P. A., (2008). Bank of Ghana, Accra, Ghana. Speech Delivered by the 
Governor o f Bank of Ghana at the Official Opening of Bank of Baroda 
International in Accra, Ghana on February 11, 2008, pp. 1-5. 
370 
Acs, Z. J., (1985). A Case Study of the Financing o f Mini Mil ls in the U. S. Steel 
Industry. Policy Studies Journal, Vol . 13, Issue 4, pp. 747-755. 
Acs, Z. J. and D. B. Audretsch, (1990). Innovation and Small Firms. Cambridge: The 
M I T Press Third Edition, ISBN-10: 0262011131, ISBN-13: 9780262011136, pp. 
1-207. 
Adams, D., (1992). Taking a Fresh Look at Informal Finance in Dale Adams and D. 
Fitchett (eds), Informal Finance in Low-Income Countries, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, pp. 5-23. 
Adler, P. and S. Kwon, (2002). Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept. Academy 
of Management Review, Vol . 27, No. 1, pp. 17-40. 
Aernoudt, R., (2005). Business Angels: The Smartest Money for Starters? Plea for a 
Renewed Policy Focus on Business Angels. International Journal of Business, 
Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 271-284. 
Aernoudt, R., (1999). European Policy Towards Venture Capital: Myth or Reality? 
Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Vol. 1, 
pp. 47-59. 
Africa Economic Outlook. (2006). The Economy of Ghana. AfDB/OECD pp. 283-293. 
Agarwal, S. and R. Hauswald, (2006). Distance and Information Asymmetries in 
Lending Decisions. Washington DC, American University. Paper Presented at 
the Conference on Financial Modernisation and Economic Growth in Europe, 
Berlin, 28-29 September, 2006, pp. 1-37. 
Aghion, P. and P. Bolton, (1992). An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting. Review of Economic Studies, Vol . 59, pp. 473. 
Aintabian, S., P. A. Mcgraw, and G. S. Roberts, (2007). Bank Monitoring and 
Environmental Risk. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol . 34, No. 
land 2, pp. 389-401. 
Aivazian, V., X. Gu, and J. Qiu, (2004). Loan Rates and the Two Faces of Collateral. 
University o f Toronto, Canada, Working Paper, pp. 1-48. 
371 
Akerlof, G., (1970). The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanisms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol . 84, pp. 488-500. 
Alando, L., (1991). Financing Small-scale Export Business in Ghana. School of 
Administration, University of Ghana, Legon, pp. 31-41. 
Albaladejo, M . , (2002). Promoting SMEs in Africa: Key Areas for Policy Intervention, 
Background Report for AfDB ' s New Policy Guidelines to Promote Small and 
Medium Scale Enterprises, Abidjan, Cote D'lvoire. United Nation Industrial 
Development Organisation, Private Sector Development Branch, Working paper, 
pp. 1-140. 
Albaum, G., J. Strandskov, and E. Duerr, (1998). International Marketing and Export 
Management, (3 r d ed.), Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Harlow, pp. 397-
423. 
Aldrich, H. and C. Zimmer, (1986). Entrepreneurship through Social Networks. D. 
Sexton, R. Smilor, (Eds). The Art and Science of Entrepreneurship. Ballinger, 
Cambridge, M A : Ballinger, pp. 3-23. 
Aldrich, H., (1999). Organisations Evolving. Sage Publications. ISBN: 0803989180, pp. 
1-407. 
Aldrich, H., L.Renzulli, and N . Langton, (1998). Passing on Privilege: Resources 
Provided by Self-Employed Parents to their Self-Employed Children. Research 
in Social Stratification and Mobility, Vol . 16, pp. 291-317. 
Aleem, I . , (1990). Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of Informal Lending: 
A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan. World Bank Economic Review, 
Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 329-349. 
Alessandrini, P., A. F. Presbitero, and A. Zazzaro, (2006). Banks, Distance and 
Financing Constraints for Firms. Universita Politecnica Delle Marche, Quaderno 
Di ricerca No. 266. Universita Politecnica Delle Marche, Diparttimento di 
Economia, Working Paper, WP 266, pp. 1-27. 
Aliaga, M . and B. Gunderson, (2002). Interactive Statistics (2 n d Edition). Prentice Hall 
Publications, 2002. ISBN-10: 013065597X, ISBN-13: 9780130655974, pp. 1-985. 
372 
Almazan, A., (2002). A Model o f Competition in Banking: Bank Capital versus 
Expertise. Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol . 11, pp. 87-121. 
Alsos, G. A. and L. Kolvereid, (1998). The Business Gestation Process of Novice, Serial 
and Parallel Business Founders. Entrepreneur ship, Theory and Practice, Vol . 22, 
pp. 101-114. 
Alvarez, S. A. and J. Barney, (2004). Organising Rent Generation and Appropriation: 
Toward a Theory of the Entrepreneurial Firm. Journal of Business Venturing, 
Vol. 19, Issue 5, pp.621-635. 
Alvarez, S. A. and L. Busenitz, (2001). The Entrepreneurship of Resource-Based 
Theory. Journal of Management, Vol . 6, pp. 755-775. 
Alvarez, S. A. , (2005). Two Theories of Entrepreneurship: Alternative Assumptions and 
the Study of Entrepreneurial Action. Foundations and Trends in 
Entrepreneurship, Vol . 1, Issue 3, pp. 105-148. 
Amabile, T .M. , (1988). A Model of Creativity and Innovation in Organisations. In B. 
Staw and L. L . Cumming (editions). Greenwich CT: JAI Press. Research in 
Organisational Behaviour, Vol . 10, pp. 123-167. 
Amano, M . , (1999). Credit Rationing of a Bayesian Bank with Simple Screening 
Tchnologies. Japan and the World Economy, Vol . 11, pp. 545-556. 
Amel, D. F. and K.P. Brevoort, (2005). The Perceived Size of Small Business Banking 
Market. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol . 1 No. 4, pp. 771-784. 
Amit, R., L. Glosten, and E. Muller, (1990). Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture 
Investments, and Risk Sharing. Management Science, Vol . 38, No. 10, pp. 1232-
1245. 
Amonoo, E., P. K. Acquah, and E. E. Asmah, (2003). The Impact of Financial Sector 
Liberalisation on the Poor International Labour Organisation, IFLIP Research 
paper, pp. 3-10. 
373 
Anderson, M . B., (1985). Technology Transfer: Implications for Women. In Gender 
Roles in Development Projects. Kumarian press, West Hartford, CT, USA, pp. 
18-21. 
Anderson, A. and C. Miller, (2003). Class Matter: Human and Social Capital in the 
Entrepreneurial Process. The journal of Socio-Economics, Vol . 32, pp. 17-36. 
Angelini, P., R. Di . Salvo, G. Ferri, (1998). Availability o f Cost o f Credit for Small 
Businesses: Customer Relationships and Credit Cooperatives. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol . 22, No. 6, pp. 925-954. 
Aram, J. D., (1989). Attitudes and Behaviours of Informal Investors Toward Early-Stage 
Investments, Technology-Based Ventures and Co-investors. Journal of Business 
Venturing, Vol . 4, Issue 5, pp. 333-347. 
Ardichvili , A., R. Cardozo, and S. Ray, (2003). A Theory of Entrepreneurial 
Opportunity Identication and Development. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 
18 ,No. l , pp. 105-123. 
Arrow, K. J., (1963). Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. The 
American Economic Review, Vol . 53, pp. 941-973. 
Arrow, K. J., (1971). Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and 
Externalities. Frontiers of Qualitative Economics, Amsterdam, North Holland. In 
Intrilligator, M . (ed.). pp. 3-25. 
Aryeetey, E., (2001). Priority Research Issues Relating to Regulation and Competition 
in Ghana. Centre on Regulation and Competition, Institute for Development 
Policy and Management, University of Manchester, Working Paper Series, 
ISBN- 10: 904056083, pp. 1-23. 
Aryeetey, E., (1998). Informal Finance for Private Sector Development in Africa. A 
Background Paper Prepared for the African Development Report, 1998, pp. 1-
31. 
Aryeetey, E., (1997). Rural Finance in Africa: Institutional Development and Access for 
the Poor. The World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 25-
26 Apri l , Washington D. C, pp. 149. 
374 
Aryeetey, E., H . Hettige, M . Nissanke, and W. Steel, (1997). Financial Market, 
Fragmentation and Reforms in Sub-saharan Africa, Washington, D. C. Africa 
Region Series, The World Bank, Technical Paper No. 356, pp. 1-68. 
Aryeetey, E., A. Baah-Nuakoh, T. Duggleby, H. Hettige, and W. F. Steel, (1994). 
Supply and Demand for Finance of Small Enterprises in Ghana. World Bank 
Africa Technical Department Series, Washington, D. C. Discussion Papers, No. 
251, pp. 1-130. 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), (2003). Peoples Republic o f China: The development 
of private enterprise, Manila. Asian Development Bank Publications No. 
030403, pp. 1-193. 
Astbro, T. and I . Bernhardt, (2005). The Winner's Curse of Human Capital. Small 
Business Economics, Vol . 24, No. 1, pp. 63-78. 
Atieno, R., (2001). Formal and Informal Institutions' Lending Policies and Access to 
Credit by Small-Scale Enterprises in Kenya: An Empirical Assessment. AERC 
Research Paper 111 African Economic Research Consortiums, Nairobi, pp. 1-53. 
Auciello, K. E., (1975). Employment Generation through Stimulation of Small 
Industries, an International Compilation of Small-Scale Industry Definitions, 
Atlanta, Georgia Institute of Technology. 
Audretsch, D. B. and J. A. Elston, (2002). Does Firm Size Matter? Evidence on the 
Impact o f Liquidity Constraints on Firm Investment Behaviour in Germany. 
International Journal of Industrial Organisation, Vol . 20, Issue 1, pp. 1-17. 
Avery, R. B., R. W. Bostic, and K. A. Samolyk, (1998). The Role of Personal Wealth in 
Small in Small Business Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 22, pp. 
1019-1061. 
Avery, R. B. and K. Samolyk, (2000). Bank Consolidation and the Provision of Banking 
Services. The Case of Small Commercial Loans, Mimeo, Federal Reserve Board 
and FDIC, pp. 1-41. 
375 
Ayyagari, M . , T. Beck, and A. Demirguc-Kunt, (2003). Small and Medium Enterprise 
across the Globe: Anew Database. World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper, 
3127, pp. 1-40. 
Azam, J. P., B. Biais, M . Dia, and C. Maurel, (2001). Informal and Formal Credit 
Market and Credit Rationing in Cote D'lvoire. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol . 17, No. 4, pp. 520-534. 
Baah-Nuakoh, A. , C. D. Jebuni, A. D. Oduro, and Y. Asante, (1996). Exporting 
Manufactures from Ghana- Is adjustment Enough? Overseas Development 
Institute/University of Ghana, Legon, Chameleon Press Limited, London. ISBN -
13:978085003241-3, pp. 1-118. 
Baden, S., (1996). Gender Issues in Financial Liberalisation and Financial Sector, Topic 
Paper Prepared for EU, DG V I I I and OECD, DAC, Sussex: BRIDGE. Report No. 
39, pp. 1-70. 
Baker, W., (1990). Market Networks and Corporate Behaviour. American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol . 96, pp. 589-625. 
Baker, M . and J. Wurgler, (2002). Market Timing and Capital Structure. The Journal of 
Finance, Vo l . 57, No. 1, pp. 1-32. 
Baldwin, J. R., G. Gellatly, and V. Gaudreault, (2002). Financing Innovation in New 
Small Firms: New Evidence from Canada. Analytical Studies Branch - Research 
Paper Series. Statistics Canada No. 11F0019 MIE No. 190. Micro-Economic 
Analysis Division 24-B R. H. Coats Building, Ottawa K 1 A OT6. ISBN-10: 
662322231, pp. 1-51. 
Baldwin, J. R., T. Gray, J. Johnson, J. Proctor, M . Rafiquzzaman and D. Sabourin, 
(1997). Failing Concerns: Business Bankruptcy in Canada. Catalogue No. 61-
525 XIE, pp. 1-72. 
Baltensperger, E., (1978). Credit Rationing: Issues and Questions. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, Vol . 10, Issue 2, pp. 170-183. 
Baltsenberger, E., (1976). The Borrower Lender Relationship, Competitive Equilibrium, 
and the Theory of Hedonic Price. American Economic Review, Vol . 66, No. 3, 
pp. 401-403. 
376 
Bank of Ghana, (BOG) (2006). Annual Report and Account for 2006. Bank of Ghana 
Head Office, Accra, Ghana, Publications, pp. 1-75. 
Bannock, G. and A. Doran, (1991). Business Banking in the 1990s: A New Era of 
Competition, Lafferty Group, Dublin. 
Barham, B. L. , S. Boucher, and M . R. Carter, (1996). Credit Constraints, Credit Unions, 
and Small-Scale Producers in Guatemala. World Development, Vol . 24, No. 5, 
pp. 793-806. 
Barney, J. B, (1991) Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, Journal of 
Enterprise Management, Vol . 17, N o . l , pp. 99-120. 
Barney, J. B. and M . H. Hansen, (1994). Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive 
Advantage. Strategic Management Journal, Vol . 15, pp. 175-190. 
Barney, J. B., M . Wright, and D. J. Ketchen, (2001). The Resource-based View of the 
Firm: Ten Years After 1991, Journal of Management, Vol. 27, pp. 625-641. 
Baron, R. A. , (1998). Cognitive mechanisms in Entrepreneurship: Why and When 
Entrepreneurs Thinks Differently than other people. Journal of Business 
Venturing, Vol . 13, pp. 275-294. 
Baron, R. A. And M . D. Ensley, (2006). Opportunity Recognition as the Detection of 
Meaningful Patterns: Evidence from Comparisons o f Novice and Experienced 
Entrepreneurs. Management Science, Vol. 52, No. 9, pp. 1331-1344. 
Baron, R. A. and M . Ensley, (2003). Cognitive Foundation of Opportunity Recognition: 
Identifying the "Opportunity Prototypes" of Repeat Entrepreneurs. Presentation 
at the Babson College-Kauffman Foundation Entrepreneurial Research 
Conference, Wellesley M A , pp. 1-17. 
Barreto, H., (1989). The Entrepreneur in Microeconomic Theory: Disappearance and 
Explanation. London: Routledge, pp. 1-153. 
Barro, R. J., (1976). The Loan Market, Collateral and Rate of interest. Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, Vol.8. No. 4, pp. 439-4568. 
377 
Barton, S. L., (1989). Capital Structure Decisions in Privately held Firms. A Summary 
of Owner Interviews. Working Paper. College o f Business Administration, 
University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, pp. 1-12. 
Barton, S. L. and P. J. Gordon, (1987). Corporate Strategy: Useful Perspective for the 
Study of Capital Structure. Academy of Management Review, Vol . 12, No. 1, pp. 
67-75. 
Barton, S. L. and C. Mathews, (1989). Small Firm Financing: Implications from a 
Strategic Management Perspective. Journal of Small Business Management, Vol. 
27, pp. 1-7. 
Basu, A., (1998). The Role o f Institutional Support in Asian Entrepreneurial Expansion 
in Britain, Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol . 5, No. 4, 
pp. 317-326. 
Basu, S., (1992). Asymmetric Information, Credit Rationing and the Stiglitz and Weiss 
Model. Macquarie University School of Economic and Financial Studies. 
Research Paper No. 360, ISBN No. 0858378264, pp. 1-24. 
Basu, A. and S. C. Parker, (2001). Family Finance and New Business Start-Ups. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol . 63, No. 3, pp. 0305-9049. 
Bates, R., (1977). Institutions as Investments. Journal of African Economies, Vol . 6, No. 
3, pp. 1-23. 
Bates, T., (1997). Financing Small Business Creation: The Case of Chinese and Korean 
Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 12, pp. 109-24. 
Bates, T., (1991). Commercial Bank Finance in White and Black Owned Small Business 
Start-ups. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, Vol . 31, No. 3, pp.64-
89. 
Bates, T., (1990). Entrepreneur Human Capital Input and Small Business Longetity 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol . 72, No. 4, pp. 551-559. 
Batjargal, B., (2003). Social Capital and Entrepreneurial Performance in Russia: A 
Longitudinal Study. Organisational Studies, Vol . 24, No. 4, pp. 535-556. 
378 
Bawumia, M . , (2007). Banking in Ghana in the Last 50 Years. Challenges and 
Prospects. A Keynote Address by Dr. Mahamuda Bawumia, Deputy Governor, 
Bank of Ghana, at the Launch of Ghana Banking Awards at M-Plaza, Accra in 
January, 23, 2007, pp. 1-5. 
Baydas, M . M . , R. L. Meyer and N . Aguilera-Alfred, (1994). Credit Rationing in Small-
Scale Enterprises: Special Micro-enterprise Programmes in Ecuador. The 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 279-309. 
Becheikh, N . , R. Landry, and N . Amara, (2006). Lessons from Innovation Empirical 
Studies in the Manufacturing Sector: A Systematic Review of the Literature from 
1993-2003. Technovation, Vol . 26, pp. 644-664. 
Bechetti, L. and G. Trovato, (2002). The Determinants o f Growth for Small and 
Medium-sized Firms: The Role of the Availability of External Finance. Small 
Business Economics, Vol . 19, pp. 291-306. 
Beck, T. M . and A. Demirguc-Kunt, (2006). Small and Medium-Size Enterprises: 
Access to Finance as a Growth Constraint. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 
30, pp. 2931-2943. 
Beck, T., M . Lundberg, and G. Majnoni, (2006). Financial Intermediary Development 
and Growth Volatility: Do Intermediaries Dampen or Magnify Shocks? Journal 
of International Money and Finance, Vol . 25, Issue 7, pp. 1146-1167. 
Becker, G. S., (1975). Human Capital, New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. Second Edition Columbia University Press, pp. 1-220. 
Becker, G. S., (1964). Human capital, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with 
Special Reference to Education, Columbia University, pp. 1-210. 
Becker, G. S., (1993). Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behaviour. The 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 3, pp. 385-409. 
Becker, L. , (1996). Trust as Non-Cognitive Security about Motives. Ethics, Vol . 107, 
pp. 43-61. 
379 
Begley, T. and D. Boyd, (1987). Psychological Characteristics Associated with 
Performance in Entrepreneurial Firms and Smaller Businesses. Journal of 
Business Venturing, Vol . 2, pp. 79-93. 
Bejou, D., C. T. Ennew, and A. Palmer, (1998). Trust, Ethics and Relationship 
Satistaction. International Journal of Bank Marketing, Vol . 16, No. 4, pp. 170-
175. 
Bengelsdijk, S., (2006). A Note on the Theory and Measurement of Trust in Explaining 
Differences in Economic Growth. Cambridge Journal of Economic, Vol . 30, pp. 
371-387. 
Berger, A . N . and R. DeYoung, (2006). Technological Progress and the Geographic 
Expansion o f the Banking Industry. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 
38, pp. 1483-1513. 
Berger, A. N . , R.S. Demsetz, and P. E. Strahan, (1999). The Consolidation of Financial 
Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 23, pp. 135-194. 
Berger, A. N . and W. S. Frame, (2007). Small Business Credit Scoring and Credit 
Availability. Journal of Small Business Management, Vol . 45, No. 1, pp. 5-22. 
Berger, A . N . , N . H . Miller, M . A. Petersen, R. G. Rajan, and J. C. Stein, (2005). Does 
Function Follow Organisational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of 
Large and Small Banks. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 76, pp. 237-269. 
Berger, A . N . and G. F. Udell, (2002). Small Business Credit Availability and 
Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure. The 
Economic Journal, Vol . 112, pp. F32- F53. 
Berger, A. N . and G. F. Udell, (1998). The Economics of Small Business Finance: The 
Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 22, Issue 6-8, pp. 873-897. 
Berger, A . N . and G. F. Udell, (1995). Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in 
Small Firm Finance. Journal of Business, Vol . 68, pp. 351-381. 
380 
Berger, A. N . and G. F. Udell, (1994). Lines of Credit, Collateral and Relationship 
Lending in Small Firm Finance. Working Paper (S-94/11), Salomon Brothers 
Centre for the Study of Financial Institutions, New York University, pp. 1-44. 
Berger, A. N . and G. F. Udell, (1992). Some Evidence on the Empirical Significance of 
Credit Rationing. Journal of Political Economy, Vol . 100, No. 5, pp. 1047-1077. 
Berger, A. N . and G. F. Udell, (1990). Collateral, Loan Quality and Bank Risk. Journal 
of Monetary Economies, Vol . 25, pp. 21-42. 
Berlin, M . and L. J. Mester, (1998). On the Profitability and Relationship Lending. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 22, pp. 873-898. 
Berry, A., S. Faulkner, M . Hughes, and R. Jarvis, (1993). Bank Lending: Beyond the 
Theory. London: Chapman and Hall. ISBN-10: 0412473100, Thompsom 
Learning College Publications, pp. 1-75. 
Berry, A., P. Grant, and R. Jarvis, (2004). European Bank Lending to the UK SME 
Sector: An Investigation of Approaches Adopted. International Small Business 
Journal, Vol . 22, pp. 115-130. 
Besanko, D. and A. Thakor, (1987a). Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in 
Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets, International Economic Review, 
Vol . 28,No.3, pp. 671-689. 
Besanko, D. and A. Thakor, (1987b). Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market 
under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 42, pp. 167-
182. 
Besley, T., (1994). How Do Market Failures Justify Interventions in Rural Credit 
Markets? The World Bank Research Observer, Vol . 9, No. I , pp. 27-47. 
Bester, H. , (1987). The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, 
European Economic Review, Vol.3\. pp. 887-899. 
Bester, H. (1985). Screening versus Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect 
Information. American Economic Review, Vol . 57, pp. 850-855. 
381 
Bester, H. , (1994). The Role o f Collateral in a Model o f Debt Renegotiation, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, Vol . 26, pp. 72-86. 
Bester, H. and M . Hellwig, (1987). Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An 
Overview o f the Issues in Bamberg, G and Spremann, K., (eds). Agency Theory, 
Information and Incentives, Heidelberg: Sringer Verlag. Discussion Paper Series 
A, No. 125, pp. 135-166. 
Bester, H . and E. Petrakis, (1995). Price Competition and Advertising in Oligopoly. 
European Economic Review, Vol. 39, pp. 1075-1088. 
Bhaird, C. M . and B. Lucey, (2006). Capital Structure and the Financing o f SMEs: 
Empirical Evidence from An Irish Survey. A Conference Paper Entitled: 
Entrepreneurship - Occupational Choice and Financing. Centre for Economic 
and Business Research, Copenhagan, pp. 1-29. 
Bharath, S., S. Dahiya, A. Saunders, and A. Scinivasan, (2007). So What Do I Get? The 
Banks View of Lending Relationship. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 85, 
pp. 368-419. 
Bhati, S., (2006). Trust Between Branch Mangers and Loan Officers of Indian Banks. 
International Review of Business Research Papers, Vol . 2, No. 4, pp. 51-58. 
Bhide, A.V. , (2000). The Origin and Evolution o f New Businesses. New York Oxford 
University Press. ISBN-13: 9780195131444, pp. 1-412. 
Bies, R. J. and T. M . Tripp, (1996). Beyond Distrust: "Getting even" and the need for 
revenge. In R. M . Kramer and T. R. Tyler (Eds), Trust in Organisation, Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 246-260. 
Biggs, T., (2003). Is Small Beautiful and Worthy of Subsidy? Available at 
www.unece.org.worldbanksfun/ece), pp. 1-35. 
Biggs, T., P. Raturi, and M . Srivastava, (2002). Ethnic Networks and Access to Credit: 
Evidence from the Manufacturing Sector in Kenya. Journal of Economic 
Behaviour and Organisation, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 473-486. 
382 
Biggs, T. and P. Srivastava, (1996). Structural Aspects o f Manufacturing in Sub-saharan 
Africa: Findings from a Seven Country Enterprise Survey. World Bank 
Discussion Paper, No. 346, pp. 1-80. 
Bigsten, A. , P. Collier, S. Dercon, M . Fafchamps, B. Gauthier, J. W. Gunning, M . 
Soderbom, Oduro, R. Oostendorp, C. Patillo, F. Teal, and A. Zeufack, (2000). 
Credit constraints in manufacturing enterprises in Africa. Industrial Surveys in 
Africa (ISA) Group. Working Paper Series No. 2000/24. Centre for the Study of 
African Economics, University of Oxford, pp. 1-21. 
Binks, M . R. and C. T. Ennew, (1997). Smaller Businesses and Relationship Banking: 
The Impact of Participative Behaviour. Entrepremurship Theory and Practice, 
Vol . 21, No. 4, pp. 83-92. 
Binks, M . R. and C. T. Ennew, (1996). Growing Firms and the Credit Constraint. Small 
Business Economics, Vol . 18, No. 1, pp. 17-25. 
Binks, M . R., C. T. Ennew, and G. V. Reed, (1992). Information Asymmetries and the 
Provision of Finance to Small Firms, International Small Business Journal, Vol . 
11, No. 1, pp. 35-46. 
Binswanger, H., J. Mclntire, and C. Udry, (1989). Production relations in semi-arid 
African agriculture in P. Bardhan (Ed), The economic theory of Agrarian 
institutions. Oxford: Clarendon press, 1989. 
Binswanger, H . P. and M . R. Rosenzweig, (1986). Behavioural and Material 
Determinants o f Production Relations in Agriculture. Journal of Development 
Studies, Vol . 22, pp. 503-539. 
Birch, D., (1979). The Job Generating Process. In Small Business, Critical Perspectives 
on Business and Management Edited by David Storey, Taylor and Francis 
Publications, pp. 431-466. 
Birley, S., (1985). The Role of Networks in the Entrepreneurial Process. Journal of 
Business Venturing, Vol . l , N o . 1, pp. 107-117. 
383 
Birley, S., C. Moss and P. Saunders, (1987). Do Women Entrepreneurs Require 
Different Training? American Journal of Small Business, pp. 27-35. 
Birley, S. and P. Westhead, (1993). A Comparison of New Businesses Established by 
Novice and Habitual Founders in Great Britain, International Small Business 
Journal, Vol . 12, pp. 38-60. 
Birley, S. and P. Westhead, (1990). Private Business Sales Environments in the United 
Kingdom, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 5, pp. 349-373. 
Black, J. and D. de Meza, (1992). Diversionary Tactics: Why Business Loan is so Safe. 
Discussion Papers in Economics - University of Exeter, No. 9/92, pp. 1-12. 
Black, J., D. de Meza, and D. Jeffreys, (1996). House Prices, the Supply o f Collateral 
and the Enterprise Economy. The Economic Journal, Vol . 106, pp. 60-75. 
Black, S. E. and P. E. Strahan, (2002). Entrepreneurship and Bank Credit Availability, 
The Journal of Finance, Vol . 57, No. 6, pp. 2807-2833. 
Blackwell, D. and D. Winter, (2000). Local Lending Markets: What a Small Business 
Owner/Manager needs to know. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 
Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 62-79. 
Blanc, X., (1977). Industrial Change Under Structural Adjustment: Tanzania 1993-1996. 
The African Regional Programme on Enterprise Development, Washington, D. 
C. World Bank. 
Blancard, S., J-P. Boussemart, W. Briec, and K. Kerstens, (2006). Short and Long-run 
Credit Constraints in French Agriculture: A Directional Distance Function 
Framework Using Expenditure-Constrained Profit Functions. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economic, Vol . 88, Issue 2, pp. 351-364. 
Blanchflower, D. G., P. B. Levine, and D. J. Zimmerman, (2003). Discrimination in the 
Small-Business Credit Market. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 85, 
No. 4, pp. 930-943. 
Blanchflower, D. C. and A. J. Oswald, (1998). What Makes an Entrepreneur? Journal of 
Labour Economics, Vol . 16, pp. 26-60. 
384 
Blau, P. M . , (1964). Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley, pp. 1-343. 
Blinder, A. and J. Stiglitz, (1983). Money, Credit Constraint, and Economic Activity, 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. Vol . 73, pp. 297-302. 
Blois, K. J., (1999). Trust in Business to Business Relationships: An Evaluation o f its 
Status. Journal of Management Studies, Vol . 36, No. 2, pp. 197-215. 
Bloodgood, J. M . , J. Sapienza and A. L. Carsrud, (1995). The Dynamics of New 
Business Start-ups: Person, Context and Process. In Katz, J. A. And S. 
Brockhaus (Eds) Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm Emergence and Growth, 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Vol . 2, pp. 123-144. 
Blumberg, B. F. and W. A. Letterie (2008). Business Starters and Credit Rationing. 
Small Business Economics, Vol. 30, pp. 187-200. 
Blumberg, B. F. and W. A. Letterie, (2002). Which Business Starters Experience 
Limited Access to Bank Funds? Maastricht University, Business Investment 
Research Centre, pp. 1 -26. 
Boden, Jr., R. J. and A. R. Nucci, (2000). On the Survival Prospects of Men's and 
Women's new Business Venture. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 15, pp. 
347-362. 
Bodt de E., F. Lobez and J.C. Statnik, (2005). Credit Rationing, Customer Relationship 
and the Number of Banks: an Empirical Analysis, European Financial 
Management, Vol . 11, No. 2, pp. 195-228. 
Boer, H. and W. E. During, (2001). Innovation, What Innovation? A. Comparison 
Between Product, Process and Organisational Innovation. International Journal 
of Technology Management, Vol . 22, No. (1-3), pp. 83-107. 
Boersma, M . F., P. J. Buckley, and P. N . Ghauri, (2003). Trust in International Joint 
Venture Relationships. Journal of Business Research, Vol . 56, pp. 1031-1042. 
385 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, E. and G. Dell'Ariccia, (2004). Bank Competition and f irm creation. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol . 36, Issue 2, pp. 225-251. 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, E. and G. Gobbi, (2001). The Changing Structure of Local Credit 
Markets: Are Small Business Special? Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 25, 
pp. 2209-2237. 
Bond, S., J. A. Elston, J. Mairesse, and B. Mulkay, (2003). Financial Factors and 
Investments in Belgium, Finance, Germany and United Kingdom: A Comparison 
using Company Panel Data. The Review of Economic and Statistics, Vol . 85, pp. 
153-165. 
Boocock, G. and M . N . M . Shariff, (2005). Measuring the Effectiveness of Credit 
Guarantee Schemes, Evidence from Malaysia. International Small Business 
Journal, Vol . 23, No. 4, pp. 427-454. 
Boocock, G. and M . Woods, (1997). The Evaluation Criteria Used by Venture 
Capitalists: Evidence from a UK Venture Fund. International Small Business 
Journal, Vol . 16, No. 1, pp. 36-57. 
Boomgard, J., (1989). A. I . D. Microenterprise Stocktaking: Synthesis Report, Bethesda, 
M D , Development Alternatives. USAID Evaluation Special Study, USAID, 
Washington, D. C. No. 65, pp. 1-15. 
Boon, E. K., (1989). Women in SMEs: An African Example. Courier, No. 115, May-
June, pp. 74-76. 
Boot, A. W. A., (2000). Relationship Banking: What Do We Know? Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, Vol . 9, pp. 7-25. 
Boot, A. W. A. and A. V. Thakor, (1997). Banking Scope and Financial Innovation. The 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol . 10, No. 4, pp. 1099-1131. 
Boot, A. W. A. and A. V. Thakor, (1994). Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an 
Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game. International Economic Review, Vol. 
35, pp. 899-920. 
386 
Boot, A. W. A., A . V. Thakor, and G. Udell, (1991). Secured Lending and Default Risk 
Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implication and Empirical Results. Economic 
Journal, Vol . 101, pp. 458-472. 
Born, M . and W. M . M . Altink, (1996). The Importance of Behavioural and Situational 
Characteristics for Entrepreneurial Success: An International Rating Study. 
International Journal of Selection and Assessment, Vol . 4, No. 2, pp. 71-77. 
Bornstein, D., (1996). The Price of a Dream: The Story o f the Grameen Bank and the 
Idea that is Helping the Poor to Change their Lives, Simon and Schuster, New 
York, pp. 1-2. 
Bose, J., (2001). Non-response Bias Analyses at the National Center for Education 
Statistics. Proceeding of Statistics Canada Symposium, 1990 K. St. NW, 
Washington DC 20006, USA. Achieving Data Quality in a Statistical Agency: A 
Methodological Perspective, pp. 1-8. 
Bougheas, S., P. Mizen, and C. Yalcin, (2006). Access to External Finance: Theory and 
Evidence on the Impact o f Monetary Policy and Firm-Specific Characteristics. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 30, Issue 1, pp. 199-227. 
Bourdieu, P., (1986). The Forms of Social Capital. In: J. C. Richardson (ed). Handbook 
of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. New York, Greenwood: 
pp. 241-258. 
Boxall, P. and M . Streeneveld, (1999). Human Resource Strategy and Competitive 
Advantage: A Longitudinal Study of Engineering Consultancies. Journal of 
Management Studies, Vol . 6, No. 4, pp. 443-463. 
Boxman, E. A. W., P. M . De Graft, and H. D. Flap, (1991). The Impact of Social and 
Human Capital on the Income Attainment of Dutch Managers. Social Networks, 
Vol. 13: pp. 51-73. 
Branch, A. E., (1995). Elements of Export Marketing and Management, 2 n d (ed). 
Chapman and Hall, London, pp. 114. 
Brander, J. A., R. Amit and W. Antweiler, (2002). Venture Capital Syndication: 
Improved Venture Selection versus the Value-added Hypothesis. Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy, Vol . 11, No. 3, pp. 422-451. 
387 
Brass, D. J., K. D. Butterfield, and B. C. Skaggs, (1998). Relationships and Unethical 
Behaviours: A Social Network Perspective. Academy of Management Review, 
Vol. 23, pp. 14-31. 
Brealey, R. A. and S. C. Myers, (1991). Principles of Corporate Finance (Fourth 
Edition.). New York: McGraw Hi l l . ISBN-10: 0071007563, ISBN-13: 
9780071007566, pp.1-1024. 
Brettel, M . , (2003). Business Angels in Germany: A Research Note. Venture Capital: An 
International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Vol . 5, No. 3, pp. 251-268. 
Brettel, M . , (2002). German Business Angels in International Comparison. Journal of 
Private Equity, Vol . 5, Issue 2, pp. 53. 
Brevoort, K. P. and T. H. Hannan, (2006). Commercial Lending and Distance: Evidence 
from Community Reinvestment Act Data. Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking, Vol . 38, No. 8. pp. 1991-2012. 
Brewer, E., (2007). On Lending to Small Firms. Journal of Small Business 
Management, Vol . 45, No. 1, pp. 42-46. 
Brewer, G., H. Genay, H. Jackson, and W. Worthington, (1996). How are Small Firms 
Financed? Evidence from Small Business Investment Companies. Economic 
Perspective, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, pp. 2-18. 
Brockner, J., T. R. Tyler, and R. Cooper-Schneider, (1992). The Influence of Prior 
Commitment to an Institution on Reaction to Perceived Unfairness: The Higher 
They Are, The Harder They fall . Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol . 37, pp. 
241-261. 
Brown, M . , T. Jappelli, and M . Pagano, (2009). Information Sharing Sharing and Credit: 
Firm-Level Evidence From Transition Conditionals. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, Vol . 18, Issue 2, pp. 151-172. 
Brown, T. E. and B. A. Kirchhoff, (1997). Resource Acquisition Self-efficacy: 
Measuring Entrepreneur's Growth Ambitions. In P. D. Reynolds, W. D. Carter, 
P. Dividsson, W. B. Garter, and P. McDougall (Eds.), Frontiers in 
Entrepreneurship Research, 1997, pp. 59-60. Wellesley, M A : Babson College. 
388 
Brownbridge, M . , C. Harvey, and A. F. Gockel, (1998). Banking in Africa: The Impact 
o f Financial Sector Reform Since Independence: Currey Publications. ISBN 
0865436924 pp. 1-242. 
Bruderl, J., P. Preisendorfer, and R. Ziegler, (1992). Survival Changes of Newly 
Founded Business Organisations. American Sociological Review, Vol . 57, No. 2, 
pp. 227-242. 
Brush, C , (1992). Research on Women Business Owners: Past Trends, A New 
Perspective and Future Directions. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 
16, pp. 5-30. 
Buame, S. K., (1996). Entrepreneurship: A Contextual Perpective, Discourses and 
Praxis o f Entrepreneurial Activities within the Institutional Context of Ghana, 
Lund University Press, pp. 1-256. 
Buatsi, S. N . , (2002). Financing Non-traditional Exports in Ghana, Journal of Business 
and Industrial Marketing, Vol . 17, No. 6, pp. 501-522. 
Buckland, R. and E. W. Davis, (1990). The Pricing of New Issues on the Unlisted 
Securities Market: the Influence of Firm Size in the Context of the Information 
Content of New Issue Prospectuses, British Accounting Review, Vol . 22, pp. 
207-22. 
Burke, A. and A. Hanley, (2006). Bank Interest Margins and Business Start-up 
Collateral: Testing for Convexity. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol . 
53, No. 3, pp. 319-334. 
Burkhart, M . and T. Ellingsen, (2004). In-kind Finance: A theory of Trade Credit. 
American Economic Review, Vol . 94, No. 3, pp. 569-590. 
Burt, R. S., (1992). Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, 
M A : Harvard University Press, 1-311. 
Burt, R. S., (1987). Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion versus Structural 
Equivalence. American Journal of Sociology, Vol . 92, pp. 1287-1335. 
389 
Burt, R. S. and M . Knez, (1996). Trust and Third Party Gossip. In R. M . Kramer and T. 
R. Tyler (Eds), Trust in Organisation, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
pp. 68-89. 
Busenitz, L.W., (1996). Research on Entrepreneurial Alertness: Sampling, 
Measurement, and Theoretical Issues. Journal of Small Business Management, 
Vol . 34, No. 4, pp. 35-44. 
Busenitz, L. and J. Barney, (1997). Differences between Entrepreneurs and Managers in 
Large Organisations: Biases and Heuristics in Strategic Decisions-making. 
Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 12, pp. 9-30. 
Butler, J. K., (1991). Towards Understanding and Measure Conditions of Trust. 
Evaluation o f Trust Inventory. Journal of Management, Vol . 17, pp. 643-663. 
Butler, J. K. and R. S. Cantrell, (1984). A Behavioural Decision Theory Approach to 
Frame Working Dyadic Trust in Superior and Subordinates. Psychological 
Report, Vol . 55, pp. 19-28. 
Butler, J. S. and C. Herring, (1991). Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship in America: 
Towards an Explanation of Racial and Ethnic Group Variations in Self-
employment. Sociological Perspectives, Vol . 34, No. 1, 79-94. 
Bygrave, W. D. and C. W. Hofer, (1991). Theorizing About Entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 16, pp. 13-22. 
Cabral, L . and J. Mata, (2003). On the Evolution of Firm Size Distribution Facts and 
Theory. American Economic Review, Vol . 93, Issue 4, pp. 1075-1090. 
Cadwell, C. and P. Meagher, (1996). Collateral Law and Economic Transitions, 
Economic Reform Toadt, Technical Paper, No. 1, pp. 1-4 
Capra, M . C , I . Comeig and M . O. Fernandez, (2002). Moral Hazard and Credit 
Screening: Experimental Evidence. Working Paper, Department of Economics, 
Emory University, Atlanta, GA. 30322, USA, pp. 1-31. 
390 
Cardone, C , M-J. Casasola, and M . Samartin, (2005). Do Banking Relationships 
Improve Credit Conditions for Spanish SMES? Universidad Carlos I I I de 
Madrid, Departamento de Economia de la Empuesa, Calle Madrid, 126. Working 
Paper 05 - 28, Business Economics Series 06, pp. 1-36. 
Carling, K. and S. Lundberg, (2005). Asymmetric Information and Distance: An 
Empirical Assessment of Geographical Credit Rationing. Journal of Economics 
and Business, Vol . 57, pp. 39-59. 
Carow, K. A., E. Kane, and R. Narayanan, (2005). How Have Borrowers Fared in 
Banking Mega-Mergers? Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working 
Paper 2005-09, pp. 1-23. 
Carpenter, R. E. and B. C. Petersen, (2002a). Capital Market Imperfections, High-Tech 
Investment and New Equity Financing. The Economic Journal, Vol . 112, pp. 
F54-F72. 
Carpenter, R. E. and B. C. Pertersen, (2002b). Is the Growth of Small Firms Constrained 
by Internal Finance? Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, Vol. 84, 
No.2, pp. 298-309. 
Carr, D., (1996). Two Paths to Self-employment? Women's and Men's Self-
employment in the United States, 1980. Work and Occupations, Vol . 23, pp. 26-
53. 
Carr, M . , M . A. Chen, and J. Tate, (2000). Globalisation and Home-Based Workers, 
Feminist Economics, Vol . 6, No. 3, pp. 123-142. 
Carree, M . and A. R. Thurik, (2002). The Impact of Entrepreneurship on Economic 
Growth. In Zoltan Acs and David B. Audretsch (2003). Chapter 17, Prepared for 
the International Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research, Boston/Dordrecht: 
Edited by Zoltan A Kluwer Academic Publishers, PP. 1-28. 
Carroll, G. and E. Mosakowski, (1987). The Career Dynamics o f Self-employment. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol . 32, pp. 570-589. 
391 
Carter, D. A. and J. E. McNulty (2005). Deregulation, Technological change and the 
business-lending performance of large and small banks. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, Vol . 29, Issue 5, pp. 1113-1130. 
Carter, S. and M . Ram, (2003). Reassessing portfolio entrepreneur, Small Business 
Economics, Vol . 21 , pp. 371-380. 
Carter, R. B. and H. Van Auken, (2005). Bootstrap Financing and Owners Perceptions 
of theit Business Constraints and Opportunities. Entrepreneurship and Regional 
Development, Vol . 17, Issue 2, pp. 129-144. 
Cassar, G., (2004). The Financing of Business Start-ups. Journal of Business Venturing, 
Vol . 19, pp. 261-283. 
Cassar, G. and S. Holmes, (2003). Capital Structure and Financing o f SMEs: Australian 
Evidence. Accounting and Finance, Vol . 43, pp. 123-147. 
Casson, M . , (2003). The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory. Edward Elgar Publishers, 
Cheltenham, pp. 1-284. 
Casson, M . , (1982). The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory (Martin Robertson, 
Oxford. Roman and Littlefield Publishers, ISBN-10: 0389203289, ISBN-13: 
9780389203285, pp. 1-418. 
Castelli, A., G.P. Dwyer, and I . Hasan, (2006). Banking Relationships and Small Firms 
Financial Performance. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Working paper Series 
No. 2006-5, pp. 1-28. 
Cavalluzzo, K., L. Cavalluzzo, and J. Wolken, (2002). Competition, Small Business 
Financing, and Discrimination: Evidence from a New Survey. Journal of 
Business, Vo l . 75, No. 4, pp. 641-679. 
Cavalluzzo, K. and J. Wolken, (2005). Small Business Loan Turndowns, Personal 
Wealth and Discrimination. Journal of Business, Vol . 78, No. 6, pp. 2153-2177. 
392 
Cerqueiro, G., H . Degryse, and S. Ongena, (2007). Distance, Bank Organisation 
Structure, and Credit." TILEC discussion paper, DP 2007-018, ISSN 1572 -
4042, Tilburg University, TILEC, The Netherlands, pp. 1-30. 
Chakravarty, S. and J. S. Scott, (1999). Relationships and Rationing in Consumer Loans. 
Journal of Business, Vol . 72, No. 4, pp. 523-544. 
Chakravarty, S. and T. Yilmazer, (2004). A Re-examination of the Role o f Relationships 
in the Loan Granting Process. Working paper. Purdue University, pp. 1-29. 
Chan, Yuk-shee, and Anjan V. Thakor, (1987). Collateral and Competitive Equilibria 
with Moral Hazard and Private Information. Journal of Finance, Vol. X L I I , No. 
2. 
Chan, Y.S. and G. Kanatas, (1985). Asymmetric Valuation and the Role of Collateral in 
Loan Agreements, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol . 17, pp. 85-95. 
Chase, S. B. Jr., (1961). Credit Risk and Credit Rationing: Comment. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vo l . 75, pp. 319-327. 
Chen, M . , (2001). Women in the Informal Sector: A Global Picture, the Global 
Movement, SAIS Review, Vol . X X I , 1, pp. 71-82. 
Chen, Y - H , and S. Barnes, (2007). Initial Trust and Online Buyer Behaviour. Industrial 
Management and Data Systems, Vol . 107, No. 1, pp. 21 -36. 
Chiappori, P. A. , D. Perez-Castrillo, and T. Verdier, (1995). Spatial Competition in the 
Banking System: Localisation, Cross Subsidies and Regulation of Deposit Rates. 
European Economic Review, Vol . 39, pp. 889-918. 
Chiles, T. H . and J. F. McMackin, (1996). Integrating Variable Risk Preferences, Trust 
and Transacton Cost Economics. Academy of Management Review, Vol . 21, No. 
7, pp. 73-99. 
Chinn, P. L . and M . K. Kramer, (1999). Theory and Nursing: A Systematic Approach 
(5 t h ed). St. Louis, Mosby, pp. 1-255. 
393 
Chirinko, R. S. and A. R. Singha, (2000). Testing Static Trade-off against Pecking Order 
Models of Capital Structure: a Critical Comment. Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol . 58, Issue 3, pp. 417-425. 
Chittenden, F., G. Hall, and P. Hutchinson, (1996). Small Firm Growth, Access to 
Capital Markets and Financial Structure: Review of Issues and an Empirical 
Investigation. Small Business Economics, Vol . 8, pp. 59-67. 
Christensen, J. L. , (2007). Constraints on Innovation Finance in North Jutlant, Denmark. 
European Planning Studies, Vol . 15, No. 9, pp. 1163-1180. 
Clemenz, G., (1986). Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information Lecture Notes in 
Economics and Mathematical Systems, Berling-Heidelbery, Springer-Verlag 
Publications, ISBN-10: 038167781, ISBN-13: 9780387167787, pp. 1-220. 
Cochran, W. G., (1997). Sampling Techniques, 3 r d edition. New York, N Y : John Wiley 
and sons. 
Coco, G., (2000). On the use of collateral. Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol . 14, pp. 
191-214. 
Cohen, W., (1995). Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity in: Stoneman, P. (ed). 
Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change. 
Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 182-264. 
Cohen, D. and L. Prusak, (2001). In Good Company: How Social Capital makes 
Organisations Work. Boston, M A : Harvard Business School Press. ISBN-10: 
087584913X, ISBN-13: 9780875849133, pp. 1-214. 
Cohn, E. and T. G. Geske, (1990). The Economics of Education (3 r d Eds.), Pergamon, 
Oxford. Butterworth-Heinemann Publications, ISBN-10: 0080377580, ISBN-13: 
9780080377582,pp. 1-452. 
Cole, R. A., (1998). The Importance of Relationships to the Availability of Credit. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 22, pp. 959-977. 
394 
Cole, R. A. , L. G. Goldberg, and L. J. White, (2004). Cookie-cutter versus Character: 
The Micro Structure of Small-Business Lending by Large and Small Banks. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol . 39, pp. 227-252. 
Cole, R. and N . Walraven, (1998). Bank Consolidation and the Availability of Credit to 
Small Businesses." Munich Personal RePEc Archive MPRA paper No. 4716, pp. 
1-25. 
Coleman, J. S., (1990). Foundation of Social Theory. Havard University Press, Belknap 
Press, Cambridge. ISBN-10: 0674312252, ISBN-13: 9780674312258, pp. 1-
1014. 
Coleman, J. S., (1988). Social Capital in the Creation o f Human Capital. American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol . 94 {Supplement): pp. S95-S120. 
Coleman, J. S. and R. Cohn, (2000). Small Firm's Use of Financial Leverage: Evidence 
from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances. Journal of Business 
and Entrepreneurship, Vol . 12, No. 3, pp. 81-98. 
Coleman, A. D. F., E. Neil, and I . G. Sharpe, (2006). Does Bank Monitoring Influence 
Loan Contract Terms. Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol . 30, No. 2, 
pp. 177-198. 
Collender, R. N . and S. Shaffer, (2003). Local Bank Ownership, Deposit Control, 
Market Structure, and Economic Growth. Journal of Banking and Finance, 
Vol.27, pp. 27-57. 
Collier, P. and J.W. Gunning, (1999). Explaining African Economic Performance, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol . 37, pp. 64-111. 
Cook, T. D. and D. T. Campbell, (1979). Quasi- Experimentation: Design and Analysis 
Issues Field Settings. Wadsworth Publishing, ISBN-10: 0395307902, ISBN-13: 
9780395307908,PP. 1-405. 
Cook, P. and F. Nixson, (2000). Finance and Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
Development. Finance and Development Research Programme Working Paper 
Series, No. 14,1DPM University of Manchester, pp. 1-28. 
395 
Cooper, A. C. and W. C. Dunkelberg, (1987). Entrepreneurial Research: Old Questions, 
New Answers and Methodology Issues. American Journal of Small Business, 
Vol. 11, pp. 11-24. 
Cooper, A. C. and W. C. Dunkelberg, (1986). Entrepreneurship and Paths to Business 
Ownership, Strategic Management Journal, 7, No. 1, pp. 53-68. 
Cooper, A. C , T. B. Folta, and C. Woo, (1995). Entrepreneurial Information Search. 
Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 10, pp. 107-120. 
Cooper, A. C , J. Gimeno, and C. Woo, (1994). Initial Human and Financial Capital as 
Predictors of New Venture Performance. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 9, 
No.5, pp. 371-395. 
Corazzini, A. J., (1967). When Should Vocational Education Begin? Journal of Human 
Resources, Vol . 2, Issue 1, pp. 41-50. 
Corbett, A., (2002). Recognising High-Tech Opportunities: A Learning and Cognitive 
Approach. In W. D. Bygrave, C.G. Brush, P. Davidsson, J. Fiet, P. G. Greene, R. 
T. Harrison, M . Lerner, G. D. Meyer, J. Sohl, and A. Zacharakis (eds), Frontiers 
of Entrepreneurship Research, Wellesley, M A : Babson College, pp. 49-61. 
Cosh, A., J. Duncan, and A. Hughes, (1996). The Changing State of British Enterprise: 
Growth Innovation and Competitive Advantage in SMEs 1986-1995, Chapter 5. 
Cambridge University: ESRC Centre for Business Research, pp. 1-24. 
Cosh, A. and A. Hughes, (2003). Enterprise Challenge: Policy and Performance in the 
British SME sector 1999-2002. ESRC Centre for Business Research. 
Cosh, A. and A. Hughes, (1998). Enterprise Britain: Growth, Innovation and Public 
Policy in the Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Sector 1994-1997. ESRC 
Centre for Business Research, Cambridge University, Cambridge, pp. 1-320. 
Cosh, A. and A. Hughes, (1994). Size, Financial Structure and Profitability: U K 
Companies in the 1980s, in A. Hughes and D. J. Storey (eds). Finance and the 
Small Firms. (Routledge), pp. 19-63. 
396 
Cosh, A. and E. Wood, (1998). Innovation: Scale, Objectives, and Constraints, in: Cosh, 
A. and Hughes, A. , (1998). Enterprise Britain: Growth, Innovation and Public 
Policy in the Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Sector 1994-1997. ESRC 
Centre for Business Research, Cambridge University, Cambridge, pp. 38-48. 
Coulter, K. S. and R. A. Coulter, (2006). Determinants o f Trust in a Service Provider: 
The Moderating Role of Length of Relationship. Journal of Service Marketing, 
Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 35-50. 
Couper, M . P., (2000). Web-Survey, A Review of Issues and Approaches. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, Vol . 64, No. 4, pp. 464-494. 
Cowling, M . and P. Mitchell, (2003). Is the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme 
Hazardous for Banks or Helpful to Small Business? Small Business Economics, 
Vol. 21, pp.63-71. 
Cowling, M . and P. Westhead, (1996). Bank Lending and Decisions and Small Firms: 
Does Size Matter? International Journal of Entrepreneur Behaviour and 
Research, Vol . 2 No. 2, pp. 52-68. 
Craig, B. R., W. E. Jackson I I I , and J. B. Thomson, (2007). Small Firm Finance, credit 
Rationing and the Impact of SBA-Guaranteed Lending on Local Economic 
Growth. Journal of Small Business Management, Vo l . 45, No. 1, pp. 116-132. 
Creed, D.W. E. and R. E. Miles, (1996). A Conceptual Framework Linking 
Organisational Forms, Managerial Philosophies, and the Opportunity Costs of 
Controls. In R. M . Kramer and T. R. Tyler (eds). Trust on Organisation 
Thousand Oaks. CA: Sage Publications, pp. 16-38. 
Cresswell, J. W., (2002). Research Designe: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed 
Methods Approaches. (2 n d ed). Sage Publications, pp. 1-246. 
Cressy, R. C , (1996). Are Business Start-ups Debt Rationed? The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 106, pp. 1253-1270. 
Cressy, R. C , (1995). Commitment Lending Under Asymmetric Information: Theory 
and Test on UK Start-up Data. Small Business Economics, Vol . 8, pp. 397-408 
397 
Criscuolo, C , J. Haskel and M . J. Slaughter, (2005). Global Engagement and the 
Innovation Activities of Firms. NBER Working Paper, No. 11479, pp. 1-48. 
Crook, J., (1999). Who is Discouraged from Applying for Credit? Economics Letters, 
Vol . 65, pp. 165-172. 
Crook, J., (1996). Credit Constraints and US Households. Applied Financial Economics, 
Vol . 6, pp. 477-485. 
Cruickshank, D., (2000). Competition in UK Banking. A Report to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. HMSO, London, pp. 1-30. 
Cuevas, J. G., (1994). Towards a Taxanomy of Entrepreneurial Theories. International 
Small Business Journal, Vol . 12, pp. 77-78. 
Cull, R., L. E. Davis, N . R. Lamoreaux, and J-L Rosenthal, (2006). Historical Financing 
of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 
30, Issue 11, pp. 3017-3042. 
Cunat, V., (2007). Trade Credit: Suppliers as Debt Collectors and Insurance Providers. 
The Review of Financial Studies, Vol . 20, No. 2, pp. 491-527. 
Curran, J., (1986). Bolton Fifteen Years on: A Review and Analysis of Small Business 
Research in Britain 1971-1986. Small Business Research Trust, London, pp. 1-
72. 
Curran, J. and R. A. Blackburn, (2001). Researching the Small Enterprise. London: Sage 
publication. ISBN-10: 0761952950, ISBN-13: 9780761952954, pp. 1-192. 
Curran, J. and R. A. Blackburn, (1993). Ethnic Enterprise and the High Street Bank. A 
Survey o f Ethnic Businesses in Two Localities Kingston University, London, 
Small Business Research Centre. 
Curran, J., R. A. Blackburn, and A. Woods, (1991). Exploring Enterprise Cultures: 
Small Service Sector Enterprise Owners and Their Views. Small Business 
Research Unit, Kingston University. 
398 
Cyrnak, A. and T. Hannan (2003). Change in Non-Local Lending to Small Business. 
Journal of Financial Service Research, Vol . 24, No. 1, pp. 31-46. 
Czaja, R. and J. Blair, (2005). Designing Surveys: A Guide to Decision and Procedures. 
London: Sage, Information Research, Vol. 11 Issue 2, R206, pp. 1-320. 
Dailey, R. C , T. E. Reuschling, and R. F. De Mong, (1997). The Family Owned 
Business. Capital Funding. American Journal of Small Business, Vol . 22, pp. 30-
39. 
Danos, P., D. I . Holt, and E.A. Imhoff, Jr., (1989). The Use of Accounting Information 
in Bank Lending Decisions. Accounting Organisations and Society, Vol . 14, No. 
3, pp. 235-246. 
Danson, M . W., (1999). Debates and Reviews, Contributions of Novice, Portfolio and 
Serial Founders Located in Rural and Urban Areas. Regional Studies, Vol. 33, 
No.2, pp. 157-173. 
Das, P. K., (2004). Credit Rationing and Firm's Investment and Production Decisions. 
International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 13, pp. 87-114. 
Das, T. K. and B. S. Teng, (1998). Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence 
in Partner Cooperation in Alliances. Academic Management Review, Vol . 23, 
No. 3, pp. 491-512. 
Dasgupta, P., (2000). Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital in Social 
Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, P. Dasgupta and 1. Seragilden, (eds.), 
Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 325-424. 
Dasgupta, P., (1998). Trust as a Commodity. In D. Gambetta (Ed), Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations (electronic edition, chapter 4): Department of 
Sociology, University of Oxford. Available at http:// 
www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/paper/dasgupta49-72.pdf, pp. 49-72. 
Daumont, R., F. Legall, and F. Leroux, (2004). Banking in Sub-saharan Africa: What 
Went Wrong? IMF Working paper WP/04/55, pp. 1-49. 
Davidsson, P., (2004). Researching Entrepreneurship. Boston, M A : Springer. ISBN-10: 
0387228381, ISBN-13: 9780387228389, pp. 1-218. 
399 
Davidsson, P., (1995). Determinants of Entrepreneurial Intentions. Research in 
Entrepreneurship Conference, IX. Jonkoping. International Business School, 
Jonkoping. Working Paper Series, No. 1, pp. 23-24. 
Davidsson, P. and B. Honig, (2003). The Role of Social and Human Capital among 
Nascent Entrepreneurs, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 18, No. 3, pp. 301-
322. 
Davidsson, P. and J. Wiklund (2001). Levels o f Analysis in Entrepreneurship Research: 
Current Research Practice and Suggestions for the Future. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, Vol . 25, pp. 81-100. 
Davidsson, P. and J. Wiklund, (2000). Conceptual and Empirical Challenges in the 
Study of Firm Growth. In D. Sexton and H. Landstrom (Eds). The Blackwell 
Handbook of Entrepreneurship. Oxford: Blackwell Business, pp. 26-44. 
Davila, A. , G. Foster, and M . Gupta, (2003). Venture Capital Financing and the Growth 
Of Start-up Firms. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 18, pp. 689-708. 
De Medeiros, O. and C. Daher, (2004). Testing Static Trade-off Against Pecking Order 
Models of Capital Structure in Brazilian Firms. Working paper, Universidade de 
Brasilia. SSRN: http: //ssrn.com, pp. 1-15. 
De Meza, D. and C. Southey, (1996). The Borrowers Curse: Optimism, Finance and 
Entrepreneurship. Economic Journal, Vol . 106, pp. 375-386. 
De Meza, D. and D. C. Webb, (2006). Credit Rationing: Something's Gotta Give. 
Economica, Vo l . 73, pp. 563-578. 
De Meza, D. and D. C. Webb, (1987). Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric 
Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol . 102, pp. 281-292. 
Degryse, H . , N . Masschelein, and J. Mitchell, (2005). SMEs and Banking Relationships: 
The Impact o f Mergers. CEPR Working Paper, No. 5061, pp. 1-43. 
Degryse, H . and S. Ongena (2005). Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition. 
Journal of Finance, Vol . 60, N o . l , pp. 231-266. 
400 
Degryse, H. and S. Ongena (2004). The impact of Technology and Regulation on the 
Geographical Scope of Banking. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol . 20, 
No.4, pp. 571-590. 
Degryse, H. and S. Ongena, (2001), Bank Relationship. Financial Management, Spring 
2001, pp. 9-34. 
Dei Ottati, G., (1994). Trust, Interlinking Transactions and Credit in the Industrial 
District. Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.18, pp. 529-546. 
Dejardin, M . , (2000). Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth: An Obvious Conjuction? 
Namur, Belgium: University o f Namur, pp. 1-17. 
Dell'Ariccia, G., (2001). Asymmetric Information and the Structure of the Banking 
Industry. European Economic Review, Vol . 45, pp. 1957-1980. 
Dell'Ariccia, G. and R. Marquez, (2004). Information and Bank Credit Allocation. 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 72, pp. 185-215. 
Delmar, F., P. Davidsson, W. B. Gartner, (2003). Arriving at the High-Growth Firm. 
Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 18, pp. 189-216. 
DeLuca, F., (1998). The Start-up. Introduction to Franchising Case Study: Subway 
Restaurants. Marina Del Ray, CA: The Young Entrepreneurs Network, Inc. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A . and V. Maksimovic, (1998). Law, Finance and Firm Growth. 
Journal of Finance, Vol . 53, No. 6, pp. 2107-2137 
Denis, D. J., (2004). Entrepreneurial Finance: An Overview o f the Issues and Evidence. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol . 10, pp. 301-326. 
Denscombe, M . , (2007). The Good Research Guide for Small-scale Social Research 
Projects. McGraw-Hill International Publications, pp. 1-349. 
401 
Denzin, N . K. and Y. S. Lincoln, (1994). Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Second Edition, ISBN-10: 0761915125, ISBN-13: 
978076195126,pp.1-1143. 
DeTienne, D. R. and C. S. Koberg, (2002). The Impact o f Environmental and 
Organisational Factors on Discontinuous Innovation within High-tech Industries. 
IEEE Transaction on Engineering Management, Vol . 49, pp. 346-364. 
DeYoung, R., W. S. Frame, D. Glennon, D. P. McMillen, and P. Nigro, (2008a). 
Commercial Lending Distance and Historically Underserved Areas. Journal of 
Economics and Business, Vol . 60, pp. 149-164. 
DeYoung, R., D. Glennon, and P. Nigro, (2008b). Borrower-Lender Distance, Credit 
Scoring, and the Performance: Evidence from Informational-opaque Small 
Business borrowers. Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol . 17, pp. 113-143. 
DeYoung, R., W. C. Hunter, and G.F. Udell, (2004). The Past, Present and Probable 
Future for Community Banks. Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol . 25, 
Issue (2/3), pp. 85-133. 
Diamond, D. W., (1991). Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank Loan 
and Directly Placed Debt. Journal of Political Economy, Vol . 99, pp. 688-721. 
Diamond, D. W., (1989). Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets. Journal of Political 
Economy, Vo l . 97, pp. 828-860. 
Diamond, D. W., (1984). Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 51, pp. 393-414. 
Dierickx, I . and K. Cool, (1989), Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of 
Competitive Advantage, Management Science, pp. 35, pp. 1504-1513. 
Dillman, D. A., (2000).Mail and Internet Survey: The Tailored Design Method (2 n d ed). 
New York: John Wiley and Sons Publications. ISBN-10: 0471323543, ISBN-13: 
9780471323549, pp. 1-480. 
402 
Dimov, D. P. and D. A. Shepherd, (2005). Human Capital Theory and Venture Capital 
Firms: Exploring "home runs" and "strike outs". Journal of Business Venturing, 
Vol.20, pp. 1-21. 
Dollinger, M . J., (1995). Entrepreneurship. Strategies and Resources. Wellesley, M A : 
Irwin, Babson College, pp. 131-144. 
Dowla, A., (2006). In Credit We Trust: Building Social Capital by Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh. Journal of Social-Economics, Vol . 35, Issue 1, pp. 102-122. 
Doz, Y. L, (1996). The evolution o f cooperation in strategic alliance: Initial conditions 
or learning processes? Strategic Management Journal, Vol . 17, pp. 55-83. 
Dufey, G. and U. Hommel, (1999). Financing the German Mittlstand, in: WHU 
Koblenz-Otto Beishein Graduate School of Management (Ed): Structure and 
Dynamics o f the German Mittelstand, Springer/Heidelberg, pp. 183-228. 
Dunkelberg, W. and A. Cooper, (1983). Financing the Start o f a Small Enterprise in J. 
Hornadey et. al. (eds). Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Wellesley: 
Babson College, pp. 369-381. 
Dunkelberg, W., J. Scott, and E. Cox, (1984). Small Business and the Value of Banker 
Customer Relationships. Journal of Bank Research, Vol . 14, No. 5, pp. 248-258. 
Durlauf, S., (2000). Econometric Analysis and the Study of Economic Growth: A 
Sceptical Perspective, in Macroeconomics and the Real World, R. Backhouse 
and A. Salanti, (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-22. 
Dyer, J. H . and H. Singh, (1998). The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and 
Sources o f Interorganisational Comparative Advantage. Academy of 
Management Review, Vol . 23, pp. 660-679. 
Ebben, J. and A. Johnson, (2006). Bootstrapping in Small Firms: An Empirical Analysis 
o f Change Overtime. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 21, pp. 851 -865. 
403 
Eccles, R. G. and D. B. Crane, (1988). Doing Deals: Investment Banks at Work. Boston, 
M A : Harvard Business School Press. ISBN-10: 0875841996, ISBN-13: 
9780875841991, pp. 273. 
Ehrenfeld, T., (1993). B-School Bohemians, in: INC.COM, September 1993, 
http://www.inc.com/magazine/19930901 /3740.html. 
Eisenhardt, M . K., (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. Academy of 
Management Review, Vol . 14, No. 1, pp. 57. 
Ellett, L. , M . Fleet , R. Jensen, M . Lim, L. Soceneantu, P. Wragg, R. Beresford, R. 
Mumby-Croft, M.N.K. Saundres and R. Smith, (2004). Initial Funding of Small 
Businesses - the mismatch between Actual and Perceived Personal Exposure. 
Business Boffins Limited, Oxford, UK, pp. 1-8. 
Elliehausen, G. E. and J. D. Wolken, (1993). The Demand for Trade Credit an 
Investigation of Motives for Trade Credit Use by Small Businesses. Board o f 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D. C. 20551, pp. 1-19. 
Elsas, R. and J. Krahnen, (1998). Is Relationship Lending Special? Evidence from 
Credit-file Data in Germany. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 22, pp. 
1283-1316. 
Elyasiani, E. and L. G. Goldberg, (2004). Relationship Lending: A Survey of the 
Literature. Journal of Economics and Business, Vol . 56, Issue 4, pp. 315-330. 
European Commission, (2003). Observatory of European SME, SME and Access to 
Finance No. 2. Enterprise publications, pp. 1-55. 
European Commission, (2002). Highlights from the 2001 Survey Observatory of 
European SMEsNo. 1, Brussel, Belgium. Enterprise Publications, pp. 1-29. 
European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) (2004). http:// 
www.evca.com, pp. 1-5. 
404 
Evans, D. and B. Jovanovic, (1989). An Estimated Model o f Entrepreneurial Choice 
under Liquidity Constraints, Journal of Political Economy, pp. 97, No. 4, pp. 
808-827. 
Evans, D. and L. Leighton, (1989). Some Empirical Aspects of Entrepreneurship. 
American Economic Review, Vol . 79, pp. 519-535. 
Fafchamps, M . , (1996). The Enforcement o f Commercial Contracts in Ghana, World 
Development, Vol . 24, pp. 427-448. 
Fafchamps, M . And B. Minten (2002). Returns to Social Network Capital Among 
Traders. Oxford Economic Papers, Vol . 54, No. 2, pp. 173-206. 
Fafchamps, M . and B. Minten, (1999). Relationships and Taders in Madagascar. Journal 
of Development Studies, Vol . 35, pp. 1- 35. 
Fagiolo, G. and A. Luzzi, (2006). Do Liquidity Constraints Matter in Explaining Firm 
Size and Growth? Some Evidence from the Italian Manufacturing Industry. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol . 15, No. 1, pp. 1-39. 
Fahy, J., (2002). A Resource-Based Analysis of Sustainable Comparative Advantage in 
a Global Environment. International Business Review, Vol . 11, pp. 57-78. 
Fairlie, R. W. and B. Meyer, (1996). Ethnic and Racial Self-employment Differences 
and Possible Explanations. Journal of Human Resources, Vol . 35, pp. 757-793. 
Fama, E. F., (1985). What's Different about Banks? Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Vol. 15, pp. 29-39. 
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French, (2002). Testing Trade-off and Pecking Order Predictions 
About Dividends and Debts. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol . 15, No. 1, pp. 
1-33. 
Felsenstein, D. and A. Fleischer, (2002). Small-Scale Entrepreneur Ship and Access to 
Capital in Peripheral Locations. An Empirical Analysis. Growth and Change, 
Vol.33, pp. 196-215. 
405 
Fernandez, R. M . and N . Weinberg, (1997). Sifting and Sorting: Personal Contacts and 
Hiring in Retail Bank. American Sociological Review, Vol . 62, pp. 883-902. 
Ferrary, M . , (2003). Trust and Social Capital in the Regulation of Lending Activities. 
The Journal of Socio-economic, Vol . 31, pp. 673-695. 
Fiet, J.O., A. Piskounov, and V. Gustavsson, (2000). How to Decide, How to Search for 
Entrepreneurial Discoveries in Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Ed. P. 
Reynolds, E. Autio, C.G. Brush, W.D. Bygrave, S. Manigart, H. J. Sapienza, and 
K. G. Shaver. Wellesley, M A : Babson College, 198, pp. 105-117. 
Findings Africa Region, (1994). Small Enterprise Finance under Liberalisation in 
Ghana. No. 26, pp. 1-5. 
Fioretti, G., (2005) Credit Rationing and Internal Ratings in the Face of Innovation and 
Uncertainty. Econpapers - http: 129.3.20.4l/eps/fin/papers/0504/0504021.pdf, 
pp. 1-22. 
Fischer, C , (2005). Bowling Alone: What's the Score? Sociological Networks, Vol. 27, 
pp. 55-67. 
Fletschner, D., (2008). A woman's Access to Credit: Does it Matter for Household 
Efficiency? American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol . 90, Issue 3, pp. 
669-683. 
Fletschner, D., (2006). Rural Women's Access to Credit: Market Imperfections and 
Intrahousehold Dynamics. Evans School of Public Affairs, University of 
Washington, Seattle. Working Paper 2006-14, pp. 1-32. 
Fletschner, D. and M . Carter, (2008). Constructing and Reconstructing Gender: 
Reference Group Effects and Women's Demand for Entrepreneurial Capital. 
Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol . 37, No. 2, pp. 672-693. 
Florin, J. and W. Schultze, (2000). Social Capital and Fundability of High Potential New 
Ventures. Paper Presented at the Academy of Management Meeting, Toronto, 
Canada. August, 2000, pp. 1-8. 
406 
Floyd, S.W. and B. Wooldridge, (1999). Knowledge Creation and Social Networks in 
Corporate Entrepreneurship: The Renewal o f Organisation Capability. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 23, No. 3, pp. 123-143. 
Foley, M . W. and B. Edwards, (1996). The paradox of civil society. Journal of 
Democracy, Vol . 7, No. 3, pp. 38-52. 
Foltz, J. D., (2004). Credit Market Access and Profitability in Tunisian Agriculture. 
Agricultural Economics, Vol . 30, pp. 229-240. 
Forbes, D., (2005). Are some Entrepreneurs more Overconfident than Others? Journal 
of Business Venturing, Vol . 20, pp. 623-640. 
Ford, E. S., (1998). Characteristics of Survey Participants with and without a Telephone: 
Findings from the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. J. 
Clin. Epidemiol, Vol . 51, pp. 55-60. 
Fowler, F. J. Jr., (1988). Survey Research Methods (Review Eds.). Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications, Inc, pp. 1-159. 
Frame, S., A. Srinivasna, L. Woosley, (2001). The Effect o f Credit Scoring on Small-
Business Lensing. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol . 33, No. 3, pp. 
813-825. 
Frank, M . Z. and V. K. Goyal, (2005). Tradeoff and Pecking Order Theories of Debt. 
Centre for Corporate Governance; Tuck School o f Business of Dortmouth. 
Working Paper, pp. 1-88. 
Frank, M . Z. and V. K. Goyal, (2003). Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital 
Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 67, pp. 217-248. 
Fraser, J. A., (2001). Money Hunt. rNC, March 2001, pp. 49-63. 
Fraser, J. A., (1999). 20 Tips for Finding Money Now. INC, March, 1999, pp. 131-136. 
407 
Fraser, D.R., B.E. Gup and J.W. Kolari, (1996). Commercial Banking: The Management 
of Risk, Thomson South-Western Second Edition. ISBN-10: 0324027184, 
ISBN-13: 978-03224027181, pp. 1-624. 
Freear, J., J. E. Sohl, and W. Wetzel, (2002). Angles on Angels: Financing Technology-
Based Ventures. A Historical Perspective. Venture Capital, Vol . 4, No. 4, pp. 
275-287. 
Freear, J., J. E. Sohl, and W. E. Wetzel, (1995). Who Bankrolls Software Entrepreneurs. 
In Bygrave, W. D., B.J. Bird, S. Birley, N . C. Churchill, M . G. Hay, R. H. 
Keeley, and W. E. Wetzel, Jr. (eds.), Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research. 
Wellesley, M A : Babson College, Centre for Entrepreneurial Studies, pp. 172-
186. 
Freear, J. and W. E. Wetzel, (1990). Who Bankrolls High-tech Entrepreneur? Journal of 
Business Venturing, Vol . 5, pp. 77-89. 
Freedman, P. L. and R. W. Click, (2006). Banks that Don't Lend? Unlocking Credit to 
Spur Growth in Developing Countries. Development Policy Review, Vol . 24, No. 
3, pp. 279-302. 
Freel, M.S., (2007). Are Small Innovators Credit Rationed? Small Business Economics, 
Vol .28 , No. 1, pp. 23-35. 
Freel, M . S., (2005). Patterns o f Innovation and Skills in Small Firms, Technovation, 
Vol. 25, pp. 123-134. 
Freel, M . S., (2000). Barriers to Product Innovation in Small Manufacturing Firms. 
International Small Business Journal, Vol . 18, No. 2, pp. 60-80. 
Freel, M . S., (1999). The Financing of Small Firm Product Innovation within the UK. 
Technovation, Vo l . 19, pp. 707-719. 
Freixax, X. and J. Rochet, (1999). Microeconomics of Banking, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: M I T Press, pp. 1-16. 
French, D., (2001). The Case for Community Banking. New Economics Foundation, 
London. ISBN-10: 1899407308, ISBN-13: 9781899407309, pp. 1-46. 
408 
Fried, V. and R. D. Hisrich, (1988). Venture Capital Research: Past, Present and Future. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 13, pp. 15-29. 
Friijs, C , T. Paulsson, and C. Karlsson, (2002). Entrepreneurship and Economic 
Growth: A Critical Review of Empirical and Theoretical Research. Ostersund, 
Sweden: Institutet for Tillvaxtpolitiska Studier. 
Fukuyama, F., (1999). Social Capital and Civil Society. Paper Presented at the 
Conferences on Second Generation Reforms IMF Headquarters, Washington, D. 
C. IMF Working Paper, WP/00/74, pp. 1-13. 
Fukuyama, F., (1997). Social Capital and the Modern Capitalist Economy: Creating a 
High Trust Workplace. Stern Business Magazine, Vol . 4, No. 1, pp. 1-10. 
Gabbay, S. M . and R. Th. A. J. Leenders, (1999). CSC: The Structure o f Advantage and 
Disadvantage. In R. Th. A. J. Leenders and S. M . Gabbay (Eds.), Corporate 
Social Capital and Liability: Boston: Kluwer, pp. 1-14. 
Gaglio, C. M . , (1997). Opportunity Identification: Review, Critique and Suggested 
Research Directions. In J.A. Kats (Eds.), Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm 
Emergences and Growth, Vol . 3, Greenwich, CA: JAI Press, pp. 119-138. 
Gaglio, C. M . and J. A Katz, (2001). The Psychological Basis of Opportunity 
Identification: Entrepreneurial Alertness, Small Business Economics, Vol. 16, pp. 
95-111. 
Galbreath, J., (2005). Which Resources Matter the Most to Firm Success? An 
Exploratory Study of Resource-Based Theory. Technovation, Vol . 25, pp. 979-
987. 
Gale, D. and M . Hellwig, (1984). Incentive-Compatible Contracts: the One-Period 
Problem. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 647-663. 
Galindo, A. and F. Schiantarelli, (2002). Credit Constraints in Latin America. An 
Overview of the Micro Evidence. Inter-American Development Bank. Research 
Network Working Paper, No. R-472, pp. 1-27. 
409 
Ganesh-Kumar, A., K. Sen, and R. R. Valdya, (2001). Outward Orientation, Investment 
and Finance Constraint: A study of India Firms. The Journal of Development 
Studies, Vol . 37, No. 4, pp. 133-149. 
Gargiulo, M . and M . Bernassi, (1999). The Dark Side of Social Capital. In R. Th. A. J. 
Leenders and S. M . Gabbay (Eds.), Corporate Social Capital and Liability: pp. 
298-322, Boston: Kluwer. 
Gartner, W. B., (2001). Is There an Elephant in Entrepreneurship? Blind Assumptions in 
Theory Development, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 25, Issue 4, 
pp. 27-41. 
Gartner, W. B., (1990). What Are We Talking About when we Talk About 
Entrepreneurship? Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 5, No. 1, pp. 15-28. 
Gartner, W. B., J. A. Starr and S. Bhat, (1999). Predicting New Venture Survival: An 
Analysis o f Anatomy of a Start-up. Cases from Incorporation Magazine. Journal 
of Business Venturing, Vol . 14, Issue 2, pp. 215-232. 
Gay, L. R. (1796). Education Research: Models for Analysis and Application. Merrill 
Publications. ISBN-10: 0675086000, ISBN-13: 9780675086004, pp. 1-158. 
Gelos, G. R. and A. M . Werner, (2002). Financial liberalisation, Financial liberalisation, 
Credit Constraints Collateral: Investment in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector. 
Journal Development Economics, Vol . 67, pp. 1-27. 
Gibson, B., (1992). Financial Information for Decision Making: An Alternative Small 
Firm Perspective. Journal of Small Business Finance, Vol . 1, pp. 221-232. 
Gifford, S., (1997). Limited Attention and the Role of Venture Capitalists. Journal of 
Business Venturing, Vol . 12, pp. 459-482 
Gil l , J. and P. Johnson, (1997). Research Methods for Managers, 2nd ed, Paul Chapman, 
London. 
Gi l l , J. and P. Johnson, (1991). Research Methods for Managers, Paul Chapman 
Publishing, Liverpool. 
410 
Gilmore, A . and D. Carson, (1996). Integrative Qualitative Methods in a Service 
Context. Marketing Intelligence and Planning (Special Issue: Qualitative Market 
Research), Vol . 14, No. 6, pp. 21-26. 
Gimeno, J., T. Folta, A. Cooper, and C. Woo, (1997). Survival of the Fittest? 
Entrepreneurial Human Capital and the Persistence of Underperforming Firms. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol . 42, pp. 750-783. 
Giudici, G. and S. Paleari, (2000). The Provision o f Finance to Innovation: A Survey 
Conducted Among Italian Technology-based Small Firm. Small Business 
Economics, Vol . 14, pp. 37-53. 
Glaeser, E. L., D. I . Laibson, J. A. Scheinkman, and C. L. Souyyer, (2000). Measuring 
Trust. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol . 115, pp. 811-846. 
Gompers, P. A. , (1997). Ownership and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms: An 
Examination o f Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Investments. 
Unpublished Manuscript, Harvard, University. Working Paper, pp. 9-28. 
Gompers, P. A., (1995). Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging o f Venture 
Capital. Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, pp. 1461-1489. 
Good, D., (2000). Individuals, Interpersonal Relational and Trust. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), 
Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (electronic ed., chapter3, pp. 
31-48). Department of Sociology, University of Oxford. Available at http: 
//www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/paper/good pdf, pp. 31-48. 
Gorman, M . and W. A. Sahlman (1989). What Do Venture Capitalists Do? Journal of 
Business Venturing, Vol . 5, pp. 77-90. 
Goswami, S. and M . Mathew, (2005). Definition of Innovation Revisitied: An Empirical 
Study of Indian Information Technology Industry. International Journal of 
Innovation Management, Vol . 9, No. 3, pp. 371-383 
Graham, J. and C. Harvey, (2001). The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: 
Evidence from the Field. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 60, pp. 187-243. 
411 
Granovetter, M . , (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, Vol . 78, pp. 1360-1380. 
Grant, R. M . , (2002). Contemporary Strategy Analysis, Concept Techniques, 
Applications, Fourth Edition, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, England. ISBN-10: 
0631231366, ISBN-13: 9780631231363, pp. 1-551. 
Gray K.R., Cooley W. and Lutabingwa, (1997). Small-scale Manufacturing in Kenya: 
Characteristics Problems and Sources o f Finance. Journal of Small Business 
Management, Vol . 35, Issue 1, pp. 66-72. 
Green, A., (2003). Credit Guarantee Schemes for Small Enterprises. An Effective 
Instrument to Promote Private Sector-led Growth? United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation, Small and Medium Enterprises Branch Programme 
Development and Technical Cooperation Division. SME Technical Working 
Papers Series No. 10, pp. 1-30. 
Green, P. and T. Brown, (1997). Resource Needs and the Dynamic Capitalism 
Typology. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 12, No. 3, pp. 161-173. 
Greenbaum, S. I . , G. Kanatas, and I . Venezia, (1989). Equilibrium Loan Pricing under 
the Bank-Client Relationship. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 13, 
pp.221-235. 
Greene, P. G., (2000). Self-employment as an Economic Behaviour: An Analysis of 
Self-Employed Women's Human and Social Capital. National Journal of 
Sociology, Vol . 12, pp. 1-55. 
Gregory, B. T., M . W. Rutherford, S. Osward and L. Gardiner, (2005). An Empirical 
Investigation of the Growth Cycle of Small Firm Financing. Journal of Small 
Business Management, Vol. 43, No. 34, pp. 382-393. 
Greve, A. and J. W. Salaff, (2003). Social Network and Entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 28, No. 1, pp. 1-22. 
Grossman, G. and C. Shapiro, (1984), Informative Advertising with Differentiated 
Products, Review of Economic Studies, Vol . 51, pp. 63-82. 
412 
Guiso, L., (1998). High-Tech Firms and Credit Rationing. Journal of Economic 
Behaviour and Organisation, Vol. 35, pp. 39-59. 
Gulati, R., (1998). Alliances and Qualitative Methods in Management Research 
Network. Strategic Management Journal, Vol . 19, pp. 293-317. 
Gulati, R., (1995). Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for 
Contractual Choice in Alliances. Academy of Management Journal, Vol . 38, No. 
1, pp. 85-112. 
Gulati, R. and M . Gargiulo, (1999). Where Inter-Organisational Networks Do Comes 
From? American Journal of Sociology, Vol . 104, No. 5, pp. 1439-1493. 
Hair, J. F. Jr., R. E. Anderson, R. L. Tathan, and W. C. Black, (1995). Multivariate Data 
Analysis with Readings, Fourth Edition, Englewood Cliffs , NJ: Prentice Hall 
College Division. ISBN-10: 0139133100, ISBN-13: 9780139133107, pp. 1-745. 
Hakim, C , (1989). Identifying Fast Growth Small Firms, Employment Gazette. January 
pp. 29-41. 
Hall, C , (2002). Profile o f SME's and SME issues in APEC 1999-2000. APEC SME 
Ministerial Meeting, Mexico. African Pacific Economic Cooperation, Small and 
Medium Enterprises, World Scientific Publishing Singapore, Working Group, 
pp. 1-136. 
Hall, G., (1989). Lack o f Finance as a Constraint on the Expansion of Innovatory Small 
Firms. In: Barber, J.L., Metcalfe, J.S., Porteous, M . (Eds.), Barriers to Growth in 
Small Firms. Routledge, London. 
Hall, P., (1995). Habitual Owners o f Small Businesses: In F. Chittenden, M . Robertson 
and I . Marshall (Eds.), Small Firms: Partnership for Growth, pp. 217-230. 
London: Paul Chapman. 
Hall, R., (1989). The Management of Intellectual Assets: A New Corporate Perspective. 
Journal of General Management, Vol . 15, pp. 53-68. 
Hall, G. C , P. J. Hutchinson, and N . Michaelas, (2004). Determinants of the Capital 
Structure o f European SMEs. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol . 31, 
No. 5 and 6, pp. 711-728. 
413 
Hallberg, K., (2000). A Market-Oriented Strategy for Small and Mediun-Scale 
Enterprises, International Finance Corporation, The World Bank Washington, D. 
C. Discussion Paper, IFD No. 40, pp. 1-30. 
Hamel, J., S. Dufour, and D. Fortin, (1993). Case Study Methods. Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage Publications. ISBN-10: 0803954166, ISBN-13: 9780803954168, pp. 1-88. 
Hamel, G. and C. K. Prahalad, (1989). Strategic intent. Harvard Business Review, Vol . 
67, pp. 63-76. 
Hamilton, R. T. and M . A. Fox, (1998). The Financing Preferences of Small Firm 
Owners, International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research. Vol. 
4, No. 3, pp. 239-248. 
Hannan, T. H., (2003). Changes in Non-local Lending to Small Business. Journal of 
Financial Services Research, Vol . 24, pp. 31 -46. 
Hannan, M . and J. Freeman, (1984). Structured Inertia and Organisational Change. 
American Sociological Review, Vol . 49, pp. 149-164. 
Hansen, E. L., (2001). Resource Acquisition as a Start-up Process: Initial Stocks of 
Social Capital and Organisational Founding's. 
http://www.babson.edu/entrep/fer/IV/IVB/html/Iv-B.html. pp. 1-27. 
Hansen, E. L. , (1995). Entrepreneurial Network and New Organisation Growth. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 19, No. 4, pp. 7-19. 
Hansen, J., (2003). Banking in Developing Countries in the 1990s. World Bank Policy 
Operations and Policy Department o f the Financial Sector Vice Presidency, 
Washington, D. C. World Bank. Research Working Paper Series 3168, pp. 1-40. 
Hansen, M . T., (1998). Combining Network Centrality and Relocated Knowledge: 
Explaining Effective Knowledge Sharing in Multiunit Firms. Working paper. 
Harvard Business School, Boston. 
414 
Harhoff, D., and T. Korting, (1998a). Lending Relationships in Germany: Empirical 
Evidence from Survey Data. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 22, pp. 
1317-1354. 
Harhoff, D., and T. Korting, (1998b). How Many Creditors Does it Take to Tango? 
Discussion Paper, Conference on industrial Structure and Input Markets, Centre 
for Economic Policy Research, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Zentrum fur 
Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim, Germany. 
Harper, M . H. , (1984). Small Business in the Third World, Chichester, Wiley, pp.2. 
Harris, M . and A. Raviv, (1991). The Theory o f Capital Structure. Journal of Finance, 
Vol . 46, No. 1, pp. 297-355. 
Harris, M . and A. Raviv, (1990). Capital Structure and the Information Role of Debt. 
Journal of Finance, Vol . 45, No. 2, pp. 321-349. 
Harrison, R. T., M . R. Dibben, C. M . Mason, (1997). The Role o f Trust in the Informal 
Investor's Investment Decision: An Exploratory Analysis. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, pp. 63-81. 
Harrison, R. T. and C. M . Mason, (1996). Introduction: The Informal Venture Capital 
Market. In R. T. Harrison and C. M . Mason (eds) Informal Venture Capital: 
Evaluating the Impact o f Business Introduction Services (Hemel Hempstead: 
Prentice Hall) pp. 3-26. 
Harrison, R.T. and C M . Mason, (2000). Venture Capital Market Complementarities: 
The Links Between Business Angels and Venture Capital Funds in the United 
Kingdom. Venture Capital, Vol . 2, Issue 3, pp. 223-242. 
Harrison, A. E and M . S. McMillan, (2003). Does Direct Foreign Investment Affect 
Domestic Credit Constraints? Journal of International Economics, Vol . 61, pp. 
73-100. 
Harrison, A. E., M . S. McMillan, and 1. Love, (2004). Global Capital Flows and 
Financial Constraints. Journal of Development Economics, Vol . 75, pp. 269-301. 
415 
Hart, O., (2001). Financial Contracting. National Bureau o f Economic Research, 1050 
Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, M A , 02138. Working Paper Series No. 
8285, Harvard University, http://www.nber.org/paper/w8285. 
Hart, O., (1995). Firms, Contracts and Financial Structures. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 
pp". 1-45. 
Harvey, M . and R. Evans, (1995). Forgotten Sources o f Capital for the Family- Owned 
Business. Family Business Review, Vol . 83, pp. 159-175. 
Harvie, C. and B. C. Lee, (2002). The Role of SMEs in National Economies in East 
Asia, Studies of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in East Asia. Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. Vol. 11, pp. 404. 
Hausman, A. , (2005). Innovativeness Among Small Businesses: Theory and 
Propositions for Future Research, Industrial Marketing Management, Vol. 34, 
No. 8, pp. 773-782. 
Hauswald, R. and R. Marquez, (2006). Competition and Strategic Information 
Acquisition in Credit Markets. Review of Financial Studies. Vol . 19, No. 3. pp. 
967-1000. 
Hauswald, R. and R. Marquez (2003). Information Technology and Financial 
Competition. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol . 16, No.3 pp. 921-948. 
Hayek, F. A. , (1945). The Use o f Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review, 
Vol. 35, pp. 529-530. 
Heino, H., (2006). Use of Borrowed Start-up Capital and Micro Enterprises in Mexico: 
Existence o f Liquidity Constraints. Portuguese Economic Journal, Vol . 5, No. 1, 
pp.1-30. 
Hellmann, T. and M . Puri, (2002). Venture Capital and the Professionalisation of Start-
up Firms: Empirical Evidence, Journal of Finance, Vol . 62, No. 1, pp. 169-197. 
416 
Hellmann, T. and J. Stiglitz, (2000). Credit and Equity in Markets with Adverse 
Selection. European Economic Review, Vol . 44, Issue 2, pp. 281-304. 
Hernandez-Trillo, F., J. A. Pagan, and J. Paxton, (2005). Start-up Capital. 
Microenterprises and Technical efficiency in Mexico. Review of Development 
Economics, Vol . 9, No. 3, pp. 434-447. 
Herrera, A . M . and R. Minetti, (2007). Informed Finance and Technological Change 
Evidence from Credit Relationships. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 83, 
pp.223-269. 
Heshmati, A. , (2001). The Dynamics of Capital Structure: Evidence from Swedish 
Micro and Small Firms. Research in Banking and Finance, Vol . 2, pp. 119-241. 
Hewitt-Dundas, N . , (2006). Resources and Capacity Constraints to Innovation in Small 
and Large Plants. Small Business Economics, Vol . 26, No. 3 pp. 251-211. 
Hills, G., G. Lumpkin, and R. P. Singh, (1997). Opportunity Recognition: Perceptions 
and Behaviours of Entrepreneurs. In P. Reynolds, P. Dividsson, W. Garter, and 
P. McDougall (Eds.), Frontiers in Entrepreneurship Research 1997, pp. 59-60. 
Wellesley, M A : Babson College, pp. 330-344. 
Hirschman, A. O, (1984). Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways o f Complication Some 
Categories o f Economic Discourse, American Economic Review, Vol . 74, No. 2. 
pp. 89-96. 
Hitt, M . A. , R. D. Ireland, H . Lee, (2000). Technological Learning Knowledge 
Management Firm Growth and Performance, An Introductory Essay. Journal of 
Engineering and Technology Management, Vol . 17, Issue 3A, pp. 231-246. 
Hoang, H . and N . Young, (2000). Social Embeddedness and Entrepreneurial 
Opportunity Recognition. More Evidence o f Embeddedness. Frontiers of 
Entrepreneurship Research, Babson College, Wellesley, Working Paper, pp. 1-
37. 
Hodgman, D. R., (1963). Commercial Bank Loan and Investment Policy, Bureau of 
Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL. 
417 
Hodgman, D.R., (1960). Credit Risk and Credit Rationing, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol . 74, pp. 258-278. 
Hoff, K. and J. E. Stiglitz, (1993). Imperfect information and Rural Credit Markets: 
Puzzles and Policy Perspectives. In: Hoff, K., Braverman, A., Stiglitz, J. E. 
(Eds.), The Economics of Rural Organization. Theory, Practice, and Policy. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 33-52. 
Hoff, K. and J. E. Stiglitz, (1990). Introduction: Imperfect Information and Rural Credit 
Markets- Puzzles and Policy Perspectives. World Bank Economic Review, Vol . 
4, No. 3, pp. 235-250. 
Hohmann, H. H. and E. Malieva, (2005). The Concept of Trust: Some Notes on 
Definitions, Forms and Sources. In H. H. Hohmann and F. Welter (Eds), Trust 
and Entrepreneurship: A West-East Perspective pp. 7-23. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Holtmann, M . , I . Ruhle, and W. Adalbert, (2000). SME Financing: Lessons from 
Microfinance SME/ISSUES New Idea from the World of Small and Medium, 1 
November. Enterprises, Vol . 1, No. 1. 
Holtz-Eakin, D., D. Joulfaian, H. Rosen, (1994). Entrepreneurial Decisions and 
Liquidity Constraints. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol . 25, pp. 334-347. 
Holtz-Eakin, D. and H. S. Rosen, (1999). Cash Constraints and Business Start-ups: 
Deutschmarks versus Dollars, CEPS Working Paper, No. 62. 
Hoshi, I . , E. Balcerowicz and L. Balcerowicz, (2003). Barriers to Entry in Early 
Transition. A Comparative Study of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Albania 
and Lithuania. N Y , Kluwer Publishers. 1SBN-13: 9780792374169, pp. 1-344. 
Hoshi, T., A .K . Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein, (1990a). Bank Monitoring and Investment: 
Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking 
Relationships, in Asymmetric Information, Investment and Capital Markets, 
edited by R. Glenn Hubbard, University o f Chicago Press, pp. 105-126. 
418 
Hoshi, T., A .K. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein, (1990b). The Role of Banks in Reducing 
the Costs o f Financial Distress in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
27, pp. 67-88. 
Hosmer, L . T., (1995). Trust: The Connecting Link Between Organisational Theory and 
Philosophical Ethnics. Academy of Management Review, Vol . 20, No. 2, pp. 379-
403. 
Hosmer, D. and S. Lemeshow, (2000). Applied Logistic Regression. 2 n d New York, NY: 
John Wiley and Sons. ISBN-13: 9780471356325, pp. 1-392. 
Hotelling, H. , (1929). Stability in competition. Economic Journal, Vol . 39, pp. 41- 45. 
Howorth, C. and A . Moro, (2006). Trust Within Entrepreneur-Bank Relationship: 
Insights from Italy. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 30, No. 4, pp. 
495-517. 
Howorth, C , M . J. Peel, and N . Wilson, (2003). An Examination of the Factors 
Associated with Banking Switching in the U.K. Small Firm Sector. Small 
Business Economics, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 305-318. 
Hsieh, N - C , (2005). Hybrid Mining Approach in the Design of Credit Scoring Models. 
Expert Systems with Applications, Vol . 28, Issues 4, pp. 655-665. 
Hsu, D. H. , (2007). Experience Entrepreneurial Founders, Organisation Capital, and 
Venture Capital Funding. Research Policy, Vol . 36, pp. 722-741. 
Hsu, D., (2003). Serial Entrepreneur, Venture Capital Funding and Social Network 
Substitution, Working Paper. 
Hubbard, R. G., (1998). Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment. Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol . 36, pp. 193-225. 
Hubbard, M . and S. Gregg, (2001). NextGen FICO Scores: More Predictive Power in 
Account Management, Fairlssac Corporation. 
419 
Hudson, J., (2006). Institutional Trust and Subjective Well-being Across the EU. Kyklos, 
Vol . 59, Issue 1, pp. 43-62. 
Hughes, A., (1997). Finance for SMEs: A U. K. Perspective. Small Business Economics, 
Vol . 9, No. 2, pp. 151-168. 
Hughes A. and D. J. Storey, (1994). Finance and the Small Firm. Routledge, (Editions) 
London and New York, ISBN-10: 0415100364, pp. 1-324. 
Hurt, O., (1995). Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
Hussey, J. and R. Hussey, (1997). Business Research: A practical Guide for 
Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students, Palgrave Macmillan Press, London. 
ISBN-10: 033360704X, ISBN-13: 9780333607046, pp. 1-368. 
Hutchison, R. W., (1995). The Capital Structure and Investment Decision of the Small 
Owner-Manager Firm. Some Exploratory Issues. Small Business Economics, 
Vol . 7, pp. 231-239. 
Huyghebaert, N . , (2003). The Capital Structure of Business Start-ups: Policy 
Implications. Journal of Economics and Management, Vol . 48, No. 1, pp. 1-24. 
Huyghebaert, N . , (2001). The Capital Structure of Business Start-ups: Determinants of 
Initial Financial Structure. Revue Bancaire et Financiere, Vol . 2, pp. 84-88. 
Huyghebaert, N and L. M . Van de Gucht, (2007). The Determinants of Financial 
Structures: New Insights From Business Start-ups. European Financial 
Management, Vol . 13, No. 1, pp. 101-133. 
Ikhide, S., (2003). Was There a Credit Crunch in Namibia Between 1996-2000? Journal 
of Applied Economics, Vol . 6, No. 2, pp. 269-290. 
Inderst, R. and H. M . Mueller, (2007). A Lender- Based Theory o f Collateral. Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol . 84, pp. 826-859. 
420 
Inkpen, A. C. and E. W. K. Tsang, (2005). Social Capital, Networks and Knowledge 
Transfer. Academy of Management Review, Vol . 30, No. 1, pp. 146-165. 
Institute o f Statistical Social and Economic Research (ISSER) Report, (2005). The State 
of the Ghanaian Economy in 2004, Accra. University of Ghana Press, pp. 1-85. 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), (2000). IFC SME Financing Needs and Supply 
Study. Compilation o f Findings Final Report Submitted by a Consortium of NE1 
BV/Unit Financial Advisory Services Rabobank International Advisory Services, 
Rotterdam. 
Isaksson, A. and C. Wihlborg, (2002). Financial Constraints on Kenyan Manufacturing, 
in Structure and Performance of Manufacturing in Kenya, (Ed). By A. Bigsten 
and P. Kimuyu, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 92-115. 
Itami, H. and T. Numagami, (1992). Dynamic Interaction Between Strategy and 
Technology. Strategic Management Journal, Vol . 13, Special Issues, pp. 119-
135. 
Jaaskelainen, M . , (2000). Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth. Helsinki: Institute of 
Strategy and International Business. 
Jack, S. L., (2005). The Role, Use and and Activation of strong and Weak Network Ties: 
A Qualitative Analysis. Journal of Management Studies, Vol . 42, Issue 6, pp. 
1233-1259. 
Jaffee, D. and F. Modigliani, (1969). A Theory and Test o f Credit Rationing, American 
Economic Review, Vol . 59, No. 5, pp. 850-872. 
Jaffee, D. and T. Russell, (1976). Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit 
Rationing, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol . 90, No. 4, pp. 651-666. 
Jalan, J. and M . Ravallion, (1999). Are the Poor Less Well Insured? Evidence on 
Vulnerability to Income Risk in Rural China. Journal of Comparative 
Economics, Vol . 26, pp. 338-357. 
421 
James, C. and P. Wier, (1990). Borrowing Relationships, Intermediation and the Cost of 
Issuing Public Securities. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 28, pp. 149-171. 
Jappelli, T., (1990). Who is Credit Constrained in the U. S. Economy? The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol . 105, No. 1, pp. 219-234. 
Jappelli, T. and M . Pagano, (2001). Information Sharing in Credit Markets: International 
Evidence. In M . Pagano, editor. Defusing Default: Incentives and Institutions. 
Washington D. C. United States: Inter-American Development Bank/John 
Hopkins University Press, pp. 1-35. 
Jappelli, T. and M . Pagano, (2000). Information Sharing in Credit Market: A Survey. 
Centre for Studies in Economic and Finance (CSEF). University of Salerno, 
Working Paper, No. 36, pp. 1-25. 
Jappelli, T., J.-S. Pischke, and N . S. Souleles, (1998). Testing for Liquidity Constraints 
in Euler Equations with Complementary Data Sources. Speech presented by the 
President and Follows of Havard College and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, pp. 251-262. 
Jarvis, R., (2000). Finance and the Small Firm. In S. Carter, Practice and Policy, FT 
Prentice Hall, London, pp. 337-353. 
Jay, L . and M . Schaper, (2003). Which Advisers do Micro-Firms Use? Some Australian 
Evidence. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol . 10, Issue 
8, No. 2, pp. 136-148. 
Jefferson, G. H., B. Huamao, G. Xiaojing, and Y. Xiaoyun, (2006). Research and 
Development Performance in Chinese Industry. Economics of Innovation and 
New Technology, Vol . 15, pp. 345-366. 
Jensen, J. B. And R. H. McGuckin, (1997). Firm Performance and Evolution Empirical 
Regularities in the US Microdata. Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol . 6, No. 
I , pp. 25-47. 
Jensen, M . C. and W. Meckling, (1976). The Theory o f the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structuring, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
3, pp. 305-360. 
422 
Jenssen, J. I . , (1999). Entrepreneurial Networks. A Study of the Impact of Network and 
Resource Access on the Start-up of New Organizations. Ph.D. thesis, Norges 
Handelshoyskole, Bergen, Norway, pp. 1 -320. 
Jenssen, J. I . And H. F. Koenig, (2002). The Effect of Social Networks on Resource 
Access and Business Start-ups. European Planning Studies, Vol . 10, No. 8, pp. 
1039-1046. 
Jimenez, G. and J. Saurina, (2003). Collateral, Type of Lender and Relationship 
Banking as Determinants of Credit Risk. Bank of Spain, Directorate-General of 
Banking Regulation, pp. 1-30. 
Johannisson, B., M . Ramirez-Pasillas, and G. Karlsson, (2002). The Institutional 
Embeddedness of Local Inter-Firm Networks: Leverage for Business Creation. 
Entrepreneur ship and Regional Development, Vol . 14, pp. 297-315. 
Johansson, E., (2000). Self-Employment and Liquidity Constraints Evidence from 
Finland. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol . 102, No. 1, pp. 123-134. 
Johns, B. L , W. C. Dunlop, and W. J. Sheenan, (1989). Small Business in Australia: 
Problems and Prospects, Third Edition, Sydney: Alder and Urwin, pp. 1-25. 
Johnson, S., R. Lindley, and C. Boulakis, (1998). An Exploratory Time Series Analysis 
o f Self Employment in Great Britain. Project report, DE Programme, Institute for 
Employment Research, University of Warwick, pp. 1-18. 
Jones, G. R. and J. M . George, (1998). The Experience and Evolution o f Trust: 
Implications for Cooperation and Teamwork. Academy of Management Review, 
Vol. 23, pp. 531-546. 
Jones, S., (1985). Depth Interviewing in Walker, R. L. (Ed.), Applied Qualitative 
Research Gower, Aldershot, pp. 45-55. 
Jones, K., (1996). Trust as an Affective Attitude. Ethics, Vol . 107, pp. 4-25. 
Jordan, J., J. Lowe, and P. Taylor, (1998). Strategy and Financial Policy in UK Small 
Firms. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol . 25, No. 1, pp. 1-27. 
423 
Kadushin, C , (2004). Too Much Investment in Social Capital? Sociological Networks 
Vol . 6, pp. 75-90. 
Kaish, S. and B. Gilad (1991). Characteristics of Opportunities Search of Entrepreneurs 
versus Executives: Sources, Interest, General Alertness. Journal of Business 
Venturing, Vol . 6, pp. 45-61. 
Kano, M . , H. Uchida, G. F. Udell, and W. Watanabe, (2006). Information Veriliability, 
Bank Organisation, Bank Competition and Bank-Borrower Relationship. RIETI 
Discussion Paper Series, 06-E-003, pp. 1-33. 
Kaplan, S. N . and P. Stromberg (2001). Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, 
Screening and Monitoring. American Economic Review, Vol . 91, pp. 426-430. 
Kaplowitz, M . D., T. D. Hadlock, and R. Levine, (2004). A Comparison of Web and 
Mail Survey Response Rates. Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol . 68, No. 1, pp. 94-
101. 
Kareken, J. H. , (1957). Lender's Preferences, Credit Rationing, and the Effectiveness of 
Monetary Policy. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.39, pp. 292-302. 
Kashuliza, A . K. and S. K. Kydd (1996). Determinants o f Bank Credit Access for Small 
Holder Farmers in Tanzania: A Discriminate Analysis Application, Savings and 
Development, No. 3, pp. 285-297. 
Kashyap, A. K., R. Rajan, and J. C. Stein, (2002). Bank as Liquidity Providers: An 
Explanation for the Co-existence of Lending and Deposit-Taking. The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 33-73. 
Kay, J., (1993). The Structure of Strategy. Business Strategy Review, Vol . 4, pp. 17-37. 
Krishnan, R., X. Martin and N . G. Noorderhaven, (2006). When Does Trust Matter 
Alliance Performance? Academy of Management Journal, Vol . 49, No. 5, pp. 
894-917. 
424 
Kumar, K. and 1. Becerra-Fernandez, (2007). Interaction Technology: Speech Act Based 
Information Tehnology Support for Building Collaborative Relationships and 
Trust. Decision Support Systems, Vol . 43, Issue 2, pp. 584-606. 
Kumar, K., R. Rajan, L. Zingales, (1999). What Determines Firm Size? NBER Working 
Paper, No.7208, pp. 1-53. 
Kunze, R.J., (1990). Nothing Ventured: The Perils and Payoffs o f the Great American. 
Venture Capital Game, New York, Harper Collins. 
Kuratko, D. , J. Hornsby, and D. Naffiziger, (1997). An Examination o f Owner's Goals 
in Sustaining Entrepreneurship. Journal of Small Business Management, Vol . 35, 
pp. 24-33. 
Kwast, M . L. , M Starr-McCluer, and J. D. Wolken, (1997). Market Definition and the 
Analysis o f Antitrust in Banking. The Antitrust Bulletin, pp. 973-995. 
Kayanula, D., and P. Quartey (2000). The Policy Environment for Promoting Small and 
Medium Enterprises in Ghana and Malawi. Institute of Development Policy 
Management (IDPM), University of Manchester. Finance and Development 
Research Programme Working Paper Series 15, pp. 1-23. 
Kutsuna, K. and Y. Honjo, (2006). Start-up Financing Choice and Post-entry 
Performance. Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University, 
Aokko Kobe Japan, Discussion Paper Series, pp. 1-32. 
Keane, M . P. and K. I . Wolpin, (2001). The Effect o f Parental Transfer and Borrowing 
Constraints on Education Attainment. International Economic Review, Vol . 42, 
Issue 4, pp. 1051-1103. 
Keasey, K. and R. Watson, (2000). Interest Rate Premia on UK Small Firm Bank 
Borrowings: A Research Note. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
Vol . 27, No. 1 and 2, pp. O306-686X. 
Keeton, W. R., (1995). Multi-office Bank Lending to Small Businesses: Some New 
Evidence. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Second 
Quarter, pp. 45-57. 
425 
Kelly, P. and M . Hay, (2000). Deal Makers: Reputation Attracts Quality. Venture 
Capital, Vol . 2, pp. 193-202. 
Kempf, A. M . and P. L. Remington, (2007). New Challenges for Telephone Survey 
Research in the Twenty-First Century. Annual Review of Public Health, Vol . 28, 
pp. 113-126. 
Kempson, E. and T. Jones, (2000). Banking without Branches. British Bankers 
Association, London, pp. 1-2. 
Kennedy, R. and S. Hobohm, (1999). Capacity Building for Private Sector Development 
In Africa. UNIDO: PSD Technical Working Paper No. 3, pp. 1-34. 
Kevane, M . , (2004). Women and Development in Africa: How Gender Works. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN-10: 1588262383, ISBN-13: 
9781588262387,pp.1-244. 
Kilkenny, M . , L. Nalbarte, and T. Besser, (1999). Reciprocated Community Support and 
Small Town-Small Business Success. Entrepreneurship and Regional 
Development, Vol . 11, pp. 231-246. 
Kirzner, I . M . (1973), Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago: University of 
Chicago press. ISBN-13: 9780226437767, pp. 1-256. 
Kish, L. , (1965). Survey Sampling. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, pp. 1-643. 
Kitcher, P., (1993). The Evolution of Human Altruism. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, 
No. 10, pp. 497-516. 
Knight, F., (1957). Risks, Uncertainty and Profit. New York: Kelly and Millman, pp. 1-
375. 
Kochar, A. , (1997). An Empirical Investigation of Rationing Constraints in Rural Credit 
Markets in India. Journal of Development Economics, Vol . 53, pp. 339-371. 
426 
Kohtamaki, M . , (2003). The Nature of Trust in Inter-Organisational Relationships. In 
Search of Dimensions of Trust. An Unpublished Licentiate Thesis. Department 
of Management., Vaasa: University of Vaasa. 
Kollmann, T., (2004). Risikomanagement fur Business Angels. Venture Capital 
Magazine. ISBN-13: 9783938338001, pp. 1-214. 
Kolvereid, L., and BuIIvg, E. (1993). Novices Versus Habitual Entrepreneurs, An 
Exploratory Investigation. In S. Birley, I.C. MacMillan, and S. Subrammaany, 
(Eds,), Entrepreneurship research: Global perspectives, Amsterdam: Kluwer and 
Associates. 
Kolvereid, L . , S. Shane, L.J. Starr, P. Westhead, and E. Bullvg, (1991). A three country 
survey of novices and experienced entrepreneurs, Proceedings of the 21 s t 
European Small Business Seminar, September 18-20, Barcelona. 
Kon, Y. and D. J. Storey, (2003). A Theory of Discourage Borrowers. Small Business 
Economics, Vol . 21 , pp. 37-49. 
Korajczyk, R. A. and A. Levy, (2003). Capital Structure Choice: Macroeconomic 
Conditions and Financial Constraints. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 68, 
pp. 75-109. 
Korayczyk, R. A., .D. Lucas, and R. McDonald, (1991). The Effects of Information 
Releases on the Pricing and Timing of Equity Issues, Review of Financial 
Studies, Vol . 4, pp. 685-708. 
Kotey, B. (1999), Debt Financing and Factors Internal to the Business. International 
Small Business Journal, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 11-29. 
Kotkin, J., (1984). Why Smart Companies are Saying no to Venture Capital. Inc 6, pp. 
65-75. 
Kourilsky, M . L., (1995). Entrepreneurship Education: Opportunity in Search of 
Curriculum. Business Education Forum, Vol . 50, No. 10, pp. 11-15. 
427 
Kramer, R. M , (1999). Trust and Distrust in Organisations: Emerging Perspective, 
Enduring Questions. Annual Review of Psychology, Vol . 50, pp. 569-598. 
Kraus, A. and R. H. Litzenberger, (1973). A State-Preference Model of Optimal 
Financial Leverage. Journal of Finance, Vol . 28, pp. 911-922. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez de Silares, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, (1998). Law and Finance, 
Journal of Political Economic, Vol . 106, pp. 1113-1155. 
Lall, S., (1992). Technological Capabilities and Industrialisation. World Development, 
Vol.20 Issue 2, pp. 165-186. 
Landstrom, H. , (1992). The Relationship Between Private Investors and Small Firms: 
An Agency Perspective, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, Vol. 9, 
pp. 199-223. 
Landstrom, H. and J. Winborg, (1997). Financial Bootstrapping in Small Business - A 
Resource-Based View on Small Business Finance. In Bygrave, W. D., N . M . 
Carter, P. Davidsson, W. B. Gartner, C M . Mason, P. P. McDougall, (eds.). 
Frontiers o f Entrepreneurship Research. Wellesley, M A : Babson College, Centre 
for Entrepreneurial Studies, pp. 471- 485. 
Larson, A., (1992). Network Dyads in Entrepreneurial Setting: A Study of the 
Governance o f Exchange Processes. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol . 37, 
pp. 76-104. 
Lau, D., (1999). No Rest for the Weary VC. Venture Capita], 1, pp. 52-54. 
Lazear, E., (2005). Entrepreneurship, Journal of Labour Economics, Vol . 23, pp. 649-
680. 
Leana, C. R.and H. J. Van Buren, (1999). Organizational Social Capital and 
Employment Practices. Academy of Management Review, Vol . 24, pp. 538-555. 
Lederer, P. and A. P. Hurter (1986). Competition of Firms, Discriminatory Pricing and 
Location. Econometrica, Vol . 54, pp. 623-640. 
428 
Leeth, J. D. and J. A. Scott, (1989). The Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence from the 
Small Business Community. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
Vol. 24, pp. 379-394. 
Lehmann, E. and D. Neuberger, (2001). Do Lending Relationships Matter? Evidence 
from Banking Survey Data in Germany. Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organisation, Vol . 45, Issue 4, pp. 339-359. 
Lepak, D. P. and S. A. Snell, (1999). The Human Resource Architecture: Toward a 
Theory o f Human Capital Allocation and Development. Academy of 
Management Review, Vol . 24, pp.31-48. 
Lerner, J., (2002). When Bureaucrats meet Entrepreneurs. The Design of Effective 
Public Venture Capital Programmes. Economic Journal, Vol . 112 pp. F73-F84. 
Lesser, E. L. , (2000). Leveraging Social Capital in Organisations. In E.L. Lesser (Ed.), 
Knowledge and Social Capital: Foundations and Applications: Boston: 
Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 3-16. 
Levenson, A. R. and K. L. Willard, (2000). Do Firms Get the Financing They Want? 
Measuring Credit Rationing Experienced by Small Businesses in the U. S. Small 
Business Economics, Vol . 4, pp. 83-94. 
Levine, R., N . Loayza, and T. Beck, (2000). Financial Intermediation and Growth: 
Causality and Causes. Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol . 46, pp. 31-77. 
Levitsky, J., (1997) Credit Guarantee Schemes for SMEs - An International Review', 
Small Enterprise Development, Vol . 8, No. 2, pp. 4-17. 
Levitsky, J., (1989). Microenterprises in Developing Countries, London, ITP, 1989, pp. 
20. 
Levitsky, J. and R. N . Prasad (1987). Credit Guarantee Schemes for Small and Medium 
Enterprises. World Bank Technical Paper No. 58. Industry and Finance Series. 
Washington, D. C. The World Bank, pp. 1-91. 
429 
Levy, B., (1993). Obstacles to Developing Indigenous Small and Medium Enterprises: 
An Empirical Assessment. World Bank Economic Review 7, Vol . 7 No. 1: 65-83. 
Lewicki, R. J., D. J. Mcllister, R.J. Bies, (1998). Trust and Distrust: New Relationship 
and Realities. Academy of Management Review, Vol . 23, No. 2, pp. 438-458. 
Lewicki, R. J., C. Wiethoff, and E. C. Tomlinson, (2005). What is the Role of Trust in 
Organisational Justice? Handbook of Organisational Justice, edited by Jerald 
Greenberg and Jason Colquitt. Published by Routledge, 2005, ISBN-10: 
08058442039, ISBN-13: 9780805842036, pp. 247-272. 
Lewis, J. and A. Weigert, (1985). Trust as a Social Reality. Social Forces, Vol. 63, No. 
4, pp. 967-985. 
Liao, J. and H. Welsch, (2003). Social Capital and Entrepreneurial Growth Aspiration: 
A Comparison of Technology and Non-technology-based Nascent 
Entrepreneurs. Journal of High Technology Management Ressearch, Vol. 14, pp. 
149-170. 
Liberti, J. M . , (2005). How does Organisational Form Matter? Chicago IL, Kellogg, 
School of Management, Northwestern, pp. 1-47. 
Liedholm, C , (2002). Small Firm Dynamics: Evidence from Africa and Latin America. 
Small Business Economics, Vol . 18, Issue, (1-3), pp. 227-242. 
Liedholm, C , (1991). Small and Micro Enterprise Dynamics and Evolving Role of 
Finance, Paper Presented at the Conference on Small and Micro Enterprise 
Promotion in a Changing Policy Environment: A special Focus on Africa, The 
Hague, 30 September - 2 October. 
Liedholm, C , (1989). Small Scale Enterprise Dynamics and the Evolving Role of 
Informal Finance, Paper Presented at the Seminar on Informal Financial Markets 
in Development, Washington, D. C. 18-20 October. 
Liedholm, C. and D. C. Mead, (1999). Small Enterprises and Economic Development. 
The Dynamics of Micro and Small Entreprises. London/New York: Routledge. 
ISBN-10: 0415193516, ISBN-13: 9780415193511, pp. 1-130. 
430 
Liedholm, C. and D. C. Mead, (1987). Small Scale Industries in Developing Countries: 
Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications. International Development paper 
No. 9, Department of Agricultural Economics. Michigan State University 
Lansing, M I , USA, pp. 1-152. 
Lin, N . , (2002). Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. Cambridge 
University Press, ISBN 052152167X, 9780521521673, pp. 1-292. 
Little, I . M . D., (1988). Small Manufacturing Enterprises in Developing Countries, The 
World Bank Economic Review, Vol . 1, No. 2, pp. 205. 
Lochner, L. and A. Monge-Naranjo, (2002). Human Capital Formation with 
Endogenous Credit Constraints. NBER Working Paper Series, No. 8815, 
Cambridge, M A , 02138. http://www.nber.org/paper/w8815, pp. 1-46. 
Long, W. and W. E. McMullen, (1984). Mapping the New Venture Opportunity 
Identification Process. In J.A. Hornaday, F.A. Tarpley, J.A. Timmons, and K. H. 
Vesper (eds). Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, pp. 567-591. Wellesley, 
M A : Babson College. 
Longhofer, S. D. and J. A. C. Santos, (2000). The Importance of Bank Seniority for 
Relationship Lending. Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol . 9, pp. 57-89. 
Lord, R. G. And K. J. Maher, (1990). Alternative Information-Processing Model and 
Their Implications for Theory, Research, and Practice. Academy of Management 
Review, IS, pp. 9-28 
Loury, G., (1987). Why Should We Care About Group Inequality? Social Philosophy 
and Policy, Vol . 5, pp. 249-271. 
Loury, G. C , (1977). A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences. In P. A. 
Wallace and A. M . LaMonde (Eds.), Women Minorties and Employment 
Discrimination: Lexington, M A : Lexington Books, pp. 153-186. 
Love, I . , (2003). Financial Development and Financing Constant: International Evidence 
from the Structural Investment Model. Review of Financial Studies, Vol . 16, pp. 
765-791. 
431 
Low, M . B. and I . C. MacMillan, (1988). Entrepreneurship: Past Research and Future 
Challenge. Journal of Management, Vol . 14No. 2, pp. 139-151. 
Luetkenhorst, W., (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility and the Development 
Agenda: The Case for Actively Involving SMEs, Inter-economics. Hamburg: 
Vol .39 , Issue3,pp.l57-167. 
Luhmann, N . , (1988). Familiarity, Confidence and Trust: Problems and Alternatives. In 
D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relationships. New 
York: Basil Blackwell. pp. 94-107. 
Luhmann, N . , (2000). Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives in 
Gambetta, Diego (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, 
Electronic Edition. Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, Chapter 6, 
pp. 94-107, hhtp://www. sociology .ox. ac.uk/papers/luhmann 94-107.pdf. 
Lukacs, E., (2005). The Economic Role of SMEs in World Economy especially in 
Europe. European Integration Studies, Miskolc, Vol.4. N o . l pp. 3-12. 
Macaulay, S., (1963). Non-contractual Relationship in Business: A Preliminary Study. 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 55-67. 
Machauer, A. and M . Weber, (2000). Number of Bank Relationships: An Indicator of 
Competition, Borrower Quality or Just Size. Centre for Financial Studies. 
Working Paper No. 2000/06, pp. 1-27. 
MacMillan I . C. (1986). To Really Learn About Entrepreneurship, Let's Study Habitual 
Entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol .1 , pp.241-243. 
Maitland, I . , (1997). Virtuous Markets: The Market as School of the Virtues. Business 
Ethics Quarterly, Vol . 7, pp. 17-18. 
Malhotra, M . , Y. Chen, A. Criscuolo, Q. Fan, I . I . Hamel, and Y. Savchenko, (2006). 
Expanding access to finance: Good practices and policies for Micro, Small and 
Medium Enterprises. World Bank Institution, Washington, D. C, pp. 1-79. 
432 
Malhotra, R. and D. K. Malhotra, (2003). Evaluation Consumer Loans Using Neutral 
Networks. The International Journal of Management Science, Vol . 31, pp. 83-
96. 
Mambula, C , (2002). Perceptions o f SME Growth Constraints in Nigeria. Journal of 
Small Business Management, Vol . 40, No. 1, pp. 58-65. 
Manigart, S. and C. Struyf, (1997). Financing High Technology Start-ups in Belgium: 
An Explorative Study. Small Business Economics, Vol . 9, No. 2, pp. 125-135. 
Manove, M . , A . J. Padilla, and M . Pagano, (2001). Collateral versus Project Screening: 
A Model of Lazy Banks. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol . 32, No. 4, pp. 
726-744. 
Manski, C , (2000). Economic Analysis of Social Interaction. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol . 14, pp. 114-136. 
Manuh, G. and R. Brown, (1987). Resources for the Development o f Entrepreneurs. 
London: Commonwealth Secretariat, pp. 69-78. 
March, J. G., (1994). A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen. New 
York: Free Press. ISBN-10:0029200350, ISBN-13: 9780029200353, pp. 1-289. 
Marlow, S. and D. Patton, (2005). A l l Credit to Men? Entrepreneurship, Finance and 
Gender. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 29, Issue 6, pp. 717-735. 
Martin, R., C. Berudt, B. Klagge, P. Sunley, S. Herten, (2003). Regional Venture 
Capitalism Policy UK and Germany compared. Anglo-German Foundation for 
the Study of Industrial Society. 
Martin, R., P. Sunley, and D. Turner, (2002). Taking Risks in Regions: The 
Geographical Anatomy of Europe's Emergent Venture Capital Market. Journal 
of Economic Geography, Vol . 2, pp. 121-150. 
Marvel, M . R. and G. T. Lumpkin, (2007). Technology Entrepreneurs' Human Capital 
and its Effects on Innovation Radicalness. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, Vol . 31, pp. 807-828. 
433 
Mason, C. M . and R. T. Harrison, (2004). Improving Access to Early Stages Venture 
Capital in Regional Economies: A New Approach to Investment Readiness, 
Local Economy, Vol . 19, No. 2, pp. 159-173. 
Mason, C. M . and R. T. Harrison, (2002). The Geography of Venture Capital Investment 
in the UK. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol . 27, Issue 4, 
pp. 427-451. 
Mason, C. M . and R. T. Harrison, (1999). Venture Capital: Rationale, Aims, and Scope. 
Venture Capital, Vol . 1, pp. 1-46. 
Mason, C. M . and R. T. Harrison, (1996). Information Venture Capital: A Study of the 
Investment Process the Post-Investment Experience and Investment 
Performance. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, Vol . 8, pp. 105-126. 
Mason, C. M and R. T. Harrison, (1993). Strategies for Expanding the Informal Venture 
Capital Market. International Small Business Journal, Vol . 11, Issue 4, pp. 23-38 
Mateut, S., S. Bougheas, P. Mizen, (2006). Trade Credit, Bank Lending and Monetary 
Policy Transmission. European Economic Review, Vol . 50, pp. 603-629. 
Mathias, P., (1973). Capital, Credit and Enterprise in the Industrial Revolution. Journal 
of European Economic History, Vol . 2, pp. 142. 
Mayer, R.C., J. H. Davis, and F. D. Schoorman, (1995). An Integrative Model of 
Organisational Trust. Academy of Management Review, Vo l . 20, No. 3, pp. 709-
734. 
Maykut, P. and R. Morehouse, (1994). Beginning Qualitative Research: A Philisophic 
and Practical Guide: Routledge Publications, 1994, pp. 1-194. 
McAllister, D. J., (1995). Affect and Cognition Based Trust as Foundations for 
Interpersonal Cooperation in Organisations. Academy of Management Journal, 
Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 24-59. 
434 
McEvily, S. K. and B. Chakravarthy, (2002). The Persistence of Knowledge-Based 
Advantage: An Empirical Test for Product Performance and Technological 
Knowledge. Strategic Management Journal, Vol . 23, pp. 285-305. 
McGrath, R., M . Tsai, S. Venkataraman, I . MacMillian, (1996). Innovation, Competitive 
Advantage and Rent: A Model and Test. Management Science, Vol. 42, pp.389-
403. 
McGrath, R. G., (1999). Falling Forward: Real Options Reasoning and Entrepreneurial 
Failure'. Academy of Management Review, Vol . 24, pp. 13-30. 
McGrath, R. G. and I . MacMillan, (2000). The Entrepreneurial Mindset, Harvest 
Business School Press, Boston, M A . ISBN-10: 087584346, ISBN-13: 
9780875848341, pp.1-368. 
McMillan, J. H . and S. Schumacher, (1989). Research in Education: A Conceptual 
Introduction. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foreman and Company, Second Edition. 
ISBN-10: 0673397920, ISBN-13: 9780673397928, pp. 1-512. 
McMillan, J. and C. Woodruff, (2002). The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition 
Economies. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol . 16, pp. 153-170. 
McNabb, D. E., (2004). Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and 
Qualitative. M . E. Sharpe Inc. ISBN: 0765612348, pp. 1-571. 
Menkhoff, L . , D. Neuberger, and C. Suwanaporn, (2006). Collateral-Based Lending in 
Emerging Markets: Evidence from Thailand. Journal of Banking and Finance, 
Vol. 30, Issue 1, pp. 1-21. 
Menkhoff, L . and C. Suwanaporn, (2007). On the Rationale o f Bank Lending in Pre-
crisis Thailand. Applied Economic, Vol . 39, No. 9, pp. 1077-1089. 
Mensah, J. V., (2005). Small-Scale Industry as a Sponge? Empirical Survey in the 
Central Region, Ghana. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol . 26, 
Issue 2, pp. 212-226. 
435 
Mensah, S., (1997). Financial Markets and Institutions: Ghana's Experience. 
Presentation at the International Programme on Capital Markets and Portfolio 
Management, Indian Institute of Management, September 8-20, pp. 1-26. 
Mensah, S., (1996). The Valuation of Government Loan Guarantees: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Perspective. Public Finance Quarterly, Vol . 24, No. 2 pp. 263-281. 
Mester, L . J., L . I . Nakamura, and M . Renault, (1998). Checking Account and Bank 
Monitoring. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Wharton, Financial 
Institutions Center, Working Paper, 99-02-C, pp. 1-42. 
Metcalf, H., T. Modood, and S. Virdee, (1996). Asian self-employment: The interaction 
of culture and economics in England, Policy Studies Institute, London. ISBN-10: 
0853746982, ISBN-13: 9780853746980, pp. 1-155. 
Meyer, L., (1998). The Present and Future Roles of Banks in Small Business Finance. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 22, pp. 1109 -1116. 
Meyer, R. L., (1989). Financial Services for Microenterprises: Programmes or Markets' 
In Jacob Levitsky (ed.), Microenterprises in Developing Countries, London: 
Intermediate Technology Publications. 
Meyerson, E. M . , (1994). Human Capital, Social Capital and Compensation: The 
Relative Contribution of Social Contacts to Managers' Incomes. Acta 
Sociologica, Vol . 37, pp. 383-399. 
Meyer-Stamer, J., (2000). Adjusting to an Opening Economy: Three Industrial Clusters 
in Brazil, in Sverrisson, A. and van Dijk , M . P. (eds), Local Economies in 
Turmoil: The Effects of Globalization and Deregulation (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan) pp. 19-42. 
Mian, A. , (2006). Distance Constraints: The Limits of Foreign Lending in Poor 
Economies." The Journal of Finance, Vol . L X I , No. 3 pp. 1465-1505. 
Michaelas, N . , F. Chittenden, and P. Poutziouris, (1996b). Empirical Evidence of the 
Stability o f the Determinants of Capital Structure in SME's. Manchester 
Business School Working Paper, No. 363. 
436 
Milde, H . and J. G. Riley, (1988). Signalling in Credit Markets, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics Vol. 103, Issue l ,pp . 101-129. 
Miller, M . , (2001). Credit Reporting Systems around the Globe. Paper presented at the 
Global Conference on Credit Scoring, Washington, D. C. 2-3 Apri l , pp. 1-90. 
Miller, M . H. , (1977). Debt and Taxes. Journal of Finance, Vol . 32, pp. 261-275. 
Miller, M . H., (1962). Credit Risk and Credit Rationing: Further Comment. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 76, pp. 480-488. 
Mincer, J., (1974). Schooling, Experience and Earnings. New York: Columbia 
University Press. ISBN-10: 0870142658, pp. 1-167. 
Mitra, J., (2000). Making Connections. Innovation and Collective Learning in Small 
Business. Education + Training, Vol . 42, No. 4/5, pp. 228-236. 
Mizruchi, M . S. and L . B. Strarns, (2001). Getting Deals Done: The Use of Social 
Networks in Bank Decision-Making. American Sociological Review, Vol . 66, 
No. 5, pp. 647-671. 
Modigliani, F. and M . Miller, (1963). Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction. 
American Economic Review, Vol . 53, No. 3, pp. 433-443. 
Modigliani, F. and M . Miller, (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the 
Theory o f Investment. American Economic Review, Vol . 48, pp. 261-297. 
Moensted, M . , (2007). Strategic Networking in Small High Tech Firms. The 
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Vol . 3, No. 1, pp. 15-
27. 
Monge-Naranjo, A . and L. J. Hall, (2003). Access to Credit and the Effect of Credit 
Constraints on Costa Rican Manufacturing Firms. Inter-American Development 
Bank, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Latin American Research Network, 
Research Network Working Paper No. R-471, pp. 1-60. 
437 
Monge-Naranjo, A., J. Cascante, and L. J. Hall, (2001). Enforcement, Contract Design, 
and Defaults: Exploring the Financial Markets of Costa Rica. Inter-American 
Development Bank, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Latin American 
Research Network, Research Network Working Paper No. R-429, pp. 1-44. 
Monroy, T. and R. Folger, (1993). A Typology of Entrepreneurial Paradigm. Journal of 
Private Enterprise, Vol . 9, pp. 64-79. 
Monsted, M . , (1995). Process and Structures of Networks: Reflections on Methodology. 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, Vo l . 7, pp. 193-213. 
Morduch, J., (1999). The Microfinance Promise. Journal of Economic Literature, pp. 
1569-1614. 
Moriizumi, Y., (1996). Credit Rationing and Public Housing Loans in Japan. Journal of 
Housing Economics, Vol . 5, pp. 227-246. 
Morna, C , (1990). Credit: A Key Agricultural Input. African Farmer, Vol. 1 No. 3. 
Morsman, E., Jr. (1986). Commercial Loan Structuring. Journal of Commercial Bank 
Lending, Vol . 68, pp. 2-20. 
Moy, J. W. and V. W. M . Luk, (2003). The Life Cycle Model as a Framework for 
Understading Barriers to SME Growth in Hong Kong, Asia Pacific Business 
Review, Vol. 10, pp. 199-220. 
Muijs, D., (2004). Quantitative Methods in Education Research. Sage Publications, pp. 
1-208. 
Muravyev, A. , D. Schafer, and O. Talavera, (2007). Entrepreneurs' Gender and 
Financial Constraints: Evidence from International Data. DIW Berlin, German 
Institute for Economic Research, Working Papers 706, Berlin, July 2007, pp. 1-
39. 
Mushinski, D. W. and K. A. Pickering, (2007). Heterogeneity in Informal Sector 
Mitigation o f Micro-Enterprise Credit Rationing. Journal of International 
Development, Vol . 19, pp. 567-581. 
438 
Myers, M . , (2000). Qualitative Research and the Generalisability Question: Standing 
Firm with Proteus. The Qualitative Report, Vol . 4, No. V2, pp. 1-4. 
Myers, S. C , (2001). Capital Structure. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol . 15, 
No. 2, pp. 81-102. 
Myers, S. C , (1990). Financial Systems, Corporate Finance and Economic 
Development. In: R. Glenn Hubbard (Ed), Asymmetric Information, Corporate 
Finance and Investment. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Myers, S.C. (1984). The Capital Structure Puzzle. Journal of Finance, Vol . 39, Issue 3, 
pp. 575-592. 
Myers, S. C , (1977). Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol . 5, pp. 147-175. 
Myers, S.C. and N.S. Maj luf (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms have Information that Investors do not have. Journal of Financial 
Economics Vo l . 13, No. 2, pp. 187-221. 
Nagarajan, G. and R. L. Meyer, (1998). Collateral Substitutes: Effects on Loan Access 
and Size in the Philippine Informal Credit Markets. Asia Pacific Development 
Journal, Vol . 5, pp. 133-145. 
Nahapiet, J. and S. Ghoshal, (1998). Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the 
Organisational advantage. Academy of Management Review, Vol . 23, pp. 242-
266. 
National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI), (1997). Annual Report, Accra, pp. 
1-5. 
Neal, A. and B. Hesketh, (2002). Productivity in Organisations. In N . Anderson, D. S. 
Ones, H. K. Sinangil, and C. Viswesvaran (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial, Work, 
and Organisational Psychology, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, Vol . 2, pp. 7-24. 
439 
Neck, P. A. and R. E. Nelson, (1987). Small Enterprise Development: Policies and 
Programme. International Labour Organisation, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Management Development Series, No. 14, pp. 1-282. 
Neergaard, H., (2005). Networking Activities in Technology-Based Entrepreneurial 
Teams. International Small Business Journal, Vol . 3, No. 3, pp. 257-278. 
Neergaard, H. and J. P. Ulhoi, (2007). Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods in 
Entrepreneurship. Edward Elgar Publications, 2007. ISBN-10: 1843768356, 
1SBN-13: 9781843768357, pp. 1-499. 
Neergard, H . and J. P. Ulhoi, (2006). Government Agency and Trust in the Formation 
and Transformation o f Interorganisational Entrepreneurial Networks. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 30, No. 4, pp. 519-539. 
Nelson, R. R. and S. G. Winter, (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Belknap Press, Cambridge, M A . ISBN-10: 0674272285, ISBN-13: 
9780674272286,pp.1-454. 
Nelson, R.E., (1989). The Strength of Strong Ties: Social Networks and Inter-group 
Conflict in Organisations. Academy of Management Journal, Vol . 32, pp.377-
401. 
Neubauer, F. and A. G. Lank, (1998). The Family Business: It's Governance for 
Sustainability. London: Palgrave Macmillan Press. ISBN-10: 0333692993, 
ISBN-13: 9780333692998, pp. 1-296. 
Newton, L., (2000). Trust and Virtue in English Banking: the Assessment of Borrowers 
by Bank Managements at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century. Financial History 
Review,Wo\. 7, pp. 177-199. 
Nguyen, T. V., T. B. LE Ngoc, and N . J. Freeman, (2006). Trust and Uncertainty: A 
Study of Bank Lending to Private SMEs in Vietnam. Asia Pacific Business 
Review, Vol . 12, No. 4, pp. 547-568. 
Nguyen, T. V., M . Weinstein, and A. D. Meyer, (2005). Development of Trust: A Study 
of Interfirm Relationship in Vietnam. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol . 
22, No. 3, pp. 211-235. 
440 
Nissanke, M . K. and E. Aryeetey, (1998). Financing Integration and Development in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Liberalization and Reform in sub-Saharan Africa. Routledge 
Studies in Development Economics, pp. 1-321. 
Nissanke, M . K., (2001). Financing Enterprise Development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol . 25, pp. 343-367. 
Nonaka, I . , (1994). A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation. 
Organization Science, Vol . 5, pp. 14 -37. 
Nooteboom, B., (2003). The Trust Process. In B. Nooteboom and F. Six (Eds), The 
Trust Process on Organizations (pp. 16-37). Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar. 
ISBN-10: 1843760789, ISBN-13: 9781843760788, pp. 1-243. 
Nooteboom, B., (2002). Trust: Forms, Foundations, Functions, Failures and Figures. 
Gheltenham, U. K.: Edward Elgar. 
Norton, E., (1991a). Capital Structure and Small Public Firms. Journal of Business 
Venturing, Vol . 6, pp. 287-303. 
Norton, E., (1991b). Capital Structure and Small Growth Firms. Journal of Small 
Business Finance, Vol . 1, No. 2, pp. 161-178. 
Nykvist, J., (2008). Entrepreneurship and Liquidity Constraints: Evidence from Sweden. 
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol . 110, No. 1, pp. 23-43. 
O'Donnell, A. and D. Cummins, (1999). The use o f Qualitative Methods to Research 
Networking in SMEs. Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, 
V o l . 2 , No. 2, pp. 82-91. 
Offe, C , (2001). Wie Konnen Wir Unseren Mitbiirgern Vertrauen? In M . Hartmann and 
C. Offe (Eds), Vertrauen: Die Grundlage des Sozialen Zusammenhalts. New 
York: Campus. Frankfurt/Main, pp. 241-294. 
Ogujiuba, K. K., F. K. Ohuche, and A. O. Adenuga, (2004). Credit Availability to Small 
and Medium Scale Enterprises in Nigeria. Importance of New Capital Base for 
Banks - Background and Issues - Working Paper, pp. 1-25. 
441 
Okoh, G. A. and S. G. Ping, (2000). Financing Small-Scale Manufacturing Firms in 
Ghana: Graduate Business School, School o f Economics and Commercial Law, 
Goteborg University. ISSN-10: 140385IX, pp. 1-82. 
Okurut, F. N . , A. Schoombree, and S. Van Der Berg, (2005). Credit Demand and Credit 
Rationing in the Informal Financial Sector in Uganda. South African Journal of 
Economics, Vol . 73, No. 3, pp. 482-497. 
Omonona, B. T., A. O. Jimoh, Y. A. Awoyinka, (2008). European Journal of Social 
Sciences, Vol . 6, No. 3, pp. 422-432. 
Ongena, S. and D. C. Smith, (2000). What Determines the Number of Bank 
Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
Vol. 9, Issue 1, pp. 26-56. 
Ongena, S. and D. C. Smith, (1998). Bank Relationship: A Review Working Paper. 
University o f Florida. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), (2004). Financing 
Innovative SMEs in a Global Economy. Promoting Entrepreneurship and 
Innovative SMEs in a Global Economy: Towards a more responsible and 
inclusive globalisation. 2 n d OCED Conference o f Ministers responsible for Small 
and Medium-Sizes Enterprises (SMEs), Istanbul, Turkey, pp. 1-47. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), (2003). 
Observatory o f European SMEs Highlights from the 2003 Observatory. 
Enterprise Publications No. 8. pp. 1-52. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), (2002). 
Observatory o f European SMEs, SMEs in Focus, main results from the 2002 
Observatory o f European SMEs, pp. 1-16. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2001). The 
Wellbeing o f Nations: The Role of Human and Social Capital. Paris: OECD. 
Executive Summary, pp. 1-8. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), (1998). Fostering 
Entrepreneurship. Paris: OECD, pp. 1-22. 
442 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1997). The Oslo 
Manual. Proposed Guideline for Collecting and Interpreting Technological 
Innovation Data, Paris, OECD. ISBN-10: 9264013083, ISBN-13: 
978926013087,pp. 1-162. 
Otero, M . and C. Lopez, (2001). Credit Scoring in Microfinance. Paper Presented at the 
Global Conference on Credit Scoring, Washington, D. C. 2-3 Apri l . 
Ou, C. and G. W. Haynes, (2003). Use of Equity Capital by Small Firms. Findings from 
the Survey o f Small Business Finances for 1993 and 1998. Paper Presented at the 
Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance 14 t h International Conference in Chicago, 
]L ,pp . 1-23. 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, B., G. O. A. Laditan, A. O. Esubiyi, (1996). Industrial Innovation 
in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Manufacturing Sector in Nigeria. Research Policy, 
Vol. 25, pp. 1081-1096. 
Ozgen, E. and R. Baron, (2007). Social Sources of Information in Opportunity 
Recognition: Effect o f Mentors, Industry Network, and Professional Forums. 
Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 22, pp. 174-192. 
Ozyildirim, S. and Z. Onder, (2008). Banking Activities and Local Output Growth: Does 
Distance from Centre Matter? Regional Studies, Vol . 42, No. 2, pp. 229-244. 
Padgett, D. K., (2008). Qualitative Methods in Social Work Research. Sage 
Publications, pp. 1-281. 
Padilla, A. J. and M . Pagano, (2000). Sharing Default Information as a Borrower 
Discipline Devine. European Economic Review, Vol . 44, Issue 10, pp. 1951-
1980. 
Paglia, J. K., (2000). An Overview of Covenants in Large Commercial Bank Loans. 
Evergreen Loan Covenants, http://www.exceptioncomplete.com/PDF/4993.pdf, 
pp. 1-4. 
Palich, L. E. and D.R. Bagby, (1995). Using Cognitive Theory to Explain 
Entrepreneurial Risk-taking: Challenging Conventional Wisdom. Journal of 
Business Venturing, Vol . 10, pp. 425-438. 
443 
Park, K. and G. Pennacchi, (2009). Harming Depositors and Helping Borrowers: the 
Disparate Impact of Bank Consolidation. Review of Financial Studies, Vol . 22, 
pp. 1-40. 
Parker R., R. Riopelle, W. Steel, (1995). 'Small Enterprises Adjusting to Liberalisation 
in Five African Countries'. Technical Department, Africa Region, World Bank, 
Washington D. C. Discussion Paper, No. 271. 
Parker, S. C , (2002). Do Banks Ration Credit to New Enterprises? And Should 
Governments Intervene? Scottish Economic Society, Vol . 49, No. 2, pp. 162-195. 
Parker, S. C. and C. M . Van Praag, (2006). Schooling, Capital Constraints and 
Entrepreneurial Performance: The Endogenous Triangle. Journal of Business 
and Economic Statistics, Vol . 24, No. 4, pp. 416-431. 
Parkhe, A., (1993). Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theretic and Transaction 
Cost Examination o f Inter-firm Cooperation. Academy of Management Journal, 
Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 794-829. 
Patton, M . O., (1987). How to use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation, Sage Publications, 
Newbury Park, CA. ISBN-10: 0803931298, ISBN-13: 9780803931299, pp. 1-
176 
Pennings, J. M . , K. Lee, and A. van Witteloostuijn, (1998). Human Capital, Social 
Capital, and Firm Dissolution. Academy of Management Journal, Vol . 41, No.4, 
pp. 425-440. 
Penrose, E.T., (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, New York, John Wiley. 
Perez, S. J., (1998). Testing for Credit Rationing: An Application o f Disequilibrium 
Econometric. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol . 20, No. 4, pp. 721 -739. 
Perren, L. and M . Ram, (2004). Case-Study Methods in Small Business and 
Entrepreneurial Research: Mapping Boundaries and Perspective. International 
Small Business Journal, Vol . 22, No. 1, pp. 83-101. 
Petersen, M . A., (2004). Information: Hard and Soft. Mineo, Kellogg School of 
Management, Northwestern University and NBER, pp. 1-20. 
444 
Petersen, M . A, and R. G. Rajan, (2002). Does Distance Still Matter? The Information 
Revolution in Small Business Lending." The Journal of Finance, Vol.57, No. 6, 
pp. 2533-2570. 
Petersen, M . A. and R. G. Rajan, (1997). Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence. Review 
of Financial Studies, Vol . 10, No. 3, pp. 661-691. 
Petersen, M . A. and R. G. Rajan, (1995). The Effect o f Credit Card Competition on 
Lending Relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol . 110, pp. 406-443. 
Petersen, M . A. and R. G. Rajan, (1994). The Benefits of Lending Relationships: 
Evidence from Small Business Data. Journal of Finance, Vol . 49, No. 1, pp. 3-
37. 
Petrick, M . , (2004). Farm Investment, Credit Rationing and Governmentally Promoted 
Credit Access in Poland: A Cross-Sectional Analysis. Food Policy, Vol . 29, pp. 
275-294. 
Petrick, M . , (2005). Empirical Measurement o f Credit Rationing in Agriculture: A 
Methodological Survey. Agricultural Economics, Vol . 33, pp. 191-203. 
Pettit, R. and R. Singer, (1985). Small Business Finance: A Research Agenda. Financial 
Management, pp. 47-60. 
Petty, J. and W. Bygrave, (1993). What does Finance have to say to the Entrepreneur? 
Journal of Small Business Finance, Vol. 2, pp. 125-137. 
Pfeffer, J., (1994). Competitive Advantage Through People. Unleashing the Power of 
the Work Force Boston: Harvard Business School Press. ISBN: 0875844138, pp. 
1-281. 
Phillips, C. A. and S. Bruchey, (1981). Bank Credit. Ayer Publications, ISBN-13: 
0405136757, pp. 1-374. 
Piga, C. A. and G. Atzeni, (2007). R & D Investment, Credit Rationing and Sample 
Selection. Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol . 59, No. 2, pp. 0307-3378. 
445 
Pinheiro, A. C. and C. Cabral, (1999). Credit Markets in Brazil: The Role of Judicial 
Enforcement and other Institutions. Banco lnternamericaro De Desarrollo, 1300, 
New York, Avenue, N . W. Washington D. C. 20577. Ensaios BNDES, pp. 1-80. 
Pinkse, J., M . E. Slade, and C. Brett, (2002). Spatial Price Competition: A semi 
parametric approach, Econometrica, Vol. 70, pp. 1111 -1153. 
Pissarides, F., (1999). Is Lack of Funds the Main Obstacle to Growth? EBRD'S 
Experience with Small and Medium-Sized Businesses in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 14, pp.519-539. 
Platteau, J. P., (1994a). Behind the Market Stage, Where Real Societies Exist - part 1. 
The Role of Public and Private Order Institutions. Journal of Development 
Studies, Vol . 30, pp. 533-577. 
Podolny, J., (1994). Market Uncertainty and the Social Character of Economic 
Exchange. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol . 39, pp. 458-483. 
Podolny, J. M . and K. L. Page, (1998). Network Forms of Organisation. Annual Review 
of Sociology, Vo l . 24, pp. 57-76. 
Podsakoff, P. M . , S. B. Mackenzie, J. Y. Lee, and N . P. Podsakoff, (2003). Common 
Methods Biases in Behavioural Research: A Critical Review of the Literature 
and Recommended Remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol . 88, No. 5, 
pp. 879-903. 
Pohle, M . , (1995). Risk, Information and Noise: Risk Perception and Risk Management 
of French and German Banks during the Nineteenth Century. Financial History 
Review, Vol . 2, pp. 32. 
Polanyi, M . , (1967). The Tacit Dimension (first published in 1966). Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, pp. 1-68. 
Porteous, D., (1995). The Geography of Finance: Spatial Dimensions of Intermediary 
Behaviour, Avebury Ashgate, Aldershot, England. ISBN-10: 1859720463, pp. 1-
230. 
446 
Portes, A., (1998). Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. 
Annual Review of sociology, Vol . 24, pp. 1-24. 
Poutziouris, P. and F. Chittenden, (1996). Family Business or Business Family? The 
Institute of Small Business Affairs, Research Series Monograph 2. 
Powell, W. W., (1996). Trust-based Forms of Governance. In R. M . Kramer and T.R. 
Tyler (Eds), Trust in Organisation pp. 51-67. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Powell, W. W. and L. Smith-Doerr, (1994). Networks and Economic Life in N . J. 
Smelser and R. Swedberg (Editions.), Handbook of Economic Sociology, New 
York, Russell Sage, Foundation, pp. 368-402. 
Pozzolo, A. F., (2004). The Role of Guarantees in Bank Lending EFMA 2004 Basel 
Meeting Paper, pp. 1-24. 
Pressnell, L. S., (1956). Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution, Oxford. 
Charendon Press, pp. 1-591. 
Pruteanu, A., (2004). Was There Evidence of Credit Rationing in the Czech Republic? 
Eastern European Economics, Vol . 42, No. 5, pp. 58-72. 
Puhakka, V., (2002). Entrepreneurial Business Opportunity Recognition: Relations 
between Intellectual and Social Capital. Environmental Dynamism, Opportunity 
Recognition Behaviour and Performance, Universitas Wasaensis, Finland. 
Working Paper, pp. 1-115. 
Punch, K. F., (2005). Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches. Sage Publications, 2005, pp. 1-320. 
Putnam, R. D., (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Simon and Schuster, Limited. ISBN-10: 0743203046, 
ISBN-13: 9780743203043, pp. 1-544. 
447 
Putnam, R. D., R. Leonardi, R. Y . Nanetti, (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
Chichester. ISBN-10: 0691037388, ISBN-13: 9780691037387, pp. 1-280. 
Putzel, J., (1997). Accounting for the 'dark side' of Social Capital: Reading Robert 
Putnam on democracy. Journal of International Development, Vol . 9, No. 7, pp. 
939-949. 
Quartey, P., (2001). Regulation, Competition and Small and Medium Enterprises in 
Developing Countries. Centre on Regulation and Competition, Institute for 
development policy and management, University of Manchester, Working paper 
series, ISBN, paper No. 10, pp. 1-22. 
Raiser, M . , (1999). Trust in Transition. EBRD Working Paper 39, London: EBRD. 
Rajan, R. and A. Winton, (1995). Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor. 
Journal of Finance, Vol . 50, pp. 1113-1146. 
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales, (1995). What do we know about Capital Structure? Some 
Evidence from International Data. Journal of Finance, Vol . 50, pp. 1421-1460. 
Rand, J., (2007). Credit Constraints and Determinants o f the Cost of Capital in 
Vietnamese Manufacturing, Small Business Economics, Vol . 29, pp. 1-13. 
Rauch, A. and M . Frese, (2000). Psychological Approaches to Entrepreneurial success: 
A general Model and an Overview of Findings. In C.L. Cooper and I.T. 
Robertson (Eds), International review of industrial and organisational 
psychology. Vol . 15, pp. 100-135. Chichester Sussex: Wiley and Sons. 
Rauch, A., M . Frese, and A. Utsch, (2005). Effects of Human Capital and Long-Term 
Human Resources Development and Utilisation on Employment Growth of 
Small-Scale Businesses: A Causal Analysis. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, pp. 1042-2587. 
Reddings, G., (1990). The Spirit of the Chinese Capitalism. New York: Walter de 
Gruyter. ISBN-10: 899256570, ISBN-13: 110137941, pp. 1-261. 
448 
Reed, R. and R. J. DeFillippi, (1990). Causal Ambiguity, Barrier to Imitation and 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage. Academy of Management Review, Vol . 15, 
pp. 88-102. 
Reed, E., E. Richard, V. Cotter, E. K. Gi l l , and R. K. Smith, (1976). Commercial 
Banking. Englewood Cilffs , Prentice Hall, pp. 1-442. 
Reicheld, F. and W. E. Sasser, (1990). Zero Defections: Quality Comes to Services. 
Harvard Business Review, Vol . 68, No. 5, pp. 105-111. 
Reid, G. C , (2003). Trajectories o f Small Business Financial Structure. Small Business 
Economics, Vol . 20, pp. 273-285. 
Reuber, A. R. and E. Fischer, (1999). Understanding the Consequences of Founders 
Experience. Journal of Small Business Management, Vol . 37, 30-45. 
Reynolds, P., (1997). Who Starts Firms? Preliminary Explorations of Firms in 
Gestation. Small Business Economics, Vol . 9, pp. 449-462. 
Reynolds, P., D. J. Storey, and P. Westhead, (1994). Cross-national Comparisons of the 
variation in new f i rm formation rates, Regional Studies, Vol . 28, pp. 443-456. 
Ridley, M , (1995). The Origins of Virtue, London pp. 80-82. 
Ring, P. S. and A. H. Van Den Ven, (1992). Structuring Cooperative Relationships 
Between Organisations. Strategic Management Journal, Vol . 13, pp. 483-498. 
Ring, P. S. and A. H . Van de Ven, (1994). Developmental Processes of Cooperative 
Interorganisational Relationships. Academy of Management Review, Vol . 19, No. 
1, pp. 90-118. 
Rizov, M . , (2004). Credit Constraints and Profitability: Evidence from a Transition 
Economy. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Vol . 40, No. 4, pp. 63-83. 
449 
Robb, A. and J. Wolken, (2002). Firm, Owner, and Financing Characteristics: 
Differences between Female and Male Owned Small Businesses. Federal 
Reserve Board Governors, pp. 1-28. 
Robbie, K. and M . Wright, (1996). Management Buy-Ins: Active Investors and 
Corporate Restructuring. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN-10: 
071904281X, ISBN-13: 978-0719042812, pp. 1-168. 
Robinson, P. B. and E. A. Sexton, (1994). The Effects of Education and Experience of 
Self-employment Success. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 9, pp. 141-156. 
Robson, P. J. A. and B. A. Obeng, (2008). The Barriers to Growth in Ghana. Small 
Business Economics, Vol . 30, pp. 385-403. 
Rogers, E, M . , (1995). Diffusion of innovations. New York: Free Press. Fourth Edition. 
ISBN-10: 0029266718, ISBN-13: 9780029266717, pp. 1-518. 
Rogers, M . , (2004). Networks, Firm Size and Innovation. Small Business Economics, 
Vol .22 , Issue 2, pp. 141-165. 
Romano, C. A., G. A. Tanewski, and K. X. Smyrnios, (2001). Capital Structure 
Decision Making: A Model for Family Business. Journal of Business Venturing, 
Vol . 16, Issue 3, pp. 285-310. 
Ronstadt, R. (1988). The Corridor Principle, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 3, pp. 
31-40. 
Roosa, R., (1951). Interest Rates and the Central Bank, in Money, Trade and Economic 
Growth: Essays in Honour of John Henry Williams, New York: Macmillan, pp. 
270-295. 
Rosa, P., (1998). Entrepreneurial Processes of Business Cluster Formation and Growth 
by Habitual Entrepreneurs, Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice, Vol . 22, pp. 
43-61. 
Rose, P.S., (1995). Commercial Bank Management, Third Edition, The Irwin Series in 
Finance, Richard D. Irwin Publishing Company, Chicago, pp. 596-598. 
450 
Rosen, B. and T. H . Jerdee, (1977). Influence o f Subordinate Characteristics on Trust 
and Use o f Participative Decision Strategy in Management Stimulation. Journal 
of Applied Psychology, Vol . 62, pp. 631. 
Rosenzweig, M . R., (1988). Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of 
Low-Income Countries. The Economic Journal, Vol . 98, No. 393, pp. 1148-
1170. 
Rousseau, D. M . , S. B. Sitkin, R. S. Burt, and C. Camerer, (1998). Not so Different 
After A l l : A Cross-Discipline View of Trust. Academy of Management Review, 
Vol .23 , pp. 405-421. 
Russo, P. F. and P. Rossi, (2001). Credit Constraints in Italian Industrial Districts. 
Applied Economics, Vol . 33, pp. 1469-1477. 
Ryder, H . E., (1962). Credit Risk and Credit Rationing: Comment. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol . 76, pp. 471-479. 
Sacerdoti, E., (2005). Access to Bank Credit in sub-Saharan Africa. Key Issues and 
Reform Strategies. IMF Working Paper, WP/05/166 pp. 1-39. 
Sahlman, W. A., (1990). The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital 
Organisations. Journal of Financial Economic, Vol . 27, pp. 473-521. 
Sahu, G. B., S. Madheswaran, and D. Rajasekhar, (2004). Credit Constraints and 
Distress Sales in Rural India: Evidence from Kalahandi District, Orissa. Journal 
of Peasant Studies, Vol . 31, No. 2, pp. 210-241. 
Salop, S., (1979), Monopolistic Competition with outside Goods. Bell Journal of 
Economics, Vol . 10, pp. 141-156. 
Sandee, H. and P. Rietveld, (2000). Innovation in Roof Tile and Cooper Craft Clusters 
in Indonesia, in Sverrisson, A. van Di jk , M . P. (eds), Local Economies in 
Turmoil: The Effects of Globalisation and Deregulation (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan) pp. 95-113. 
451 
Santos, N . , (2003). Financing Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises in Post-conflict 
Situations. Microfinance Opportunities in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. OECD Development Centre. Discussion Paper Produced for the Seminar 
"Public Private Partnership for the Development of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo" Kinshasa, April 7, pp. 1-64. 
Saparito, P. A., C. C. Chen, and H. J. Sapienza, (2004). The Role of Relational Trust in 
Bank-Small Firm relationship. Academy of Management Journal, Vol . 43, No. 3, 
pp. 400-410. 
Sapienza, P., (2002). The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts. Journal of 
Finance, Vo l . 57, Issue 1, pp. 329-367. 
Sapienza, H. J, S. Manigart, and W. Vermeir, (1996). Venture Capitalists Governance 
and Value Added in Four Countries. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 11, pp. 
439-469. 
Sarder, J., (2001). An Assessment of Operational Conditions of Cottage, Small and 
Medium Enterprises (CSME) in Bangladesh, Report Prepared for FBCCI, 
Dhaka, pp. 1-27. 
Scheaffer, R., M . Gnanadesikan, A. Watkins, and J. Witmer, (1996). Activity-Based 
Statistics: Instructor Resource, New York. Springer, Verlag. ISBN-10: 
0387945970, ISBN-13: 9780387945972, pp. 1-258. 
Schiffer, M . and B. Weder, (2001). Firm Size and the Business Environment: 
Worldwide Survey Result. International Finance Corporation (IFC), The World 
Bank, Washington, DC. Discussion Paper, No. 43, pp. 1-51. 
Schilit, W.K., (1991). Dream Makers and Deal Breakers: Inside the Ventue Capital 
Industry. Prentice Hall. ISBN-10: 0139340351, ISBN-13: 9780139340352, pp. 
1-256. 
Schreiner, M . and G. Woller, (2003). Microenterprise Development Programme in the 
United States and in the Developing World. World Development, Vol . 31, pp. 
1567-1580. 
Schultz, T. W., (1959). Investment in Man: An Economist's View. Sociological Service 
Review, Vol . 33, No. 2, pp. 69-75. 
452 
Schultz, T. W., (1961). Investment in Human Capital. American Economic Review, Vol . 
51,pp. 1-17. 
Schumpeter, J. A. , (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. First Edition. New 
York: Harper and Row, pp. 1-381. 
Scott, J. O., (1957). The Availability Doctrine: Theoretical Underpinnings. The Review 
of Economic Studies, Vol . 25, No. 1, pp. 41-48. 
Scott, J. and W. Dunkelberg, (1999). Bank Consolidation and Small Business Lending. 
A. Small Firm Perspective. In Business Access to Capital and Credit (eds J. 
Blanton, A. Willaims and S. Rhine), pp. 238-361. A Federal Research System 
Research Conference. 
Scott, J. A., (2004). Small Business and the Value o f Community Financial institution. 
Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol . 25, No. 2, pp.207 - 230. 
Seaton, J. S. And 1. Walker, (1997). Signally, Disclosure and the Implications of 
Financial Structure for UK Corporate R and D. Economics of Innovation and 
New Technology, Vol . 5, Issue 1, pp. 75-90. 
Senbet, L. W. and I . Otchere, (2006). Financing Sector Reforms in Africa: Perspective 
on Issues and Policies. Annual World Bank Conference on Development 
Economics. The World Bank, Washington, D. C. pp. 81-121. 
Sengupta, R., (2007). Foreign Entry and Bank Competition. Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol . 84, Issue 2, pp. 502-528. 
Sexton, D. and N . Bowman, (1984). Entrepreneurship Education: Suggestions for 
Increasing Effectiveness. Journal of Small Business Management, Vol . 22, pp. 
18-25. 
Seymour, C. R. and W. E. Jr. Wetzel, (1981). Informal Risk Capital in New England. 
Washington, D.C. United States Small Business Administration, Office of 
Adovacy. 
Shailer, G. E. P., (1999). The Relevance of Owner-Manager Signals and Risk Proxies to 
the Pricing o f Bank Loans. Accounting and Business Research, Vol . 30, pp. 57-
72. 
453 
Shane, S., (2000). Prior Knowledge and the Discovery of Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 
Organisation Science, Vol.11, pp. 448-469. 
Shane, S. and S. Venkataraman, (2000). The Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of 
Research. Academic Management Review, Vol . 25, No. 1, pp. 217-226. 
Shane, S. and D. Cable, (2002). Network Ties, Reputation, and the Financing of New 
Ventures. Management Science, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 364-381. 
Sharpe, S. A. , (1990). Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A 
styled Model o f Customer Relationships. Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, pp. 1069-
1087. 
Shaver, K. and L. R. Scott, (1991). Person, Process, Choice: The Psychology of New 
Venture Creation. Entrepreneurial Theory and Practice, Vol . 16, pp. 23-45. 
Shaw, E. and S. Conway, (2000). Networking and the Small Firm in Enterprise and 
Small Business. Ed. S. Carter and D. Jones-Evans. Harlow, UK: Financial 
Times/Prentice Hall, pp. 367-383. 
Shaw, R. B., (1997). Trust in Balance: Building Successful Organisations on Results of 
Integrity and Concern. San Francisco, C.A. Jossey Bass Publishers. 1SBN-13: 
9780787902865, pp. 1-272. 
Shleifer, A . and R. W. Vishny, (1989). Management Entrenchment: The Case of 
Manager-Specific Investments. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 25, pp. 
123-139. 
Shockley, R. and A. V . Thakor, (1993). Information Content of Commitments to Lend 
in the Future: Theory and Evidence on the Gains from Relationship Banking, 
Working Paper, Indiana University. 
Shrader, R. and D. S. Siegel, (2007). Assessing the Relationship Between Human 
Capital and Firm Performance: Evidence from Technology-Based New Venture. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 31, pp. 893-908. 
454 
Shrivastava, P. and J. H. Grant, (1985). Empirically Derived Models of Strategic 
Decision-Making Processes. Strategic Management Journal, Vol . 6, pp. 97-113. 
Shyam-Sunder, L. and S. Myers, (1999). Testing Static Trade-off Against Pecking Order 
Models of Capital Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 51, pp. 219-
244. 
Singh, G. and R. Belwal, (2008). Entrepreneurship and SMEs in Ethiopia. Gender in 
Management, Vol . 23, No. 2, pp. 120-136. 
Singh, R. P., G. E. Hills, R. C. Hybels and G. T. Lumpkin, (1999). Opportunity 
Recognition through Social Network Characteristics of Entrepreneurs. In P. D. 
Reynolds, W. D. Bygrave, S. Manigart, C. M . Mason, G. D. Meyer, H. J. 
Sapienza, and K. G. Shaver (eds.), Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, 228-
256. Wellesley, M A : Babson College, pp. 228-256. 
Slater, S. F., (1997). Developing A Customer Value-Based Theory o f the Firm. Journal 
of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol . 25, pp. 162-167. 
Smallbone, D. and F. Lyon, (2002). A Note on Trust, Networks, Social Capital and 
Entrepreneurial Behaviour. In H. H. Hohmann and F. Welter (Eds), 
Entrepreneurial Strategies and Trust: Structure and Evolution of Entrepreneurial 
behavioural Patterns in East and West European Environments - Concept and 
Considerations pp. 19-24. Bremen: Forschungsstelle Osteuropa. 
Smallbone, D. and F. Welter, (2001). The Distinctiveness o f Entrepreneurship in 
Transition Economies. Small Business Economic, Vol . 16, No. 4, pp. 249-262. 
Smallbone, D. and P. Wyer, (2000). Growth and Development in the Small Firm, in 
Carter, S. and Jones-Evans, D. (Eds), Enterprise and Small Business, Prentice 
Hall, Harlow. (2 n d ed), pp. 1-572. 
Smith, V. L., (1972). A Theory and Test of Credit Rationing: Some Generalizations. 
American Economic Review, Vol . 62, No. 3, pp. 477-483. 
Smith, C.W. and J. B Warmer, (1979). On Financial Contracting. An Analysis o f Bond 
Covenants. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol . 7, pp. 117-161. 
455 
Soh, P-H, (2003). The Role of Networking Alliances in Information Acquisition and its 
Implication for New Product Performance. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol . 
18, Issue 6, pp. 727-744. 
Sonnenfeld, J. A . and P. L. Spence, (1989). The parting Patriarch of a Family Firm. 
Family Business Review, Vol . 2, No. 4, pp. 355-375. 
Soo, C. W., T. M . Devinney, and D. F. Midgley, (2002). Knowledge Creation in 
Organisations. Eploring Firm and Content Effects. Working Paper, 
2002/55/MKT pp. 1-38. 
Sowa, N . K., (2003). Comment on 'The Golden Age of Business'. The Role o f the 
Banking Sector www.cepa.org.eh/archines/research-workingpaper/2003/ 
Comment on the Golden Age of Business. 
Sowa, N . K., (2002). Assessment o f Poverty Reduction Policies and Programmes in 
Ghana. A Paper Presented in a Conference on Assessment of Poverty Reduction 
Policy Organised by INSEA and IDRC under Micro Impact o f Macro Economic 
Adjustment Policies (MIMAP) Project, pp. 1-29. 
Sowa, N . K., A. Baah-Nuakoh, K. A. Tutu, and B. Osei, (1992). Small Enterprises and 
Adjustment: The Impact o f Ghana's Economic Recovery Programme, London: 
Overseas Development Institute. ISBN-10: 0850031885, ISBN-I3: 
978085003188, pp. 1-64. 
Sowa, N . K. and I . K. Acquaye, (1999). Financial and Foreign Exchange Markets 
Liberalisation in Ghana. Journal of International Development, Vol . 11 pp. 385-
409. 
Spence, M . , (1973). Job Market Signalling; Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol . 87, 
No. 3, pp. 355-374. 
Spender, J.C., (1996). Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm. 
Startegic Management Journal, Winter Special Issue, Vol . 17, pp. 45-62. 
456 
Starr, J., and Bygrave, W. (1991). The Assets and Liabilities o f Prior Start-up 
Experience: An Exploratory Study of Multiple Venture Entrepreneurs. In N . C. 
Churchill, W. D. Bygrave, J. G. Covin, D. L. Sexton, D. P. Slevin, K. H. Vesper 
and W. E. Wetzel (Eds), Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 1991, 
Wellesley, M A , Babson College, pp. 213-227. 
Stedler, H . R. and H. H. Peters, (2003). Business Angels in Germany: An Empirical 
Study. Venture Capital, An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 
Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 269-276. 
Steel, W. F, (1994). Changing the Institutional and Policy Environment for Small 
Enterprise Development in Africa. Small Enterprise Development, Vol . 5, No. 2, 
pp. 4-9. 
Steel, W. F. and L . M . Webster, (1992). How Small Enterprises in Ghana have 
Responded to Adjustment, The World Bank Economic Review, Vol . 6, No. 3, pp. 
423-438. 
Steel, W. F. and L. M . Webster, (1991). Small Enterprises under Adjustment in Ghana. 
Technical Paper No. 138, World Bank, Washington, D. C , USA, pp. 1-70. 
Steijvers, T. and W. Voordeckers, (2007). Credit Rationing in the Corporate Bank Loan 
Market: Short-Term Versus Long-Term Bank Debt Rationing. Hasselt University, 
KIZOR Research Centre, http://hdl.handle.net/l942/7869. 
Stein, J. C , (2002). Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralised versus 
Hierarchical Firms. Journal of Finance, Vol . L V I L , pp. 1891-1922. 
Stephan, F. F. and P. J. McCarthy, (1958). Sampling Opinion. An Analysis o f Survey 
Procedure. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York, pp. 1-451. 
Stephanou, C. and C. Rodriguez, (2008). Bank Financing to Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) in Colombia. Latin America and the Caribbean Region. 
Financial and Private Sector Development Unit. The World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper, WPS 4481, PP. 1-46. 
Stephen, D., (1990). An Outsider in Kano, in: G. Vulliamy, K. Lewin, and D. Stephen 
(eds). Doing Educational Research in Developing Countries, pp. 68-82 (London, 
The Falmer Press). 
457 
Stevenson, H. H. , M . J. Robert, and H. I . Grousbeck, (1985). New Business Ventures 
and the Entrepreneur. Homewood, IL : Richard D. Irwin, Inc. Second Edition. 
ISBN-10: 025602166X, ISBN-13: 9780256021660, pp. 1-345. 
Stewart, F., (1987). Macro-policies for Appropriate Technology in Developing 
Countries. Westview Press, (ed) Boulder, Colo (EUA), pp. 1-315. 
Stiglitz, J. E., (2000). Capital Market Liberalisation, Economic Growth and Instability. 
World Development, Vol . 28, No. 6, pp. 1075-1086. 
Stiglitz, J. E., (1989). Imperfect Information in the Product Market. Handbook of 
Industrial Organisation, Vol . 1, pp. 769-847. 
Stiglitz, J. E., (1975). The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of 
Income. The American Economic Review, Vol . 65, No. 3, pp. 283-300. 
Stiglitz, J. E. and A. M . Weiss, (1986). Credit Rationing and Collateral in Recent 
Developments in Corporate Finance, Cambridge, (ed) J. Edwards, pp. 101-136. 
Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss, (1981). Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information. American Economic Review, Vol . 71, Issue 3, pp. 393-410. 
Storey, D. J., (2004). Racial and Gender Discrimination in the Micro Firms Credit 
Market? Evidence from Trinidad and Tobago. Small Business Economics, Vol . 
23, No. 5, pp. 401-422. 
Storey, D. J., (1994). Understanding the Small Business Sector. Cengage Learning 
EMEA, Routledge, London. ISBN-10: 1861523815, ISBN-13: 9781861523815, 
pp. 1-355. 
Strahan, P. E. and J. P. Weston, (1998). Small Business Lending and the Changing 
Structure o f the Banking Industry. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 22, pp. 
821-845. 
Stulz, R. M . and H. Johnson, (1985). An Analysis of Secured Debt. Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol.14, pp. 501-521. 
458 
Sunley, P., B. Klagge, C. Berndt, and R. Martin, (2005). Venture capital programmes in 
the UK and Germany. In what sense Regional Policies. Regional Studies, Vol . 39, 
No. 2, pp. 255-273. 
Sussman, O. and J. Zeira, (1995). Banking and Development. CEPR Discussion Paper 
1127. Theses Jacques F., and Xavier Vives, 1988, on the Strategic Choice of 
Spatial Price Policy, American Economic Review, Vol . 78, pp. 122-137. 
Sverrisson, A. , (1997). Enterprise Networks and Technological Change: Aspects of 
Light Engineering and Metalworking in Accra, in van Dijk , M . P. and Rabellotti, 
R. (eds), Enterprise Clusters and Networks in Developing Countries (London: 
Frank Cass) pp. 169-190. 
Sverrisson, A., (1994). Gradual Diffusion of Flexible Techniques in Small and Medium-
sized Enterprise Networks, in Pedersen, P. O., Sverrisson, A. and van Dijk, M . P. 
(eds). Flexible Specialization: The Dynamics o f Small-Scale Industries in the 
South (London: Intermediate Technology Publishers) pp. 42-54. 
Sykes, J., (1928). The Present State o f Joint Stock Banking, London. 
Szabo, A., (1996). The Role o f Governments in Promoting Small and Medium-size 
Enterprises in Counties in Transition, United Nations, Geneva. UN-ECE 
Operational Activities United Nations, Geneva. 
Tagoe, N . , E. Nyarko, and E. Anuwa-Amarh, (2005). Financing Challenges Facing 
Urban SMEs under Financial Sector Liberalization in Ghana. Journal of Small 
Business Management, Vol . 43, No. 3, pp. 331-343. 
Tannous, G. F., (1997). Financing Export Activities of Small Canadian Business. 
Exploring the Constraints and Possible Solutions. International Business Review, 
Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 411-431. 
Tashiro, Y., (1999). Business Angels in Japan. Venture Capital, Vol . 1, No. 3, pp. 259-
. 273. 
Teach, R., F. Tarpley, and R. Schwartz, (1986). Software Venture Team. In Ronstadt, 
R., Hornaday, J., Peterson, R. R., Vesper, K. (Eds.), Frontiers in 
Entrepreneurship Research, 1986. Babson Centre for Entrepreneurial Studies, 
Wellesley, M A . Pp. 546-562. 
459 
Teece, D. J., G. Pisano, and A. Shuen, (1997). Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management. Strategic Management Journal, Vol . 18, No. 7, pp. 509-533. 
Thompson, Lighthouse and Co. (1996). Canadian Source o f Financing for SMEs, In 
Lavoie, D. (ed.), ICSB Bulletin, Vol . 29, No. 4, pp. 5. 
Thorne, J., (1989). Alternative Financing for Entrepreneurial Ventures. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, pp. 7-9. 
Thurik, R. and S. Wennekers, (2001). Entrepreneurship, Small Business and Economic 
Growth. Rotterdam: Erasmus Research Institute o f Management Report Series, 
pp. 1-10. 
Thurow, L.C., (1970). Investment in Human Capital, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
Belmont, California, pp. 1-145. 
Timan, S. and R. Wessels, (1988). The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. 
Journal of Finance, Vol . 43, No. 1, pp. 1-19. 
Timmons, J. A, (1994). New Venture Creation. Fourth Edition, Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin, 
Chicago. 
Timmons, J. A . and H. Sapienza, (1992). Venture Capital: The Decade Ahead, in D. L. 
Sexton and J. Kasarda (eds) The State of the Art of Entrepreneurship (Boston: 
PWS Kent), pp. 402-437. 
Ting, O. K., (2004). SMEs in Malaysia: Pivot Points for Change, online available at 
http://www.mca.org.my. 
Tirole, J., (1998). The Theory of Industrial Organisation. MIT Press, Boston, MA. 
Tornell, A. and F. Westermann, (2002). Credit Market Imperfections in Middle Income 
Countries, NBER, Working Paper, No. 9737, pp. 1-29. 
460 
Tourangeau, R., L. J. Rips, and K. Rasinski, (2000). The Psychology of Survey 
Response. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-401. 
Trovato, G. and M . A l f o , (2006). Credit Rationing and the Financial Structure of Italian 
Small and Medium Enterprises. Journal of Applied Economics, Vol . 9, No. 1, pp. 
167-184. 
Trulsson, P., (1999). Managing Growth: Perspectives on Achieving Small Enterprise 
Growth in Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. (ILO working paper, PMD/4/E). 
Geneva: ILO. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/ent/papers/pmd-
4.htm. pp. 1-40. 
Tucker, J. and J. Lean, (2003). Small Firm Finance and Public Policy. Journal of Small 
Business and Enterprise Development, Vol . 10, No. 1, pp. 50-61. 
Tucker, J. and J. Lean, (2001). Information Asymmetry, Small Firm Finance and the 
Role o f Government. Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services, 
Vol. 1, pp. 43-61. 
Tucker, C , J. M . Brick, and B. Meekins, (2007). Household Telephone Service and 
Usage Pattern in the US in 2004. Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol . 71, No. 1, pp. 
3-22. 
Tull , D. S. and D. I . Hawkins, (1990). Marketing Research, Measurement and Method, 
(5 t h ed). Macmillan Publications, New York, N Y . 
Turvey, C. G. and A. Weersink, (1997). Credit Risk and the Demand for Agricultural 
Loans. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol . 45, pp. 201-217. 
Ucbasaran, D., G. A. Alsos, P. Westhead, and M . Wright, (2008). 'Habitual 
Entrepreneurs'. Foundations and Trends ® in Entrepreneurship, Vol . 4, No. 4, 
pp. 309-450. 
Ucbasaran, D., P. Westhead, M . Wright, (2006). Habitual Entrepreneur. Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar. ISBN-10: 184542249X, pp. 1-240. 
461 
Ucbasaran, D., M . Wright, and P. Westhead, (2003). A Longitudinal Study of Habitual 
Entrepreneurs: Starters and Acquirers. Entrepreneurship and Regional 
Development, Vol . 15, No. 3, pp. 207-228. 
Ucbasaran, D., P. Westhead and M . Wright, (2001). The Focus of Entrepreneurial 
Research: Contextual and Process Issues, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 57-80. 
Uchida, H. , G. F. Udell, and W. Watanabe, (2008). Bank Size and Lending 
Relationships in Japan. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 
Vol . 22, pp. 242-267. 
Ulheri, J.P., (2005). The Social Dimensions of Entrepreneurship. Technovation, Vol. 25, 
Issue 8, pp. 939-946. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), (2004). 
Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: The Empretec Showcase, 
Geneva. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/TEB/2004/3, pp. 1-16. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), (2001). Survey of 
Good Practice in Public-Private Sector Dialogue. Enterprise Development 
Series, New York and Geneva: United Nations. UNCTAD/ITE/TEB/4, pp. 1-42. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), (1999). Providing 
Sustainable Financial and Non-financial Services for SME Development. 
Geneva: United Nations. TD/B/COM.3/EM. 7/2, pp. 1-20. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), (1995). Issues 
Concerning SME's Access to Finance. Report to the UNCTAD Trade and 
Development Board by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Role of Enterprise in 
Development, Geneva UNCTAD. UNCTAD. TD/B/WG.7/6, pp. 1-40. 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), (2006). Annual Report, 
(2005). Industrial Development Board, Thirty First Session, Programme and 
Budget Committee, Twenty-Second Session, Vienna, 2006, IDB 31/2 -PBC 
22/2, ISSN 1020-7651, pp. 1-140. 
462 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), (1999). Financing of 
Private Enterprise Development in Africa. Need for Wider Range of Financial 
Instruments and Interface with Business Development Services for SMEs. 
Conference on Industrial Partnerships and Investments in Africa, Dakar, 
Senegal, 20-21 October, 1999, pp. 1-45. 
United Parcel Services, (UPS), (2005). UPS Reveals Asia Business Monitor Survey 
Findings, online available at http://www.ups.com, pp. 1-8. 
Usher, A . P., (1943). The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, M A . Harvard Economic Studies, Vol . 75, 
pp. 1-603. 
Uzzi, B., (1999). Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social 
Relations and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing. American 
Sociological Review, Vol . 64, pp. 481-505. 
Uzzi, B., (1997). Social Structure and Competition in Inter-firm Networks: The Paradox 
of Embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol . 42, pp. 35-67. 
Uzzi, B. and R. Lancaster, (2003). Relationship Embeddedness and Learning: The Case 
o f Bank Loan Managers and Their Clients. Management Science, Vol . 49, No. 4, 
pp. 383-399. 
Valez, P., (2000). Interpersonal Trust between Supervisor and Subordinate, Doctoral 
Dissertation Abstracts International, UNI No. 3002301, University of California. 
Van Auken, H . E., (2001). Financing Small Technology-based Companies: The 
Relationship Between Familiarity with Capital and Abil i ty to Price and 
Negotiate Investment. Journal of Small Business Management, Vol . 39, Issue 3, 
pp. 240-258. 
Van Auken, H . E. and R. B. Carter, (1989). Acquisition of Capital by Small Business. 
Journal of Small Business Management, Vol . 27, No. 2, pp. 1-9. 
Van Auken, E. Howard, and L. Neeley, (1996). Evidence o f Bootstrap Financing among 
Small Business Start-up Firms. Entrepreneurship and Small Business Finance, 
Vol . 5, Issue 3, pp. 235-249. 
463 
Van der Sluis, J. C. M . Van Praag, and W. Vijverberg, (2003). Entrepreneurship, 
Selection and Performance: A Meta-Analysis of the Role of Education. Impact 
of Education in Less Developed Countries, Working Paper, pp. 1-39. 
Van der Wijst, D., (1989). Financial Structure in Small Business Theory, Tests and 
Applications. Springer-Varlag, Berlin. Lecture Notes in Economics and 
Mathematical System Series, No. 320. 
Van Deth, J. W., (2003). Measuring Social Capital: Orthodoxies and Continuing 
Controversies. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, Vol . 6, 
No. 1, pp. 79-92. 
Van Eeden, S., M . Rhakadu, G. Sharp, and S. Viviers, (2003). Access to Finance - A 
Small Business Constraint. University of Port Elizabeth, South Africa. Working 
Paper, pp. 1-16. 
Van Straveren, I . , (2001). Gender Biases in Finance. Gender and Development, Vol. 9, 
No. 1, pp. 9-17. 
Van Uxem, F. W. and J. Bais, (1996). Het Startten van een bedrijf: Ervaringen van 
2000 Starters, Zoetermeer: EIM. 
Vandell, K. D., (1984). Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing: 
Comment and Extension. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol . 99, No. 4, 
pp. 841-863. 
Venkataraman, S., (1997). The Distinctive Domain o f Entrepreneurship Research: An 
Editor's Perspective, in Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm Emergence, and 
Growth, Vol . 3, Ed. J. A. Katz. Greenwich, CA: JAI Press, pp. 119-138. 
Verheul I . and R. Thurik, (2001). Start-up Capital 'Does Gender Matter' Small Business 
Economics, Vol . 16, pp. 329-345. 
Vernier, E., (1993). Que Vaut Une Enterprise Sans Son Dirigeant. Banque 566, pp. 34-
36. 
464 
Visser, E. J., (2000). Structural Adjustment and Cluster Advantages: A. Case from Peru, 
in Sverrisson, A. and van Dijk, M . P. (eds), Local Economies in Turmiol: The 
Effects o f Globalization and Deregulation (Basingstoke: Macmillan) pp. 77-94. 
Vogel, R. and D. Adam, (1997). Costs and Benefits of Loan Guarantee Programmes. 
The Financier, Vol . 4, (1 and 2), pp. 22-29. 
Von Eije, H., M . Fishazion, and C. Lutz, (2003). Accessing Bank Credit in Eritrea: 
Bottlenecks for Small Firms and for the Commercial Bank of Eritrea. Journal of 
Eritrean Studies, vol. 1, No. 1, pp 59-74. 
Voordeckers, W. and T. Steijvers, (2005). Credit Rationing for SME's in the Corporate 
Bank Loan Market of a Bank-Based Economy. Working paper, Limburg 
University, Belgium. Working Paper, pp. 1-40. 
Voordeckers, W. and T. Steijvers, (2006). Business Collateral and Personal 
Commitments in SME lending. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 30, pp. 
3067-3086. 
Vos Ed., A. Yuh Yeh, C. Sara, and S. Tagg, (2007), The Happy Story o f Small Business 
Financing. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol . 31, Issue 9, pp. 2648-2672. 
Vulliamy, G., K. Lewin, D. Stephens, (1990), Doing Educational Research in Developing 
Countries: Qualitative Strategies. London: New York, Falmer Press. ISBN-10: 
1850007136, ISBN-13: 9781850007135, pp. 1-265. 
Wagenvoort, R., (2003). Bank Survey Evidence on Bank Lending to SME in European 
Union: European Investment Bank papers, Vol . 01, pp. 1-56. 
Wald, J. K., (1999). How Firm Characteristics Affect Capital Structure: An International 
Comparison. Journal of Financial Research, Vol . 22, No. 2, pp. 161 -187. 
Wale, J., (1994). What help have the Banks given British Industry? Some Evidence on 
Bank Lending in the Midlands in the late Nineteenth Century. Accounting, 
Business and Financial History, Vol . 4, Issue 2, pp. 321-342. 
Walker, D. A., (1989). Financing the Small Firm. Small Business Economics, Vol . 1, pp. 
285-296. 
465 
Walker, D. A., (1985). Trade Credit Supply for Small Businesses, American Journal of 
Small Business, Vo l . 9, pp. 30-40. 
Walsh, M . and L. Wigens, (2003). Foundations in Nursing and Health Care Series 
Edition. Introduction to Research. Nelson Thornes, ISBN: 0748771182, pp. 1-
176. 
Watson, R. and N . Wilson, (2002). Small and Medium Size Enterprise Financing: A 
Note on Some of the Empirical Implications o f a Pecking Order. Journal of 
Business Finance Account, Vol . 29, pp. 557-578. 
Wattanapruttipaisan, T., (2003). Four Proposals for Improved Financing of SME 
Development in Asean. Asian Development Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 1-45. 
Webster, L., (1991). World Bank Lending for Small and Medium Enterprises. The 
World Bank Washington D. C. World Bank Discussion Papers 113, pp. 1-76. 
Weick, K. E. (1993). The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organisation: The Mann Gulch 
Disaster. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 38, pp. 628-652. 
Weick, K., (1996). Drop Your Tools: An Allegory for Organisation Studies. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 41, pp. 301-314. 
Welbourne, T. M . and A. O. Andrews, (1996). Predicting Performance of Initial Public 
Offerings: Should Human Resource Management be in the Equation? Academy 
of Management Journal, Vol . 39, Issue 4, pp. 891-919. 
Welter, F. and D. Smallbone, (2006). Exploring the Role of Trust in Entrepreneurial 
Activity. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol . 30, Issue 4, pp. 465-475. 
Wennekers, S., N . Noorhaven, G. Hofstede, and A. R. Thurik, (2002). Cultural and 
Economic Determinants of Business Ownership Across Countries. In Bygrave, W. 
D., E. Autio, C. G. Brush, P. Davidsson, P. G. Green, P. D. Reynolds, and H. J. 
Sapienza, (Eds.). Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Babson College, 
Wellesley, Mass, pp. 179-190. 
466 
Wennekers, S. and R. Thurik, (1999). Linking Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth. 
Small Business Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 27-55. 
Wennekers, S., L. M. Uhlaner, and R. Thurik, (2002). Entrepreneurship and its 
Conditions: A Micro Perspective, International Journal of Entrepreneurship 
Education, Vol. I pp. 25-64. 
Wemerfelf, B., (1989). From Critical Resources to Corporate Strategy. Journal of 
General Management, Vol. 14, pp. 4-12. 
Westhead, P., (1997). Ambitions, External Environment and Strategic Factor Difference 
between Family and Non-family Unquoted Companies, Entrepreneurship and 
Regional Development, Vol. 9, pp. 127-157. 
Westhead, P., (1995). Survival and Employment Growth Contracts between Types of 
Owner-Managed High-Technology Firms, Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 5-27. 
Westhead, P. And D. J. Storey, (1997). Financial Constraints on the Growth of High 
Technology Small Firms in United Kingdom. Applied Financial Economics, 
Vol. 7, pp. 197-201. 
Westhead, P., D. Ucbasaran, M. Wright, and M. Binks, (2005c). Novice, Serial and 
Portfolio Entrepreneur Behaviour and Contributions. Small Business Economics, 
Vol. 25, pp. 109-132. 
Westhead, P., D. Ucbasaran, and M. Wright, (2005b). Experience and Cognition: Do 
Novice, Serial and Portfolio Entrepreneurs Differ? International Small Business 
Journal, Vol. 23, pp. 72-98. 
Westhead, P., D. Ucbasaran, M. Wright, (2005a). Decisions, Actions and Performance: 
Do Novice, Serial and Portfolio Entrepreneurs Differ? Journal of Small Business 
Management, Vol. 43, pp. 393-417. 
Westhead, P., D. Ucbasaran, M. Wright, and M. Binks, (2004). Policy Towards Novice, 
Serial and Portfolio Entrepreneurs. Environment and Planning C: Government 
and Policy, Vol. 22, pp. 779-798. 
467 
Westhead, P., D. Ucbasaran, M. Wright and F. Martin, (2003a). Habitual Entrepreneurs 
In Scotland: Characteristics, Search Processes, Learning and Performance in 
Scottish Enterprise. 5 5 Atlantic Quay, 150 Broomielaw, Glasglow, G2, 8LU. 
Westhead, P., D. Ucbasaran and M. Wright, (2003b). Differences between Private Firms 
Owned by Novice, Serial and Portfolio Entrepreneurs: Implications for Policy-
makers and Practitioners, Regional Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 187-200. 
Westhead, P. and M. Wright, (2000). Introduction. In P. Westhead and M. Wright 
Editions. Aldershot: Edward Elgar publishing Limited. Advances in 
Entrepreneur ship, 3 Volumes, pp. 11-46. 
Westhead, P. and M. Wright, (1999). Contributions of Novice, Portfolio and Serial 
Founders Located in Rural and Urban Areas, Regional Studies, Vol. 33, pp. 157-
173. 
Westhead, P. and M. Wright, (1998b). Novice, Serial and Portfolio Located in Rural and 
Urban Areas. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 63-
100. 
Westhead, P. and M. Wright, (1998a). Novice, Portfolio and Serial founders, are they 
Different? Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 13, 173-204. 
Weston, J. F. and E. F. Brigham, (1981). Managerial Finance, Seven Edition, Hinsdale: 
Dryden Press, pp. 899-913. 
Wetzel, W. E., (1981). Informal Risk Capital in New England. In K. H. Vesper (ed.) 
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 1981 (Wellesley, MA: Babson College) 
pp. 217-245. 
Wiklund, J. and D. A. Shepherd, (2008). Portfolio Entrepreneurship: Habitual and 
Novice Founders, New Entry and Mode of Organising. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, Vol. 32, Issue 4, pp. 701-725. 
Williamson, O. E., (1981). The Economics of Organisation: The Transaction Cost 
Approach. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 87. 
Williamson, S. D., (1987). Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit 
Rationing. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, pp. 135-145. 
468 
Williamson, O. E., (1993). Calculativeness Trust and Economic Organisation. Journal 
of Law and Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 453-486. 
Wilson Committee, (1979). The Financing of Small Firms: Interim Report of the 
Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions, CMND 7503. 
London: HMSO. 
Wilson, P. F., (1993). The Pricing of Loans in a Bank-Borrower Relationship. Indiana 
University Working Paper (July). 
Winborg, J. and H. Landstrom, (2001). Financial Bootstrapping in Small Businesses: 
Examining Small Business Managers' Resource Acquisition Behaviours. 
Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 16, Issue 3, pp. 235-254. 
Winker, P., (1999). Sluggish Adjustment of Interest Rates and Credit Rationing: An 
Application of Unit Root Testing and Error Correction Modelling. Applied 
Economics, Vol. 31, pp. 267-277'. 
Winter-Nelson, A. and A. A. Temu, (2005). Liquidity Constraints, Access to Credit and 
and Pro-poor Growth in Rural Tanzania. Journal of International Development, 
Vol. 17, pp. 867-882. 
Wintoro, D., (2000). An Investigation of the Role of Trust in the Relationship between 
Pension Fund Trustees and Investment Managers: An Indonesian Case Study, 
Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Wollongong, Vol. 12, pp. 
1-444. 
Witt, P., (2004). Entrepreneurs Networks and the Success of Start-ups, Entrepreneurship 
and Regional Development, Vol. 16, pp. 391-412. 
Witt, U., (1998). Imagination and leadership - The Neglected Dimension of an 
Evolutionary Theory of the Firm. Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organisation, Vol. 35, pp. 161-177. 
469 
Wolf, S., (2004). Performance and Problems of Enterprises in Ghana. Survey of Formal 
Private Sector Enterprises in the Agricultural and Manufacturing Sectors. 
Department of Agricultural Economic and Agribusiness, University of Ghana 
and Centre for Development Research, Bonn, Germany, pp. 1-27. 
Wolken, J. and D. Rhode, (2002). Changes in the Location of Small Businesses 
Financial Services Suppliers between 1993 and 1998. Federal Reserve Board 
Memorandum. 
Woolcock, M., (1998). Social Capital and Economic Development: Towards a 
Theoretical Systhesis and Policy Framework. Theory and Society, Vol. 27, No. 2, 
pp. 151-208. 
World Banks, (1993). Characteristics of and Constraints Facing Black Businesses in 
South Africa: Survey Results. Industry and Energy Division, Southern Africa 
Department, Washington, D. C. Discussion paper No. 5. 
World Bank, (2004a). Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulation Washington, 
DC: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank, (2004b). World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate 
for Everyone. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wright, M., K. Robbie, and C. Ennew, (1997a). 'Serial Entrepreneurs' British Journal of 
Management, Vol. 8, pp. 251-268. 
Wright, M., K. Robbie, and C. Ennew, (1997b). Venture Capitalists and Serial 
Entrepreneurs, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 12, pp. 227-249. 
Wright, P. M., B. B. Dunford, S. A. Snell, (2001). Human Resources and the Resource 
Based View of the Firm. Journal of Management, Vol. 27, pp. 701-721. 
Yin, R., (1994). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2 n d ed), Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
470 
Yli-Renko, H., (1999). Dependence, Social Capital, and Learning in Key Customer 
Relationships: Effects on the Performance of Technology-Based New Firms. 
Finnish Academy of Technology, Espoo Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica, IM5 
Finland. 
Yli-Renko, H., E. Autio, and H. Sapienza, (2001). Social Capital, Knowledge 
Acquisition and Knowledge Exploitation in Young Technology-Based Firms. 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22, pp. 587-613. 
Zahra, S. A. and J. G. Covin, (1995). Contextual Influences on the Corporate 
Entrepreneurship - Performance Relationship: A Longitudinal Analysis. Journal 
of Business Venturing, Vol. 10, Issue I , pp. 43-58. 
Zand. D.E., (1972). Trust and Managerial Problem Solving. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 17, pp. 229-239. 
Zeller, M., (1994). Determinants of Credit Rationing: A Study of Informal Lenders and 
Formal Credit Groups in Madagascar. International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington D. C, U.S.A. World Development, Vol. 22, No. 12: 1895-
1907. 
Zhang, J., (2007). The Advantage of Experienced Start-up Founders in Venture Capital 
Acquisition: Evidence from Serial Entrepreneurs. Department of Economics, 
Clark University. Institute for the Study of Labour, IZA, Discussion Paper No. 
2964. 
Zingales, L., (2000). In Search of New Foundations, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 
1623-1653. 
Ziorklui, S. Q., (2001). The Impact of Financial Sector Reforms on Banking Efficiency 
and Financial Deepening for Savings Mobilisation in Ghana. Howard University, 
African Economic Policy Discussion Paper, No. 81, pp. 1-74. 
Zucker, L., (1986). Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 
1840-1920. B. Staw, L. Cummings, eds. Research in Organisational Behaviour, 
Vol.8, pp. 53-111. 
471 
T3 a 
a> 
o. 
a < 
e 
•5 c 
a-a 
1 o 
3 .2 
c « y 
VI 
o 
41 -O 
3J u •B 5 o 
a) •-
& c 
81 
5 « " 
5 u. c 
01 
5.8 
3 u 
c 
73 
E 
X c S g 
u 
.£2 
ft- <" 3 
•7? M 
C 
a 
V) 
as 
< S 
8 
"35 
trt en 
"3 fe 
on 00 
00 T3 
u 00 1 
t .s 
o c 
is 
s i 
0 8 . 
3 
g .H 
M . 2 
.s a 
^ 13 
73 
> 
CO 
e o 
O. 
±1 
e 
c 
D 
N V 
T3 C 
VI 4> 
s * 
S i — "a 
& ^ >, .52 
— o o 
<N 5 « 5 
-a 
1 J= 
13 
o a> 
•U u o 
•s a b 
o o 
o a. 
s •§ 
eo 13 
> 
73 
c 
3 
00 o -J 
73 
< (SS 
> I 
g "O 
-g -o 
a E 
3 3 
•I * 
'•3 i 
a E 
2 0 
.S c 
= 1> 
VI <U c 
u 
o 
"I 
S 8 IS 
u i I 
•s ^ — 
2 o S 
" l i 
"Si 3 .a 
'« § feb 
VI . 
HI 
D- D. p 
£ E £ 
T3 
H > ~ 
3 0 
S 
O 
u 
2 8 
D on c 3 
S> S E 
<u o w B -C • -q u h 4> V) 
h 3 e C ° S o ^ U 5 >,& 
•a u 
E £ -a. 
a 
S 
a 
o 
c o o. 
a. 
II • £ 
'£ =1 
c a 
'I = 
3 UJ 
4) 
p 
n 
c 
< 
•a u 
> N 
O o 
c o 
D. 
a: 
cv -J 
> 
c o o. 
V) 
0) 
13 
3 
<= 2 
(U 
u 
13 
c 
< 
g s a 
GO CO 
i2 2 .2 
E ° 
S .5 
3 § 
1 I 
6-8 
o. 
a 
O 
*7f •* C 
•s * 
•a <u 
^ " I 3 3 2 
2" 2 2 — _ a 
>\ "O u 
••C C ? 
I I «s 
•- c a g 
O I -
~ u 
u oo 5. O £2 
C 
3 
O 
U 
u. 
c o 
I « 
.Si 
u . c/i 
> 3 * '3 -a 
5 "a 
2 -o „ .c O 
<u u 
3 E 
52 
5 .Si 
•S -s 
U D. 
O. o 
x .£ 
13 »> 
3 c/3 
U 4J 1/1 OJ 
SJ CM 
5b g 
8 E 
as W 
> •-
V e 
o 
3 OS 
o o 
_ S o 
Q - O . & 
J5 a t: 
c 
c 
< 
a: 
c 
< 
O o 
c o 
Cl-
u 
a; 
c 
w 
•a 
c 
< 
'5 
D 
du
al
 
> 
so 
vo 
%
6I 
•5 c 
II 
pi
e 
= 
ra
te
 =
 
al
ys
is
 
Is 
•a 
c 
< 
•a 
> 
c 
o 
D-
S 2 
J? o 
6h 
o -J 
•a 
t 
o 1_ 
u 
o 
•o 
V 
DD 
M 
u 
3 
O 
J2 8 
-is 
? J 
.2- g 
•a > 
4) ^ 
•S cL o. 
J = .2 
I I 
• 2 O 
1 s 
U 3 > O. 
c c 
•o c 
.c 
8 2 
O o (u 
a 
« 2 ^ 
a. u 
o •a S 2 
S S o o 
a a <-< g 
c 
£ - ° 
8 -a 5 ™ 
. 'S " a. 
o-*° > ^ 
a s g s 
2 .2 8.^ 
a a a 
O 
op « 
"U u Q 
x c ^ 
l b 
S o 
O 3 
£2 o 
a) o 
FT <N 
n> o 
O.OV a. os 
o 
U 
2 8 1 8 
= 3 
en 
B 
•5 e 
tZ 
•8:s-S.s-d"i 
2 in a OQ u 5 "3 
E 2 M 1 3 5= 5 
M oo E c 2 - a g> 5 „ S> o •- 8 x> o -a -Hb 
c 
K .E o 
i -
•o . u oo 
i -
o . 
Q. C 
| x g g> 
| 5 - | E 8 J S ' S f i g 
•o " b 
U C J 
"S '5 0 0 
NO O — 
D. 
O . 
2L E 
•3 12 
•S 8 .S 73 13 ? P 
o r~ 
c rN 
S.I 
C L . U 
X TD 
o -a 
=3 -S •? 
o 
c 
73 S 
•o c 
c c 
^ s 
3 </> 
» 2 
L . TO a. 
(L) O 
c -
- J •>) 
p 73 
E 
E * 
73 
(/I \E 
6 •» 
« 3 s 
— c •-
« -9 
vi u tlC 
'S .5: c 
0. \C 
c 
W tjn o 
- ft-"=3 
s b E 
c .0 
eg 
e . 2 
o »> 
8 • 
u JS o a. E « 
V3 
£ a . 
13 
> 
o o 
c o a. tn v 06 
3 
T3 
c 2 
< -s 
" s § 
c o 
I 
u 
to 
M 
o 
•a 
c 
< 
S 
Si 
Q-
> 
O 
O 
c o o. 
•a 
< s 
e5 
73 
II 
o 
3 
73 
> 
o o 
c 
c 
c 
< 
'5 
D 
00 
IX 
11 
o 
e 
* 3 
5 S 8 °-= <a o. 
& ! 
(J 
i & 
1 * _ 
o ? . c 
CQ 73. § o. op o 
2 ~ o 73) u 3 .a o 
D -S 
id •£ 
•° £ 
•° s 
c 2 
•a 2 
c 73 
E E 
>, u 
•5 -a 
o Si 
•a ^ 
.t; c 
00.2 
0 ^ - o 
1 6 
• 
^ 00 
a 3 
00 
73)^ 
o — 
J: " a. " a. 
.2 c 
u 1 
i & 
o t 2 o 
« S 
c 
"S u 
00 T3 S 73 
3 u o ^ 
. 2 a 
V) 00 ci. 
g . s r 
1 8 - t 8.«s| 
X c o u -a a. 
c § 9r 
.> 0 ts 5b o u 00 u S 
C ^ to 
•§5 g 
S SP-E 
I E £ o 
c a 
u •£ 
u o 
•5 « 
o c 
CO .2 
<3 
« 00 
to C 
.£ I 73 
J5- a 
u- 1 = 
o •£ o 
a c" — 
1 00 -
"8 
o S 
o o 
3 t3 
a 
2 E 
a. 
o 
S c 
C -Q 
3 I 
c „ 
•a 
D. 
a. 
a a a. 
J 2 
O 
«73 
a a 
•S 8. 
~ 00 
SS n 
c S 5 
•o .a •- -a Ti. o ^ a H o to 
S S o 
C w ^ 
S S3 E 
•5 - 0 
S 73 
3 « 
P -5 
8 I" 
a S 
2 8 
as 
6 a I 
•2 73<2 
£ 'C .5 
" " q 
^ 4> a 
S D.73 « 
S E 1 -a (2 S.2 E 
O L . 
x: a 
l b 
5 
c 
00 
c 
•si '5 
.5 .2 ^ -c a- r; 
Appendix II 
Screening and clarification questionnaire 
Screening and clarification questions completed prior to main questionnaire. This 
screening questionnaire was given to the entrepreneur of each small business, or to a 
major partner who was close to the entrepreneur and able to know and to provide the 
required information. 
(la). Is this business a subsidiary of another business? Yes No 
I f Yes then END; i f No ask the following clarification 
(lb). So, can you confirm that this is an independent business? Yes No 
I f the business is a subsidiary and is not independent then END; Otherwise, Go To 2 
(2). Did you start this business, or buy this business? Yes No 
If you did not start the business, or did not buy the business then END; Otherwise, Go 
To 3 
(3) . Have you run a business before? Yes No 
(4) . How many businesses, other than this business, do you own? 
(5) . How many years have you been running businesses? 
(6) . What does this business make or do? 
(7) Approximately, how many people are employed in this business? 
mm 
V Durham 
U n i v e r s i t y 
Appendix III 
Durham Business School 
Centre for Entrepreneurship 
Survey of Small Businesses in Ghana 
2007 
This survey is prepared to gain a better understanding of the problems faced by 
small businesses in Ghana. 
All the information which you provide will be kept confidential and anonymous, and 
will be used only for academic research. 
SMALL BUSINESSES 
SECTION A: BUSINESS C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S 
A l . In which year was your business established? 
A2. What does your business do or make? 
A3. What is the legal status of your business? 
Registered Sole Proprietorship 1 
Unregistered Sole Proprietorship 2 
Partnership 3 
Joint Venture 4 
Corporation 5 
Others (Please specify) 6 
A4. How many businesses do you regard as serious competitors? 
(If no serious competitors, please write zero) 
A5. Of your serious competitors: 
a. How many businesses are larger than your business? 
b. How many businesses are overseas? 
A6. Has your business taken over any businesses in the last 3 years? 
A7. How many employees do you now have in your business? 
No Yes 
A8. How many employees did your business have at the end of its first year? 
A9. How many employees did your business have a year ago? 
A10. How many employees did your business have three years ago? 
A l 1. Is your business an exporter? | ^ Q | y e s 
SECTION B: INNOVATION 
Innovation is concerned with the application of new ideas. Often these ideas take 
the form of new products and services or new production processes. However, 
innovation may also refer to new work practices and workforce organisation, to 
new sources of supply or materials (or new ways of working with key suppliers), 
to the exploitation of new markets or means of reaching those markets (including 
innovations in marketing, selling and distribution) and to new administration and 
office systems. In the following section we would like you to tell us about 
innovation introduced into your business. Unless otherwise specified, the term 
innovation should be taken to encompass any of the categories described above. 
However, innovations should involve substantive changes. 
B l . In the last 3 years, has your business undertaken any form of innovation as 
regards the following? Please circle the appropriate response on each line: 
Innovation 
Not Tried 
Innovation 
Tried and 
Failed 
Innovation 
New to 
business but 
not industry 
Innovation 
New to 
industry 
In products or services 1 2 3 4 
In production processes 1 2 3 4 
In work practices 1 2 3 4 
In supply and supplier relations 1 2 3 4 
In markets and marketing 1 2 3 4 
In administration and office systems 1 2 3 4 
In products or services distribution 1 2 3 4 
Others (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 
B2. In the last 3 years, has your business co-operated with other businesses or 
organisations for innovation related activity (including marketing, training, 
production techniques, management training and or technology transfer)? I No Yes 
B3. I f yes, please indicate the type of firm/organisation and the location of the 
partner(s). 
Ghana 
Local 
(<50km) 
Ghana 
National 
West 
Africa 
Rest of 
Africa 
Overseas 
Customers No Yes 
Suppliers No Yes 
Competitors No Yes 
Tertiary Institutions No Yes 
NBSSI No Yes 
Empretec Gh Ltd No Yes 
DFID (Ghana) No Yes 
IFC No Yes 
APDF No Yes 
Technoserve Gh Ltd No Yes 
SECTION C : FINANCE 
C I . At start-up which of the following sources of finance did you use, and it 
would also be helpful i f you could indicate for each source what percentage 
of your capital it represented? 
% of capital 
Own savings No Yes 
Pension No Yes 
Gift from relations No Yes 
Loan from relations No Yes 
Bank loan No Yes 
Bank overdraft No Yes 
Suppliers credit No Yes 
Co-investor No Yes 
Customer advance No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
TOTAL 100% 
C2. Which one source was the main/principal source of finance and why was 
that the case? 
C3. Which of the following methods does your business adopt in accumulating 
savings? 
Home savings No Yes 
Bank(s) No Yes 
Purchase of T-bills, Shares, Bonds No Yes 
Local banks ('Susu' agent) No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
C4. Which of the following applies to your business? 
Applied for a bank loan/overdraft (last year) No Yes 
Applied for a bank loan/overdraft (last 2 years) No Yes 
Applied for a bank loan/overdraft (last 3 years) No Yes 
Never applied for a loan/overdraft No Yes 
Enquired but discouraged No Yes 
C5. The inability of the small business to provide adequate information during 
loan application may lead to some difficulties in having the loan approved 
or the application being declined altogether. Has your business experienced 
this phenomenon in the last three years? 
No Yes 
D: E N T R E P R E N E U R ' S C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S 
D l . Are you male or female? Male Female 
D2. Which age group do you belong to? 18-30 31-45 46-60 60+ 
D3. Has any member of your family been involved in business in the past? 
D4a. Do you currently employ any member of your family in the business? I No | Yes 
No Yes 
 s 
D4b. I f the answer to the above question is yes, please indicate the number and 
the role. 
Number of family members 
Role 
D5. How many years have you been in business? years 
D6. Which of the following levels of education applies to you? 
Please tick all the boxes which are applicable. 
No Education No Yes 
Junior Secondary School No Yes 
Senior Secondary School No Yes 
Ordinary - Level No Yes 
Advanced - Level No Yes 
Apprenticeship/V ocational 
/Technical (HND etc.) 
No Yes 
Professional Qualification 
(CA, ACCA, ACIB, CIM ) 
No Yes 
University (first degree) No Yes 
University (second degree) No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
D7. Which of the following constitute the main source(s) of the owner's savings? 
Please tick all the boxes which are applicable. Also, i f possible, please 
provide an estimate of the percentage of your savings held in that type of 
source. 
% 
Profits from this business No Yes 
Profits from other businesses No Yes 
Salary from formal employment No Yes 
Pension No Yes 
Remittance from abroad No Yes 
Inheritance/Gifts No Yes 
Others No Yes 
Total 100% 
SECTION E : LENDING RELATIONSHIP 
El . Please provide below the list of lending bank(s) your business has a banking 
relationship with. Please indicate the branch, distance from the office and the 
duration of the relationship. 
Name of institution Branch Distance from Duration of relationship 
Office (km) (years) 
E2. Of the above bank(s) which is your preferred bank? 
E3. For your preferred bank which of the following relationship(s) does your 
business have with it? 
Deposit relationship only No Yes 
Deposit and credit relationships No Yes 
Service relationship only No Yes 
Credit and service relationships No Yes 
Deposit and service relationship No Yes 
Deposit and credit relationship No Yes 
Deposit, credit and service 
relationships 
No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
E4. Does your business deal with Non-Bank financial institutions? No Yes 
E5. I f yes, which of the following do you have a working relationship? 
Finance Companies No Yes 
Insurance Companies No Yes 
Brokerage Firms No Yes 
Leasing Companies No Yes 
Venture Capitalist(s) No Yes 
Informal Sources No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
SECTION F : LOAN APPLICATION 
F l . How long has your business being doing business with your preferred bank? 
F2. Do you get all the needed financing from your preferred bank and/or other 
banks? 
No Yes 
F3. I f this is not the case, by what percentage did you wish to increase your 
financing from banks? Please tick the appropriate box. 
Less than Between 25% and Between 50% and More than 
25% 50% 100% 100% 
F4. What percentage of the loan contract is the interest rate from the bank? 
% 
F5. Did your business desire more credit at the current market rate? No Yes 
F6. I f yes, what conditions were acceptable in order to obtain more credit? 
Please tick the appropriate Box on each line. 
The same interest rate and the same collateral No Yes 
A higher interest rate but the same collateral No Yes 
The same interest rate but more collateral No Yes 
A higher interest and more collateral No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
F7. Was the cost of credit from the bank higher than the market cost of credit? 
No Yes 
F8. I f yes, by what percentage was this variation in credit costs? % 
F9. In the absence of the bank meeting your financing needs, which of the 
following do you rely on to meet your business' financing gap? And what 
percentage of the financing gap is met by the non-bank financial institution? 
Finance Companies No Yes % 
Loans and savings companies No Yes % 
Brokerage Firms No Yes % 
Leasing Companies No Yes % 
Venture Capitalist(s) No Yes % 
Informal Sources No Yes % 
Others (Please specify) No Yes % 
F10. What percentage of the loan contract is the interest rate from the non-bank 
financial institution? % 
Fl 1. Was the cost of credit from the non-bank sources higher than the market 
cost of credit? 
No Yes 
F12. I f yes, by what percentage was this variation in credit costs? % 
SECTION G: LOAN APPLICATION II 
G1. Was there any time in the past three years that you thought of applying for 
credit at a particular place but changed your mind because you thought you 
might be turned down? 
No Yes 
G2. In the last three years, in your loan/overdraft application from your preferred 
bank, which of the following occurred and how many times? 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total 
No. of loan/overdraft application(s) 
Successful (full amount) 
Successful, but amount reduced 
Number of failures before success 
Never successful 
Others (Please specify) 
TOTAL 
G3. Please specify the reasons why you applied for loan from your Preferred 
bank/ other banks/ Non-bank/ 
other sources. 
Preferred Other Non-bank Other 
bank banks sources 
Low interest rate No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Do not know any other possibility No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Do not have any other possibility No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Low borrowing fees No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No collateral required No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Longer repayment period No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Personal relationship No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Others (please specify) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Please specify the other sources 
Please specify the non-bank(s) 
G4. In the last three years has your preferred bank or any other lender turned 
down any request that you made for credit or have you been unable to get as 
much credit as you applied for? 
No Yes 
G5. Please specify the reasons why your application was turned down by your 
preferred bank/ other banks/ Non-bank/other sources. 
Preferred Other Non-bank Other 
bank banks sources 
Low profitability No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Unstable sales No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Unstable output price No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Lack of business information No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Lack of collateral No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
High risks No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Old machines/equipment No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Poor management capability No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Poor banking relationship No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Poor track record No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Others (Please specify) 
G6. What kind of information did you provide to the lenders in order to get the 
loans from your preferred bank/other banks/ non-bank/other sources? 
Preferred Other Non-bank Other 
bank banks sources 
Business plan No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Past financial statements No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Projected financial statements No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm profile No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Collateral No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Additional information No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Others (please specify) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
G7. Has your preferred bank or other lenders declined your loan application 
because you could not provide the required business information? 
No Yes 
G8. Has your inability to provide the required business information lead to an 
increase in the cost of credit or a reduction in the amount of credit for your firm? 
No Yes 
G9. Do any of the factors listed below affect the price, amount and availability of 
your loan application? 
Length of banking relationship No Yes 
Type of banking services No Yes 
Multiple banking relationship No Yes 
Distance between firm and bank No Yes 
Lack of adequate collateral No Yes 
Type and location of collateral No Yes 
Absence of business information No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
G10. Various reasons have been outlined for small firm's failure to apply for 
bank credit. Which of the following factors in your opinion account for 
this? 
No need for bank credit Yes No 
Complex application procedures Yes No 
Assumes that the application will be rejected Yes No 
High interest rate Yes No 
Increasing collateral requirement Yes No 
Others (Please specify) Yes No 
G i l . How far is your business from your preferred bank? km 
G12. How far is your business from the closest competitive lending bank? ....km 
SECTION H: LOAN APPLICATION III 
H I . Banks pay particular attention to the following criteria for granting loans to 
small businesses. Which of these factors apply in your loan application? 
Ability to repay Yes No 
Profitability of project Yes No 
Risk of project Yes No 
Existence of collateral Yes No 
Type of collateral Yes No 
Value of collateral Yes No 
Geographical location of collateral Yes No 
Previous experience with borrower Yes No 
Economic sector of project Yes No 
Others (Please specify) Yes No 
H2. Which of the following collateral types does your preferred bank accept and 
which of these do you provide in any loan applications? 
Collateral Collateral provided 
accepted by bank by firm 
Land Yes No Yes No 
Home/Flat Yes No Yes No 
Firm building Yes No Yes No 
Plant and equipment Yes No Yes No 
Vehicles Yes No Yes No 
Credit guarantee schemes Yes No Yes No 
Third party guarantee Yes No Yes No 
Business savings Yes No Yes No 
Financial instruments Yes No Yes No 
(T-bills, Shares, Bonds) 
Others (Please specify) Yes No Yes No 
H3. In the last three years, what is the most frequent method of communication 
by which your business conducts business with your preferred bank? 
Never Occasionally Often Very often 
In person 1 2 3 4 
By phone 1 2 3 4 
By fax 1 2 3 4 
By mail ' 1 2 3 4 
Others (Please specify) 
1 
2 3 4 
H4. Does your method of communication change with your bank as your 
relationship matures? 
Yes No 
H5. I f yes, in which form is the method of communication changing to? 
From to 
THANK Y O U F O R COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Appendix IV 
mm 
If Durham 
University 
Durham Business School 
Centre for Entrepreneurship 
Survey of Small Businesses in Ghana 
2007 
This survey is prepared to gain a better understanding of the problems faced by 
small businesses in Ghana. 
All the information which you provide will be kept confidential and anonymous, and 
will be used only for academic research. 
BANKS 
1. Are you male or female? Male Female 
2. How many years have you been in banking? years 
3. What is your job title: 
SECTION A: 
A1. Do any of the following factors influence your bank in lending to small 
businesses? 
Not 
Important 
Little 
Importance 
Very 
Important 
Crucial 
Level of the firms' capitalisation 1 2 3 4 
Firm's profitability and cash flow I 2 3 4 
Finn's repayment ability 1 2 3 4 
Value and location of collateral 1 2 3 4 
Others (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 
A2. In financing small businesses which of the following factors will your bank 
consider? 
Not 
Important 
Little 
Importance 
Very 
Important 
Crucial 
Location of business premises 1 2 3 4 
Condition of production machinery/equipment 1 2 3 4 
Education and experience of key management 1 2 3 4 
Marketing of firms products or services 1 2 3 4 
Assets and liabilities of small businesses 1 2 3 4 
Others (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 
A3. Which of the following factors will your bank consider in financing small 
businesses? 
Not Little Very Crucial 
Important Importance Important 
Length of banking relationship 1 2 3 4 
Types of financial services offered 1 2 3 4 
Past track record of the small business 1 2 3 4 
Satisfactory conduct of bank account 1 2 3 4 
Business experience of entrepreneurs 1 2 3 4 
Firms cash flow projection 1 2 3 4 
Others (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 
SECTION B: 
B l . What kind of information does your bank require in order to process a credit 
application? 
B2. What are some of the major challenges your bank faces in financing small 
businesses? 
B3. In your opinion will any of the following technological development(s) 
contribute to a favourable loan application processing? 
Improvement in communication with bank customers No Yes 
Greater information availability eg. Small business data No Yes 
Use of spreadsheet programmes, financial software and credit scoring No Yes 
Improving site visit screening and monitoring of small business projects No Yes 
Improvement in banking services and hours of service No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
B4. How will your bank response to the excess demand for bank credit by its 
customers? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
agree 
Decline credit to entrepreneurs regarded as high 
risk borrowers 
1 2 3 4 
Decline credit to entrepreneurs because the bank is 
unable to obtain the required return at any interest 
rate 
1 2 3 4 
Use collateral requirement to induce a 
entrepreneur's higher effort 
1 2 3 4 
Increase collateral requirements to clear the excess 
demand 
1 2 3 4 
Keep interest rate low and randomly select loan 
applicants 
1 2 3 4 
Others (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 
SECTION C: 
C I . In processing credit applications of small businesses what are some of the major 
reasons for turning down loan applications? 
C2.In a credit application can the location of a business affect the interest rate, 
collateral requirement and the credit availability? 
No Yes 
C3. In screening credit applications of small businesses, does your bank use either 
an increase in interest rate or increasing collateral requirement or both? 
No Yes 
C4. Does your bank use both interest rate and collateral requirements to screen loan 
applicants? 
No Yes 
C5. Is it likely for your bank to experience risky borrowers even after screening? 
No Yes 
C6. Will any of the following factors influence your bank's decision in lending to 
small businesses? 
Not 
Important 
Little 
Importance 
Very 
Important 
Crucial 
Bank's inability to charge desired 
interest rate 
1 
2 3 4 
Possibility of business reallocating 
bank loan into other projects 
1 
2 3 4 
Inadequate information to process 
loan applications 
1 
2 3 4 
Poor financial records and bank 
accounts of small businesses •
 1 
2 3 4 
Lack of collateral to secure loan 
application 
1 
2 3 4 
Obstacles due to the business' size 
and the nature of business 
1 
2 3 4 
Others (Please specify) 
1 
2 3 4 
SECTION D: 
D1. Will any of the following banking relationships with your customer influences 
the amount and price of a bank loan? 
Not Little Very Crucial 
Important Importance Important 
Deposit relationship 1 2 3 4 
Credit relationship 1 2 3 4 
Service relationship 1 2 3 4 
Durable relationship 1 2 3 4 
Multi-banking relationship 1 2 3 4 
Others (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 
D2. In a banking relationship with your customers, which of the following factors do 
occur? 
Gather valuable information about the entrepreneur No Yes 
Distinguish between creditworthy and uncreditworthy entrepreneur No Yes 
Use the information to refine the loan contract terms No Yes 
Make a decision on the loan rate No Yes 
Make a decision on collateral requirements No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
D3. Which of the following factors will influence your banks decision on a 
customer's loan contract? 
Not 
Important 
Little 
Importance 
Very 
Important 
Crucial 
Quality and trend of the 
entrepreneur's deposit account 
1 
2 3 4 
Repayment ability of the 
entrepreneur 
1 
2 3 4 
Purchase of bank's financial services ' 2 3 4 
Entrepreneur's outstanding debt to 
the bank 
1 
2 3 4 
Entrepreneur's outstanding debt to 
other banks 
1 
2 3 4 
Others (Please specify) 
1 
2 3 4 
D4. Does the rate of interest for small business' loan contract decline with the length 
of the banking relationship with your customer? 
No Yes 
D5. Does the degree of collateral requirement decline for small entrepreneur's loan 
contract with the length of the banking relationship with your customer? 
No Yes 
D6. Will credit availability for small businesses typically increase with the length of 
the banking relationship with your customer? 
No Yes 
SECTION E : 
E1. In lending to small businesses which of the following collateral issues will your 
bank consider? 
Type of collateral No Yes 
Value of the collateral No Yes 
Expected selling price No Yes 
Disposal of the property No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
E2. Of the following types of collateral please indicate how important they are for 
your bank in making/accepting loan applications? 
Collateral accepted Not Little Very Crucial 
Important Importance Important 
Land 1 2 3 4 
Home/Flat 1 2 3 4 
Firm building 1 2 3 4 
Plant and equipment 1 2 3 4 
Vehicles 1 2 3 4 
Credit guarantee schemes 1 2 3 4 
Third party guarantee 1 2 3 4 
Business savings 1 2 3 4 
Financial instruments 1 2 3 4 
(T-bills, Shares, Bonds etc) 
Others (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 
Lower risk borrowers are bank customers who are less likely to default on a bank 
loan. Higher risk borrowers are bank customers who are more likely to default on a 
bank loan. 
E3. In your opinion which of the following will occur in a small business loan 
application regarding the price of the loan and the collateral offered? 
Lower risk entrepreneurs are willing to pledge more 
collateral with low interest rate 
No Yes 
Higher risk entrepreneurs prefer higher 
interest rate with no collateral 
No Yes 
Lower risk entrepreneurs are willing to pledge 
less collateral with higher interest rate 
No Yes 
Higher risk entrepreneurs prefer lower 
interest rate with more collateral 
No Yes 
Others (Please specify) No Yes 
Any other Comments: 
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